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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
SIXTH SITIING 
Monday, 30th November 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Resumption of the session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part 
of the session (Doe. 1113). 
5. Action by the Presidential Committee (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, 
Doe. 1126). 
6. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
7. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee 
on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft 
decision, Doe. Ill 0). 
8. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-
second annual report of the Council (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 1117). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Resumption of the session 
The President declared the thirty-third 
ordinary session of the Assembly resumed. 
2. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
3. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
4. Examination of credentials 
In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter 
from the President of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council ofEurope informing the 
Assembly that the credentials of the representa-
tives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 6 had 
been ratified by that Assembly. 
5. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The President addressed the Assembly. 
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6. Observers 
The President welcomed parliamentary 
observers from Denmark, Greece, Norway, Por-
tugal and Spain. 
7. Adoption of the draft order of business 
for the second part of the session 
(Doe. 1113) 
The President proposed the adoption of the 
draft order of business for the second part of the 
session. 
Speakers: MM. Hardy and Garrett. 
The President replied to the speakers. 
The President proposed to the Assembly that 
the presentation of the report on the military use 
of computers, originally proposed for the 
afternoon of 3rd December, be brought forward 
to the morning of 2nd December and that the 
presentation of the report on European arma-
ments co-operation, originally proposed for the 
morning of 2nd December, be deferred until the 
afternoon of 3rd December. 
The draft order of business for the second part 
of the session as amended was adopted. 
MINUTES 
8. Action by the Presidential Committee 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Presidential Committee, 
Doe. 1126) 
The report of the Presidential Committee was 
presented by Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the 
Assembly. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Pannella and Burger. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. V alleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
replied to the speakers. 
The Assembly ratified the action of the Presi-
dential Committee. 
9. Election of two Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly 
Two candidates had been proposed for the 
posts of Vice-President, namely Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg and Mr. Sarti. 
The Assembly decided unanimously not to 
have a secret ballot but to elect the two Vice-
Presidents by acclamation. 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Sarti were 
elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation. 
The President informed the Assembly that, 
according to age, the order of precedence of the 
Vice-Presidents was as follows: Mr. van der 
Werff, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Valleix, Sarti, 
Soell, Pecriaux. 
10. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General 
ofWEU 
Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. Cahen answered questions put by MM. 
Close, Burger, Valleix, Pannella, Stegagnini and 
Soell. 
11. Revision and interpretation 
of the Rules of Procedure 
(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, 
Doe. 1110 and amendment) 
The report of the Committee on Rules of Pro-
cedure and Privileges was presented by Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur. 
The President informed the Assembly that the 
amendment tabled by Mr. Pannella was out of 
order. 
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SIXTH SITTING 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
decision. 
The draft decision was agreed to unanimously. 
(This decision will be published as No. 1) 1• 
12. Political activities of thf Council -
reply to the thirty-second ail.nual report 
of the Council 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 1117) 
The report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Mr. van der Sanden, 
Rapporteur. 
Mr. Soel/, Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Aarts, Wilkinson and 
Antretter. 
The debate was adjourned. 
13. Revision of the Rules of Procedure 
(Motion for a decision, Doe. 1124) 
The President announced that a motion for a 
decision to amend the Rules of Procedure had 
been tabled by Mr. Pannella and others. 
In accordance with Rule 51 (1), the motion 
was referred to the Committee on Rules of Pro-
cedure and Privileges without debate. 
14. INF treaty 
(Motion for a resolution, Doe. 1127) 
The President announced that a motion for a 
resolution on the INF treaty had been tabled by 
Mr. Stoffelen and others. 
The motion was included in the register and 
referred to the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. ' 
15. Changes in the membership of committees 
In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the changes in 
the membership of committees as follows: 
1. See page 17. 
MINUTES 
Belgium: 
Italy: 
Netherlands: 
United Kingdom: 
Belgium: 
Netherlands: 
United Kingdom: 
SIXTH SITTING 
1. CoMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QuEsTioNs AND ARMAMENTS 
Members 
Mr. Ramaekers (in place of 
Mr. Bogaerts) 
MM. Cariglia 
Fiandrotti 
Fioret 
Pecchioli 
Sinesio 
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman 
MM. de Beer 
de K waadsteniet 
MM. Cox 
Hardy 
Sir Dudley Smith 
MM. Speed 
Stokes 
2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
MM. Foschi 
Martino 
Natali 
Pieralli 
Sarti 
MM. Aarts 
van der Sanden 
Stoffelen 
Mr. Coleman 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Mr. Hill 
Lord Mackie 
Mr. Shelton 
Alternates 
MM. Pannella 
Andreis 
Fassino 
Cannata 
Filetti 
MM. Tummers 
Maris 
De Hoop Scheffer 
Mr. Thompson 
Lord Newall 
Sir Russell Johnston 
Ms. Ruddock 
Mr. Wilkinson 
MM. Spitella 
Andreis 
Capanna 
Rubbi 
Manzolini 
MM. van der Werff 
Eisma 
Mrs. Herfkens 
Lord Kirkhill 
Lady Jill Knight 
Mr. Stewart 
MM. Ewing 
Speed 
3. CoMMITTEE ON SciENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QuESTIONS 
Italy: 
Netherlands: 
United Kingdom: 
Mr. Caccia 
Mrs. Francese 
MM. Intini 
Malfatti 
MM. van der Werff 
Worrell 
MM. Garrett 
Hill 
Parry 
Wilkinson 
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MM. Kessler 
Rodota 
Fiandrotti 
Stegagnini 
MM. Aarts 
Tummers 
Mr. Lambie 
Lord Rodney 
Mr. Atkinson 
Sir Dud1ey Smith 
MINUTES 
Belgium: 
Italy: 
Netherlands: 
United Kingdom: 
France: 
Italy: 
Netherlands: 
United Kingdom: 
Italy: 
Netherlands: 
United Kingdom: 
SIXTH SITTING 
4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION 
Mr. Ramaekers (in place of 
Mr. Bogaerts) 
MM. Greco 
Rauti 
Sinesio 
Triglia 
MM. de Jong 
Worrell 
Dame Peggy Fenner 
MM. Morris 
Rathbone 
Redmond 
MM. Intini 
Rubner 
Pari si 
Giagu Demartini 
Mr. de Kwaadsteniet 
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman 
Mr. Stokes 
Lord Mackie 
MM. Bowden 
Litherland 
5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES 
Mr. Lacour 
MM. Caccia 
Filetti 
Pasquino 
Taramelli 
MM. Maris 
Stoffelen 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
Mr. Jessel 
Lord Kirkhill 
Mr. Thompson 
Mr. Montastruc 
MM. Stegagnini 
Fassino 
Capanna 
Natali 
MM. de Jong 
van der Sanden 
Lord Kinnoull 
Mr. Gale 
MM. Redmond 
Parry 
6. CoMMITTEE FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND Puauc RELATIONS 
MM. Fiandrotti MM. Pasquino 
Sal vi Spitella 
MM. De Hoop Scheffer MM. de Beer 
Tummers Eisma 
Mr. Faulds MM. Coleman 
Lady Jill Knight 
16. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting 
were agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 1st 
December 1987, at 10 a.m. 
The sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m . 
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Shelton 
APPENDIX SIXTH SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium MM. Steiner (Scheer) 
Lemmrich (Schmitz) 
MM. De Decker (Adriaensens) Mrs. Pack (von Schmude) 
Declercq MM. So ell 
Close (Dejardin) Zierer (Unland) 
Ramaekers 
Mrs. Staels-Do m pas 
Italy 
France MM. Caccia 
MM. Bassinet Filetti 
Bohl (Croze) Fioret 
Fourre Gabbuggiani 
Bordu (Gremetz) Pannella (lntini) 
Lacour (Jeambrun) Stegagnini (Kessler) Malfatti Jung Martino Pontillon (Matraja) Manzolini (Natali) Valleix Pari si 
Cannata (Pecchioli) 
Federal Republic of Germany Pieralli Mrs. Francese (Rodota) 
MM. Ahrens MM. Greco (Rubbi) 
Antretter Sal vi Sarti Bohm Trig/ia (Sinesio) Hitschler 
Klejdzinski (Holtz) Taramelli 
Inner 
Kittelmann 
Schmidt (Mrs. Luuk) Luxembourg 
Muller 
Niegel MM. Burger 
Reddemann Linster 
The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
Belgium MM. de Chambrun 
Collette 
MM. Pecriaux Galley 
Steverlynck Koehl 
Mrs. Lalumiere 
MM. Oehler 
France Portier 
Seitlinger 
MM. Baumel 
Caro 
Netherlands 
MM. Aarts 
Maris (de Jong) 
de K waadsteniet 
Stoffelen 
Tummers 
de Beer (van der Werft) 
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman 
(Worrell) 
United Kingdom 
MM. Ewing (Coleman) 
Cox 
Dame Peggy Fenner 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
MM. Thompson (Garrett) 
Hardy 
Hill 
Jessel 
Sir Russell J ohnston 
Lord \fackie (Earl of 
Kinnoull) 
MM. Lord (Lady Jill Knight) 
Morris 
Lord Kirkhi/1 (Parry) 
Sir Dudley Smith 
MM. Speed 
Gale (Stokes) 
Wilkinson 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Buchner 
Mechtersheimer 
United Kingdom 
Mr. Shelton 
1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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TEXT ADOPTED SIXTH SITTING 
DECISION 1 
on the revision of Rules 7, 8, 12 and 48 of the Rules of Procedure, 
The Assembly, 
DECIDES 
To amend Rules 7, 8, 12 and 48 as follows: 
1. Rule 7 
Add the following sentence at the end of paragraph 3: 
"An alternate must be of the same nationality as the titular member he may be asked to replace. " 
Replace paragraph 4 by the following text: 
" Any titular member of a committee who is prevented from attending a meeting shall arrange to 
be replaced by a representative or substitute appointed for the purpose. If the latter is unable to 
attend, the chairman of the committee must be informed of the name of the other member of his 
national delegation who is authorised to take his place. " 
2. Rule 8 
Replace paragraph 1 by the following text: 
" The term of office of representatives and substitutes shall take effect from the date of the com-
munication of the statement of the ratification of the credentials by the Presijdent of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or, if the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe has been unable to ratify the credentials, from the date of the ratification of their creden-
tials by the WEU Assembly in accordance with Rule 6, paragraph 2. " 
3. Rule 12 
Add the following sentence at the end of paragraph 1: 
"A Vice-President may not replace the President during a debate in which he has taken part nor 
speak in a debate over which he has already presided. " 
4. Rule 48 
Replace paragraph 2 by the following text: 
"The Assembly or, in between sessions or part-sessions, the Presidential Committee, in appli-
cation of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, may, if necessary, approve supple-
mentary estimates of expenditure, but if the latter so acts it shall submit its decision to the next 
sitting of the Assembly for ratification. " 
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SEVENTH SITIING 
Tuesday, 1st December 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-
second annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on 
the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 1117 and 
amendment). 
2. First part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council 
(Presentation by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, Doe. 1123). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 10 a. m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of representatives and substitutes 
who signed the register of attendance are given in 
the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes ofthe proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-second annual report 
of the Council 
(Resumed debate on the report 
of the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 1117 and amendment) 
The debate was resumed. 
Speakers: MM. Irmer, Valleix, Gale, Pannella 
(point of order) and Burger. 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the 
Assembly, took the Chair. 
Speaker. Mr. Pannella. 
The debate was adjourned. 
The sitting was suspended at 10.55 a.m. and 
resumed at 11.10 a.m. 
Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair. 
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4. First part of the thirty-third annual 
report of the Council 
(Presentation by Mr. l'an thn Broek, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 
Chairman-in-Offu:e of the Council, Doe. 1123) 
The first part of the thirty-third annual report 
of the Council to the Assembly was presented by 
Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council. 
Mr. van den Broek answered questions put by 
MM. Valleix, Close, Hardy, Wilkinson, 
Pontillon, Pannella, Burger, Martino, Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Pieralli, Stegagnini, 
Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Mr. Aarts, Sir Russell 
Johnston, MM. Miranda Calha (Observer from 
Portugal), Garrett and Declercq. 
5. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 
3p.m. 
The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m. 
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APPENDIX SEVENTH SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance 1: 
Belgium MM. Niegel 
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MM. Declercq Scheer 
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The following representatives apologised for their absence: 
Belgium 
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MM. Bassinet 
Baumel 
Caro 
de Chambrun 
Collette 
Croze 
Galley 
MM. Gremetz 
Jeambrun 
Koehl 
Portier 
Seitlinger 
Netherlands 
MM. Aarts 
Maris (de Jong) 
de K waadsteniet 
Stoffelen 
Tummers 
de Beer (van der Werfl) 
Worrell 
United Kingdom 
MM. Coleman 
Cox 
Dame Peggy Fenner 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
MM. Garrett 
Hardy 
Stewart (Hill) 
Jessel 
Sir Russell J ohnston 
Lord Mackie (Earl of 
Kinnoull) 
MM. Rathbone (Lady 
Knigbt) 
Morris 
Sir Dudley Smith 
MM. Speed 
Gale (Stokes) 
Wilkinson 
Federal Republic of Germany 
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1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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EIGHTH SITIING 
Tuesday, 1st December 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-
second annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on 
the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the 
draft recommendation Doe. 1117 and amendment). 
2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1988 (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doe. 
1121 and addendum). 
3. Address by Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
France. 
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1986 - the auditor's report 
and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of 
and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to 
approve the final accounts, Doe. 1108 and addendum). 
5. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second annual report of 
the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doe. 
1116 and amendments). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
I. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes ofthe proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-second annual report 
of the Council 
(Resumed debate on tlu report 
of the General Affairs Committee tmd vote on 
the draft recommendation, Doe. 1117 and amendment) 
The debate was resumed. 
Speakers: MM. Caro and Martino. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur, replied to 
the speakers. 
Speaker. Mr. Caro. 
Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur, replied to 
the speaker. 
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Mr. Ahrens, Chairman, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
recommendation. 
An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by 
Mr. Burger and others: 
1. Add the following new text at the beginning of 
paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation 
proper: 
" Ensure that the permanent structure of the 
ministerial organs allows the establishment of 
a unit responsible solely for implementing an 
active policy for informing the public and the 
press and" 
Speakers: MM. Burger; (point of order): 
Pieralli, Close, Caro, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg; Mr. 
Ahrens. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
Speakers (point of order): MM. Pieralli, Caro, 
Pieralli and Reddemann. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft recommendation. 
The amended draft recommendation was 
agreed to. (This recommendation will be pub-
lished as No. 449) 1• 
1. See page 23. 
MINUTES 
The sitting was suspended at 4.25 p.m. and 
resumed at 4.35 p.m. 
4. Address by Mr. Raimond, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of France 
Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
France, addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. Raimond answered questions put by MM. 
Soell, Rubbi, de Beer and Caro. 
5. Amendment of the Charter of the Assembly 
(Motion to amend the Charter, Doe. 1128) 
The President announced that a motion to 
amend the Charter of the Assembly had been 
tabled by Mr. Pannella and others. 
The motion was referred to the Committee on 
Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
6. Draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1988 
(Presentation of the report 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration and vote on the draft budget, 
Doe. 1121 and addendum) 
Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair. 
The report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. 
Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur. 
Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
budget of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1988. 
The draft budget was agreed to unani-
mously. 
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7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 -
the auditor's report and motion to approve 
the final accounts 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion 
to approve the final accounts, 
Doe. 1108 and addendum) 
The report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. 
Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speaker. Mr. Burger. 
The debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
motion to approve the final accounts for the 
financial year 1986. 
The motion was agreed to unanimously. 
8. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second 
annual report of the Council 
(Presentation of and debflte on the report 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 1116 and amendments) 
The report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. 
Scheer, Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Muller and Soell. 
The debate was adjourned. 
9. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 2nd 
December 1987, at 10 a.m. 
The sitting was closed at 6.25 p. m. 
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RECOMMENDATION 449 
on the political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that developments in the Atlantic Alliance make it essential to strengthen its 
European pillar and that at the present juncture WEU is still the only organisation capable of forming 
this pillar; 
(ii) Considering that the way to achieve this result is through the early implementation of the Rome 
declaration and welcoming the fact that the adoption of the platform on European security interests 
marks the starting point in the effective reactivation of WEU; 
(iii) Noting with satisfaction that the platform on European security interests adopted by the Council 
on 27th October 1987 responds, in the main, to Assembly Recommendations 420,429, 432, 438, 441, 
442 and 446; ' 
(iv) Welcoming the development of consultations between member countries in the framework of 
WEU and expressing its satisfaction that the Council implemented Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the 
\ modified Brussels Treaty for the first time in summer 1987 in the context of the Gulf crisis; 
(v) Regretting, however, that co-ordination of the action taken by member countries in that region 
was limited; 
(vi) Noting that the thirty-second annual report of the Council gives only a very inadequate account of 
the Council's activities in 1986; 
(vii) Regretting the Council's slowness in answering the Assembly, the ever-later dates on which it 
transmits its reports and the very inadequate information it gives; 
(viii) Noting that the informal procedure increasingly practised by the Council is not likely to alleviate 
this shortcoming; 
(ix) Stressing that the Assembly's own needs are wholly independent of those of the ministerial organs 
and that restructuring must not affect the independence of either the Assembly or the Office of the Clerk 
vis-a-vis the ministerial organs, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Speed up its procedure to allow quicker transmission to the Assembly of the substantial infor-
mation it needs in order to exercise its responsibility of supervising the Council's activities under Article 
IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, respect a time-limit, under normal circumstances, of eight weeks for 
answering questions and adopt a normal schedule of dates so that the Assembly might receive its half-
yearly reports in time for preparing useful replies; 
2. Ensure the immediate implementation of the intentions expressed in paragraph Ill (a) 4 of the 
platform which it adopted on 27th October 1987; 
3. While respecting the time-limit of 31st December 1987, take the measures to restructure the 
organs of WEU allowing these new requirements to be met and, in pursuance of this, invite the 
Assembly to comment on the draft organogram being prepared by the Secretary-General before its sub-
mission to the Council for approval; 
4. Pursue the full implementation of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, and in particular 
its paragraph 3; 
5. Examine carefully the development of bilateral co-operation between its members on security 
matters with a view to extending this co-operation to all member countries without thereby diluting the 
results of bilateral co-operation; 
6. In consultation with the Presidential Committee, ensure satisfactory co-ordination of the presence 
of ministers at Assembly sessions, and in particular the participation of the presidency in all debates on 
the Council's reports; 
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7. Ensure that the permanent structure ofthe ministerial organs allows the establishment of a unit 
responsible solely for implementing an active policy for informing the public and the press and continue 
to give and improve information to the Assembly and the public on meetings of the WEU Council at the 
level of the enlarged Council; 
8. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of meetings and the results of the work of the special 
working group and its sub-groups; 
9. Accord the Assembly without delay the funds and staff necessary for restructuring the Office of 
the Clerk; 
10. Ensure that the Secretariat-General is in a position to assist the Council in all its activities. 
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NINTH SITTING 
Wednesday, 2nd December 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Disarmament- reply to the thirty-second annual report of 
the Council (Resumed debate on the report of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doe. 1116, 
addendum and amendments). 
2. Military use of computers - towards a joint European 
defence research programme (Presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions and votes on the draft recommen-
dation and draft order, Doe. 1118). 
3. Address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom. 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 10.05 a. m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of representatives and substitutes 
who signed the register of attendance are given in 
the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second 
annual report of the Council 
(Resumed debate on the report 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, Doe. 1116, addendum and amendments) 
The debate was resumed. 
Speakers: MM. Baumel, Wilkinson and Cox. 
Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair. 
Speakers: MM. Close, Reddemann, 
Gabbuggiani and Malfatti. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair. 
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4. Address by Mr. Melior, Minister of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth A/fairs of the 
United Kingdom 
Mr. Melior, Minister of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, 
addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. Melior answered questions put by Lord 
Kinnouli, MM. Gale, Close, Wilkinson, Lord 
Mackie, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. van der 
San den. 
5. Military use of computers -
towards a joint European defence research 
programme 
(Presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Scientifu:, 
Technological and AerospMe Questions 
and votes on the draft recommendation 
and draft order, Doe. 1118) 
The report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions was pre-
sented by Mr. Fourre, Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speaker: Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman. 
The debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
recommendation. 
MINUTES 
The draft recommendation was agreed to 
unanimously. (This recommendation will be 
published as No. 450) 1• 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
order. 
The draft order was agreed to unanimously. 
(This order will be published as No. 69) 2• 
l. See page 28. 
2. See page 29. 
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6. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 
3.15 p.m. 
The sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m. 
APPENDIX NINTH SITIING 
APPENDIX 
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1 
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1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets. 
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RECOMMENDATION 450 
on the military use of computers -
towards a joint European defence research programme 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering the converging views observed at European level on more active participation in the 
East-West dialogue and any disarmament initiatives; 
(ii) Considering the results of work conducted in the IEPG recalling the interest of a European 
defence market; 
(iii) Considering that an essential prerequisite for a modern and competitive European defence 
industry is Europe's mastery of the whole range of microelectronics; 
(iv) Considering the conclusions drawn in the report "Towards a stronger Europe", indicating 
Europe's relatively weak position as compared with its main competitors in certain areas of defence 
electronics and specifically microelectronics; 
(v) Considering the close relationship in research and development between military and civilian 
microelectronics; 
(vi) Noting the striking contrast between the repeated public announcements of the WEU member 
countries' determination to take the necessary steps in the European Community to strengthen Europe's 
own technological capability and achieve the creation of a technological community on the one hand 
and the endless bickering leading to an unsatisfactory agreement on a European framework programme 
for 1987-91 on the other hand; 
(vii) Considering that the early harmonisation of national operational requirements and the 
interoperability of the military computer systems are of primordial importance, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Stop making solemn statements on the determination of the WEU member countries to create a 
technological community for as long as their action is turned in the opposite direction, and instead: 
(a) attach higher priority to IEPG co-operative technology projects than has been the case 
hitherto; 
(b) convince member countries of the need to increase the budget for the European framework 
programme and for Esprit in particular; 
(c) pay attention to the risks stemming from the protection of American and Japanese markets 
which calls in question the rules of international trade and threatens Europe's legitimate 
interests; 
(d) make a major effort to harmonise national operational requirements for military computer 
systems; 
2. Initiate a joint European defence research programme associating round the WEU member coun-
tries all the Western European countries wishing to take part. 
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ORDER 69 
on the military use of computers -
towards a joint European defence research programme 
The Assembly, 
Convinced that the importance of a well-developed data-processing industry cannot be overesti-
mated, 
INSTRUCTS the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 
To examine in greater detail ways of protecting markets and civil and military interchange in key 
sectors of technology: 
- by comparing the United States, Japan and the WEU member countries; 
- by proposing suitable solutions for developing a competitive European industry, particularly in 
areas of high technology such as microelectronics. 
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Wednesday, 2nd December 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the 
Netherlands. 
2. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second annual report of 
the Council (Resumed debate on the report of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on 
the draft recommendations and draft resolution, Doe. 
1116, addendum and amendments). 
3. Recent developments in Soviet external policy (Presen-
tation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs 
Committee, Doe. 1111 and addendum). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
I. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, 
Minister of Defence of the Netherlands 
Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the 
Netherlands, addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. van Eekelen answered questions put by 
MM. Hardy, van der Sanden, Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg, Mr. Pieralli, Lady Jill Knight, MM. 
Wilkinson, Fourre, Sir Dudley Smith and Sir 
Russell Johnston. 
4. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second 
annual report of the Council 
(Votes on the draft recommendations 
and draft resohttion, Doe. 1116, 
addendum and amendments) 
Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
recommendation replying to the thirty-second 
annual report of the Council. 
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The draft recommendation was agreed to. 
(This recommendation will be published as 
No. 451) 1• 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
recommendation on disarmament. 
Speaker (point of order): Mr. Stoffelen. 
Three amendments (Nos. 5, 6 and 7) were 
tabled by Mr. Pieralli: 
5. In the preamble to the draft recommendation 
on disarmament, place paragraph (i) after para-
graph (vi). 
6. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation on disarmament, leave out 
" progress on a properly verifiable INF 
agreement " and insert " the agreement ". 
7. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation on disarmament, leave out 
"should" and insert "must". 
Speakers: MM. Pieralli, Scheer and Pieralli. 
Amendment 5 was withdrawn; amendments 
6 and 7 were agreed to. 
An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. 
Eisma: 
1. After paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation on disarmament, add a 
new paragraph as follows: 
"Urging the United States Senate to advise 
and consent as a matter of urgency to the rati-
fication of the INF agreement; " 
l. See page 34. 
MINUTES 
Speaker. Mr. Kittelmann. 
The amendment was not moved. 
An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. 
Eisma. 
2. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation on disarmament, after " ABM 
treaty" insert "in its traditional interpre-
tation". 
The amendment was not moved. 
An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. 
Reddemann and others: 
8. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation on disarmament, leave out " in 
different armaments and forces". 
Speakers: MM. Reddemann and Scheer. 
The amendment was negatived. 
An amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Mr. 
Reddemann and others: 
9. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation on disarmament, add a 
new paragraph as follows: 
" Noting in this connection that in Prague on 
lOth April 1987 General Secretary Gorbachev 
confirmed the existence of such imbalances 
and asymmetries for historical and other 
reasons;" 
Speakers: MM. Reddemann and Scheer. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
An amendment (No. 10) was tabled by Mr. 
Reddemann and others: 
10. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper on disarmament, after " in Europe " 
insert "and the various regions concerned". 
Speakers: MM. Reddemann and Kittelmann. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. 
Soell: 
4. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recom-
mendation proper on disarmament, leave out 
" with priority to negotiations on the Central 
European region ". 
Speakers: MM. Klejdzinski and Scheer. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. 
Eisma: 
3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation 
proper on disarmament, after "ABM treaty", 
insert "in its traditional interpretation". 
The amendment was not moved. 
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An amendment (No. 11) was tabled by Mr. 
Reddemann and others: 
11. In paragraph 4 of the draft Ilecommendation 
proper on disarmament, after "military 
strategy " insert " and doctrine " and leave out 
the words to the end of the paragraph. 
Speakers: MM. Reddemann, Stoffelen and 
Scheer. 
The amendment was negatived. 
An amendment (No. 12) was tabled by Mr. 
Reddemann and others: 
12. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommen-
dation proper on disarmament, add two new par-
agraphs: 
"Call on the Warsaw Pact to renounce its 
offensive military and technical doctrine and 
give its armed forces a structure clearly 
designed for defensive purposes and which 
does not allow it to undertake an offensive 
against other countries; 
In the framework of disarmament, ensure that 
in each case both sides make reductions to the 
lowest level; " 
Speakers: MM. Reddemann and Scheer. 
An amendment to amendment 12 was tabled 
by MM. Scheer and Stoffelen: 
In amendment 12 to the draft recommen-
dation on disarmament, after" countries;", add 
a new paragraph as follows: 
"Call on NATO and the Warsaw Pact to 
renounce offensive technical capacities in 
favour of the creation of mutual 
non-provocative, confidence-building defence 
structures; " 
Speaker. Mr. Scheer. 
The amendment to the amendment was agreed 
to. 
The amended amendment was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft recommendation on disarm-
ament. 
The amended draft recommendation was agreed 
to. (This recommendation will be published as 
No. 452) 1• 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
resolution on the INF treaty in the addendum to 
Document 1116. 
The draft resolution was agreed to. (This reso-
lution will be published as No. 77) 2• 
l. See page 35. 
2. See page 36. 
MINUTES 
5. Recent developments in Soviet external policy 
(Presentation of and debate 
on the report of the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 1111 and addendum) 
The report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Mr. Pecriaux, Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Muller, 
Rubbi and Declercq. 
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The debate was adjourned. 
6. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 3rd 
December 1987, at 10 a.m. 
The sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m. 
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RECOMMENDATION 451 
replying to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the Council's continued close consultation on European security and disarmament 
questions and its determination not to allow Europe to be sidelined in the present strategic debate; 
(ii) Welcoming the commitment in the platform on European security interests adopted by the 
Council on 27th October 1987 to build a European union; 
(iii) Welcoming in particular the active role of the presidency of the Council in initiating consultation, 
including the first consultation on a threat to peace arising outside Europe; 
(iv) Welcoming also the establishment of the Council's high-level special working group to improve 
co-operation between Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Defence in all member countries; 
(v) Stressing the need for a decision in 1988 on the eo-location and restructuring of all Council organs 
and WEU institutions; 
(vi) Calling for an early decision thereafter on the accession of the countries which have expressed a 
wish to join WEU; 
(vii) Recalling the continued importance of the long-standing institutional responsibilities of the 
Council concerning troop levels and the remaining internal arms control, 
REcOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Continue its discussions on all aspects of European security and disarmament and ensure that 
European interests are safeguarded in the present strategic debate; 
2. Decide to eo-locate all Council bodies and WEU institutions and to define the new tasks of the 
agencies for security questions; 
3. Reinstate in its annual reports the information previously given on the number of control mea-
sures carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 452 
on disarmament 
TENTH SITTING 
(i) Calling for the collective defence effort to be maintained at all times at the level necessary to 
ensure the security of all countries of the alliance, while negotiations are actively pursued on the mutual 
reduction of forces and armaments to the lowest levels compatible with that essential security, in full 
accordance with the long-standing policy of the alliance; 
(ii) Welcoming the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union ~ased on zero-zero 
proposals agreed by the alliance as a whole which it believes must be in the long-term security interests 
of countries both ofthe alliance and the Warsaw Pact, and noting that the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments will report fully on all aspects of the anticipated agreement when the text is pub-
lished; 
(iii) Welcoming also the approach to a bilateral agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons; 
(iv) Stressing the importance of respect for the existing ABM treaty and notional, limitations of the 
SALT accords which can be modified only by agreement between the parties to them, and recalling in 
this connection the reply of the Council to Recommendation 413; 
(v) Noting with satisfaction the improved prospects for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty to ban 
all chemical weapons and a bilateral agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons 
tests; 
(vi) Noting both the similarities and the differences between the security policy declared by NATO 
most recently in Reykjavik and the military strategy enunciated by the Warsaw Pact in Berlin, and wel-
coming the positive aspects of the Berlin proposals for consultations between the two alliances to discuss 
military doctrine and a search for ways of removing imbalances and asymmetries in different arma-
ments and forces; 
(vii) Noting in this connection that in Prague on lOth April 1987 General Secretary Gorbachev con-
firmed the existence of such imbalances and asymmetries for historical and other reasons; 
(viii) Calling in general for the councils of both alliances to give careful consideration to all arms 
control proposals of the other, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Press for the earliest opening of negotiations on conventional stability mandated to discuss asym-
metrical reductions of conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals so as to 
establish a stable and non-threatening military balance in Europe and the various regions concerned at 
the lowest possible levels; 
2. Express full support for a verifiable bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet 
Union to reduce the strategic warheads of each party to 6 000, and continue to ensure that any such 
bilateral agreement imposes no restrictions on the forces of European countries, who are not parties 
to it; 
3. Urge on the two parties the importance of fully respecting the existing ABM treaty and notional 
limitations of the SALT accords, which can be modified only by agreement between them; 
4. Call on the North Atlantic Council to consider positively the Berlin proposal ofthe Warsaw Pact 
for consultations between the two alliances to compare military strategy, and to find ways of removing 
asymmetries in types of armaments and forces through reductions to the lower level in each case, and in 
general to give proper consideration to all arms control proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries with a 
view to identifying those elements which may provide a fruitful basis for mutually-advantageous negoti-
ations; 
5. Call on the Warsaw Pact to renounce its offensive military and technical doctrine and give its 
armed forces a structure clearly designed for defensive purposes and which does not allow it to 
undertake an offensive against other countries; 
6. Call on NATO and the Warsaw Pact to renounce offensive technical capacities in favour of the 
creation of mutual non-provocative, confidence-building defence structures; 
7. In the framework of disarmament, ensure that in each case both sides make reductions to the 
lowest level. 
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RESOLUTION 77 
on the INF treaty 
The Assembly, 
Endorsing the view of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments expressed in Doc-
ument 1116 that the INF agreement now to be signed by the United States and the Soviet Union should 
be in the long-term security interests of countries both of the alliance and the Warsaw Pact, 
URGES THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
To give its advice and consent to the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces as expeditiously 
as possible; 
INSTRUCfS ITS PRESIDENT 
To transmit the text of the present resolution and the corresponding report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments to the President of the United States Senate for the information of 
all its members. 
36 
ELEVENTH SilTING 
Thursday, 3rd December 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Recent developments in Soviet external policy (Resumed 
debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and 
votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doe. 
1111 and addendum). 
2. Threat assessment (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments and vote on the draft rfcommendation, Doe. 
1115 and amendment). 
3. Public information activities on security and defence 
matters in WEU member countries (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations and vote on th'e draft resolution, Doe. 
1112). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Geo.ffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the 
Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of the proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Recent developments in Soviet external policy 
(Resumed debate on the report 
of the General Affain Committee and "otes on 
the draft recommendlltion 
and draft order, Doe. 1111 and addendum) 
The debate was resumed. 
Speakers: MM. Hill, Soell, Atkinson, Bordu, 
Hardy, Martino, Lord, Burger and Lord 
Mackie. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Pecriaux, Rapporteur, and Mr. Ahrens, 
Chairman, replied to the speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
recommendation. 
The draft recommendation was agreed to. 
(This recommendation will be published as No. 
453) 1• 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
order. 
The draft order was agreed to. (This order will 
be published as No. 70) 2• 
1. See page 39. 
2. See page 40. 
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4. Threat assessment 
(Presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, Doe. 1115 and amendment) 
The report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. 
Stokes, Rapporteur. 
Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Speed, Soell, Klejdzinski, 
Lambie, Sir Dudley Smith and Mr. Hitschler. 
The President informed the Assembly that 
Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Reddemann and 
others, was withdrawn. 
Speakers: Mr. Hardy and Dame Peggy 
Fenner. 
The debate was closed. 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg proposed that the report 
be referred back to committee. 
Speakers: MM. Stoffelen and Kittelmann, 
Chairman. 
The Assembly agreed to refer the report back 
to committee. 
5. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The orders of the day for the next sitting were 
agreed to. 
The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 
3p.m. 
The sitting was closed at 1.15 p. m. 
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RECOMMENDATION 453 
on recent developments in Soviet external policy 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that, if confirmed and pursued, the policy of reform and openness undertaken by the 
Soviet Union opens the way for a far-reaching change in relations between Eastern and Western Europe, 
important disarmament measures and a consolidation of international peace; 
(ii) Noting that the prospects for "reality and guarantees for a secure world., expressed by Mr. 
Gorbachev on 17th September 1987 very largely respond to Western Europe's aspirations, but consid-
ering that Soviet practice should correspond more to these words; 
(iii) Considering that the CSCE is the framework in which the conditions for new relations between 
the two parts of Europe can be worked out, provided adequate progress is accomplished in each of the 
three baskets; ' 
(iv) Welcoming the progress achieved in the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons but noting 
that Western Europe's security also requires agreements on the verified limitation of strategic weapons, 
on a balance of conventional weapons and on banning the use of chemical weapons with the progressive 
destruction of existing stocks; 
(v) Noting that the principal threats to international peace now originate in regions outside the area 
covered by the North Atlantic Treaty; 
(vi) Stressing that a concern of the WEU Council should be to concert the action of member countries 
to restore peace by the application of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 and to ensure 
freedom of navigation in the Gulf; 
(vii) Welcoming the fact that the Assembly has been able to start a dialogue with the Supreme Soviet of 
the Soviet Union on the conditions of European security and hoping that it will be possible to continue 
these exchanges of views, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Examine regularly the evolution of relations between Eastern and Western Europe; 
2. Urge both the United States and the Soviet Union to implement any Soviet-American agreements 
on the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons, while assuring Europe that there will be a deter-
mined and vigorous effort to achieve an early, satisfactory outcome to negotiations on other categories 
of weapons; 
3. Through close consultations, seek to uphold joint positions in all meetings held in the framework 
of the CSCE in order to obtain substantial, balanced results in negotiations held in the context of each of 
the thr~e baskets, including: 
(a) the early conclusion of an agreement on the limitation of conventional weapons restoring the 
balance of forces in Europe and including a satisfactory system of verifi(::ation; 
(b) the liberalisation of exchanges of ideas and the free movement of persons between Eastern and 
·western Europe; 
(c) the definition of the obligations of each country taking part in the conference, particularly in 
regard to human rights and the environment; 
(d) the development of economic, scientific and cultural relations between the two parts of 
Europe; 
(e) respect for the sovereignty and independence of all states. 
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ORDER 70 
on recent developments in Soviet external policy 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling that the goal of the reactivation of Western European Union is to strengthen the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance; 
(ii) Considering that the close association of Western Europe and the United States in the Atlantic 
Alliance is the essential basis of Europe's security; 
(iii) Considering that any Soviet-American agreement on the limitation of armaments must give 
Western Europe the guarantees necessary for its security; 
(iv) Noting with interest the initiative taken by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to invite a 
delegation from the Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly to visit Moscow in April1987 for an 
exchange of views on the requirements of European security, 
INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE 
1. In order to avoid the reactivation of WEU adding to "transatlantic misunderstandings", to 
promote a regular dialogue between the Assembly and the United States Congress covering inter alia the 
consequences for Europe's security of any American-Soviet agreements on the limitation of armaments, 
on the aims to be pursued in the CSCE and on threats to international peace which may arise outside the 
area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty; 
2. To invite members of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to pursue the exchange ofviews 
started in April1987 on the limitation of armaments with a view to achieving a balance of conventional 
forces acceptable to both parties and on the three baskets of the CSCE in order to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace. 
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Thursday, 3rd December 1987 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Public information acUviUes on security and defence 
matters in WEU member countries (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doe. 
1112). 
2. European armaments co-operation - reply to the thirty-
second annual report of the Council (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Tech-
nological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft 
recommendation, Doe. 1119 and amendments). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Attendance register 
The names of the representatives and substi-
tutes who signed the register of attendance are 
given in the appendix. 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The minutes of proceedings of the previous 
sitting were agreed to. 
3. Public information activities on security 
and defence matters in WEU 
member countries 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations and vote 
on the draft resolution, Doe. 1112) 
The report of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations was presented by 
Mr. Burger, Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Rathbone, Filetti, Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg and Mr. K.atsaros (Observer from 
Greece). 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Burger, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
resolution. 
The draft resolution was agreed to unani-
mously. (This resolution will be published as No. 
78) 1• 
l. See page 44. 
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4. European armaments co-operation -
reply to the thirty-second annual 
report of the Council 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote 
on the draft recommendation, 
Doe. 1119and amendments) 
The report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions was pre-
sented by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur. 
The debate was opened. 
Speaker. Mr. Klejdzinski. 
The debate was closed. 
Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speaker. ' 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
recommendation. 
Two amendments (Nos. 1 and 2) were tabled 
by MM. Bassinet and Fourr~: 
1. After paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Welcoming the organisation in 1988 of a first 
European defence study session to advance 
knowledge of the European dimensions of 
security matters;" 
2. At the end of the draft recommendation 
proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
" Instruct the Secretariat-General to ensure 
periodical meetings of Eur<>pean defence study 
MINUTES 
sessions and to co-ordinate national initiatives 
in this connection with a view to setting up a 
European defence research institute as soon as 
possible. " 
Speaker: Mr. Bassinet. 
The amendments were agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft recommendation. 
The amended draft recommendation was 
agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation 
will be published as No. 454) 1• 
l. See page 45. 
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5. Change in the membership of a committee 
In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following 
change in the membership of the Committee on 
Rules of Procedure and Privileges proposed by 
the French Delegation: Mrs. Trautmann as an 
alternate member to fill a vacant seat. 
6. Close of the session 
The President declared the thirty-third 
ordinary session of the Assembly closed. 
The sitting was closed at 4.20 p.m. 
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RESOLUTION 78 
on public information activities on security and defence matters 
in WEU member countries 
The Assembly, 
TWELFfH SITTING 
(i) Anxious to make public and parliamentary opinion more aware of the European dimension of 
security and the specific aims of WEU in this context; 
(ii) Stressing that it is of the utmost importance for more members of the Assembly to. intervene in 
their national parliaments on the basis of texts adopted in order to draw the attention of government 
authorities and public opinion to the work of the WEU Assembly; 
(iii) Welcoming the initiative taken by the Netherlands Government in communicating to the Second 
Chamber of the States-General its position on the future prospects of WEU under Netherlands presi-
dency; 
(iv) Regretting nevertheless that the remarkable efforts made by certain member governments to keep 
the public - and in particular the younger generation - in their countries informed of security and 
defence problems only exceptionally give adequate information on the role of WEU, 
INVITES NATIONAL DELEGATIONS 
1. To ensure that debates on defence and security in parliaments, in the political groups and with 
governments and the public are organised so as to bring the greatest possible attention to the work of the 
WEU Assembly; 
2. To urge governments to improve the co-ordination, with the appropriate WEU bodies, of their 
national activities in keeping the public informed, and in particular the younger generation. 
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RECOMMENDATION 454 
on European armaments co-operation -
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting that ever since the Rome declaration in October 1984 the Council as a whole and its 
members individually have stated that WEU should provide political impetus to the development of 
European co-operation in armaments matters; 
(ii) Dissatisfied that during the three years that have elapsed since October 1984 the Council has 
failed to provide proof of this much-vaunted political impetus, notwithstanding the primordial role of 
the WEU countries in the IEPG, their geographical and military position and the s~e of their defence 
industry; 
(iii) Welcoming the organisation in 1988 of a first European defence study session to advance 
knowledge of the European dimensions of security matters; 
(iv) Recalling the final communique of the IEPG ministers' meeting held in SevUk on 22nd June 
1987, in which the ministers endorsed the long-term objectives of the European defence industry study 
(EDIS) report and expressed their determination to develop an action plan for a step-by-step approach 
towards an open European market for defence equipment; 
(v) Considering that neither the division of work between the Standing Armaments Committee and 
the IEPG, dating from 1978, nor the agreement regarding co-operation between the ,presidency of the 
IEPG and the Secretary-General of WEU, dating from 1986, are being observed; 
(vi) Considering that the IEPG ministers have declined to establish an international secretariat for the 
IEPG, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Take the lead in implementing the action plan for an open European m~rket for defence 
equipment as recommended by the EDIS report by committing its members to reach agreement on 
common operational requirements for each major piece of defence equipment they will need from 
now on; 
2. Conclude its three-year reflections and deliberations on the reorganisation, future role and tasks 
of the SAC and Agency Ill and instruct the new ministerial organs to conduct studies connected with the 
IEPG ministers' decision to develop an action plan for a step-by-step approach towards an open 
European market for defence equipment; 
3. Increase its efforts to guarantee that appropriate international bodies and national administra-
tions provide all the information needed by the body which takes over to conduct its studies; 
4. Ensure that the division of work between the SAC and the IEPG dating from 1!978, if considered 
obsolete, is replaced by an up-to-date agreement and that the 1986 co-operation agreement between the 
presidency of the IEPG and the Secretary-General of WEU is observed; 
5. Arrange for the presidency of the IEPG to address the Assembly once a year to inform it about 
developments in European armaments co-operation; 
6. Instruct the Secretariat-General to ensure periodical meetings of European defence study sessions 
and to co-ordinate national initiatives in this connection with a view to setting up a European defence 
research institute as soon as possible. 
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SIXTH SITTING 
Monday, 30th November 1987 
SUMMARY 
1. Resumption of the session. 
2. Attendance register. 
3. Adoption of the minutes. 
4. Examination of credentials. 
S. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
6. Observers. 
7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second 
part of the session (Doe. 1113). 
Speakers: The President; (points of order): Mr. Hardy, 
Mr. Garrett, the President. 
8. Action by the Presidential Committee (Presentation of 
and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, 
Doe. 1126). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Valleix (Vice-President of 
the Assembly), Mr. Pannella, Mr. Burger, Mr. Valleix 
(Vice-President of the Assembly). 
9. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
10. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
Replies by Mr. Cahen to questions put by: Mr. Close, Mr. 
Burger, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Pannella, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. 
Soell. 
11. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure 
(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, 
Doe. 1110 and amendment). 
Speakers: The President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg 
(Chairman and Rapporteur), the President. 
12. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-
second annual report of the Council (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 1117). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. van der Sanden 
(Rapporteur), Mr. Aarts, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Antretter. 
13. Revision of the Rules of Procedure (Motion for a 
decision, Doe. 1124). 
14. INF treaty (Motion for a resolution, Doe. 1127). 
IS. Changes in the membership of committees. 
16. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Resumption of the session 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
I declare resumed the thirty-third ordinary 
session of the Assembly of Western European 
Union which was adjourned on 3rd June 1987 at 
the end of the fifth sitting. 
2. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
3. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-
l. See page 16. 
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cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the fifth 
sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
4. Examination of credentials 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the examination of the creden-
tials of the new representatives and substitutes 
nominated since our Assembly's last part-session 
whose names have been published in Notice No. 6. 
In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of 
Procedure, these credentials have been attested 
by a statement of ratification from the President 
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. 
I welcome our new parliamentary colleagues. 
5. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ministers, 
your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, the 
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The President (continued) 
session starting today is of particular importance 
because it should be the last during the period of 
reorganisation of WEU that began three years 
ago with the Rome declaration and, in principle, 
ends, if not with the adoption of the platform on 
European security interests in The Hague on 
27th October, at least at the end of this year. It 
will therefore allow us to review events and give 
thought to the future, which should be calmer 
than in the recent past, at least where the struc-
tures of WEU are concerned. 
However, this consideration of events and 
future prospects is not just an internal WEU 
matter. At the time of the Rome declaration, two 
series of events had led our seven governments 
to undertake the reactivation of WEU that our 
Assembly had been urging for a long time. The 
moral crisis stemming from the deployment of 
intermediate-range missiles in Europe, marked 
by widespread street demonstrations in our 
towns, had shown the need to reaffirm the will of 
the Western European nations to ensure their 
own security. Furthermore, President Reagan's 
strategic defence initiative made our countries 
face choices that were at one and the same time 
technical, strategic and political. The first task 
the Council set itself after Rome, therefore, was 
to examine the consequences of the SDI for 
Europe. 
A new dimension was given to the reactivation 
of WEU when, in the last two years, the conse-
quences of the new Soviet policy, in particular in 
regard to disarmament: made themselves felt. 
Our session is being held just before the meeting 
between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev which 
is to lead to the signing of a treaty on the limi-
tation of intermediate-range nuclear weapons 
and also either to the opening or to the revival of 
other negotiations concerning not only the entire 
nuclear panoply of the two great powers but also 
chemical weapons and conventional forces. In 
other words, disarmament, and probably also 
other aspects of detente, are becoming major 
factors in Europe's security and consequently 
they must henceforth play a major part in the 
debates of the only European assembly with 
responsibilities in defence questions. 
These events, to which should be added the 
rising perils in the Middle East, have continu-
ously spurred the reactivation of WEU. They 
provide the background against which our 
session is starting and several of them will be in 
the centre of our debates. 
We shall also consider events inside WEU in 
recent months: completion of the restructuring of 
the ministerial organs, the application for the 
first time, thirty-three years after the Paris Agree-
ments were signed, of paragraph 3 of Article VIII 
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of the modified Brussels Treaty under which 
WEU member countries must consult each other 
as a matter of urgency in the event of a threat to 
international peace and the aqoption by the min-
isters on 27th October of a plajtform on European 
security interests. 
Some may have considered the text adopted 
rather disappointing: its very title was a step 
backwards compared with th~ idea advanced by 
Mr. Chirac in the Assembly *'ust a year ago of a 
charter formally expressing t e requirements of 
European security and spec fically binding its 
signatories. 
Yet, in the new circumstances I have just men-
tioned, it was not unimportant for the seven 
countries to reaffirm together the principles on 
which they base their security! and, after relieving 
WEU of the burden of obligittons inherited from 
a past age, to show in whiCh! directions it must 
now move to make Europe at last exist in 
defence matters. Faced with the questions raised 
by the SDI, the new Soviet policy, progress in 
disarmament negotiations and threats to peace 
outside Europe, this platfoill), clearly the result 
of a compromise between goyemment positions 
which were known not alwayis to converge, con-
stitutes, in spite of some l~ck of precision, a 
major European answer and a programme for 
WEU. 
Our gratitude is due to the Netherlands presi-
dency - and I have no hesiijltion in expressing 
that gratitude - for its firmn~ss in directing the 
work of the Council in the last six months. On its 
initiative, three meetings of the enlarged Council 
have been held on the situation in the Gulf in the 
last three months and European consultations on 
this matter have been develqped. It is also very 
largely thanks to its efforts that the platform was 
adopted on 27th October, in spite of serious diffi-
culties. ' 
If it is borne in mind that under our Rules of 
Procedure committees have to adopt their 
reports three weeks before the beginning of ses-
sions and that the meeting in The Hague was 
held on 27th October, it is n~t surprising that no 
report has been wholly dev ted to considering 
this platform. It is, on the c ntrary, remarkable 
that several of them examine it in detail and it 
will clearly be prominent in the debate on the 
activities of the WEU Council for which the 
reports of the three committees will provide a 
sound basis, together with addresses by several 
ministers, including the Ch.irman-in-Office of 
the Council, Mr. van den Bnoek. 
Queries about how far the affirmation of 
Europe's security requirements might weaken 
the solidarity of the Atlamtic Alliance were 
answered on 4th November when President 
Reagan voiced the United States' response by 
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emphasising in a speech beamed to a very wide 
audience that his country welcomed the 
modernisation of the nuclear forces of the 
United Kingdom and France and the affir-
mation, through the adoption of this platform, of 
a Western European identity in defence matters 
within the Atlantic Alliance. According to the 
President of the United States, this identity 
should establish relations of equality between the 
European and American partners of the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
This step by President Reagan was most 
important because, without it, the effort to reac-
tivate WEU, started three years ago, might well 
have failed should our governments have feared 
that it might loosen the links between the two 
sides of the Atlantic and call in question the 
United States' conventional and nuclear partici-
pation in Europe's security. We now know that 
the United States considers Western Europe's 
assumption of its security responsibilities to be 
useful ~o the alliance. I personally am absolutely 
determmed to develop the Assembly's relations 
with our transatlantic partners as a contribution 
to averting any future misunderstanding about 
the implications of strengthening the European 
pillar of the alliance. 
These are the various considerations which 
have allowed some to assert that WEU has now 
been reactivated. This is rather premature, 
however. It is admittedly possible to note a con-
siderable growth in intergovernmental activities 
in the framework of WEU and this meets the 
requirements of Article VIII of the treaty. Fur-
thermore, the platform shows a remarkable rap-
prochement of views which until recently 
seemed irreconcilable concerning the role of 
nuclear deterrence and member countries' soli-
darity in ensuring mutual assistance at each 
other's frontiers. This expression of joint posi-
tions gives full weight to Article V. However, 
those of us who met the Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council at the close of the ministerial 
meeting in The Hague on 27th October had to 
note that the results achieved by the ministers in 
the restructuring of WEU are far from equalling 
progress in political consultations and 
responding to the principles set out in the 
platform. 
We can well understand why the presidency of 
the Council wished to give priority to working 
out these principles and following up these con-
sultations. Differences of views between member 
countries about the conditions for restructuring 
were such that some degree of failure in this area 
had been foreseeable for months. However the 
considerable progress made in the truly political 
sector will not have firm foundations or be a real 
gain for Europe until it is translated into new 
activity throughout WEU, and this requires deci-
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sions which are at first sight far less important 
than those already taken but with_out which those 
taken first might be short-lived. 
First, there is the reorganisation of WEU. 
From what the Assembly has managed to learn 
of the meeting in The Hague, member countries 
do not seem to have yet followed through the 
measures necessary for adopting structures to 
requirements. It is very good to have decided to 
reduce the number of agencies to one. But the 
Council has not yet said what it expects of this 
agency. In order to take the necessary steps to 
apply the principles set out in the platform 
adopted in The Hague, however, it is essential 
for it to be able to rely on a strong Secretariat-
General, assisted by the necessary technical 
body. 
Actually, the Council's work seems to have 
been dominated by the problems of restruc-
turing, fixing the establishment of the WEU min-
isterial organs and collocating them. Conversely, 
it is not yet clear what role the Council is 
assigning to the Secretariat-General in view of 
the decisive importance assumed by the presi-
dency. The platform adopted in The Hague 
offers broad prospects for the role of WEU but, 
although information about institutional ques-
tions provides many details about secondary 
aspects, there is nothing about the main 
question, i.e. the role attributed to the 
Secretariat-General and the single agency. 
The second point is the enlargement of WEU. 
The Assembly has always challenged the grounds 
for the decision taken by the Council to wait for 
restructuring to be completed before tackling this 
matter. The prospect of enlargement now seems 
to have been delayed because the Council has 
not yet adopted a position on the candidatures 
submitted or suggested by countries which are 
certainly not prepared to stand on our door step 
indefinitely. We hope that the principles 
adopted, albeit belatedly, in The Hague on the 
conditions for admitting new members will allow 
enlargement to be guided in accordance with 
Europe's true interests. In the particular case of 
Spain, it seems to me, to my regret, that WEU 
has given up playing the useful role that it was 
able to play in other circumstances as a bridge 
between the Atlantic Alliance and a European 
country whose relations with NATO were in dif-
ficulties. 
Finally, there are the relations between the 
Council and the Assembly. I will not dwell on 
their financial aspect because of the Council's 
promise that, as soon as the restructuring of the 
ministerial organs has been resolved, a decision 
will be taken on the funds necessary for com-
pleting the structure of the Office of the Clerk as 
decided by the Presidential Committee at the 
end of last year. However, I wish to recall 
unequivocally that, before the end of the year, we 
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need, without fail, the means of work first 
requested a year ago. This is an urgent matter for 
six months' experience as President has shown 
me that we can no longer hope to pursue the 
Assembly's activities normally if the essential 
decisions are not taken in the very near future. 
Conversely, I wish to stress that the question 
of relations between the Council and the 
Assembly arises at the level of the dialogue estab-
lished by Article IX of the treaty because, in spite 
of clear good will on the part of the Council, we 
have not yet found how to have fully satisfactory 
exchanges between a Council, reactivated in the 
political field, and an Assembly which must 
apply the correct procedure of a parliamentary 
assembly. 
It should be recalled that the modified Brussels 
Treaty, without laying down supranational prin-
ciples, was a singularly audacious innovation in 
that it made the action of the WEU Council 
subject to parliamentary supervision. Together, 
the Council and the Assembly must therefore 
seek means of improving their dialogue to allow 
the Assembly to be informed more quickly and 
more completely, thus allowing it to play to the 
full the role assigned to it by the treaty. This 
means improving official and public procedures. 
The Council should no longer delay the trans-
mission of statutory texts - annual report and 
replies to recommendations and written ques-
tions. Furthermore, the Council will probably 
agree that these tardily-communicated texts lack 
substance and it is necessary to remedy the situ-
ation. 
The dialogue between the presidency and the 
Presidential Committee no doubt allows some 
information to be given at confidential meetings 
and has the great advantage of allowing 
remarkable frankness. It certainly shows the 
major effort governments make to satisfy the 
Assembly when they take over the presidency. 
But the whole Assembly should be able to pursue 
this dialogue with the Council. It is the whole 
Assembly that votes on the annual report and 
makes recommendations to the Council. 
The solution of these problems is of the 
utmost importance for the Assembly and also, 
certainly, for the Council. The standard of the 
dialogue between the two sides of WEU must 
remain a continuing concern for both of them. It 
is mainly for the Council, however, to decide 
how best to keep the Assembly properly 
informed. It is at this price that the parlia-
mentary dimension of the treaty will be 
respected and this is an essential aspect of it. In 
this way, the deliberations of representatives of 
governments connect up with those of represen-
tatives of parliaments and the Council's actions 
will be able to gain the support of public opinion. 
51 
SIXTH SITTING 
We well realise that the briefness of the annual 
report and certain replies to Assembly recom-
mendations or written questions put by represen-
tatives is due not to a lack of esteem for the 
Assembly on the part of tre presidency or gov-
ernments, but to the persis ence of certain differ-
ences. By moving toward a harmonisation of 
our countries' views, the Council will therefore 
be better able to meet the Assembly's require-
ments. The establishment of a fruitful dialogue 
between the governmental and parliamentary 
sides is linked to the succe's of the organisation. 
The dialogue can also contlribute to this success. 
Our criticisms are always made in a constructive 
spirit. The Assembly wishes to help the Council 
to carry out its important tasks. 
Let there be no mistake: the platform adopted 
in The Hague can be a star!ting point for the true 
reactivation of WEU, its enlargement and affir-
mation as the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance and the application of a single act which 
aims to set up the European union of tomorrow. 
It will remain a mere declaration of intent with 
no true content if its signatories do not swiftly 
reach agreement on how effectively to follow it 
up. Concerted action by our countries in the Gulf 
will be short-lived if, institutionally, it does not 
lead to the introduction of procedure for per-
manent consultations backed up by an effective 
administrative structure. A crisis management 
unit might thus be established allowing the 
Council to handle threats to peace that might 
arise in various regions of the world. 
I felt it was important tolrecall these principles 
which, thirty-three years ago, were the basis for 
the modification of the Brussels Treaty by the 
Paris Agreements, now that ministerial activity 
in WEU has achieved a new dimension. The 
rebirth of WEU certainly implies this intergov-
ernmental activity which we all unhesitatingly 
welcome. But it also requires full respect for the 
treaty which the Council stlill rightly considers to 
be the basis for any enlargement of WEU. This 
respect also means maintaining the Assembly's 
independence and granting it the wherewithal to 
carry out its tasks. 
While 1987 has been vital from the point of 
view of intergovernmental activity in WEU, 
1988 must - if we want a reactivated WEU to 
take its place in a European union as outlined in 
the single European act - witness the completion 
of what has been undertaken. Restructuring the 
ministerial organs, enlargement and granting the 
Assembly the material abd political means it 
needs to take part in the reactivation of WEU 
form an ample programme whose early 
achievement is essential. 
In the session now starting, we must recall all 
the implications of these fundamental prin-
ciples. 
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6. Observers 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now 
welcome to our debates the parliamentary 
observers from Denmark, Greece, Norway, Por-
tugal and Spain. 
I also welcome those members of the Per-
manent Council present at this part-session. 
7. Adoption of the draft order of business 
for the second part of the session 
(Doe. 1113) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the adoption of the draft order 
of business for the second part of the thirty-third 
ordinary session, Document 1113. 
I call Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - On a point 
of order, Mr. President. Some members will have 
heard me raise this point a year ago, but it needs 
to be raised again. You have just made a signif-
icant address in which you mentioned the sub-
stantial business before the Assembly and the 
significant position in which we are placed at this 
point in European history. 
We have to deal this week with ten reports 
over which at least some committees have 
laboured long and hard. They all have to be 
debated in the next three days. I remind you, Mr. 
President, that some time ago the Assembly 
decided firmly and clearly that no more than two 
ministerial contributions would be allowed 
during the week that the Assembly meets. 
I suppose that we have made some advance, 
because a year ago we had six ministerial visits 
and this year we have four such visits. However, 
we shall still not be able to devote enough time 
to some of the important reports before us. Some 
members will not be called to speak and others 
will have to curtail their speeches because of the 
proliferation of ministerial visits. 
I know that it is hoped that ministers will give 
the Assembly the resources that it needs, but that 
does not mean that we must sacrifice the inde-
pendence of our debates, especially if ministers 
address us at considerable length and leave 
before difficult questions can be presented to 
them. 
I insist that the Assembly should either stick to 
its decision that there should be no more than 
two ministerial speeches in a week or revoke that 
decision. We should not allow ourselves to be 
ridden over roughshod by any minister who 
wishes to have a trip to Paris. I do not suggest 
that that is why ministers come and I would not 
dream of suggesting that that view be conveyed 
to them, but I am sick and tired of trying to ask 
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questions and not being called, perhaps because 
some of those questions might cause discomfort 
to ministers. 
If we are properly to discuss the ten committee 
reports, we shall not have sufficient time for 
ministers to give a proper account of themselves. 
I hope that the matter will be considered seri-
ously. I had not expected to have to make the 
same point again in almost exactly the terms I 
used last year. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Hardy, 
no one objects to the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council having the floor nor the Netherlands 
Minister of Defence. As for the French speaker it 
is traditional for a member of the French Gov-
ernment to address the Assembly during the 
winter part-session. The British Defence Min-
ister, Mr. David Mellor, has also asked to speak. 
Let me read you the relevant part of our 
Charter: .. Ministers who are members of the 
Council and other ministers of member states 
may be present at all sittings of the Assembly. 
They may be heard by the Assembly at their own 
or the Assembly's request. " 
As for the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
he will be very brief and only have the time to 
answer four questions at most. In other words 
the ministers themselves are doing their best not 
to take up too much of our time. 
Does that reply satisfy you? 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - Further to 
that point of order, Mr. President. We face the 
same problem that we faced a year ago when the 
Assembly decided that there should be only two 
ministerial visits in any week. I know that the 
rule says that ministers may be invited, but it 
does not say that they must be invited. The fact 
that we may invite ministers does not mean that 
any minister who is interested in coming here 
must be invited. 
I asked last year that the word " may " be 
examined properly and not become the " must". 
It is not satisfactory for us to have interruption 
after interruption of debates that are very 
important at this stage of Europe's history. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I take note 
of your comments, Mr. Hardy. I will give the 
floor to the members of the Council and repre-
sentatives of member states but I will raise the 
issue at the next meeting of the Presidential 
Committee. 
I call Mr. Garrett. 
Mr. GARRETT (United Kingdom). - Further 
to the point of order, Mr. President. You have an 
, important role. We have decided to reactivate 
WEU, and reactivation means participation and 
debate. I agree with Mr. Hardy. Can you give us 
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an assurance that last year's situation will not be 
repeated? If we do not tackle the problem, we 
shall face the same difficulty next year. It is no 
good trotting out the rule book. You have the 
power to decide who should and who should not 
address the Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - To satisfy 
members of the Assembly who hold this view the 
Charter would have to be changed. It would 
therefore be expedient to ask the Presidential 
Committee to look into the question. 
Mr. Fourre and Mr. Bassinet have told me that 
they would like to invert the order in which their 
reports are to be presented. 
Thus Mr. Fourre's report on the military use of 
computers - towards a joint European defence 
programme - will be considered on Wednesday 
morning, 2nd December, and Mr. Bassinet's 
report on European armaments co-operation -
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the 
Council - will be taken on Thursday afternoon, 
3rd December. 
Is there any opposition to this amended draft 
order of business? ... 
The draft order of business, as amended, is 
adopted. 
8. Action by the Presidential Committee 
(Presentation of and debate on the report 
of the Presidential Committee, Doe. 1126) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Presidential Committee, 
Document 1126. 
I call Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the 
Assembly and Rapporteur. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, this report will 
of course repeat some of the points made by our 
President in his very interesting opening 
address. 
What is the role of the Presidential Committee 
if not to be the standing committee of this 
Assembly? Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of 
Procedure, provides that, like the Council, our 
Assembly must be able to act of itself on a day-
to-day basis between sessions or part-sessions. 
This it does through the Presidential Committee. 
Indeed, meetings of the Presidential Committee 
have recently increased in frequency, reflecting 
the intensification of WEU activity, particularly 
that of the Council. 
What scope does our Presidential Committee 
have for action? Basically, it has to keep itself 
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informed of the activities of the Council and, 
therefore, to monitor those activities step by step 
whilst at the same time offering such encour-
agement or making such cljiticisms as the Presi-
dential Committee feels ar~ warranted. In short, 
ladies and gentlemen, the !purpose of the com-
mittee is to act between the sessions in your 
stead and, today, to report to you on what it has 
done in the months since the last part-session. 
I would comment that trMitionally the role of 
the committee has been j more a matter of 
dealing with questions df the moment but, 
looking at what has happened in the last few 
months, it seems to me that the Presidential 
Committee has been increasingly occupied in 
putting across the Assembly's policy recommen-
dations and decisions. That, after all, is why we 
are here. 
I 
So what types of activity does the committee 
have, ladies and gentlemen? In fact, there are 
two: firstly it deals with the administrative tasks 
that are the responsibility of the Assembly and 
the committee and secondly it has to discharge 
political responsibilities ~luding in particular 
the dialogue with the Couqcil of Ministers. The 
distinction is somewhat : theoretical however 
because, as you well know; the resources at the 
command of our Assembly also determine, in 
part at least, its political 'influence. Resources are 
the basis of that influence .. 
As to the administrative~ ctivities, we have to 
know where we are going. he Presidential Com-
mittee has always in mi d the mission that 
seems to have been entrusted to it by the 
Assembly, namely to represent the final purpose 
of the Assembly, its political independence in 
matters of European defence and its effec-
tiveness. It also consists ~· maintaining budg-
etary independence so that its objectives may be 
better served and the As embly be effectively 
master of its own actions. 1 
On that budgetary score; moreover, the Pres-
ident of our Assembly identifies two separate 
aspects; firstly the appropriations for the per-
manent staff of the Assembly secretariat and sec-
ondly the appropriations for the actual operation 
of the Assembly. · 
With regard to the former it should be noted 
that for the staff, as the President has just 
pointed out, an establishment table has been set 
out in a note on the structure of the Office of the 
Clerk which was agreed at the end of last year. 
So, according to the rulesj the staff appropria-
tions are decided each yeat although, of course, 
they are renewable in prac~ice from year to year 
on the same basis. That is why it is perfectly rea-
sonable that there should be no question of any 
transfers between these appropriations and the 
operating appropriations which relate to the 
Assembly itself. 
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With regard to that group of appropriations, 
the Council has only accepted the promotions 
bound up with job classification, in the 
framework of the establishment table to which I 
just referred, on a personal basis. But I have to 
tell you that the Council has refused to agree to 
the four new posts intended to supplement that 
establishment in the 1988 draft budget. 
And that is where we stand. The Council has 
argued, as has already been indicated, that it was 
difficult and even impossible for it to make up its 
mind before being able to consider an Assembly 
establishment. The question needed to be seen as 
part of the revision of the structures of WEU as a 
whole. 
Clearly, and here I am speaking on behalf of 
the Presidential Committee, this way of looking 
at things does not satisfy us because the secre-
tariat seems to us to be an essential tool for the 
Assembly and that deciding upon the 
organisation of the Assembly secretariat is a 
matter for the Assembly - and the Presidential 
Committee on its behalf between sessions. This 
is inherent in its functions and responsibilities 
but it is also the way in which it equips itself with 
the appropriate resources. 
So this, ladies and gentlemen, is a problem for 
which I hope we shall quickly find a solution, 
Secretary-General. It would certainly be neither 
right nor fortunate for our relations and our 
work that are basically so necessary and 
important to be soured by disputes or contro-
versy that would be prejudicial to the whole of 
our organisation. 
That, therefore, ladies and gentlemen, is the 
point we have to deal with. 
The second group of appropriations I referred 
to a moment ago finances the Assembly's activ-
ities. These are the appropriations that 
determine our real capacity for direct political 
action, in particular in relation to the rest of the 
world. The right of the Assembly to transfer 
appropriations from one budget head to another 
has been recognised by the Council and we can 
only be pleased at that because it represents the 
real expression of our Assembly's budgetary 
independence in its administrative management. 
That is very important. 
This year, the Presidential Committee tabled 
two supplementary budgets with the agreement 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration. At this point I would like to 
stress the importance of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's 
draft amendment establishing a legal basis for 
the action taken by the Presidential Committee 
on behalf of the Assembly. It is certainly best to 
regularise a de facto situation. The Rules of Pro-
cedure will then provide a legal foundation for 
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this technical measure. We shall be regularising 
the situation but the measure will naturally leave 
all the rights of the Assembly intact because sup-
plementary budgets will have to be ratified by 
the Assembly itself. 
One last point, Mr. President, to which you 
made a discreet reference is the total figure for 
the Assembly's budget. Clearly the principle of 
zero growth that the Council has so often 
repeated cannot satisfy us. It is not compatible 
with the reactivation of WEU, with the increase 
of its activities or even merely with the course of 
events. As we well know, inflation forecasts are 
often overtaken by the real cost of goods and ser-
vices. Actually, a zero budget or zero growth, at 
constant prices, means a cut in the budget, with 
serious consequences for our Assembly. The 
problem is still there. Together with the Council 
we need to find a dynamic solution. We cannot 
leave things as they are. 
Ladies and gentlemen, it is good that we 
should discuss the budget but even more 
important to the lofty vocation of this Assembly 
that we should discuss policy. At last, the 
intensity of the Presidential Committee's activ-
ities matches the intensification of those ofWEU 
in general and its Council in particular and our 
Assembly. In fact, and this is now standard 
practice, the new President of the Assembly, as 
soon as he took up his post, had meetings with 
both the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. 
van den Broek, who is the Netherlands Minister 
for Foreign Affairs and will be addressing the 
Assembly, and with Mr. van Eekelen, the Min-
ister of Defence. Both ministers then received us 
in order to take stock of the situation with the 
Presidential Committee prior to the ministerial 
meeting. 
Before the last meeting in October, the Presi-
dential Committee was naturally very blunt in 
expressing the views of our Assembly and in par-
ticular our impatient and even uncertain hopes, 
as at 13th October, about the drafting of a 
European charter. 
Two other fundamental problems are the 
restructuring ofWEU and the organisation of the 
agencies. On enlargement I, too, would like to 
say how pleased we are to have observers with us 
from our sister countries in the Atlantic Alliance. 
We greet them in friendship and cordiality and I 
would take this opportunity, ladies and gen-
tlemen, to stress our interest in the current possi-
bilities for enlargement. The Presidential Com-
mittee has reminded the Council of the 
importance attached by our Assembly to 
Portugal's formal application for membership. A 
favourable decision on that application should 
be given as quickly as possible. 
Spain's case should also be considered without 
delay. Here, ladies and gentlemen, we are voicing 
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the virtually unanimous wishes of our 
Assembly. 
Another vital issue dealt with at that early 
October meeting prior to the ministerial meeting 
is the problem of the Gulf. The methods of work 
that were instituted, the stances taken by the 
Council, the exchanges of information with our 
Assembly and the Presidential Committee are all 
cause for satisfaction. I would just express one 
wish and that is that this problem, unfortunately 
still with us and very much so, should continue 
to be the subject of equally intensive exchanges. 
Is not our purpose, vis-a-vis the Council, to con-
tribute our thorough knowledge of things and 
sometimes additional information but also to 
combine our efforts and bring weight to bear in a 
solution that is so difficult to find? 
Lastly, the Presidential Committee also dis-
cussed various developments in political rela-
tions with the Soviet world at the meeting in The 
Hague and I shall sum up our concerns in just 
one phrase: in answer to the new Soviet interna-
tional approach there must be a western and a 
European approach. It is therefore vital that we 
should define our action in that direction. We 
shall, in any case, be having a full debate on this 
issue during this part-session. 
The Presidential Committee recorded its satis-
faction with progress in co-operation with the 
Council even though certain inadequacies and 
gaps were noted. 
I would add that we thought it right, on behalf 
of the Assembly, to point out that the Council's 
decision-making, particularly with regard to the 
big international issues, sometimes lacked 
rapidity and that the wording of its decisions 
sometimes lacked force. All this happened on 
27th October and that was followed by the min-
isterial meeting after which, before leaving The 
Hague, the committee held an extremely inter-
esting working meeting, lasting slightly longer 
than planned, with the Chairman-in-Office. 
That, as the President has just said, enabled us to 
gain our first knowledge of the platform that was 
being drafted with difficulty no doubt, but also 
with a great deal of talent and, in the end, clarity 
and at the same time to define the main prin-
ciples of Europe's defence wishes. I shall not go 
back over the political analysis already outlined 
by the President on this point, but a vital step 
forward has been taken. Following the speech 
made in this very chamber by the French Prime 
Minister on 2nd December 1986, referring to a 
possible charter, we now have a platform 
instead. The content is more important than the 
label and our action, finally, will be enlightened 
by the policies, decisions, restatements and facts 
contained in this platform. It constitutes a real 
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doctrine for WEU in 1987 up to the horizon of 
the year 2000. 
Now, ladies and gentlemen, we have a great 
deal to do in the way of analysis and then taking 
implementation as far as we possibly can. 
With regard to WEU's ongoing action -
another problem raised at that Presidential Com-
mittee meeting - I would make the point that 
problems of structures and headquarter location 
should not continue forever to be obstacles to 
our work and discussions. We urgently need to 
strengthen the effectiveness of our action in both 
these ways. If we do not do this quickly I fear 
that we shall get lost in interminable discussions. 
We need to apply our minds and take coherent 
and wise decisions. We also need to waste no 
time. Let us therefore hope that at the next 
meeting of the Presidential Committee which is 
to take place in the middle of ~his month - as we 
asked you, Secretary-General, on 27th October-
further progress will be made. 
In this report on the work of the Presidential 
Committee since the last part-session, a con-
clusion of a more general n~ture is called for. 
The year 1987 could have beep difficult, a year of 
retreat. With this discussion going on at the 
highest world level that, normally, should cul-
minate on Monday or Tuesday next in the 
signing of the first instruments by the two super-
powers, Europe could easily have given up the 
fight. It was a job to tighten up the bolts, but, 
finally, WEU more or less collected itself 
together and the Assembly and the Council got 
together too. In that context, tlhe role of the Presi-
dential Committee was obviously that of liaison 
agent but it also had to be the spokesman for the 
Assembly and the defender of its policy recom-
mendations, some of which I have recalled. 
What might have been a f•tal risk for Europe 
has, on the contrary, been transformed into an 
opportunity which we have managed to seize, 
relatively speaking, or at leas1 which we have not 
let completely go to the detriment of a free 
Europe. In all this I see reasons for hope but the 
fact remains that the major tensions we saw this 
year could return in the near or not so near 
future and that there can be np question of giving 
up or being satisfied with the situation as it is. 
I would therefore like, Secretary-General, to 
pay tribute to the efforts you are making per-
sonally and with your team to try to strengthen 
the cohesion of the WEU organisation and I am 
grateful for your increasing readiness to pay heed 
to this Assembly and its resflute policy recom-
mendations. It does not wan to go its own way: 
it wants to perform its superVisory role vis-a-vis 
the Council and at the same time be a source of 
political initiative alongside the Council. 
As for us, ladies and gentlemen, I simply hope 
that, as the President said a few moments ago, 
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we make the most of the coming months to 
develop, benefit from and confirm Europe's role 
with regard to defence. 
I thank you, on behalf of the Presidential 
Committee, for your confidence in us and I hope 
that together, we shall be the architects of that pro~d and honourable Europe that is determined 
to live in peace and to be respected. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is open. 
I call Mr. Pannella. 
Mr. PANNELLA (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, thank you for your speech. It does not 
beat about the bush. Your views are shared, I 
think, by most of us. The question is whether we 
are up to a task which is, without doubt, increas-
ingly important but also increasingly difficult 
ideologically and technically. 
The excellent report we have just heard poses a 
very simple problem: to what extent will each of 
us be able to propose measures to the Assembly 
that will equip us to face up to our obligations 
more effectively? 
The Rapporteur has brought out very clearly 
the Council's evasion of its responsibilities 
towards us in a matter that is fundamental for an 
assembly that claims to be, and should be, a par-
liamentary body, namely budgetary indepen-
dence. Given that our Charter and Rules of Pro-
cedure are not satisfactory we can hardly be 
surprised at this lack of budgetary independence 
and the lack of political and parliamentary inde-
pendence that it implies. In reality, we are 
helping the Council to overstep its functions and 
not to respect the rules of dialogue. It is a council 
that counsels nothing because it counsels every-
thing and we, the Assembly, are not the dis-
cussion partner and the driving force that we 
should be. This explains why I propose, under 
Article XII of the Charter, that Article VIII con-
cerning budgetary questions be amended. The 
situation is simple. At the moment we adopt a 
draft budget which the Council can then accept 
or not, and our own powers regarding the 
breakdown of the budget are non-existent. I 
therefore suggest that we make provision in our 
Charter for a parliamentary procedure ensuring 
that there will be a discussion and the formu-
lation of our common will in the budget and in 
the budget procedure. The Charter requires that 
such an amendment be tabled in writing by at 
least ten representatives. I therefore ask the 
members present to kindly sign my Amendment 
1 worded as follows: 
1. Add the following new text at the beginning of 
paragraph 4 of the draft decision proper: 
" Replace paragraph 1 by the following text: 
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The draft budget of the Assembly shall be 
drawn up by the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration in consultation 
with the Presidential Committee. 
This draft budget shall be submitted to the 
Council which may make comments in the 
form of amendments thereto. 
Thus amended, the draft budget shall be re-
examined by the Assembly in accordance with 
the following proceoure: 
- if the Council has not amended the draft 
budget, it shall be agreed to by the Assembly 
by simple majority; 
- if the Council has amended the draft budget, 
the Assembly may ratify it by simple 
majority or itself amend the draft budget as 
amended by the Council. Any amendment 
to the Council's amendments to the draft 
budget must be approved by an absolute 
majority. 
The budget thus adopted shall be proclaimed 
adopted by the President, who shall commu-
nicate it to the Council." 
This matter could be dealt with under urgent 
procedure. I therefore ask the members 
intending to sign this draft amendment to say so 
quickly so that urgent procedure may be 
adopted. 
As you said in your statement, Mr. President, 
and in the spirit of the report that has just been 
presented, we must, if we are to promote the dia-
logue with the Council, assist it and ourselves 
with instruments- the Charter and the Rules of 
Procedure - that tally with our own experience. 
We could have saved ourselves the trouble 
because our parliaments have had very long 
experience but we decided otherwise. That is 
why I hope this amendment is adopted. 
You made a brief but very accurate reference, 
Mr. President, to East-West relations. Let us 
beware of finding ourselves back in the 1937-38 
situation. Let us beware of deluding ourselves. 
There can definitely be no question of not con-
cerning ourselves with what is going on in the 
world and, on that point, I agree with the 
Rapporteur. We should remember Colonel ~e 
Gaulle coming back from Poland and, on h1s 
arrival in France, telling those who were 
designing the Maginot Line that it would not be 
enough because only new weapons -. tan~s. at 
that time - would be able to hold 1t, fallmg 
which it would become an utterly dangerous 
form of defence. We should also remember the 
Quai d'Orsay Secretary-General who resigned 
when he got back to Paris after accompanying 
Mr. Daladier to Munich and signing an unwise 
agreement, because he thought that this so-called 
peace pact was an act of cowardice in face of the 
danger of war. 
' \ 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Pannella (continued) 
The Secretary-General from the Quai d'Orsay 
was Alexis Saint-Leger, a poet who took the 
name Saint-J ohn Perse and who foresaw the 
tragedy in store. Today, the claim that military 
weapons are vital and definitive can only come 
from the defence industry: we know that the 
modern weapons for the security and defence of 
our country are food, technology and propa-
ganda. Yet these are totally excluded from our 
field of reference and we ourselves do not talk 
about these aspects of our defence and security. 
I, Mr. President, would like to see a pressing 
demand from our Assembly for security and 
defence to be really equipped with every modern 
weapon. Let us not stop at the design of the 
Maginot Line, the tanks of 1939 and today's 
defence weapons, let us take this further step. 
You can argue any way you like but if, today, 
we say we have to arrive at a WEU that works we 
are deluding ourselves with a false utopia. Either, 
during the next few hours, we succeed both polit-
ically and technically in having a WEU as a 
launch pad matching up to today's requirements, 
or else - with this false and pitiful minimalist 
utopia - we shall once again lose years and 
decades and possibly unique opportunities to 
reconcile freedom with security and peace and 
the defence of our country with our ideas. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - If I have 
rightly understood, you want to convert your 
draft amendment to Document 1110 into a draft 
amendment of the Charter. 
Mr. PANNELLA (Italy) (Translation). - Not 
altogether, Mr. President. I have used the two 
possibilities. The first, which needed only one 
signature, is the text you have in your hands. I 
have tabled that one but there is, of course, a 
second arising out of that amendment. This I 
hope to table after I have collected ten signa-
tures. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Burger. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this is not 
the first time that I have to praise a report by my 
French colleague, Mr. Valleix, both for its 
content and its presentation. But that is no 
reason for me to congratulate him again today. I 
note that several issues in the report will be dealt 
with later by the rapporteurs for the committees 
concerned. 
The report spells out the role of the Presi-
dential Committee which is to inform itself or 
rather be informed of the Council's activities, 
and to offer encouragement or even, if necessary, 
criticism. If WEU were a lady, I would say in 
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medical terms that the Luxembourg President 
has tried the Niehans method, which consists in 
injecting embryonic cells, whereas the Nether-
lands President is giving her a face lift. Both 
operations have certainly improved and will con-
tinue to improve relations between the parlia-
mentary Assembly with the extremely effective 
help of Mr. Cahen, the Secretlary-General. 
With regard to independent management of 
the budget, I note with satfsfaction that the 
Rapporteur and the Presiden~ of our Assembly 
are fully agreed that the apptlopriations for the 
permanent staff of the secretariat should be sepa-
rated from the resources available to the 
Assembly to fulfil its task. Further details will 
certainly be given in the report on the budget by 
my fellow countryman, Mr. Linster. 
With regard to Mr. Valleix's report, I would 
like to thank Mr. Whyte, who is about to leave 
us, for the devotion and courage he has shown 
during his years in our organisation. I also wish 
good luck to Mr. Burgelin, his worthy successor, 
who has already proved his ability combined 
with great willingness to be of help. 
With regard to the political side of the report, I 
am pleased to note that at last Portugal and 
Spain have observers with us1 a right that other 
EEC member states already ep.joy. 
With regard to the political subjects, most of 
which will be dealt with the~ next few days, I 
would pick up a phrase frpm Mr. Valleix's 
report: " WEU has to be more !efficient ". I would 
say has to " become " more efficient. This must 
be the goal of all the WEU organs including our 
own, the parliamentary Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - I 
would like to thank everyone who has spoken. 
Our debate will indeed continue on the various 
technical points that have been raised. In these 
remarks the Presidential Committee sees encour-
agement to do even better in defending the 
interests, policies and objecti~es of the Assembly 
while seeking the best possible spirit of 
co-operation and positive co~struction with the 
Council. · 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I 
I believe the Assembly m.ll agree that we 
should ratify the actions of the~ Presidential Com-
mittee. 
Is there any opposition? ... 
It is so decided. 
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9. Election of two Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In order to 
bring the Bureau of the Assembly up to strength 
as soon as possible, I would like, with your 
approval, to proceed with the election of two 
Vice-Presidents. 
Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure states that 
substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of 
the Assembly. In addition, Rule 10(2) and (10) of 
the Rules of Procedure specifies that no repre-
sentative may stand as a candidate for the offices 
of President or Vice-President unless a proposal 
for his candidature has been sponsored in writing 
by three or more representatives and that repre-
sentatives who are members of governments 
shall not be members of the Bureau. 
Two candidates have been proposed in the 
prescribed manner. 
In alphabetical order they are Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg and Mr. Sarti. 
If the Assembly agrees unanimously I propose 
we elect the two Vice-Presidents by accla-
mation. 
Are there any objections? ... 
I therefore declare Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and 
Mr. Sarti elected Vice-Presidents. 
The order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents 
according to age is as follows: Mr. van der Werff, 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Sarti, Mr. 
Soell and Mr. Pecriaux. 
10. Address by Mr. Cahen, 
Secretary-General of WEU 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the address by Mr. Cahen, 
Secretary-General of WEU, who told me a 
moment ago that he was ready to answer any 
questions at the end of his speech. 
Mr. Cahen, would you please come to the 
rostrum. 
Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-General of WEU) 
(Translation). - This is now the fifth time, Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, members of the 
parliamentary Assembly of Western European 
Union, that you have invited me here to address 
you during your biennial plenary sessions. 
I do not have to tell you just how great an 
honour and a privilege this is for me and today 
than ever before. 
The session which you have just opened Mr. 
President is, I believe, bound to be of special 
significance for me as it is now taking place in 
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a dual context, both aspects of which are equally 
important. 
Firstly, there is a rapidly-evolving interna-
tional situation. Secondly, our organisation has 
recently made a decisive step forward with the 
adoption on 27th October 1987 of the platform 
on European security interests which demon-
strates the extent to which its reactivation has -
as our ministers recognised at their Luxembourg 
meeting last April - become a reality. 
You, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, 
must be aware even more than I of the impor-
tance that these circumstances lend your 
meeting, as your remarkable speech, Mr. Pres-
ident, that of a real European statesman, has 
shown. 
As politicians and elected representatives of 
your countries, sensitive to public opinion, you 
must also be aware of the expectations which 
your forthcoming discussions have aroused 
among our peoples. They cannot help but 
wonder about the future of our Europe in the 
face of the changes taking place in the USSR 
which are affecting East-West relations and, 
beyond that, developments on the world stage. 
And is their attention not drawn therefore quite 
naturally to this hemicycle in which representa-
tives of our Council of Ministers and yourselves 
are about to begin this vital democratic dialogue 
within Europe about the future conditions of its 
security. 
All these key problems are examined in the 
remarkable reports which are before you today. 
From recent developments in Soviet foreign 
policy - dealt with by Mr. Pecriaux - to the arms 
control and disarmament negotiations 
analysed by Mr. Scheer - via the assessment of 
the threat - investigated by Mr. Stokes - many 
of the points affecting the very foundation of 
European security have been dealt with, as well 
as the question I have just mentioned, i.e. 
informing public opinion of these issues, covered 
in Mr. Burger's paper. 
It will be for you to discuss these issues and, in 
so doing, to identify the broad lines of the 
options which - in the indispensable framework 
of Atlantic solidarity to which all our govern-
ments remain committed- you consider Europe 
should adopt. 
On the eve of the summit between the General 
Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mr. 
Gorbachev, and the United States President, Mr. 
Reagan, which is to take place in Washington in 
precisely one week's time, there is certainly no 
shortage of material to be discussed. 
How does this summit fit in with the overall 
development of Soviet policy? 
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What impact will it have on East-West rela-
tions? 
What will be its influence on the transatlantic 
relationship? In this connection, Mr. President, I 
note the importance you attach to developing 
our links with our transatlantic allies so that 
there shall be no misunderstanding. I think you 
are right and I thank you for the thought. 
The platform on European security interests 
by the Ministerial Council on 27th 
last expresses the wish that the summit 
lead to a United States-Soviet agreement 
the global elimination of land-based INF mis-
siles with a range of 500 to 5 000 km. If that 
proves to be so, and we may now hope that it 
will be so, what should be the essential priorities 
- in accordance with the decision taken by the 
North Atlantic Council in Reykjavik - for both 
Europe and our common security within a global 
and coherent approach to arms control? 
The tensions and confrontations in the world 
today could well have serious consequences for 
our security, construed in its broadest sense. Our 
organisation is empowered to address these 
issues by virtue of paragraph 3 of Article VIII of 
the Brussels Treaty as modified by the Paris 
Agreements, a fact of which we have been oppor-
tunely reminded by Mr. van der Sanden, and by 
virtue of the Rome declaration. This is why there 
has been close political consultation among our 
countries on the situation in and around the Gulf 
since last August. Will the results of the summit 
also be reflected in this area? And if so, in what 
way? 
You have before you, therefore, very many 
pressing matters. They are fundamental because 
the responses which will be given go to the very 
heart of the problem of our countries' security. 
The importance of what is at stake is clear. 
But, to answer these questions, we now have 
what Mr. Valleix has called a body of doctrine, 
which can be used as terms of reference. 
That body of doctrine is contained in the 
platform of European security interests. As Mr. 
Valleix said, you will remember that this was the 
hope expressed a year ago in this forum by the 
French Prime Minister, Mr. Jacques Chirac. 
Today, now that the hope has become reality, it 
is only fair to applaud his inspiring initiative. 
For this is an important matter, of itself and also 
in relation to the work of your Assembly; I will 
come back to this question in a moment. 
The Chairmen-in-Office of the Ministerial 
Council, the Netherlands Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs and Defence, Mr. van den Broek and Mr. 
van Eekelen, the French Foreign Minister, Mr. 
Raimond, and the Minister of State of the 
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr. Melior, 
will all be speaking to you about this docu-
ment. 
I shall therefore confine my remarks to two 
aspects of its approval by our ministers which I 
believe to be essential. 
First, as Mr. Valleix stressed, the reactivation 
of Western European Union ltllves intact the 
substance of the treaties and, in particular, the 
obligations which these diplomatic acts place on 
each of the member states vis-a-vis the others 
within the framework ofthe WEU alliance which 
binds them together. The Rome declaration, 
however, adds a new and significant dimension 
to the organisation's terms of reference by 
making it the European centre for joint reflection 
and concerted action on security questions. The 
purpose is to establish among the Seven an 
on-going dialogue aimed at achieving convergent 
or even common positions on the concrete 
problems of Europe's security and thus affirm a 
European identity in this field. 
It can be said that this dialogue has now been 
in existence for almost two years, that it is 
occurring at various levels of authority and 
responsibility and that it has steadily gathered 
momentum and gained in both substance and 
significance. It is concerned with the many key 
questions of security raised by current events. 
Three months ago, a new and decisive step 
forward was taken when, with th~ Gulf problem, 
that dialogue addressed for the first time a crisis 
developing outside Europe's imJinediate security 
area but affecting its strategic and economic 
interests in their widest sense. 
Above all, however, transqending current 
events, it has arrived, with the adoption of the 
platform, at an initial definition of a European 
identity in security. Mr. Vallei.x made special 
mention of this in the excellent report he pre-
sented on behalf of the Presidential Com-
mittee. 
You will agree that this double event is signi-
ficant not just for WEU but also for the entire 
process of European construction in which our 
reactivated organisation - alongside the Com-
munities and political co-operation, of course -
represents a significant component. 
Public opinion has clearly seen this and so 
have the media which reported the event widely 
and here let me quote from a BBC radio pro-
gramme which impressed me gtJeatly: 
" The trouble with historical ~urning points is 
that they don't always adverti~e themselves as 
such, and those that do, not ip.frequently turn 
out to be imposters. All the same, the meeting 
of foreign and defence ministers that took 
place earlier this week in The Hague [the pro-
gramme went out on 31st October] may well 
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turn out to be one such turning point and an 
important step in the drawing together of the 
states of Western Europe ... Some of the lan-
guage used in The Hague suggested that some-
thing of real importance was happening. ' The 
construction of an integrated Europe will 
remain incomplete as long as it does not 
include security and defence ' said the 
platform, which was described by one of the 
ministers as a' European identity card'. That 
sort of talk... could not have been heard a 
couple of years ago. " 
It will come as no surprise to you that the 
report gave me considerable pleasure too, espe-
cially as I had followed the daily progress of the 
work, taking some nine months to produce the 
document, and also because I was very conscious 
of the difficulties of the project and the political 
will shown by member states to overcome them. 
As the weeks went by I saw gradually emerging 
from the national positions a growing area of 
common ground and common language, as a 
result of which we can now speak - still within 
the context of Atlantic solidarity - of truly 
European security. 
Secondly, and this is extremely important for 
you and your work, the platform on European 
security interests represents a kind of programme 
declaration adopted by the Council of Ministers 
on the subject. 
This programme declaration is now before this 
Assembly. 
Thus, the ideal conditions are present for the 
democratic debate which both you and national 
governments have been calling for since the start 
of WEU reactivation. 
As a militant campaigner for the European 
cause for forty years and as a career diplomat for 
over thirty of those years often involved in the 
misadventures of the European construction 
process, I am only too well aware that no success 
can ever be regarded as finally won. As that great 
European, Jean Monnet, said in this connection 
in his Memoires, extracts from which I have 
already quoted on previous occasions," the path 
ahead must be opened up a day at a time". 
There is still a long way to go to the end of that 
path. We clearly have much more to do and 
there will be obstacles along the way. I believe 
sincerely, however, that a crucial stage has now 
been passed and that the reactivated WEU has 
this time got into top gear. If that is so, it is 
because the intergovernmental organs - notably 
the newly-created ones which had to prove their 
worth - have functioned properly. 
With their activities guided by ministerial 
directives and co-ordinated by the Permanent 
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Council, they have- in the three areas of topical 
questions, crises outside Europe's immediate 
security area and the definition of European 
security interests - pursued the tasks of 
reflection and consultation assigned to them in 
such a way as to develop the desired convergent 
positions. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
political directors from the foreign ministries 
and their defence ministry counterparts have 
already met eight times in 1987 whereas the 
original and, incidentally, informal agreement 
was that, in principle, they should meet four 
times a year. 
The politico-military directors from these 
same ministries and their close associates from 
the same departments have met as many as two 
or three times a month - sometimes for two-day 
sessions and working on late into the evening. 
For their part, the work of the expert groups -
particularly those concerned with the problem of 
security in the Mediterranean and the allocation 
and management of defence resources - has pro-
ceeded at a sustained pace. But, as I said just 
now, much still remains to be done, as you have 
yourselves pointed out in your speeches. 
At the institutional level, for example, the 
reorganisation of the administrative organs of 
WEU has still to be consolidated. Your President 
made the point a moment ago. 
At their meetings on 26th and 27th October, 
our ministers agreed that this reorganisation 
would involve the merging of the three agencies 
on security questions into a single entity and that 
this should come under the direct authority of 
the Secretary-General. They also agreed that all 
the administrative organs of WEU should be 
brought together at one and the same location. 
It is with these goals in view that the govern-
ments are now working on the changes to these 
organs. The aim is to remodel them in such a 
way that, as recommended by Mr. van der 
Sanden, " the Secretariat-General is in a position 
to assist the Council in all its activities". 
I should not like to end this address without 
mentioning - in addition to those reports sub-
mitted to your Assembly to which I have already 
referred- the reports of the Committee on Scien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, 
written by Mr. Bassinet and Mr. Fourre. 
I feel that it is particularly valuable that, 
through this committee's reports, the Assembly 
is helping to steer European energies towards 
co-operative projects designed to enable our con-
tinent to maintain, at the highest possible level, 
its contribution to the mastery of technological 
progress and the development of basic research. 
This is especially necessary in the space sector 
which illustrates how closely Europe's security 
depends, in the final analysis, on its scientific 
OmCIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Cahen (continued) 
and technological independence. The exceptional 
richness of our past and our regained prosperity 
place an obligation on our countries to respond 
together to the challenges of the future. 
It is gratifying that the parliamentary 
Assembly is making its voice clearly heard in this 
connection, thus stimulating the genesis of a 
common political will at governmental level. 
Because it is, of course, a question of political 
will and our governments, as they have shown, 
have that political will. 
Since reactivation, successive presidencies of 
European Union - today the Nether-
lands presidency to whom I am pleased to pay 
tribute - have inspired the organisation to 
achieve the results which we can now see and 
which have also been greeted with satisfaction in 
the other forums concerned with the building of 
Europe. 
Let me quote in this context the words of a 
great European whose work at the head of the 
European Commission deserves the highest 
praise and respect. I am talking about Jacques 
Delors. 
Addressing the Institut Royal Superieur de 
Defense in Brussels last September at the 
opening of the current academic year and 
referring specifically to " Defence, a dimension 
of Europe", President Delors said: "In institu-
tional terms, my hope is focused on the reacti-
vation of WEU and its ability to act in the near 
future as the necessary interface between the 
European Community, political co-operation 
and the Atlantic Alliance. This hope is based on 
the fact that, since its reactivation, achieved, it 
must be stressed, in difficult rather than in 
favourable circumstances (i.e. the unilateral dec-
laration of the SDI programme and the problem 
of how to respond to it, the Reykjavik meeting 
and the quickening pace of the Geneva negotia-
tions), WEU has enabled some fundamental 
thinking to take place about European defence 
through the frequent and regular meetings of the 
foreign and defence ministers of seven member 
states. " 
Mr. Delors then added that, although the 
platform was not yet agreed, " this thinking 
should lead to a definition of European interests 
in the field of defence in the near future. It could 
be a very important step if, with use, this defi-
nition were to become a kind of' compulsory ref-
erence ' on the basis of which common European 
positions within the Atlantic Alliance could be 
established for the implementation of the provi-
sions of the single European act. " 
Speaking on 4th November, Mr. Reagan, the 
President of our great ally the United States, also 
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welcomed the adoption of the platform as an 
event of major importance. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, a king of 
my country, Leopold 11, said: " You wear an idea 
out if all you do is to go on talking about it and 
never put it into practice. " This is a danger 
which lies in wait for every llluman venture, 
however noble it may be. The grand idea of 
European construction is no more immune from 
this than any other. 
It is now some three years since the reacti-
vation of our organisation effectively began. You 
have expressed some impaticmce about its 
progress, performing in this way the vital cata-
lytic role which is that of a parliament. I believe 
that today we can now together take heart from 
the achievement of that reactivatlion and from its 
results, which will enable the iclea of European 
security - and beyond that the building of our 
Europe - not to become wornl but instead to 
flourish. 
I said that we should take heart together 
because, as our President and Mr. Valleix said, 
we share the same objective. We all want security 
with a European dimension. We want that 
security in the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance and in the framework of the con-
struction of Europe. So we need to work towards 
it together. 
Clearly that joint action - our joint action -
has to be based on the reciprocal exchange of 
information and of our political wills as well. 
In that connection, the parli~ment you form 
has an essential part to play. I twas gratified to 
hear the speakers reiterate their ~sh to play that 
part. You have my assurance that the Council 
also wishes to do so with you. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Secretary-General, for your address. 
A moment ago you said you were ready to 
answer any questions from Il)embers of the 
Assembly. 
I call Mr. Close. 
Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, I have a 
two-part question to put to the Secretary-
General. 
In paragraph 46 of his report, Mr. van der 
Sanden said that, at its meeting on 21st Sep-
tember 1987, the General Affairs Committee was 
divided in its views on the degree! of co-operation 
in the operations of five of our member countries 
in the Gulf. 
I am one of those who did not think they have 
been a complete success, far from it. The opera-
tions were mounted quite separately and, to my 
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mind, far more under the pressure of external 
circumstances than as the expression of a delib-
erate strategy for coherent action in that part of 
the globe where we have vital interests. 
I would like to know to what extent there was 
any military co-ordination of the naval forces 
sent to the Gulf by member countries. Was the 
question discussed in the enlarged Council? 
On this point I would recall that the Atlantic 
Alliance has its ACE mobile force which has mis-
sions both on our northern flank, in the Narvik 
area, and on our southern flank, in Greece and 
Turkey. It too is made up of various national 
detachments - from Italy, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Belgium and so on. It is 
clear that, even in peace time, the missions given 
to these forces would be impossible without 
operational plans worked out in advance, a 
measure of integrated military command and 
consultation between the various national 
detachments. All that, it seems to me, is sadly 
lacking in the case of the forces sent to the Gulf. I 
can see that this may be the first large-scale oper-
ation of its kind but I nevertheless draw your 
attention to the fact that if the intention is to 
have a force permanently on call for similar 
operations, which seems to me desirable, it 
would perhaps be a good idea to have contin-
gency plans prepared in advance as well. 
Moving to my second point, the media have 
given a lot of space to an operation by a Franco-
German brigade called, revealingly, "cheeky 
sparrow". Sparrow was probably a better name 
for the operation than " daring eagle " would 
have been! That being said, the event seems to 
me to have been grossly inflated. In fact, it was a 
combined operation by two national forces in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. This has been 
going on for twenty years since General Haig 
made it general practice when he was supreme 
commander. I would also point out that no oper-
ations other than integrated multinational 
manoeuvres can take place in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. This is gratifying evidence 
of a renewed interest in the co-operation that has 
long prevailed between France and Germany. 
That brings me to the question I really wanted 
to ask. We have also learned that the Nether-
lands is interested in being associated with the 
Franco-German brigade. I would point out, in 
passing, that a brigade consists of 3 000 to 5 000 
men and this is not likely to have the Soviets 
trembling in their shoes. Spain has apparently 
shown a similar interest. I wonder how the Neth-
erlands, situated as it is right to the north of 
central Europe, could take part in operations in 
Bavaria or the Alps? While the Spanish, who 
would probably have a long way to come, would 
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no doubt arrive in time for the end of the 
manoeuvres. So much for that. 
What I wanted to say was that we have to keep 
our commonsense and see things in their right, 
i.e. in this case, symbolic, proportions. We 
should not imagine that WEU is going to be able 
to make any extraordinary capital out of this 
operation. 
Another important point relates to the funda-
mental problem of command. Ifl remember cor-
rectly, the manoeuvres took place without Lord 
Carrington, the Secretary-General of the a.u.c•au,.., ... , 
and the Supreme Commander being invited. T 
my mind, that was a mistake, but no matter. Tl> 
legitimate question is: if a joint formation wer 
to be instituted, who would be giving the 
if it went into operation? A Franco-German 
command suspended between the Atlantic 
Alliance and something that does not yet exist? I 
put the problem to you and would be glad, Secre-
tary-General, to have your feelings on these two 
points. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I would ask 
other speakers not to make speeches but to put 
their questions briefly. 
I call the Secretary-General to reply to Mr. 
Close. 
Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-Genera/ of WEU) 
(Translation). - You have yourself made the 
point that it was the first operation of its kind. It 
was certainly the first time that the WEU coun-
tries tackled an out-of-area problem. Their 
approach, if I may say so, has been wholly prag-
matic in a field that is within their competence 
but altogether new. 
They began, since after all we are a forum for 
political thinking and consultation - that was 
why we were reactivated- with political consul-
tation. On the initiative of the Netherlands Pres-
ident, the political directors and their opposite · 
numbers in the defence ministries met at The 
Hague on 20th August. At that time, two coun-
tries long present in the Gulf had already decided 
to send out the necessary ships. Following that 
first meeting, three other countries, at various 
intervals, decided to send their flotillas too. It 
should be noted that these were operations at 
national level but based on WEU consultation 
which continued into September and October. It 
is interesting to note that two countries that 
could not take part directly in the operation - the 
Federal Republic of Germany because its consti-
tution does not allow it and Luxembourg 
because it does not have the necessary military 
and naval capability - decided nevertheless to 
give their backing to the operation. The Federal 
Republic of Germany agreed to replace the units 
leaving for the Gulf not only in the Atlantic but 
also in the Mediterranean, which was to some 
extent an innovation and important for Europe. 
,, 
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For its part, Luxembourg - though not asked to 
do anything - took the initiative of sharing in the 
cost of certain operations. It is right, therefore, to 
speak of concerted political action or political 
solidarity and, on top of that, technical 
co-ordination, because the operations are 
co-ordinated at technical level both on the spot, 
that is to say between the commanders of the flo-
tillas in the Gulf, and in the capitals concerned: a 
correspondent has been appointed in the various 
admiralties and can be summoned by the Neth-
erlands presidency. 
You will tell me that this is not what happens 
in NATO where we have forces permanently on 
call and contingency plans. We have been reacti-
vated not as an operational organisation but as a 
political organisation for study and consultation. 
As I told a Belgian journalist asking me ques-
tions about the WEU fleet, I am only a secretary-
general not an admiral. It may come, I would not 
mind, but we have not got that far yet. 
To my mind it is because of our progress in 
political consultation that we were able to mount 
these operations which are national but have a 
frame of political solidarity and are co-ordinated 
at technical level. That is already quite some-
thing. 
As to Franco-German " cheeky sparrow " 
manoeuvres and the possibility that certain 
countries, including the Netherlands - which is 
news to me and you seemed surprised too, Your 
Excellency - and possibly Spain, might be 
joining the brigade or the manoeuvres or the 
Franco-German defence council, all this has to 
be seen in a certain context, that of our alliance 
and our WEU solidarity as expressed in the 
platform and, for example, in the formal under-
taking entered into by all member countries to 
defend their partners at their borders. Being no 
more than a second lieutenant on the reserve and 
in retirement, I shall not make any judgment on 
the impact or importance of the "cheeky 
sparrow " manoeuvre. However, in the context 
of the platform and the undertaking, together 
with the commitment under Article V of the 
treaty to defend all our partners by every pos-
sible means, whether military or otherwise, the 
" cheeky sparrow " manoeuvre, the Franco-
German brigade and even the defence council 
may be said to acquire a wholly different 
dimension and undoubted political importance. 
I would add that all these problems are discussed 
within WEU and that extremely useful 
exchanges of information take place. Europe's 
identity and security are being built in WEU 
around which initiatives are developed like those 
which are features of the relations between 
Germany and France but which could equally 
well be aspects of relations between Germany 
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and the United Kingdom or 'between Germany 
and Italy in the Mediterranean. 
Now with regard to the possibility of other 
countries joining the brigade, the manoeuvres or 
the Council, that is for the moment no more 
than an idea. You have asked me whether the 
Spanish Government is prepared to take part in 
joint manoeuvres. I do not know, but it is cer-
tainly a question that the platform raises for our 
Spanish friends. Since the platform says that we 
are all ready to defend our partners at their 
borders, is Spain ready, as France has declared it 
is, to do so and to structure its forces to make 
this possible? 
I have heard, off the record, that the answer is 
not necessarily no. With regard to the Nether-
lands there is no problem. They have signed the 
platform. I would even say that it came into 
being because of the efforts of the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg presidencies, the members of 
the Atlantic Alliance and the integrated 
command. For them there is nothing new in 
taking part in bilateral, trilateral or other 
manoeuvres. 
Does that answer your questions, Mr. 
Senator? 
Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). - Partly, 
at least. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Secretary-General. I would ask members who 
wish to ask questions to be brief in their intro-
ductory statements and the Secretary-General, as 
far as possible, to give very brief answers. 
I call Mr. Burger. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Secretary-General, with regard to the security 
and defence of Western Europe, why was the 
term " platform " preferred to the word 
"charter" proposed by Mr. Chirac? Was it 
because it was Mr. Chirac who proposed it or 
does " platform " imply as formal a commitment 
as " charter "? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Secretary-General. 
Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-General of WEU) 
(Translation). - Thank you , very much Mr. 
Burger. Actually we had several alternatives. The 
act could have been called a <+ charter " and we 
also thought of" declaration", "communique" 
and finally "platform", which was chosen 
because it has more meanings in French than in 
English. 
Our ultimate concern was that the substance 
should have more importance ~ban the form and 
on that score I think I can tell you very briefly -
in deference to the President's wishes - that the 
word " platform " in no way detracts from the 
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substance or character of the commitments 
entered into in these documents and that these 
commitments are extremely important. The con-
firmation of Article V of the treaty, the com-
mitment to defend any member country at its 
borders, the commitment to improve conven-
tional forces and the support for the deterrence 
principle with the right conventional/nuclear 
mix are notions charged with substance and fully 
binding whatever term is used. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - Secre-
tary-General, I would just add one word. I feel 
awkward at taking the floor again because you 
referred at some length to the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions whose Chairman, Mr. Wilkinson, is leaving 
us. I know my question is something he is con-
cerned about as well. 
You referred to the reports of Mr. Bassinet and 
Mr. Fourre which are indeed highly interesting. 
They will be debated during this session, but as 
for certain recent answers to some reports you 
have not told us everything we wanted to know. I 
am thinking, for example, of Europe's space 
future. Fortunately, the decisions reached in The 
Hague are relatively encouraging. 
Secretary-General, do you think that the 
Council has the will and the means to give effect 
to the work of that committee? May we, in other 
words, hope that the dialogue on this subject will 
be more fruitful in the future than it has been in 
the recent past? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Secretary-General. 
Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-General of WEU) 
(Translation). - It is a fact that when the min-
isters met at The Hague, they made some very 
encouraging statements in this field. That is why 
I made the point because I know that some 
replies have not been full enough for you. The 
Council is resolved to pursue and intensify its 
efforts in this field and those efforts could have 
repercussions either in our own organisation or 
in others like ESA. After all they too are involved 
in the construction of Europe and, if they can 
play a mainspring role in other fields in which 
they can work more usefully than we can because 
they have the necessary technical and scientific 
staff, they will do so. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Pannella. 
Mr. PANNELLA (Italy) (Translation). - Sec-
retary-General, the argument I have heard is that 
we are an organisation for consultation and 
political co-operation but is saying that the same 
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thing as saying that we are prepared to be an 
organisation of consultation and study in 
response to action already taken? To my mind 
we can only be such an organisation if we 
actually defend our frontiers and an institutional 
WEU territory. I tell you frankly the Franco-
German brigade leaves us unmoved - one way 
or the other. It is very nice, it is a good thing, it is 
a sparrow, a swallow - but it does not make a 
summer. The only people who can really be 
moved are those with totems or taboos. The time 
I am moved is when the Secretary-General of our 
organisation tells us: " It is very good, there is 
Iran, the Gulf and the things that have hap-
pened. " Member countries, one by one have 
taken their decision. Five are there but the others 
are not. We consult and reflect about what others 
have done. As far as we can, we pick up the 
pieces after the bull's visit to the china shop. 
My question is this: do you not think when all 
is said and done that an organisation or union 
like ours might sometimes have - I will not say 
the courage - but the need to answer a clear no 
to something that may seem positive in itselfbut 
which is the expression of a chaotic, an anar-
chical or, say, national and fragmentary way of 
responding to the events of our century and our 
age. On the contrary, in the context, it is neg-
ative. 
I do not, I am sorry to say, share your satis-
faction. Quite the contrary. Either we succeed in 
getting the others to pull together behind a WEU 
initiative or perhaps, in forty years' time, we 
shall again be patting ourselves on the back for 
the progress we have made and hoping that 
Europe and European defence will come to 
maturity in the forty years still to come. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Cahen. 
Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-General of WEU) 
(Translation). - Thank you very much, Mr. 
Pannella. You said " I do not share your satis-
faction ", but as always in the European field the 
satisfaction is double-edged. I feel satisfied today 
when I look back and see where we have come 
from. That applies both to the European Com-
munity and to political co-operation. 
I am not satisfied when I look forward because 
there is still a long way to go and there, of course, 
we have to look for further progress. We have 
come from nothing. We shook ourselves awake 
two and a half or three years ago. Then we began 
to learn, as you say very rightly, to react to what 
was going on in the outside world and to try to 
consult and agree our attitude towards it. This 
was the reaction phase. In the Gulf, we went a 
little further. It is true that it would no doubt 
have been more satisfactory if it had been a 
WEU operation. But, after all, when our min-
isters decided to reactivate WEU they did not go 
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that far. As a first stage, they confined them-
selves to political consultation and reflection. In 
the end, on the basis of that political consul-
tation, we went further than they had intended 
and they accepted it. 
Then comes the third and last stage, because, 
in order not simply to react but to take action, 
there has to be a doctrine: we cannot act or plan 
without one. Now, thank heaven or rather 
thanks to the work of the experts and the min-
isters, we have our doctrine, the platform. Not 
only can we respond, using the terms of reference 
drawn up and defined prior to the crisis, we can 
even use those terms of reference to plan and 
programme our reactions to given situations in 
advance. So that is not so bad. I fully agree we 
should go further. I quoted Jean Monnet a 
moment ago and I am going to quote him again. 
You will remember him saying, at the end of his 
Memoires: " Those who have decided in advance 
that things will go the way they expected them to 
go condemn themselves to inertia." No one can 
foretell the way Europe of the future will look 
because no one can foresee what further changes 
will come from change and he added: " The path 
ahead has to be opened up day by day. What is 
important is to have an exact vision of one's goal 
and not to be diverted from it. " Perhaps we have 
made a first step in that direction with the 
platform. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Stegagnini. 
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). -
Secretary-General, I should like to comment on 
your remarks concerning partial concerted action 
on the Persian Gulf. I recall that when the multi-
national force was set up for Sinai, with United 
States participation, it became an international 
body even though it was based on bilateral 
treaties between the countries taking part. The 
multinational force has in fact continued to 
operate over a number of years and I think to the 
general satisfaction. This would appear to teach 
the somewhat bitter lesson that without United 
States involvement it is difficult for the member 
countries of WEU to agree on any major 
co-ordinated action, as they failed to do for the 
Persian Gulf. 
May I make a further comment. You said, Sec-
retary-General, that with your agreement it has 
been decided that the WEU agencies should be 
reorganised into a single agency to provide tech-
nical support for the Council. I wonder what the 
purpose of this is to be. Is the aim industrial 
co-operation, the co-ordination of scientific and 
technological research or, particularly at this 
very difficult time when there are more and 
more " Irangates ", is it to be collaboration in 
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working out common legislation for the pro-
duction and the export of armaments? 
I should be grateful for an answer on these 
points, and may I remind you that we discussed 
them when we met last spring in London. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Cahen. 
Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-General of WEU) 
(Translation). - Thank you very much Mr. 
Stegagnini. 
On the first point, there have been many 
experiments in bilateral military co-operation, 
particularly in the case of peace-keeping op~ra­
tions. Some of these are under the Umted 
Nations umbrella as still in Cyprus at the 
moment and in the Middle1 East and others 
under bi- or multinational agr~ements like those 
you have just mentioned and the multinational 
force in Lebanon. 
These are experiments from which we cancer-
tainly draw, at least for reference. But they are 
somewhat different from what has happened 
with regard to the Gulf where we began with our 
own field of competence: poltitical consultation 
and co-operation. This led on to the national 
operations- we are not yet at the point of having 
WEU operations and I do not know whether we 
ever will be - in a deliberate context of solidarity 
and with technical co-ordination of the imple-
menting action. That is what we have done so far 
and it is that which gives us ~atisfaction at this 
stage in terms of the political climate and the 
practical course of operations, if I am to judge 
from what I have been able to glean at the 
political and technical meetings, i.e. at the level 
of the admiralties, that I am able to attend. 
Up to now we have had three agencies: the 
first is a think tank on arms control and disarm-
ament problems, the second deals with security 
problems and the third with those of arms 
co-operation. The idea is to merge these three 
units into one, the members of which would be 
high-level experts and whose field of competence 
would be, in broad terms, firstly security, that is 
to say both defence and the1 control of arma-
ments and disarmament, and. secondly security 
and defence capabilities. This of course relates to 
interarmament co-operation and problems like 
resource allocation and management. 
In this very broad framework, the single 
agency would respond to member countries' 
requests for specific studies . .lfor that purpose it 
would have to have a very fle){.ible structure. The 
experts would have their specialisations of 
course, but they would be able to work with 
experts with other specialisations in a workshop 
to meet member countries' requests. It would be 
a kind of Chatham House - the Royal Institute 
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of International Relations in London - at the 
service of WEU. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Soell. 
Mr. SOELL (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Secretary-General, my question, 
like those of previous speakers, is prompted by 
my anxiety that Western European Union and 
its institutions are lagging further and further 
behind the real tide of East-West developments 
and are being relegated to ratifying the factual 
achievements of others. 
As Secretary-General, you informed the 
Assembly at the end of March 1987 that the 
security agencies were being commissioned to 
carry out two studies, the first on the verification 
proposals associated with the current arms 
control negotiations and the second on Soviet 
arms control and disarmament tactics in relation 
to the countries of Western Europe. 
What has been the outcome of this work so far, 
and how can the Assembly's committees take 
advantage of the results achieved? This is a vital 
question, when we consider that in a week's 
time, on 7th December, the agreement on inter-
mediate nuclear forces is to be concluded, an 
agreement of more than 120 pages, with one 
hundred pages of highly detailed verification 
provisions, only very few of which are known. 
This leads me to the conclusion that the 
Assembly, the Council, the Secretary-General 
and the agencies are obviously unable in practice 
to do anything but react to the negotiations of 
others without themselves undertaking any 
co-ordinated and concerted action. 
How do you consider that Western European 
Union's institutions could be improved for the 
benefit of the debates and negotiations of the 
Assembly and its committees as well? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Cahen. 
Mr. CAHEN (Secretary-Genera/ of WEU) 
(Translation). - Mr. Soell, the agencies have 
indeed done the work they were asked to do, par-
ticularly with regard to Soviet tactics in this 
matter. They produced their report which the 
Council has discussed and is still discussing. In 
particular, some delegations are still waiting for 
instructions from their governments on the 
subject. 
You have asked us - and this I think is the 
heart of the problem - what we can do together -
parliament, Council of Ministers, Permanent 
Council and all the intergovernmental bodies -
to react to events. 
The problem is political and needs first to be 
examined on the basis of the body of doctrine 
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with which we have now equipped ourselves at 
political level, since reactivation and then the 
adoption of this platform were decided by the 
representatives from capitals, then the Per-
manent Council and lastly the ministers. 
By fleshing out this doctrine - and we are 
resolved to continue our action in that direction 
- we should be able to decide our long-term posi-
tions and in that way to be ready in advance of 
events by defining how Europe sees things in this 
or that sphere. 
We shall, of course, be presenting you with a 
report on the basis of which the Assembly will be 
able to define its attitude. I hope that you will 
have this discussion with the ministers visiting 
you and that you will tell them: " This is what we 
want your platform to go into more deeply, these 
are the hypotheses we would like you to study 
and on which you ought to take policy deci-
sions. " In this way we shall be able to do more 
than just react. 
In this connection, the role of the agencies is 
very important. If we want to act on the basis of 
our political doctrine - which is the business of 
national governments and your parliament -
and not just react to certain potential events we 
have to be able to ask our think tank: what are 
the facts, what are the possibilities and what are 
the possible scenarios. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
very much, Secretary-General. I also thank the 
speakers. 
11. Revision and interpretation 
of the Rules of Procedure 
(Presentation of the report of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Pri'ikges 
and 'ote on the draft decision, 
Doe. 1110 and amendment) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Rules of Pro-
cedure and Privileges on the revision and inter-
pretation of the Rules of Procedure and vote on 
the draft decision, Document 1110 and 
amendment. 
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and 
Rapporteur of the Committee on Rules of Pro-
cedure and Privileges. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
I could take ten or fifteen minutes to explain the 
recommendations in detail, but I do not think 
that we want to do that. We are already a little 
behind time. 
I assure the Assembly that none of the recom-
mendations is controversial. They all tidy up 
matters that have been brought to our attention. 
I shall be delighted to answer questions after our 
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discussion, if there are any, but I should say that 
all the recommendations are carefully explained 
in my memorandum. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Pannella to speak in the debate. 
He does not appear to be here. 
The debate is therefore closed. 
I call the Chairman of the committee. 
(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg indicated that he had 
nothing to add) 
We shall now consider the draft decision in 
Document 1110. 
Amendment 1 has been tabled by Mr. 
Pannella. 
The amendment has been distributed. 
However, under Rule 29 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, I declare the amendment to be out of 
order. 
It is contrary to the provisions of paragraphs 
(a) and (c) of Article VIII of the Charter of the 
Assembly regarding budgetary questions. 
However, the idea could be studied by the 
Presidential Committee. 
We shall now, therefore, vote on the draft 
decision in Document 1110. 
Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting 
and standing unless ten or more representatives 
or substitutes present in the chamber request a 
vote by roll-call. 
Are there ten members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
That is not the case. 
We shall therefore vote by sitting and 
standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft decision is adopted unanimously 1• 
12. Political activities of the Council - reply to 
the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the 
General A/fairs Committee, Doe. 1117) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order ofthe day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the General Affairs Committee 
on the political activities of the Council - reply 
1. See page 17. 
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to the thirty-second annual report of the Council, 
Document 1117. 
I call Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur of the 
General Affairs Committee. 
Mr. van der SANDEN .(Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, seldom before in the 
comparatively short history of WEU have there 
been in so short a time so many events of funda-
mental importance to peace and security in 
Europe and the world. 
When I was instructed by the General Affairs 
Committee to draw up a report on the thirty-
second annual report of the Council of Ministers, 
it seemed a very simple task. There was not a 
great deal to report on and since hardly anything 
had happened my report would have to be fairly 
negative. But that was not eX!ceptional in itself, 
because when I acted as the Assembly's 
Rapporteur on the thirtieth annual report a few 
years ago, immediately after the decisions to 
reactivate WEU had been taken in Rome in 
October 1984, I also had to say that relations 
between the Council and Assembly left a great 
deal to be desired. Then too I had to point out 
that the amount of information the Assembly 
was receiving was completely inadequate. 
The Assembly was, of course, pleased when 
the Council reacted in its answer to Recommen-
dation 420 as follows: 
" The Council wishes to assure the Assembly 
of the importance that the member states as a 
whole attach to its reply to the Council's 
annual report in view of the fact that the ques-
tions dealt with in these documents directly 
affect the organisation's activity and its subse-
quent development. The Council, moreover, 
has on several occasions 1 acknowledged the 
important contribution that the Assembly's 
deliberations have made to the revival of 
WEU." 
But, Mr. President, that Was on 18th Sep-
tember 1985. In the intervening two years the 
Assembly has adopted three reports, one by Mr. 
Bianco and two by the current Chairman of the 
General Affairs Committee, Mr. Ahrens. These 
reports are crammed with questions - many of 
which have remained unanswered. 
So when your Rapporteur began work on his 
report on the thirty-secollP annual report, 
nothing had in fact changed and there was a 
danger of the monotonous tale being repeated. 
But fortunately things had been speeding up in 
the organisation's inner chambers, and it seemed 
that favourable decisions on' reactivation could 
not and would not be put off any longer. Apart 
from strong initiatives by the presidency, 
external factors were also needed to bring this 
about. I refer in this context to the rapidly esca-
lating tension in the Gulf, of which you, Mr. 
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President, the Secretary-General and Mr. Valleix 
have spoken today. I refer also to the surprising 
developments in the relationship between the 
two superpowers as regards intermediate-range 
missiles and the announcement of the estab-
lishment of a Franco-German brigade. 
As regards the reactivation of WEU itself, 
there have been some important initiatives, 
which eventually led, at the meeting of the 
Council of Ministers on 27th October, to the 
establishment of a platform which I have even 
seen called in some press commentaries " a new 
constitution for WEU ".The result of all this was 
that my terms of reference as your Rapporteur 
were extended to make the Council's political 
activities the main subject of the report. I shall 
not therefore be saying anything today about the 
thirty-second annual report which, as far as I am 
concerned, can be stored away in the library as it 
stands. 
Mr. President, I also want to make it abso-· 
lutely clear today that a reactivated WEU must 
be no more and no less than the European pillar 
within the NATO alliance. I am therefore very 
happy about the assurance recently given by the 
current Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 
Mr. Hans van den Broek. He said that the Amer-
icans are in no doubt at all about free Europe's 
solidarity with NATO and that they are 
observing with approval the "'developments that 
m(ly help to strengthen this European pillar. This 
is as it should be, because security and peace are 
inseparable in the present world situation and at 
this very moment an agreement between the two 
superpowers is so close - closer in fact than ever 
before - that there must be no rifts in the NATO 
alliance. 
This is all the more true now that President 
Reagan has for the first time spoken about WEU 
at length, in a statement on 4th November to a 
very broad public, in which he gave his whole-
hearted support to the platform adopted in The 
Hague. He said then that his country welcomed 
the statement by the Seven reaffirming the 
importance of maintaining both nuclear and 
conventional deterrents and establishing a pos-
itive Western European identity in the field of 
defence within the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance. He added that a more equal rela-
tionship should not diminish our bonds but 
strengthen them. It should not limit our 
potential but expand it. Although in 1985 the 
United States had serious reservations about the 
public expression of a European view on disarm-
ament, it was now delighted with WEU's reacti-
vation. 
None of this alters the fact that the Europeans 
also have a responsibility of their own and that, 
in particular, a reduction in nuclear weapons 
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must focus our attention more closely on con-
ventional arms. But the political as well as the 
purely military aspects are extremely important. 
Let me remind you once again that WEU's reac-
tivation, which has now been given such clear 
form and substance in the platform, must not be 
seen as a temporary substitute for European 
political co-operation, which has not worked in 
the past. Now that we have made a beginning by 
bringing the seven WEU countries much closer 
together in the area of security policy, WEU 
should also continue to be the instrument for 
further development towards an integrated 
Europe. After all, the platform itself says in para-
graph 3 of the preamble: 
" We see the revitalisation of WEU as an 
important contribution to the broader process 
of European unification. " 
In this connection, Mr. President, I should just 
like to say a few words about more specific 
developments in relations between France and 
the Federal Republic of Germany in the military 
sphere. I will admit that I was taken aback to 
start with. Why? Because at first sight something 
strange was happening here: French troops, 
which are not part of NATO, were going to 
co-operate with German units, which are inte-
grated. On the other hand, a Franco-German 
brigade does once again underline very clearly 
the Franco-German friendship which is so vital 
to the process of European unification. 
However, I still have some quite specific 
worries, as I will explain. WEU is an 
organisation to which the smaller countries, such 
as Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 
also belong, and in the case of a subject as sen-
sitive as military co-operation it is never a good 
thing when large countries look like going their 
own way to some extent. I will do no more today 
than refer to this anxiety which the small coun-
tries undoubtedly feel, and await further devel-
opments. Many questions remain unanswered, 
and the nuclear aspects are not the least 
important of them. But perhaps things will be 
clearer when the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
Elysee Treaty is celebrated at the end of January 
1988. 
Mr. President, the platform repeatedly 
emphasises the need for a united Europe: " It is 
our conviction that a more united Europe will 
make a stronger contribution to the alliance, to 
the benefit of western security as a whole. " 
This brings me to the problem of enlargement. 
First of all, I would remind you of the Council's 
position. It has told the Assembly that 
enlargement cannot be envisaged until the 
decision-making on reactivation has been com-
pleted. The Assembly has said on several occa-
sions that Portugal's application cannot be left 
much longer. The Assembly has not issued state-
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ments on other countries in the same way. I refer 
you to the report by Mr. Ahrens. If I understand 
the platform rightly, the Council is in fact saying 
that the ball is back in the court of the countries 
that are interested in acceding to WEU. Why? 
Because the conditions that have been laid down 
for the current member states must also be 
accepted by new members. I am therefore 
assuming at the moment that, as all the 
European NATO countries have been directly 
informed of the platform, the Council will await 
reactions from the capitals concerned. I would 
stress in this connection that as matters stand at 
present not only the modified Brussels Treaty, 
the WEU treaty, but also the platform must be 
seen as governing the accession of new 
members. 
I consider it highly logical in this context that 
the statement by the Chairman of the Council 
should explicitly indicate that there must be no 
conflicts between future member states. 
There is another very important point in the 
platform that I should like to single out today. 
The first paragraph of section Ill( a) reads: 
"We recall the fundamental obligation of 
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty to 
provide all the military and other aid and 
assistance in our power in the event of armed 
attack on any one of us. " 
And in paragraph 4 we read: 
" Ensure that our determination to defend any 
member country at its borders is made clearly 
manifest by means of appropriate arrange-
ments." 
Others have already referred to these famous 
words this afternoon. I repeat: "To defend any 
member country at its borders", and this obli-
gation should be taken literally and should also 
be incumbent on new members. The same 
burden-sharing applies, as the platform also 
explicitly states, to all aspects of co-operation in 
WEU. 
Mr. President, the developments in the Gulf 
have - for the first time - prompted the appli-
cation of Article VIII of the treaty. I am - like 
others I have heard today - very happy about 
this, and I hope that co-operation, which is far 
from complete at the moment, will continue to 
expand, because what we are in fact talking about 
here is the freedom of the seas in the Gulf. The 
purpose cannot and must not be solely the pro-
tection of our own national interests: the 
interests of the international community as a 
whole are equally at stake. 
In paragraph 44 of my report I have said that 
the Assembly has only twice been informed of 
the Council's meetings. This meant that we 
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would not have received any written information 
on the meeting of 14th October, the so-called 
"third Gulf consultations". l am pleased to be 
able to say now that the Presi<ilent of the Council 
informed the Assembly of this meeting by letter 
of 20th October. 
I will conclude with a few' comments on the 
Council's decisions on the agencies. The three 
agencies are being merged into one. I assume 
that a start has now been made on the implemen-
tation of this decision. I alsp assume that the 
decision taken on 27th Octdber will be imple-
mented immediately and not left until a much 
later date. This one agency will then be the direct 
responsibility of the Secretary-General and will-
as far as I know - comprise three secretariats: 
policy, research and logistics, which will include 
the support secretariats, such ~s interpreters. The 
Council has yet to take a deci*on on the location 
of this agency, together with t.be other ministerial 
organs. 
Mr. President, I will depart from my text for a 
moment, because I have noted this morning that 
some people believe collocation would extend to 
the Assembly and the Office of the Clerk. As far 
as I know, that is not the case. We are talking 
only about the collocation of the ministerial 
organs. 
The reactivation of the organisation, which 
means significant reductions hand-in-hand with 
greater effectiveness, will release financial 
resources that can be used to I pay for things this 
Assembly would like to see 1 done. I hope and 
expect that decisions will very soon be taken on 
this. After all, Mr. President, you have already 
written to the Council on this issue. 
Last week, Secretary of ~tate Shultz of the 
United States and Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze of the Soviet p nion finalised an 
historic agreement between tqe two superpowers, 
which is to be signed in Washington on 8th 
December. This treaty will have far-reaching 
implications, both for East-West relations and 
for European security policy. Now that the 
deployment of cruise missiles.can be stopped, the 
reduction of nuclear weapon~on the territory of 
the WEU countries and el ewhere will have 
implications for the strate pursued by the 
NATO countries as a whole' and for the WEU 
countries in particular. I have already referred to 
burden-sharing, which will also apply to any new 
countries joining WEU, but first and foremost, 
of course, it implies an obligation for the WEU 
countries, as the platform a~in explicitly states. 
Burden-sharing applies to both nuclear and con-
ventional arms. The platforni states: " European 
forces play an essential role: the overall credi-
bility of the western strategy of deterrence and 
defence cannot be maintain~d without a major 
European contribution not least because the con-
ventional imbalance affects the security of 
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Western Europe in a very direct way." The 
platform goes on to say: " The Europeans have a 
major responsibility both in the field of conven-
tional and nuclear defence. " 
Mr. President, I have almost finished. It is a 
long time since we were last able to speak with so 
much optimism in this Assembly about real 
progress being made in the reactivation of WEU 
- and in a matter of only a few months. I feel this 
underlines the political will of the member states 
ofWEU not only with words but also with deeds. 
I wish the Council luck in this respect, but I also 
congratulate the Assembly, because the 
Assembly has never stopped spurring the min-
isters on to greater unity and to action that 
would give real substance to the October 1984 
Rome declaration. This means that the 
Assembly too can be grateful today for the results 
that have been achieved. They are a beginning, 
but they exist. This also means that this parlia-
mentary body of ours must continue to keep a 
critical eye on the Council, as befits a good par-
liament. 
(Mr. Soe/1, Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is open. 
I call Mr. Aarts. 
Mr. AARTS (Netherlands) (Translation). -
Mr. President, the report drawn up by Mr. van 
der Sanden marks perhaps the most important 
phase in WEU's history. It is a very compre-
hensive report and I compliment the Rapporteur 
most sincerely on the outcome. 
The report is frequently critical of the Council 
and I share this criticism. If our Assembly wants 
to fulfil its function properly, we must receive 
fuller and faster information on the Council's 
decisions and political activities. It cannot be 
sufficiently emphasised that WEU is a demo-
cratic organisation which means it is essential for 
the actions and omissions of the responsible 
political leaders to be monitored. As the Council 
of Ministers is more than the sum of the indi-
vidual government members, it must be 
accountable to the peoples of the seven member 
states represented in this Assembly. The need for 
this will increase in proportion to the reacti-
vation of WEU. 
The Secretary-General has referred this 
afternoon to the democratic dialogue between 
the Council and the Assembly, and rightly so. 
But if the Council sets so much store by this, it 
must do everything in its power to enable the 
Assembly to be properly equipped for this dia-
logue. 
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Mr. President, closely related to this is the way 
in which the Assembly and the staff and 
equipment which support it are able to function. 
That is a second criticism. The decisions on 
restructuring, the elimination and amalgamation 
of organs and collocation have been deferred too 
long. Implementation of the decisions taken 
should now be speeded up. The passage in the 
platform that begins" We highly value ... "is dif-
ficult to reconcile with inadequate involvement 
in the workings of the Assembly and its 
organs. 
Answers have yet to be given to many ques-
tions concerning the winding up of the three 
agencies, the future of the single agency and the 
establishment table. Too many uncertainties on 
this point are indicated in the reports. It is not 
just a question of efficiency and the sound man-
agement of the available resources, important as 
they are: WEU's future task as we see it must 
also be discussed. Another very important point 
is the quality ofthe staff, which has to enable the 
Secretary-General to make a creative approach 
to the challenges that WEU will face in the near 
future. The decisions on the agencies and the 
establishment plan cannot, of course, be seen in 
isolation from the question of collocation. The 
link is obvious, but this very fact must spur the 
Council on to take decisions that solve both 
problems. There should also be absolute clarity 
on the position of the Standing Armaments 
Committee. 
Developments in the international sphere are a 
major challenge for WEU. The INF agreement, 
the continuing disarmament negotiations, the 
threat to freedom of navigation in the Gulf and 
so on are of immediate concern to the countries 
of Europe. All these developments should be 
thoroughly analysed in WEU and considered in 
terms of their relevance to European security. A 
suitable and, if possible, anticipatory policy 
should be developed. 
Although the threat in the Gulf area has not 
been treated in the way many of us had hoped 
where WEU is concerned, the Netherlands presi-
dency did take steps under Article VIII, para-
graph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty. Given 
WEU's history, this action gives the presidency 
hope for the future. As has already been said, this 
may be one swallow that does make a 
summer. 
There are developments within WEU as well. 
Some member states are planning to co-operate 
more closely at bilateral level. The importance of 
this must not be underestimated, but the 
cohesion of the organisation must also be main-
tained. This entails complete openness towards 
the other member states. The extension of 
bilateral co-operation must not be ruled out, but 
the link with the Atlantic Alliance must not be 
endangered in any way. 
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The enlargement of WEU has been discussed 
repeatedly in this Assembly, and the Rapporteur 
is rightly highly critical of the Council's policy in 
this respect. Portugal in particular has not been 
treated fairly. We are not underestimating the 
difficulties, both in principle and in practice, 
which the enlargement of the organisation 
involves, but definition of a clear policy has 
taken far too long. If we are not mistaken, the 
establishment of the platform has provided one: 
after all, paragraph 3 issues a clear invitation to 
other states. We welcome this, because a closed 
shop is historically unacceptable and does not do 
justice to other European members of NATO. 
What is more, the matter of European security is 
hardly conceivable without the southern flank. 
The platform also sets out the criteria that would 
govern the accession of new member states. It is 
important in this context that WEU should 
remain united in its perception of the conduct of 
the defence of Europe. This requires balanced 
burden- and risk-sharing. 
The member states will, where possible or 
desirable, make their contribution in both the 
conventional and the nuclear sphere. This 
.. acquit politique " must be endorsed by 
acceding countries. 
The agreement on the security platform must 
be welcomed. I fully agree with what the Pres-
ident said in his opening speech this afternoon 
about its being a good point of departure. The 
platform is the beginning of a new phase of 
thinking on European responsibility with respect 
to the security of our continent, if only because 
the formulation of premises and the reaffir-
mation of our joint mission lay the foundations 
for future policy. It is to be hoped that this 
platform will evolve into a more direct associ-
ation between the member states, expressing 
both the determination to stand firm on 
European security and the will to contribute to 
an arms level that will not jeopardise security 
and stability throughout Europe. 
All this must be done without selling Atlantic 
solidarity short, because whatever is said about 
strengthening European security, the explicit 
premise must be that this security is possible 
only in co-operation with the United States. 
There is no clash between European and United 
States interests when it comes to standing firm 
on the defence of democratic values and stan-
dards. American security was coupled with 
Europe's after the second world war, and must 
remain so. Hence the major importance of a 
homogeneous, efficient and alert NATO 
organisation geared to deterrence. As the 
platform rightly says: .. The security of the 
alliance is indivisible." We call for a policy of 
European identity and security, taking shape in a 
reactivated WEU, a European pillar of a North 
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Atlantic bridge whose other pillar stands on the 
far side of the ocean. For this - as the Secretary-
General rightly said - political will is needed. 
Our task is to generate this will and stimulate it 
in our governments. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - First, 
I pay tribute to the Rapporteur for his excellent 
work and for the frankness with which he has 
presented certain key issues foil' the future of our 
·organisation to this Assembly. I also pay tribute 
to the work of the Council of Ministers under the 
chairmanship of our Dutch friends. They have 
shown considerable leadership and considerable 
force of character in moving our organisation 
forward at a particularly crucial time of inten-
sified negotiations over INF, and of course at the 
time of increasing tension in the Persian Gulf. 
The statement of principle of European 
security policy - I abhor and abominate the 
word " platform " - will prove an historic doc-
ument. I congratulate them on that also. 
However, we now have to address ourselves to a 
crucial issue which I hope will not - it certainly 
need not - divide us. I speak on the question of 
the collocation of the various organisations of 
our institutions. 
Mr. van der Sanden, the Rapporteur, has been 
politic and probably wise in saying that perhaps 
we ought to regard the collocation of the Council 
and the agencies as sufficielllt. We should not 
necessarily press for collocatioh of the Assembly, 
the Council and the agencies. Nevertheless, I 
support that latter course. I will put before the 
Assembly the criteria that I hope will be adopted 
on the question of collocation. If they are looked 
at dispassionately, we can come to a joint con-
clusion which I think will do credit to our 
organisation and will at long last bring together 
the Assembly, the Council and the agencies in 
one place. 
I begin by insisting that the location should 
enhance the standing of our organisation and not 
diminish it, and be wholly compatible with the 
principles and aims of revivification set out in 
The Hague declaration. It should be a location 
that will catch the imagination of the European 
parliaments and public alike, that is architec-
turally and physically impressive and worthy of 
the vital role of our organisation and help to put 
our joint work in WEU more in the public eye. 
Secondly, it should be a location that is 
acceptable to all the member countries' govern-
ments. Thirdly, it should be a location acceptable 
to the Council of Ministers and parliamentarians 
of the Assembly alike. In that respect the Coun-
cil's choice of a single seat for WEU should be 
ratified by a majority of two-thirds of the parlia-
mentary Assembly. The inte11'ests and views of 
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the members of the Assembly must not be subor-
dinate in this matter. 
Fourth, we must have a location that is the 
most cost-effective from the administrative point 
of view, leading to the minimum displacement of 
existing WEU personnel, and from the point of 
view of ease of access by air from all the member 
countries and the rest of Western Europe, as well 
as from the United States and Canada and the 
wider world. 
Fifth, we must have a location where the local 
language is one of the two WEU working lan-
guages - English or French - and where both are 
widely understood and spoken. 
Sixth, we must have a location that will not be 
misunderstood by our American and Canadian 
friends or by any other members of the NATO 
alliance. 
Seventh, we must have a location that accords 
with the primordial role of nuclear deterrence in 
the defence of Western Europe. 
Eighth, we must have a location where an 
appropriate building, including a hemicycle or 
assembly chamber, plus contiguous office space, 
already exists and is available close to the centre 
of government of the host nation. No new 
building should be required or initiated as a con-
sequence of collocation. 
Ninth, we must have a location that ensures 
that as far as possible a fair distribution of 
European and other international institutions is 
maintained. 
Tenth, we must have a location that will dem-
onstrate WEU's distinct identity and purpose, 
leading no one to the view that WEU is a mere 
adjunct of any existing international insti-
tution. 
I believe that if we keep those ten principles in 
view they could form the guidelines to an agreed 
choice for a single site for our organisation in all 
its three manifestations, which we have long 
sought and which has been long overdue. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Antretter. 
Mr. ANTRETTER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, we del-
egates are often criticised by the Council and our 
governments for taking an insufficiently appreci-
ative or excessively negative view of the Coun-
cil's activities. However, anyone reading our 
reports and recommendations - and this is, of 
course, particularly true of Mr. van der Sanden's 
excellent report - will observe that the 
Assembly's attitude is by no means negative in 
principle; on the contrary, it is constantly trying 
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to engage in an objective dialogue with the 
Council. The fact is that the Council makes it 
rather difficult for us to identify anything pos-
itive in the very sparse information communi-
cated to us in its annual reports. 
On the other hand, and the point has already 
been made by the Assembly, it is quite clear that 
the present annual reports do reflect positive 
developments compared with those we received 
a few years ago. For example, they now appear 
every six months and their overall content has 
become more political in character. This can be 
taken as a hopeful sign that WEU's political sig-
nificance is gradually growing and manifesting 
itself in this visible form. 
But these positive aspects are weakened - one 
might almost say invalidated - by the Council's 
continuing apparent inability to furnish the 
Assembly with these half-yearly reports soon 
enough for them to be considered while the 
events covered are still more or less topical. 
We are only now able to discuss the Council's 
thirty-second annual report, relating to 1986, 
which might be described as yesterday's news. I 
recognise the difficulty of obtaining the necessary 
unanimity within the Council, but as these 
reports are concerned with events and not with 
analyses for the future, that cannot be a con-
vincing reason for such undue delays. 
But I want to do justice to the positive side. I 
join Mr. van der Sanden in welcoming the estab-
lishment on 27th October this year of the 
platform on European security interests, and the 
fact that the Gulf crisis has caused the Council to 
confer on this issue in separate consultations at 
The Hague, outside the routine sessions of the 
Permanent Council. It is gratifying that the 
Council is now finally availing itself of the 
opportunities offered by the modified Brussels 
Treaty - a step, I may add, which the Assembly 
has been urging for years. 
The Secretary-General has also informed us 
that the meetings of the political directors and 
other expert groups have been intensified, and 
that too is welcome, although we hope we shall 
also be kept better informed about the content 
and results of these consultations. 
I now wish to mention three topics which are 
in my view highly significant and deserving of 
particular attention by the Council and our gov-
ernments. 
First, the platform on European security 
interests. Much could be said on this subject, but 
I will confine myself to one aspect of the doc-
ument which, though not perhaps of central 
interest, is in my opinion very important. I am 
pleased that the document in question is not con-
cerned exclusively with security and defence 
policy but also expresses aims and proposals for 
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East-West dialogue and collaboration. At a time 
when the CSCE follow-up process in Vienna 
seems to have ground to a complete halt, I regard 
this as very important. It is quite true, however, 
that the Council will soon have to ask itself what 
concrete steps it should take to implement its 
good intentions and contribute effectively to the 
improvement of East-West relations. 
A further problem is the reaction of various 
European states to the latest development in 
bilateral Franco-German security and defence 
co-operation. I refer in particular to the estab-
lishment of a Franco-German brigade and the 
still somewhat vague proposals for the insti-
tution of a Franco-German security council. 
I welcome all efforts to strengthen co-operation 
with France, in security as elsewhere, though I 
think the governments concerned should avoid 
the irritations that inevitably arise when they 
themselves are not yet sure exactly what they 
want. I gather from various public statements by 
members of the German Government that the 
intention is not to establish exclusive bodies, and 
I am therefore all the more in favour of these 
projects being discussed and examined as quickly 
as possible in the framework of WEU. 
My final point is the old and enduring subject 
of the Council's publicity work. This is, I believe, 
the third or fourth time I have raised this point 
without anything much having changed in the 
meanwhile. What I have in mind at present is 
not the relationship between the Council and the 
Assembly, but the information given to the 
public and the press. Despite the weighty 
announcements made by the Council some years 
ago on this subject, the situation seems to be as 
stagnant as ever, which is all the more regrettable 
since the Council itself has noted a general 
increase in public interest in the work of WEU. 
Yet its publicity policy, if such a term applies at 
all, is characterised more by reaction than 
action. 
Even the relatively modest job of publicity 
officer in the Secretariat-General is still vacant, 
though the post has long figured in the estab-
lishment table. If we consider, for example, the 
magnitude of the publicity efforts made by 
NATO, both in Brussels and in the member 
states, and the resources NATO mobilises for the 
purpose, we must ask how WEU can hope to sell 
itself to the public as NA TO's European pillar, 
unless it become considerably more active in this 
respect. You may well be growing sick and tired 
of the constant need to raise this matter, trivial 
as it is in financial terms. 
If the reserve shown so far - and I wish to 
emphasise that this does not apply to the Secre-
tary-General - should turn out to be an 
73 
SIXTH SITTING 
expression of political intent, I consider this a 
very dangerous policy. Consequently, I again 
urge the Council to pay greater attention to these 
questions, and to include theltrl in its structural 
deliberations. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the debate be adjourned until tomorrow. 
13. Revision of the Rules of Procedure 
(Motion for a decision, Doe. 1124) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I inform 
the Assembly that I have received a motion to 
amend the Rules of Procedure in the name of 
Mr. Pannella and others. 
In accordance with Rule 51(1), the motion is 
referred without debate to the Committee on 
Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
14. INF treaty 
(Motion for a resolution, Doe. 1117) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I inform 
the Assembly that I have received a motion for a 
resolution on the INF treaty in the name of Mr. 
Stoffelen and others. 
This motion is in order. 
I propose that the text be included in the reg-
ister and referred to the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
15. Changes in the membership of committees 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We now 
come to changes in the membership of com-
mittees. 
Changes in the membershi~ of the committees 
are requested by the United Kingdom, French, 
Belgian, Italian and Dutch Delegations. 
The changes have been published in Notice 
No. 6 which has been distribdted. However, the 
United Kingdom Delegation has proposed a 
number of changes to the list published in the 
notice. 
The changes are as follows: in the membership 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments: Mr. Cox as a titular member in 
place of Mr. Edwards; Mr. Hardy as a titular 
member in place of Mr. Mill~r; Mr. Thompson 
as an alternate member in place of Mr. Brown 
and Ms. Ruddock as an alternate member; in the 
membership of the General Affairs Committee: 
Mr. Coleman as a titular member in place of Mr. 
Hardy; Lord Kirkhill as an al~emate member in 
place of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Ewing as an 
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alternate member in place of Mr. Millan; in the 
membership of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions: Mr. 
Parry as a titular member in place of Mr. 
McGuire and Mr. Lambie as an alternate 
member; in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration: Mr. Redmond as a titular 
member in place of Mr. Freeson and Mr. 
Litherland as an alternate member in place of 
Mr. Woodall; in the membership of the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. 
Thompson as a titular member in place of Mr. 
Coleman; Lord Kirkhill as a titular member in 
place of Mr. Woodall; Mr. Parry as an alternate 
member in place of Mr. Cox and Mr. Redmond 
as an alternate member in place of Mr. Edwards; 
and in the membership of the Committee for 
Parliamentary and Public Relations: Mr. Faulds 
as a titular member in place of Mr. Miller. 
All these changes are subject to ratification by 
the Assembly in accordance with Rule 38, para-
graph 6, of the Rules of Procedure. 
Are there any objections to these changes? ... 
These changes are agreed to. 
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16. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 1st December, at 
10 a.m. with the following orders of the day: 
1. Political activities of the Council - reply to 
the thirty-second annual report of the 
Council (Resumed debate on the report of 
the General Affairs Committee, Document 
1117 and amendment). 
2. First part of the thirty-third annual report 
of the Council (Presentation by Mr. van 
den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, Document 1123). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.) 
SEVENTH SITTING 
Tuesday, 1st December 1987 
SUMMARY 
1. Attendance register. 
2. Adoption of the minutes. 
3. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-
second annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on 
the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 1117 and 
amendment). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Irmer, Mr. Valleix, 
Mr. Gale, Mr. Pannella (point of order), Mr. Burger, 
Mr. Pannella. 
4. First part of the thirty-third annual, report of the Council 
(Presentation by Mr. van den Broe~ Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Cha#man-in-Office of the 
Council, Doe. 1123). 
Replies by Mr. van den Broek to questions put by: 
Mr. Valleix, Mr. Close, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Wilkinson, 
Mr. Pontillon, Mr. Pannella, Mr. Burger, Mr. Martino, 
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Stegagnini, 
Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Mr. Aarts, Sir Russell 
Johnston, Mr. Miranda Calha (Observer from Portugal), 
Mr. Garrett, Mr. Declercq. 
S. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. Political activities of the Council - reply to 
the thirty-second annual report of the Council 
(Resumed debate 011 the report 
of the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 1117 a11d amendme11t) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee on the 
political activities of the Council - reply to the 
l. See page 19. 
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thirty-second annual report of the Council, Doc-
ument 1117 and amendment. 
I call Mr. Irmer. 
Mr. IRMER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, speaking on behalf of the Liberal Group, 
I wish to thank the Rapporteur warmly for his 
work and especially for going beyond his brief. 
Had he confined himself to replying to the thirty-
second annual report, what he could have told us 
would have been of interest primarily to histo-
rians, if not actually to archeologists. This again 
shows how regrettable it is that the Council is 
still unable to present its reports soon enough for 
the Assembly to consider theim while they are 
still topical. I wish explicitly to deplore this 
behaviour, and I appeal to the Council to make 
its annual reports available earlier in future so 
that the Rapporteur can really get to grips with 
the text. 
Very wisely and sensibly our Rapporteur has 
extended his remarks to the events of this year, 
and we note with pleasure that the idea of reacti-
vating WEU has now taken concrete shape. We 
welcome this. 
We are particularly pleased that proposals 
have also been made with regard to restructuring 
and organisational improvem~nt. There is only 
one note of warning to be sounded - the imple-
mentation of these proposals must not founder 
on indecision as to where WEU headquarters 
should be located. The interminable discussions 
about the location of the European Parliament 
have shown us how in the course of decades the 
issue can become a bottomless well. I appeal to 
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you all: even if agreement on this issue cannot be 
reached for reasons of prestige or because of all 
kinds of reservations and doubts, the restruc-
turing process should nevertheless take place, 
regardless of where the institution has its seat. 
Mr. Wilkinson yesterday made an eloquent 
case - for London, I presume - and I can under-
stand that, because it would involve him in less 
travel. But whether it be London, Paris or 
Brussels - or even Luxembourg, which certainly 
merits consideration - the most important thing 
is to carry out the organisational improvements 
essential to the functional efficiency of this insti-
tution. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I especially wish to 
direct your attention to a point of significance in 
yesterday's debates. I refer here to the irritation 
undoubtedly caused to some member states by 
the agreement for closer Franco-German collabo-
ration on defence. Speaking not only on behalf of 
my group but as a German parliamentarian, I 
urge that these attempts to bring about closer col-
laboration between France and Germany should 
also be considered against the special historical 
background, as an effort to overcome the old 
problems which, as you all know, have existed in 
the past between these two countries in par-
ticular. This is why we ascribe a primarily sym-
bolic importance to this closer Franco-German 
collaboration. In fact, the symbolic implications 
will far outstrip those of a practical order. 
To those who have fears in this connection I 
would mention that the alternating command of 
a joint brigade would present problems of consti-
tutional law in our country, and very careful 
investigations will have to be made as to whether 
suc.h an arrangement is at all possible under the 
constitution. As you know, we in the Federal 
Republic of Germany are extremely conscious of 
our constitution. We did not send any ships to 
the Gulfbecause our constitution forbids it. You 
may be sure of one thing: we shall adhere as scru-
pulously to the provisions of our constitution in 
this matter as in all others. 
What is more, bilateral agreements are always 
useful when they help to engender and encourage 
multilateral progress. It is quite possible that this 
Franco-German collaboration may provide a 
core or power pack for the collaboration and 
reinforcement of WEU. We always say, and 
rightly, that WEU as such does no harm to 
NATO. On the contrary, we should promote col-
laboration in WEU in order to strengthen NATO 
as our collective defence alliance. It is our wish 
to develop WEU as the European pillar within 
NATO, and it is therefore my beliefthat Franco-
German collaboration, so far from being 
harmful, can only be beneficial. 
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It should also be pointed out in this context 
that our goal is not bilateral collaboration on 
defence. We much prefer a European solution, 
and that is why the platform of 27th October 
1987 is so important and significant. It places 
our joint defence and security policy within the 
framework of overall European unification. We 
express here our desire for European union, and 
this European union is quite inconceivable 
without the inclusion of questions of security 
and defence. The fact that this has been 
recognised and so clearly expressed is the true 
political breakthrough for Western European 
Union and is indispensable to its reactivation. 
That of course also means that we must make 
a genuine approach to the idea of enlargement. 
European union should comprise not merely 
WEU's seven member countries but something 
much broader. In the long run we shall not be 
able to exclude from our collaboration other EEC 
member states or other members of NATO in 
Europe. We must search for ways of organising 
the inclusion in this military, security-related 
collaboration of those others who are still on the 
sidelines, on behalf of our joint political goal: the 
creation of European union. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I will just add a final 
word. For me the reactivation of Western 
European Union is apparent in the qualitative 
change that this Assembly has undergone during 
the past year. When I first came here at the 
beginning of the year, the Assembly struck me as 
a gathering of somewhat resigned individuals 
with their future already behind them and with 
no drive left. Today the atmosphere is quite dif-
ferent and the spirit of enterprise predomi-
nates. 
Ladies and gentlemen, let us maintain this 
spirit and we, as a parliamentary body which 
also has a monitoring role, shall then be able to 
contribute to a joint European security policy 
and to the creation of European union. Thank 
you. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - Mr 
President, ladies and gentlemen, in resuming our 
work this morning I do not know if there are 
grounds for optimism, although we obviously 
share Mr. Irmer's view of the buoyant outlook 
for WEU. 
For my part I will be a little more pragmatic. I 
thank Mr. van der Sanden for the excellence of 
his report and for his very full analysis as well as 
for all the pertinent observations and useful sug-
gestions embodied not only in the draft recom-
mendation but also in the explanatory memo-
randum. 
I shall deal with a number of very specific 
points. 
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The question of collaboration is a difficult 
subject which has been deferred by the Council 
pending reorganisation of the entire institution 
and structures. We are now at what should be the 
end of discussions and approaching the time of 
decision. I recall, Mr. President, that at the 
meeting on 27th October we asked to be 
involved in the work ofthe Secretariat-General. I 
hope that this wish can be implemented and that 
the next meeting of the Presidential Committee 
will enable us to participate in defining the new 
structures aimed in part at simplification but 
also at increased efficiency. 
I wish to direct particular attention to the char-
acter of this reorganisation. As the Rapporteur 
pointed out yesterday, the problem does not 
really affect our Assembly but concerns the 
reorganisation of the agencies in conjunction 
with possible geographical relocation. It is 
important that matters should be clear and any 
confusion of the issues avoided. I thank the 
Rapporteur for the clarification he has provided 
which I accept as identifying the real core of the 
problem. 
My second point concerns the actual choice of 
a location. You may object that we have not yet 
reached that point and that it is not up to us to 
decide directly. While this is true, we intend to 
participate in the deliberations which will ulti-
mately lead to the decision. After all there are 
always two ways of approaching a problem, one 
of which may be better than the other. It could 
be claimed that as a pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance WED should be in the closest possible 
physical proximity to the alliance, and that con-
sideration would certainly influence the choices 
to be taken. It may also be said, as I myself 
would say, that while WED must be the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance its 
primary task should be to reinforce European 
solidarity and the spirit of European unity within 
the alliance. In other words, it is more important 
for us to strengthen our European will and our 
unity within the alliance than to say that we are 
close to it. While there is no doubt of our deter-
mination to act within the alliance, we unfortu-
nately vacillate and hesitate when it comes to 
taking coherent united action involving our 
seven WED countries as well as our European 
friends in the alliance who are not members of 
WED, and why should they not participate? It is 
always a pleasure to welcome them as observers 
in this forum with the hope on both sides that 
they will shortly become full partners. It is 
therefore more important that we should be 
located so that we can affirm the cohesion of a 
possibly enlarged Europe on defence matters 
than that we should move physically closer to the 
alliance. 
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This leads me to the conclusion that other 
locations are preferable to the NATO head-
quarters which some are considering. Everyone 
is entitled to his opinion but it is well that we 
should discuss the subject, and when the time is 
opportune the Presidential. Committee can 
further the dialogue with the Council on the 
matter. 
Another point in Mr. van der Sanden's report 
which has not so far been considered in detail is 
the publicising of our activities. Paragraph 25 of 
Mr. van der Sanden's rewrt refers to "the 
setting up of a unit within the Political Division 
of the Secretariat-General to be responsible for 
relations with the press and f<J>r providing infor-
mation". This has always been our policy. I 
would like to know more about this idea, and I 
assure the Rapporteur that this could be a most 
positive step. I say " could be " in the knowledge 
that there is often a wide gap between good 
intentions and their implementation. WED 
suffers from under-exposure. 
We are now in a period of rapid change thanks 
to WED's own initiatives which are giving it a 
new sparkle - and as Mr. Irmer has just men-
tioned we can say without self-flattery that 1987 
has not been a bad year, quite the contrary - and 
thanks also to circumstances in the world 
outside. Here I am thinking, of course, of the 
great debate now under way which should lead to 
an agreement in Washington on 7th-8th 
December as the outcome of the meeting of Mr. 
Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. My next remark 
relates to paragraph 49 of the report on a text 
unanimously adopted on 3rd June this year, 
namely Mr. Ahrens's report stressing the need to 
reformulate WED's major actions and ambitions 
in order to define jointly sect,trity requirements 
for the next ten years and the role to be 
attributed to WED to this end. 
At this level I associate myself fully with Mr. 
Irmer's comments. There now exists, I believe, a 
buoyancy which is happily due to our own initia-
tives for the reactivation of WED. In three years 
the situation has finally matur~d, and that fact is 
specially reflected by the platform adopted on 
27th October and signed by the seven member 
countries. 
The importance of WED's initiative is com-
mensurate with international events themselves 
because the international dialpgues which have 
taken place during the past year at superpower 
level have been concerned with disarmament, 
and we, of course, are in the direct line of fire. 
Our problem is that we must look more to 
defence than to disarmament. 
Given that some disarmament is taking place 
apparently over our heads, should we be happy 
or worried? Whatever the answer, the situation 
in which we find ourselves is profoundly 
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changed. Luckily, the timing of this great and 
historic international event - and I use the words 
not with scepticism but at least with a question 
mark - is taking place in a year when WEU is 
flexing its muscles, defining its objectives more 
clearly and laying down the ground rules for its 
actions. Will this historic event usher in a new 
era of peace in the world and more specificially 
in Europe, or will it deprive us of the means 
which have contributed to European security 
over the last forty years? 
Peace based on terror is not ideal - that much 
is certain - but if terror is reduced, is peace 
thereby enhanced? This is a question to which I 
am as yet unable to respond either with an 
enthusiastic affirmative or with apprehension. 
There is some doubt. In the light of Mr. van der 
Sanden's illuminating report which I have 
merely touched on, I should therefore like us to 
take comfort from the fact - to which your own 
contribution, Mr. President, has been as vital as 
was to be expected - that the reactivation of 
WEU has become a reality and we have achieved 
some results. But the world also pursues its 
changing course and obliges us to follow. It is a 
welcome fact that the two processes are simulta-
neous. 
Beyond reactivation, it seems to me that what 
we should now be aiming at for the year 2000 is 
the updating of the European defence concept. 
We are well aware that technology, resources and 
the defence concept are continuing to develop, 
and reactivation should therefore necessarily be 
followed by updating our approach to the 
problem. The world's equilibrium is shifting and 
we must move with it, hence my reference to 
Mr. Ahrens's suggestion. 
In these circumstances, Mr. President, I would 
like Mr. van der Sanden's report to be the inspi-
ration for our updating process accompanied, of 
course, by a strengthened will for unity and 
determination to maintain the peace. It is our 
duty to protect the peace, and more than ever in 
the interplay of momentous international events 
we must be clear-thinking in our analysis and 
must have the political will to ensure that 
advances in the interests of peace are not, for us, 
acts of abandonment or resignation. Finally, we 
must also update our approach to the foreseeable 
new conditions of defence from 1987 or 1988 
onwards as compared with those which have 
existed hitherto and in which we have been 
living for many years. 
Mr. President, let me say again that I also see 
grounds for hope in the events of recent months, 
and I trust that our Assembly will continue in its 
determination to thrust ahead. Reactivation was 
a move in the right direction but account must 
be taken of recent events. Updating of the 
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defence concept with a wider group of European 
partners and with a modern approach to the new 
defence requirements must now be our objective. 
The task is exhilarating and exciting, but it is not 
easy. I believe that we have the determination 
necessary to our purpose. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Gale. 
Mr. GALE (United Kingdom). - It is a priv-
ilege to follow Mr. Valleix. I should like to pick 
up immediately one of his comments. Mr. 
Valleix drew attention to paragraph 25 of Mr. 
van der Sanden's report urging the Assembly to 
pay some attention to promotion and publicity. I 
suggest to the Assembly and to you, Mr. Pres-
ident, that if you were to go into many of the 
schools and colleges in Europe and ask the 
pupils, and even those teaching history and pol-
itics, to name the member countries of Western 
European Union, they might be hard pressed to 
do so. If you were to take that a stage further and 
ask them to describe, even briefly, the contents 
of WEU's platform, most of them would 
probably find that impossible. I do not wish to 
pre-empt the next debate or to be out of order, 
but I note that in the first part of the thirty-third 
annual report Mr. van den Broek will state that: 
" Both media and public have shown a 
growing interest in WEU in the first part of 
this year, particularly during ministerial 
meetings and Assembly sessions. " 
That may be so, but if the Council of Ministers 
believes that to be so, they need to reappraise 
their judgment. The combined operation of 
WEU countries in the Gulf is of considerable sig-
nificance, but how much publicity does it 
actually receive? 
If the Assembly and the Council of Ministers 
were to spend a little more time concentrating 
upon matters of security and a little less time 
involving themselves in detailed and prolonged 
discussions about collocation, the deliberations 
of WEU might receive a rather more favourable 
press internationally, and perhaps a little more 
attention from those young people to whom a 
number of these reports have referred and whose 
interest we wish to attract. 
Paragraph 33(c) of Mr. van der Sanden's report 
refers to international terrorism and he correctly 
says: "The thirty-second annual report is 
laconic. " That is an overstatement. The thirty-
third annual report, he will be pleased to know, 
has nothing at all about terrorism, not even the 
six lines on the subject in the thirty-second 
annual report. The Assembly should address 
itself to international terrorism and it should be 
offering to Europe and the world a clear 
statement of where we stand. 
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Regrettably, some countries recently have 
failed to hold the line when it comes to settling 
ransoms for hostages held by terrorists. That is 
the thinnest end of a very dangerous wedge. Ifwe 
pay once, we shall pay twice, three times, and 
then for ever. The thirty-second annual report 
suggests that WEU member countries should 
participate in other international bodies dealing 
with terrorism. That appears to imply that this 
Assembly and the Council of Ministers have not 
real cause to concern themselves with what is, 
after all, one of the most serious threats to our 
security. It is this international body, WEU, that 
should take a clear line and make a bold 
statement that we will not in any circumstances, 
at any price, settle with terrorists anywhere in the 
world. I should like to think that as terrorism is 
not mentioned in the first part of the thirty-third 
annual report, perhaps when we come to see the 
second part of the thirty-third annual report the 
Council of Ministers may have addressed itself 
to that matter. 
Co-operation is more important than collo-
cation and the fight against terrorism is second 
only to multilateral disarmament in the cause of 
European security. If this Assembly and the 
Council genuinely wish to seek wider and better 
publicity, their reputation will depend not upon 
talk but upon achievement. 
Mr. PANNELLA (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I would like to know whether the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council is present. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council will be 
arriving shortly, Mr. Pannella. 
Mr. PANNELLA (Italy) (Translation). - Do 
you not consider, Mr. President, that the absence 
of the executive or someone ofthe same status as 
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council from a 
parliamentary sitting shows a lack of courtesy 
which is hardly in line with parliamentary tra-
dition? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - As you 
know, the order of the day indicates that the 
Chairman-in-Office will arrive before 11 a.m. 
and will address the Assembly at that time. I 
have no comments to add to that. 
I call Mr. Burger. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I first wish 
to congratulate my Netherlands colleague, Mr. 
van der Sanden, on the excellent work he has 
done despite the problems of timing imposed by 
the rapid march of European events at several 
levels. 
As far as relations with the Council are con-
cerned, shortcomings certainly exist although 
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some glimmer of hope appeatted under the Lux-
embourg chairmanship, as my colleague, who 
was present at the Paris session, has just noted. 
There was also Mr. Poos's contact with the 
Assembly in Luxembourg at the end of the 
Council meeting. 
I see other glimmers of hope under the Nether-
lands chairmanship referred tC!> yesterday by Mr. 
Valleix and by Mr. van der Salnden in his report. 
I am an optimist by nature as :regards the future, 
the reactivation ofWEU at all levels, the restruc-
turing operation, the fusion of the agencies and 
the reorganisation of the ministerial organs, and 
I hope that a day will come when the Council's 
reports and replies to our ques~ions will arrive in 
time to satisfy our parliamentary Assembly, 
which is responsible though demanding. 
In paragraphs 25 and 26 of the explanatory 
memorandum, Mr. van der Sanden looks at the 
very important problem, for both public opinion 
and our Assembly, of the public relations infor-
mation emanating from the Council of Ministers 
and the responsible representatives. A question-
naire in the report which I shall have the honour 
to present on Thursday afternoon shows that 
interest in WEU and requests for information 
about its activities have increased appreciably in 
recent months. 
While the Secretariat-General is now con-
cerning itself with providing answers and other 
information, it must be noted tlhat the Council of 
Ministers has not kept its promise, in response to 
the Assembly's request, to set up within the 
political division of the Secretariat-General a 
special unit responsible for relations with the 
press and for providing information. I therefore 
wish to table an appropriate •mendment to be 
added to paragraph 7 of the recommendation. 
My suggested amendment is in French and there 
is therefore no need for me to read it. 
The first part is concerned with general infor-
mation, and the second with special information. 
I hope that the Rapporteur, Mt. van der Sanden, 
will agree with this suggestion, the wording of 
which he may care to alter or accept as it stands. 
If, according to some opinion polls, the 
General Secretary of the Soviet Communist 
Party is more popular in the West than the Pres-
ident of our NATO ally, the United States of 
America, it is because our media have either sur-
rendered or simply have not flllnctioned at all -
which is very regrettable. This failure must be 
made good very quickly and with all possible 
means to the advantage of Western European 
Union and the Atlantic Alliance which will 
remain vital to Western Europe despite the 
probable agreement between Mr. Gorbachev and 
Mr. Reagan. 
With regard to the Council's political activities 
little has been said, rightly or wrongly, about ter-
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rorism, as this is chiefly a problem which con-
cerns the Cout?-cil of Europe. Speaking in Paris, it 
would be rem1ss of me not to express my satis-
faction at France's substantial measure of success 
in its policy of" terrorising the terrorists", which 
is beginning to produce results. The eradication 
o~ the hard core has opened the way to negoti-
atiOn and exchange. I hope that the obligation to 
obtain a French entry visa which applies to our 
colleagues in various delegations will shortly be 
abolished in the wake of France's success in 
dealing with terrorism. Solidarity has obviously 
played a part here and will also be an effective 
weapon outside the NATO area. 
Following the threat to Europe's economic sta-
bility due to the Iran-Iraq war and insecurity in 
the Gulf, Europe has reacted after a number of 
meetings at Council level within the framework 
of WEU and has taken a concerted, if not 
actually unified, action under Article VIII, para-
graph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
Turning now to WEU's role in European 
security, the platform adopted by the Council on 
27th October 1987 represents a combined and 
coherent European identity which is vital after 
Reykjavik and the forthcoming agreement of 7th 
December. With all due emphasis on the desire 
for peace and liberty, Europe's security still rests 
on the right combination of the conventional 
and nuclear forces of NATO, of which Western 
European Union is the European pillar, and on 
the independent forces of France and the United 
Kingdom with their phased nuclear deterrent 
capacity. 
European unification under the terms of the 
single European act requires the security and 
defence platform. As to the entry of the 
European Community countries which have long 
been knocking on WEU's door, and I am 
thinking here particularly of Portugal and Spain 
and then of Denmark and Norway, we can no 
longer stand in the way of their admission. 
As to the Franco-German brigade, we shall 
have to see whether Chancellor Kohl's fears 
stemming from his country's geomilitary 
position find a response in France after the presi-
dential elections of May 1988. 
The United Kingdom's Prime Minister, Mrs. 
Thatcher, has another opinion on the matter and 
believes that this brigade could impede Western 
European Union's role in European security. I 
will just say "Wait and see". 
On the subject of collocation, I share the view 
of my British colleague, Mr. Wilkinson. 
(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the 
Assembly, took the Chair) 
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The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Pannella. 
Mr. PANNELLA (Italy) (Translation). - It is 
true, Mr. President, that the problem I raised a 
short time ago is minor, but for any important 
debate, and in fact on any occasion, I would like 
to see the Council presidency represented here in 
accordance with the practice in our national par-
liaments and the European Parliament. I thought 
this should be recalled, or even demanded. 
The excellent report before us identifies many 
other causes of dissatisfaction, which we should 
not stress in a list of complaints but regarding 
which we should nonetheless demand com-
pliance with the treaty and statements made. 
The Council often acts outside the rules and 
standards by which our union is governed. 
When the Rapporteur, without fear of denial, 
can draw attention to the lack of a proper dis-
cussion on the budget and of the Council's 
failure to assume its responsibilities and to act in 
accordance with the spirit and the letter of the 
treaty, our Assembly cannot do other than 
respond in clear terms. 
In this connection my thanks go to the 
twenty-five members who have supported my 
motion to amend the Charter with regard to the 
budget, which aims at creating a budgetary pro-
cedure offering guarantees for ourselves and our 
union, and I hope, Mr. President, that we shall 
not have to wait a year for the adoption of this 
amendment on which there is a consensus. 
As this consensus exists, Mr. President, could 
not the Presidential Committee meet very briefly 
so that this budgetary procedure can be approved 
before the end of the session? I am well aware 
that such a meeting is not planned before 6th or 
7th December but it is important that we and the 
Council should have acceptable budget rules. For 
this purpose it is sufficient if the Presidential 
Committee is formally convened and a very 
short oral report is submitted by the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure. I repeat, 
Mr. President, that we have here not a majority 
but a consensus and it would be very regrettable 
if you as a good paterfamilias did not allow our 
Assembly to adopt this budgetary procedure. 
When we turn to the late but important deci-
sions on the Gulf and note that these were imme-
diately communicated to the press whereas the 
Assembly had to wait eleven days it is clear that 
to continue complaining is pointless. We must 
say frankly that if such a cavalier attitude 
towards the treaty and the elementary rules of 
precedence were to be repeated we should have 
to lodge an official and formal protest. We will 
help the Council to stay the Council ofWEU, not 
to act as the informal council of just some 
organisation or other. 
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With regard to the reactivation Mr. Irmer 
mentioned, I believe we should exercise a little 
caution. For some years, since the Rome decla-
ration in fact, the only effect of the drive for 
restructuring and reactivation has actually been 
to inhibit the growth ofWEU. What has become 
of the applications by Portugal and all the others 
who want to join the organisation? On the 
pretext that we are reorganising to give effect to 
reactivation we are in fact practising a policy 
which restricts WEU's development and the 
quality of our activities. 
As the Rapporteur has said to excellent effect, 
it is intolerable that we should have no report on 
the work of the two agencies. Not only is there 
delay in passing on to us information which we 
have the right and duty to know immediately, 
but there is even a failure to supply us with 
reports. If this is due to oversight, it is even 
worse than if it were deliberate. We are in fact 
denied the information we need to know in order 
to conduct our deliberations and arrive at 
informed decisions. 
At WEU we are running the same risk which 
afflicts the European Economic Community. 
The greater the satisfaction we take in concerted 
action, the greater becomes the threat of crisis to 
our organisation's institutional and structural 
procedures and attributes. 
Of course, we welcome concerted international 
action; we welcome sparrows and swallows; we 
welcome good will and increased contacts and 
more dialogue, but we must take care that the 
dialogues and advances serving the cause of 
European integration follow the rules which we 
ourselves have set up under our treaties. Other-
wise, by a process of reaction, we are afraid at 
times and tend more to act individually. At other 
times there is a need for dedicated constructive 
work performed in a calm atmosphere. We fail to 
act in concert and we fail to activate WEU or 
even the European Community because fear 
does not impel us to act. 
We must therefore demand the full application 
of the terms of our treaties. The Rome decla-
ration did not nullify the Brussels declaration or 
our institutional powers as regards arms control 
and close oversight of the defence and security 
problems of our times. 
That is only one aspect. We had other func-
tions which we have relinquished, apparently in 
accordance with the Council's wishes. We should 
state clearly that the Rome declaration has not 
curtailed our powers or duties as an institution, 
quite the contrary. We as an institution also have 
something to say about arms control. 
Instead of viewing with satisfaction the consul-
tations and small-scale meetings which take 
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place at times of crisis between the member 
states, we should in fact use our procedures and 
the powers of WEU to respond to dramatic 
events as they occur. Otherwise, Mr. President, 
whenever a crisis arises we shall find psycho-
logical justification for dispensing with WEU's 
procedures, institutions and capacity to act. 
Naturally, I welcome the Franco-German 
projects and what has been achieved, which 
strike me as preferable to the growing prospects 
of a rapprochement between the two Germanies 
for which the cultural and psy1chological ground 
seems to be being prepared within Europe. I am 
of course very pleased when two of our member 
states act together to form a brigade, a company 
or a division at a time when it is not yet clear 
how relations between the two Germanies will 
have developed by 1990. 
I must state frankly that I do not fully share 
the optimism which our Secvetary-General has 
expressed with such erudition and brilliance with 
regard to the achievement of the last forty years 
and the prospects for the next forty. It is my 
belief that Europe is not playing a full or even an 
adequate role. Europe's role is in fact incredibly 
and dramatically inadequate! WEU's long 
delayed meeting on the Gulf crisis underlines the 
absence of Europe from the Mediterranean, the 
Middle East and the politics of the Gulf and its 
failure to influence armaments, the management 
of agro-food weapons and the technological and 
propaganda resources which are increasingly 
superseding military weapons in the confron-
tation between the political blocs and in the 
various operational theatres which concern us 
throughout the world. 
In all these instances we should avoid 
optimism and pessimism alike. Very practically, 
very modestly and as " chartered accountants " 
we should merely try to record the progress of 
our institutions and what we qave achieved, and 
I fear that in this regard we do not have grounds 
for satisfaction. 
Those, Mr. President, are the observations 
which Radical Party members, as newcomers to 
this Assembly, wished to make. As I told the 
Committee on Defence Que$tions and Arma-
ments this morning, it is my wish that our ideas 
on defence and security should not be tied to the 
past. As I was saying a moment ago, we must not 
overlook the fact that the problems of the third 
and fourth worlds and the international balance 
of trade are closely linked to the manipulation of 
agro-food weapons, which are increasingly being 
used by multinational enterprises and major 
food producers without supervision and without 
any evident desire on our part to address the 
problem. 
I repeat my thanks to the twenty-five members 
who have been kind enough to support the 
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motion to reform the budgetary procedures 
which we are about to table. 
The PRESIDENT. -I propose to adjourn the 
sitting until 11 a.m. when the Chairman-in-
Office will address us. 
(The sitting was suspended at 10.55 a.m. and 
resumed at 11.10 a. m.) 
(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is resumed. 
4. First part of the thirty-third annual report 
of the Council 
(Presentation by Mr. van den Broek, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doe. 1123) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation by Mr. van 
den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
of the first part of the thirty-third annual report 
of the Council, Document 1123. 
It gives me the greatest pleasure to welcome 
here today Mr. van den Broek, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. Mr. van den 
Broek has organised two particularly fruitful 
meetings with the Presidential Committee 
during which we were able to discuss in depth 
the problems before the Council. As I 
emphasised in my address, the Assembly wants 
the Council to succeed in its undertakings and 
because it wants to contribute to that success, I 
congratulate Mr. van den Broek on having, for 
the first time, implemented the provisions of 
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty con-
cerning threats to peace in whatever area they 
may arise. 
The consultations on the Gulf situation on the 
harmonisation of the action taken by our coun-
tries are a practical sign of the reactivation of 
WEU which our Assembly has called for. It is 
also under the Netherlands chairmanship that 
our countries have agreed for the first time on 
principles governing the security policy of 
member states. We are well aware that this 
success would not have been possible without 
the typically Dutch determination with which 
Mr. van den Broek worked for the 
announcement of The Hague platform. It has 
already been stressed that a great deal of effort is 
still needed to give WEU the efficient structure 
necessary for the realisation of the ambitions we 
have for it, but, here as elsewhere, we can count 
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on the Netherlands to persevere until success is 
achieved. 
I now invite you to come to the rostrum, Mr. 
van den Broek, and I should be grateful if you 
would then reply to the questions from members 
of the Assembly. 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council). - Mr. President, may I begin by 
thanking you for your warm words of welcome 
and add that I consider it a privilege to address 
this Assembly, which plays such an important 
role in the work of Western European Union. 
Democratic nations cannot pursue effective 
security and defence policies without the support 
of the people and their elected representatives. I 
therefore highly value your involvement in our 
endeavour to develop a clearer European 
identity in security and defence as a vital com-
ponent of a more united Europe under con-
struction. 
Mr. President, you will expect me to report 
where we stand in the process of revitalisation of 
our organisation and, naturally, I shall be pleased 
to do so. But allow me first to touch briefly upon 
a significant event that in these days is so much 
in the forefront ofthe international public debate 
on security issues and that, moreover, so clearly 
has implications for the European dimensions of 
security. What I am speaking about, of course, is 
the INF agreement that will be signed just eight 
days from now at the Washington summit. 
We do not exaggerate when we call the 
agreement an unprecedented achievement. The 
threshold that seemed elusive for so long is about 
to be crossed. For the first time in arms negotia-
tions, we shall see real reductions. Whole cate-
gories of modern missiles will be eliminated. 
Also for the first time, the principle of asymmet-
rical reductions will be put into practice: if you 
have more weapons, you will have to reduce 
more. No fewer than 1 500 deployed nuclear 
warheads will be dismantled by the Soviet Union 
and three hundred and fifty will be dismantled 
by the United States in Europe. For the first 
time, a verification system of an intrusive nature 
will become operative and will include extensive 
on-site inspections. The significance of those ver-
ification procedures and provisions and the 
asymmetrical reductions cannot be overesti-
mated, not least because of the exemplary role 
that they can play in other arms control negotia-
tions. 
Perhaps all those features are obvious. The 
essential question to be posed in judging the 
forthcoming agreement is whether it enhances 
peace and security and adds to stability. After all, 
arms reductions are not an aim in themselves 
but should contribute to those purposes. My 
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reply is an unequivocal yes. The agreement does 
contribute to those purposes. 
Apart from the fact that the INF zero option 
proposal originated in Europe, it should be 
remembered that the deployment of cruise mis-
siles and Pershing lis in Western Europe was pri-
marily a response to the SS-20 threat directed 
particularly at our countries. The Soviet threat is 
being reduced and that allows for and justifies 
a response in kind. That is consistent policy 
constantly pursued and seconded by the 
alliance. 
We should not shrink from the success of our 
own steadfastness or talk ourselves into seeing 
signs of an impending United States disen-
gagement. The bonds between America and 
Europe rest on the firm foundation of shared 
values and common interests. In military terms, 
the linkage is given tangible expression by the 
presence of a variety of American nuclear 
systems on European soil, as well as the presence 
of large United States conventional forces here. 
The French Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, put it 
aptly from this very rostrum when he said: 
" the commitment of our American allies is 
first and foremost a political reality which does 
not depend solely on any particular category of 
arms." 
I hope that after the agreement is signed the 
United States Senate will proceed promptly with 
ratification, bearing in mind the significance of 
the agreement for Europe. I suggest that the 
WEU Assembly will want to draw to the 
attention of the Senate its support for a speedy 
entry into force of the agreement. 
In your address yesterday, Mr. President - I 
also read the report of the speech by the Secre-
tary-General - you placed the revitalisatio~ of 
WEU against the background of the rapidly 
evolving international situation. Developments 
in the Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern 
Europe, with their bearing on East-West rel~­
tions, the summit in Reykjavik, the progress m 
arms control, the SDI initiative, other newly-
developed technologies, the perennial issue of 
burden-sharing in the alliance and the impact of 
out-of-area regional conflicts on vital Euro~e!'ln 
interests are challenges, risks and opportunities 
which present themselves at Europe's doorstep 
and call for a more united European response. 
I sincerely feel that the recent adoption of the 
platform on European security interests is timely 
and provides us with a sort of European identity 
card. For the first time, it formulates a more 
coherent European vision of the various aspects 
of our security and defence. 
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We clearly place our endeavours in the double 
perspective of European unification and the 
strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance. In doing 
so, we have reverted to the origins of our 
organisation. As we know, the Brussels Treaty 
was only one of the early steps on the long road 
towards European unity but gave an impetus to 
common defence and security efforts. By 
revitalising WEU we want to contribute further 
to that European integration. For a number of 
reasons, of which we are all aware, co-operation 
on security has not kept pace with the progress 
made in other areas of European construction. 
The time was ripe to correct that defect. 
A more united Europe will make a stronger 
contribution to the Atlantic Alliance and that, in 
turn will enhance the European role and ensure 
the basis for a balanced partnership across the 
Atlantic. Former Secretary of State Kissinger 
complains in his memoirs that in the drafting of 
what became the Ottowa declaration the Euro-
peans were reluctant to use the word " part-
nership". I can tell you that in the drafting of 
The Hague platform, we all agreed from the start 
that " partnership " was the very word to 
describe the close ties that bind us inextricably to 
the United States and connect Europe and North 
America. 
The fact that that message has been under-
stood on both sides of the Atlantic may be wit-
nessed by the appreciation expressed recently by 
the American President of the adoption of the 
WEU platform. One of our overriding aims has 
always been, and will remain, to prevent any 
type of conflict. We may have differing opinions 
about how that can be secured, but few will 
dispute that in present circumstances - and as 
far as we can foresee - there is no realistic alter-
native to a strategy of deterrence based on an 
adequate mix of nuclear and conventional forces. 
Therefore we committed ourselves in the 
platform to risk-sharing and burden-sharing in 
conventional and nuclear areas. 
We are also pledged to defend any member 
country on its borders. That clearly manifests 
our determination to do so by the stated appro-
priate arrangement. It is right that this very 
essence of solidarity points us the way in the 
months ahead, and we shall reflect on how to 
give further substance to those commitments. 
Bilateral co-operation within WEU in security 
matters between France and Germany is here a 
case in point and, again, in enhancing our own 
security it is something to be valued. 
Reverting to arms control; you Win infer from 
my earlier remarks on INF that I see more cause 
for rejoicing than for worry. That having been 
said, we in WEU have to think about the best 
INF security agenda, an agenda that, as I have 
said, will have to take specific European security 
interests fully into account. Moscow's new 
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thinking seems to open up further prospects in 
arms control and the INF agreement will have 
the valuable aim of maintaining our stead-
fastness and, indeed, our part in bringing this 
about. 
As stated in the platform, we would bring out 
the basis of a coherent and comprehensive arms 
control concept bearing in mind the require-
ments of our security. An obvious item in the 
INF agenda is to realise 50% cuts in strategic 
arsenals. At the same time we are aware that sub-
stantial reductions in nuclear weapons will have 
the effect of increasing the significance of the 
current conventional imbalance, and removing 
that imbalance is clearly a priority. 
Europeans have a special interest and I wo':lld 
add a special responsibility in this respect. Major 
steps in the pace of nuclear arms control would 
also include the need for a global ban on 
chemical weapons, and that is of specific 
European interest. Arms control, howe~er 
important, is only one ofthe elements of the dia-
logue between East and West needed to shape 
East-West relations more constructively. We 
have therefore, to express how much value we 
attach to it in improving the situation via the 
CSCE process. · 
Another case in point - it was mentioned by 
various rapporteurs yesterday - is the devel-
opment in regional conflicts and their impact on 
European security. We have discussed the 
Middle East and the Gulf. It is with a certain sat-
isfaction that we may note that our consultation 
within WEU on these out-of-area issues has sub-
stantially increased. We have succeeded in sig-
nalling to the outside world that where European 
interests outside our area are at stake we are 
willing and capable of assuming our own respon-
sibility to protect our vital interests, such as 
those at stake in the Gulf, where we speak about 
the importance of preserving the freedom of nav-
igation. WEU certainly has provided us there 
with valuable instruments to concert our 
respective national endeavours. It is also of the 
utmost importance to the United States, the bel-
ligerents in the Gulf and, ~ot least, o~her coun-
tries of the Gulf Co-operation Council. 
I will not refer here to another important issue 
on our agenda for the coming months - arma-
ments co-operation - because my colleague and 
eo-Chairman, Mr. van Eekelen, will speak about 
that in his address to you tomorrow. However, I 
think that I have made it clear that in the coming 
months there are several subjects on the WEU 
agenda. We are in close consultation with our 
colleagues in the various capitals to sort out our 
priorities and I think I have given you an 
impression of the lines along which those discus-
sions will proceed. We count on your support 
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and co-operation to give further inducement to 
our work. 
I cannot leave the rostrum without making a 
few remarks about the enlargement of WEU and 
the reorganisation of the ministerial organs. The 
Assembly will be aware that in the so-called 
platform which has been considered by the seven 
members of WEU reorganisation is not regarded 
as a closed shop. That would run counter to 
WED's European vocation. We must, therefore, 
be open to European nations willing to. accept 
their obligations and to accept the commitme!lts 
contained in the platform and prepared to gtve 
concrete expression to those commitments. 
Clearly that will require a dialogue between us 
and the countries concerned. 
I believe that in the not too distant future dia-
logue will begin with a number of countries that 
have clearly shown interest in joining WEU, 
countries that have reacted to the platform. The 
subject will be discussed at. a futu~e mi~is~erial 
meeting that will commumcate With mimsters 
and our NATO allies. 
In your address yesterday, Mr. President, I 
read that you have the feeling that ministers had 
made greater progress in coming to grips with the 
specific issues than with reorganisational issues. I 
hope you do not think me conceited when I say 
that I am not too sad that it is not the other way 
around or that we were lacking in fulfilling our 
responsibility on the political side. I do not 
mean that I do not take your remarks about 
reorganisation seriously, and I hope that you and 
the Assembly are aware that we have done our 
utmost at the latest ministerial meeting to make 
progress and that at our October meeting agreed 
that at some stage the three agencies should 
become a single entity and that we decided to 
place the single entity under the leadership of the 
Secretary-General. We have in the meantime 
received a draft document to see how the new 
entity should be composed. ~e agree. t~at ~e 
should arrive at a concentratiOn of mimstenal 
organs in one capital- the same city. I am appre-
ciative of the need for having just one capital, 
though it is not easy, and I am no less appreci-
ative of the difficulty that faces the Assembly 
over here. 
There are four candidates, which is not bad for 
an organisation that consists of seven countries, 
though making the choice is difficult. I can only 
say that we feel fully committed to the whole 
process of reorganisation and concentration in 
the one city. I hope that by the next time we meet 
it will be possible to communicate to you the 
eventual choice. 
Mr. President, you also touched upon the need 
to improve the dialogue between the Council and 
the Assembly, and distinguished delegates have 
also made such remarks. I can only say that I 
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agree with most of what has been said in that 
respect, and we will therefore do what lies within 
our competence to improve our communica-
tions. 
Mr. PANNELLA (Italy) (Translation). - For 
several years now we have heard time and again 
that everything possible will be done in the 
future. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Please let 
the speaker finish what he has to say, 
Mr. Pannella. You can ask questions after-
wards. 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council). - I will conclude my remarks, and 
then, of course, I shall be very pleased to answer 
further questions. 
As we progress along the road to European 
unification, its different aspects become increas-
ingly interconnected and mutually supportive. 
WEU has an essential role in that process. 
Looking back at 1984, when we started reacti-
vation, it is clear that a lot has been achieved. 
WEU is now the political forum for harmonising 
our views and for promoting our practical 
co-operation. We have set the principles that 
guide our further work, and we count on the 
Assembly to stimulate us further in that work. 
Mr. President, it has been said before that if we 
did not have WEU, we should now have to 
invent it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I thank you 
for your address, Mr. van den Broek, and for 
your readiness to answer questions. 
I call Mr. Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - Let 
me say again, Mr. van den Broek, what a 
pleasure it is for us to receive you here together 
with some of the fortunate colleagues who 
worked with you on 27th October last after The 
Hague platform was finalised. This platform yes-
terday received a unanimous welcome from our 
Assembly. As you mentioned, it reflects the hope 
expressed by the French Prime Minister in this 
forum a year ago almost to the day. 
You referred twice to this Assembly's ability to 
provide a stimulus for the Council and urged us 
to use our inspiration. You have, of course, 
already referred to what is to happen at the 
Washington meeting next week, and this brings 
me to two questions. 
First, as things stand, what prospects, in quite 
general terms, does the platform offer to the 
seven member states for fresh action as regards 
the defence and unification of Europe ? 
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Second, to bring ourselves right up to date, if 
we consider the agreement which may be reached 
in Washington next week, what effects do you 
think this will have for European defence ? I 
refer here not only to the continuing process of 
disarmament, but specifically to the role of the 
WEU Assembly. 
How, in your view, should WEU react to this 
agreement and what initiatives should it take ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council). - I understand that Mr. Valleix is 
interested to hear more in detail how we view the 
agenda for the coming months. I tried to indicate 
in my introductory remarks that in setting up 
this agenda in the various capitals we tabled a 
number of issues which mostly relate to what we 
would call the post-INF agenda, which is con-
cerned with reorganisation, collocation and so 
on. That will automatically continue. 
In the short term it is necessary to reflect on 
the political issues that deserve the highest pri-
ority in our consultations within WEU. I cannot 
sufficiently repeat that the post-INF agenda will 
be of the utmost importance. I indicated that for 
us an INF agreement followed by continuing 
negotiations on strategic arsenals - the proposed 
50% cut - is of the utmost importance; but even 
closer to our own interests are the negotiations 
on the present tremendous imbalance in conven-
tional weapons, an imbalance that becomes more 
acute and damaging where we are reducing 
nuclear arsenals. 
I also referred to chemijcal weapons. My 
feeling is that the negotiations in the multilateral 
framework in Geneva are thteatened with stag-
nation. We have seen progre$s there in the past 
year, but my impression of~ past months is of 
stagnation. Europe also has a plear interest there. 
In other words, we should sound out with 
capitals whether the WEU governments can 
harmonise their positions somewhat on these 
extremely important issues. After all, they are 
discussed in the NATO alliance. Especially on 
these issues, where clearly European security 
interests are at stake, it would be extremely 
useful and a valuable contribution to cohesion in 
the alliance if WEU capitals could harmonise 
their positions and contribute in that way to the 
discussion in NATO. 
Apart from that, we shall continue to discuss 
out-of-area issues. The Gulf situation has not 
much improved. Our interests in preserving the 
freedom of navigation are and will continue for 
the time being to remain there. We are reaching a 
point at which we shall have to discuss with each 
other who will stay there and who will come 
back. It is of the utmost importance that the 
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European countries participating in the naval 
exercise in the Gulf carefully concert their posi-
tions in this respect. Although I am fully aware 
that all the individual nations participating there 
are doing so under a national and individual 
title, formally the signal of our presence there is 
of a European, not a national, kind. We should 
preserve this carefully as an asset. It can only 
contribute to a lessening of tension in the area if 
Europe is prepared to assume certain responsibil-
ities, apart from the fact that the vulnerability of 
each individual and national contribution is 
lessened by this token. 
Mr. Valleix asked what would be the conse-
quences for Europe of withdrawal of 
intermediate-range missiles. I do not believe that 
I am best placed at the moment to elaborate on 
that issue. That typically belongs to the dis-
cussion about a comprehensive arms control 
concept. I speak now in a personal capacity. I am 
fully aware that, apart from all the advantages 
that I have enumerated in my introductory 
remarks, in some capitals there may also be 
question marks about, for instance, the con-
tinuing or not continuing validity of the strategy 
of flexible response when eliminating complete 
categories of arms and what-have-you. There 
may be certain tendencies towards trying to com-
pensate for the elimination of INF. I personally 
would not support that, but this whole dis-
cussion can and should take place between 
Western European capitals as such. It is of tre-
mendous interest to us all. 
In airing our impressions about this agreement 
- Europe has wanted it in the past and we have 
suggested concrete proposals, a solution being 
the zero option - we should try to avoid endan-
gering the desired coupling between the 
European and United States forces and arsenals. 
I do not always believe in self-fulfilling proph-
esies. I would warn against underlining this point 
time and again. No statements have been made 
by the American administration anyhow that 
indicate a lessening of their commitment to 
Europe. For me that is the best of all reassur-
ances. I am convinced that the United States 
administration is convinced that a free and inde-
pendent Europe is also of vital interest to the 
United States and that the first line of defence of 
the United States lies in Europe. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Close. 
Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). - My 
question concerns the INF treaty. In Le Monde 
of 1st December the philosopher Jean-Marie 
Benoit, who is Deputy Director of the College de 
France and President of the European Centre for 
International Relations and Strategy, wrote a 
devastating article entitled " What is the point of 
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this agreement on Euromissiles ? " In Tuesday's 
International Herald Tribune the American 
strategist Edward N. Luttwak expressed more or 
less the same view. My own position is quite 
clearly defined - I believe that the European 
agreement is symptomatic of resignation or 
impotence. 
That point having been made, I now put my 
specific question: one of the great benefits 
claimed for the INF treaty is that we shall 
exchange 572 cruise and Pershing 11 missiles- in 
my opinion the only valid deterrent as they were 
capable of reaching Soviet territory and some of 
them have not yet been deployed - against three 
times 430 SS-20 nuclear warheads. If we now 
turn to missiles with ranges of 0-500 km - and 
according to my old friend General Altenburg's 
statement at a conference seven days ago we 
have eighty-eight Lance missiles compared with 
1 438 Soviet Scud and Frog missiles - would it 
not be very tempting to use the same argument 
to say, "What a wonderful deal we shall get by 
exchanging our eighty-eight missiles against 
1 438 on the other side! ". 
What guarantees do we have that we shall not 
proceed from the single zero to the double zero 
and even the treble zero, thereby abandoning the 
very basis of NATO's strategy, of the flexible 
response, without any alternative in view? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council). - Mr. Close has touched on a 
crucial subject that will be one of the important 
discussion points in what we call our post-INF 
agenda - the short-range missiles, those ranging 
from zero to 500 km range. 
I hope that Mr. Close is reassured by the 
vision that governments have proffered in the 
platform for future commitments and the com-
ponents of the deterrents. They have clearly 
underlined that we do not see in the foreseeable 
future any credible strategy other than that of the 
strategic deterrent based upon an appropriate 
mix of nuclear and conventional forces. 
Secondly, I would readily agree with Mr. Close 
if he meant that we should be aware that 
denuclearisation of Europe is simply not on. I 
could not agree more and that also has been so 
clearly expressed by what I said on the lines of 
the platform in this respect. In Reykjavik on 
12th June the NATO Council decided that 
post-INF conventional stability talks would 
deserve high priority and that in conjunction 
with those talks the short-range systems could be 
addressed. 
My feeling - I speak quite openly - is that the 
majority of member states in NATO clearly 
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believe that addressing the short range without 
having arrived at a substantial correction of con-
ventional imbalances would not be wise. After 
reading the statements of the Federal Chancellor 
in the Federal Republic recently, I have the 
feeling that, also in the Federal Republic, it is 
certainly an important problem to address the 
imbalances on short range. 
But we feel that the emphasis on conventional 
imbalances should in no way be disputed. I see a 
clear role for a discussion among WEU members 
and feel that we shall arrive at acceptable solu-
tions in the sense that there will be no elimi-
nation of shorter-range weapons, or rather that 
there will not even be a decrease of shorter-range 
weapons in which the numbers are very much in 
disfavour of the West, as the distinguished del-
egate indicated. That will not be the case until 
there is a realistic perspective for correcting 
the tremendous imbalances in conventional 
weapons. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - I welcome 
the support that Mr. van den Broek has 
expressed for the INF agreement. Despite hesita-
tions within the alliance and at national level 
about further reductions in capacity, will the 
Council consistently and wholeheartedly support 
the case for asymmetric reductions, if not the 
entire removal of strategic weapons ? Does Mr. 
van den Broek see any serious difficulty about 
establishing verification arrangements that 
would justify such removals or reductions ? Does 
he 'see any difficulty in arranging verification of 
the comprehensive arms control policy to which 
he referred ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council). - The alliance has spoken out 
clearly in various communiques in support of 
the INF agreement. The alliance, including WEU 
members, has jointly supported the idea of 
halving the strategic arsenals. Unrest was created 
in European capitals at the time of the Reykjavik 
summit when it was suggested that we should 
aim at the elimination of all intercontinental bal-
listic missiles. That theory is no longer under dis-
cussion. There is no difference between the allies 
about their support for halving the strategic 
arsenals. 
I mentioned the agreement on verification 
arrangements within the INF proposal. It is 
extremely important. As I said, an intrusive 
system has been agreed, with on-site inspections. 
The agreement is set out in a book that is about 
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six inches thick. George Shullz discouraged us 
from taking it to bed because it is not interesting 
literature, but it is detailed an.d contains much 
fine print and may be useful in solving the dif-
ficult problem of verification in other areas. 
It goes without saying that verification of a 
strategic arms agreement will be even more com-
plicated than verification on INF. We are talking 
about even more mobile systems that are more 
difficult to detect. INF is a zero-zero agreement. 
START will be 50:50, which is more difficult to 
control. We do not know whether things are 
moving round. If arms can be produced under an 
agreement and, therefore, may be stocked and 
tested, verification becomes increasingly dif-
ficult. 
However, we should not be discouraged. It is 
also tough to arrange verific~tion on chemical 
weapons, but we should contir}Ue working on it. 
Perhaps 100% verification will not be possible 
and we may have to face the difficult choice of 
accepting 90% verification with an agreement or 
getting no agreement. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - Why 
did the Ministerial Council respond so nega-
tively to Recommendation 448 on a European 
space policy until 2000 ? The broad outlines of 
the recommendations drafted by our Rappor-
teur, Mr. Valleix, were endorsed by the Minis-
terial Council of the European Space Agency at 
The Hague only a few days ago. Does not Europe 
need a military space policy, so that we may have 
an autonomous capability in space in military 
satellites for telecommunicatiqns, signals intelli-
gence, navigation, reconnaissa~nce and, thereby, 
confidence-building? Should pot WEU be the 
instrument for concerting sue._ a policy ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translatlion). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council). - I certainly do not discount that 
possibility. You should attribute our reluctance 
primarily to financial preoccupations and not to 
our not seeing a great usefulness in such a pro-
gramme. Most of our countries are involved in 
the ESA projects on satellites, missiles and so on. 
The latest ministerial meeting of that organ-
isation shows that many requirements have been 
recognised, but there is a great financial problem. 
Do not see it as a political no; see it, for the time 
being, as a reluctance because of the lack of 
finance. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Pontillon. 
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Mr. Chairman, in your introductory remarks you 
mentioned arms co-operation, and you expressed 
the hope that this Assembly would stimulate 
some initiative by ministers, I am happy to 
provide an opportunity for this. 
Agency Ill has submitted two reports on arma-
ments to the Council. One is entitled armaments 
co-operation between WEU member countries -
co-operative projects since 1984 and the second 
technology transfer. As usual, the Assembly is 
deprived of its information sources and research 
results. These documents would clearly be val-
uable to the Assembly's future work. Mr. 
Chairman, could not these reports be passed to 
us, even if only in declassified form ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office 
of the Council). - An interesting development 
has become public only this morning. General 
Secretary Gorbachev has admitted for the first 
time that there is a research programme on SDI 
in the Soviet Union. He said that the Soviet 
Union did not wish to deploy such a strategic 
defence system in space, but it is comforting that 
we have confirmation of what we have always 
claimed, which is that a research programme on 
the western side was prudent, as similar pro-
grammes were being carried out in the Soviet 
Union. 
I believe that solutions between Washington 
and Moscow may be possible. There is a growing 
rapprochement between them about accepting a 
commitment of non-withdrawal from the ABM 
treaty for a certain period. That would at least 
ensure that the deployment of such systems in 
space did not materialise in the next decade. 
I also feel that the difficult question of what 
would be allowed under the ABM treaty in 
testing, development and research could be 
resolved if the political will existed in Moscow 
and Washington. That would provide the 
prospect of lifting the blockade on a START 
agreement. 
The report drawn up in WEU is still under dis-
cussion. I feel that it is not treated with the 
utmost urgency because our minds are focused 
on a number of issues that I mentioned earlier. It 
would be premature to publish or submit reports 
to the Assembly. I suggest that my colleague, Mr. 
van Eekelen, address you tomorrow on arma-
ments co-operation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Pannella. 
Mr. PANNELLA (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, notwithstanding its kind words the 
Council has always acted over the years as 
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though we were a service corps necessarily 
bringing up the rear, and I shall therefore ask 
questions from that standpoint. 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council) (Translation). - Service corps ? 
Mr. PANNELLA (Italy) (Translation). -Yes, 
when dealing with state administrative 
problems, General de Gaulle used to say, "T~e 
service corps will bring up the rear". The fact IS 
that the Council displays towards us a degree of 
Gaullist condescension which is not always jus- · 
tified by its historic achievements. 
What measures suggest that we shall, in future, 
receive not merely fine words but the Council's 
replies to our written questions within eight 
weeks? 
The Council should send us its six-monthly 
reports in good time ! I do not believe there has 
been any ill will here, just a lack of the necessary 
resources. Good will is essential, but there are 
other needs as well. 
Our General Affairs Committee has described 
the thirty-second annual report as very inade-
quate and I would ask you, Mr. van den Broek, 
what 'measures you have taken to correct this 
totally unacceptable situation and to conform to 
the rules which theoretically govern relations 
between the Assembly and the Council of Min-
isters ? These rules have not in fact been 
observed by the Council for years. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council). -I understand Mr. Pannella's frus-
tration and irritation. As for what would be 
essential to meet the criticisms, we can at least 
agree about the introduction ofthe so-called ded-
icated communications network among the cap-
itals to alleviate the current burden of communi-
cations. If I am asked what has been done I can 
only say that we have asked the capitals and will 
communicate their replies, responses and reac-
tions as quickly and as soon as possible. I ask for 
your understanding. We also remain as 
dependent on the other partners in WEU as they 
are on us. I do not say that we are always the 
fastest movers and that they are the slowest. 
That is not the sense of my remarks. But we have 
to find ways and means of shortening the process 
and we need to agree upon the contents of replies 
to questions. 
I fully agree that a period of eight weeks would 
be appropriate so that the significance of ques-
tions did not subside and that we should not take 
longer to reply. It is not that we wish to be longer 
with our replies, I assure you. 
.• 
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I can only say again that we shall do our 
utmost to improve this type of communication. 
We shall have another go at it during the minis-
terial meeting in order to get the agreement of 
the seven on this dedicated communications 
network. There are still one or two member 
states with difficulties here but we shall proceed 
along the same lines. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Burger. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation).-
Are there really grounds for optimism when we 
see the disappointing progress made on conven-
tional weapons at the Vienna Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe ? 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council). - My optimism is based on the fact 
that we are now for the first time reaching con-
crete results in arms control. I do not underes-
timate the difficulties that we are encountering in 
resolving communications on conventional sta-
bility. The distinguished delegate is right to say 
that the mandate discussions on negotiations in 
Vienna are difficult. On the other hand, I have 
no less confidence that a mandate will be drawn 
up in a couple of months' time and that we shall 
be able to advise on the present follow-up 
Vienna meeting on the mandate on conventional 
stability. Having the mandate, however, does not 
mean that rapid results on communications are 
to be expected, because we know that it is a com-
plicated matter. However, let us not shy away 
from our difficulties. It is a priority that should 
be addressed and we shall continue to address it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Martino. 
Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (Translation). - Min-
ister, there are earlier bilateral agreements and 
bilateral agreements which are currently being 
worked out. We know that the first kind are still 
impeding the speedy adoption of joint political 
decisions on defence and security, as has hap-
pened with the events in the Gulf; we know that 
the second do not always appear to some of us to 
be directly concerned with joint responsibility 
for European defence and security, as with what 
has happened between France and Germany. 
How do you think the first and second problems 
can be overcome ? Do you think that the first are 
more difficult obstacles or that all the second 
group offer better prospects ? Thank you, Min-
ister. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of 
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the Council). - As with many things in life, it is a 
matter of time. The question is how can we 
accede to a close kind of co·operation without 
acting upon our own responsibility as, for 
instance, in the Gulf in the matter of preserving 
freedom of navigation. How can we accede to 
closer European consultation in this respect 
without more recognition of our own responsi-
bilities, so to speak? 
I say that it is a matter of time when I see what 
has been attained already in the past three or 
four months and how many sessions there have 
been of the political directors of WEU in dealing 
with this problem. We have agreed the naval 
staffs in the capitals should be communicating 
with each other on this problem. We have agreed 
with the five participating nations over there that 
the naval commanders in the area be in regular 
contact. Thus I say that you can certainly 
recognise progress in this area of co-operation. 
But we cannot withhold from anybody the 
argument that on a purely international law basis 
everybody is acting upon a national title since he 
is expected to preserve his own national 
interests. In spite of that legal argument, my 
feeling is that the cohesion of operation with a 
more European mark on it, if I may say so, is 
clearly increasing, and the French and German 
co-operation should be highly valued. 
Everything that leads to the reaffirmation of 
close French-German co-operation is to the 
benefit of Europe. The same applies to specific 
defence and military co-operation. This limit 
should not infringe upon existing military struc-
tures, such as those that exist between members 
of the alliance that belong to the integrated mil-
itary circuit. That would be the limit for us. One 
can go parallel with the other, but should not 
start infringing upon it. We do not believe that 
undermining NATO military co-operation 
would benefit our common security. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
You have just spoken about the Gulf and you 
have told us that the admiralties in the five cap-
itals are in regular contact, and that the naval 
forces in the Gulf are in regular contact. May I 
ask a simple question? Let us suppose that a 
mine-sweeper of country B is sunk by Iranian 
action tomorrow. I do not ask what would be 
done, but whether the naval commanders there 
have sealed orders already agreed by their gov-
ernments so that they take concerted action 
along with any other forces in that area, or have 
such orders not yet been decided ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
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Affairs of the Netherlands, Chaiman-in-Office of 
the Council). - The distinguished delegate refers 
to certain rules of the engagement in the Gulf 
area, the prime responsibility for which belongs 
to the ministers for defence. I do not deny that 
there would be clear political implications in 
such a situation. Perhaps the question of the dis-
tinguished delegate could be dealt with more spe-
cifically by Mr. van Eekelen tomorrow. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Pieralli. 
Mr. PIERALLI (Italy) (Translation). - I am 
very grateful to you, Minister, for the support 
you have given to the INF agreement and more 
generally to the prospects for arms reduction. My 
question concerns the outlook for negotiations 
on conventional weapons. 
It says in today's Herald Tribune that, 
according to an American television journalist 
working for NBC news, Mr. Gorbachev has said 
that Moscow is ready to enter into immediate 
talks with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation on the Soviet proposals for conven-
tional forces in Europe. According to this jour-
nalist he said," We are ready and we have made 
our proposals. Now we are waiting for a more 
active response from NATO ". These remarks 
have a very important bearing on future work 
designed to achieve effective security in Europe 
based on the minimum level of armaments and I 
would ask your opinion, Minister, about Mr. 
Gorbachev's remarks. Could you tell us some-
thing about preparations in NATO for negotia-
tions of this kind ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council). - All the positions taken in Vienna 
will be co-ordinated within the alliance. Sec-
ondly, we have not yet reached the phase of 
negotiation. We are trying to establish agreement 
on the mandate ofthe negotiations, which means 
that we should agree in the first place about what 
reduction area we are going to negotiate. Again, 
there are certain nuances in the various posi-
tions. Apart from reduction areas, it must be 
decided which type of armaments, troops and so 
on will be involved in those negotiations and 
which types will be left out. That is the dis-
cussion that is going on in Vienna at present. 
Before that mandate has been put into place, I 
do not believe that it is wise to express an 
opinion on or react to the substance of the Soviet 
proposals as such. Various capitals - also those 
belonging to WEU - have already presented 
certain working papers internally as a contri-
bution to the discussion on substance. Therefore, 
we are not only waiting until the negotiations 
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that are going on are concluded before reflecting 
on the western position, but we are very carefully 
preparing them. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Stegagnini. 
Mr. STEGAGNINI (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. Chairman, you described WEU as a forum 
for political consultation and practical 
co-operation on defence questions. At the 
moment co-operation between the WEU coun-
tries on land, air and naval training is largely 
confined to bilateral agreements; for example, 
between Italy and the United Kingdom for air 
forces; with Germany for ground forces and staff 
colleges; with France for naval forces, particu-
larly as regards exercises in the Mediterranean. 
Why does WEU not seek to promote specific 
agreements both within and outside the 
organisation - with Canada for example - in 
view of the ever-increasing difficulty of pro-
viding firing ranges and suitable training areas ? I 
believe that this would be practical proof of 
genuine collaboration. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council). - Plainly, we cannot exclude the 
possibility of other accords on co-operation 
between more WEU members being concluded. 
Nothing is excluded in this respect. I believe that 
any type of action in this area will be tested 
against its effects on the cohesion of the NATO 
alliance as a whole, and existing structures 
should not be infringed. The examples referred 
to by Mr. Stegagnini need not necessarily have 
that disturbing function. Military co-operation 
between WEU members is being conducted 
mostly under bilateral agreements. For instance, 
France has made it known that it would like to 
extend to other countries certain forms of 
co-operation that it entertains at present with the 
German Federal Republic. Whether that would 
always be in the form of separate bilateral agree-
ments I am not quite certain, but we could think 
in the longer term of agreements of a more multi-
lateral character within WEU. Again, there is no 
dogmatism in that respect as long as it serves the 
purpose that we want to serve. 
We all know that WEU is not a military 
organisation. First and foremost it is a political 
organisation, but it can provide for impulses 
towards more armaments co-operation or the 
common training of forces, as we have seen with 
the Federal Republic of Germany and with 
France. I think that flexibility, not dogmatism, 
should rule our proceedings, keeping in mind 
that in this respect we are serving the 
enhancement of defence capabilities and of sta-
bility in general. 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mrs. 
Hennicot-Schoepges. 
Mrs. HENNICOT -SCHOEPGES (Luxem-
bourg) (Translation). - In your address, Min-
ister, you did not mention chemical weapons and 
spoke only of nuclear and conventional weapons. 
The platform also fails to mention chemical 
weapons. We do not know what stocks of such 
weapons are held in the East. Should this not 
also be of concern to the Council in view of the 
disarmament talks? 
We also know that in 1986 the Council com-
piled a list of biological weapons. Why has the 
agency done nothing to verify the production of 
these biological weapons? We should be as con-
cerned about this question as about nuclear 
weapons. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council). - I readily admit that the latter 
question does not immediately ring a bell with 
me, but perhaps I may let it ring if I am given 
some time. I should like to respond to that 
question in writing. That would be no problem. I 
can do that within eight weeks. 
I mentioned chemical weapons earlier. It is in 
the platform, insofar as the platform on the arms 
control chapter refers also to the decisions taken 
on 12th June by NATO in Reykjavik. We are 
speaking about the post-INF agenda. The 
various sectors of arms control were enumerated, 
including chemical weapons. As I indicated, 
there is a certain stagnation about verification 
with chemical weapons. What we felt two years 
ago was that sufficient verification of chemical 
weapons no longer served our requirements. 
That is the opinion of a number of important 
partners in these multilateral chemical weapons 
negotiations. What I tried to indicate earlier 
applies notably to chemical weapons. One comes 
to a point where one has to choose between 
accepting 90% verification certainty with an 
entire ban on chemical weapons as such or 
striving for 100%, which one will not reach and 
which will eventually impede the coming into 
being of a complete ban on chemical weapons. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Aarts. 
Mr. AARTS (Netherlands) (Translation). -
Mr. President, the question I want to ask about 
Franco-German co-operation has to a great 
extent been covered by Mr. Martino's question. 
But I have a further, specific question to add. 
Did those who proposed this Franco-German 
co-operation at brigade level formally bring the 
proposal to the notice of the Council of Min-
isters, and was the Council formally asked for its 
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opinion on this plan ? Is it also intended that the 
further elaboration of this plan and the practical 
details, specifically in connection with the mil-
itary and defensive implications, should be dis-
cussed in the Council and, by analogy, the 
NATO Council too ? 
Mr. President, I have read what the platform 
has to say about the enlargeme~t of WEU, which 
the Minister also mentioned this morning. Can I 
take it that Portugal may become a member of 
this organisation in the immediate future if a 
further application for accession is submitted 
and if Portugal is willing to satisfy the criteria set 
out in the platform and the Brussels Treaty ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council). - I am tempted to reply in Dutch, 
but I shall stick to English, because politicians 
should try to be consistent ! 
It is indeed the case that the co-operation 
between France and Germanly, including this 
mixed brigade, has been discussed by political 
directors and ministers. At least we have been 
informed about this by our French and German 
colleagues. We have welcomed this type of devel-
opment, but again under the provision that I 
mentioned earlier - that we wi~h to count on the 
fact that these types of co-op~ration, including 
French and German forces, should in no way 
infringe upon the existing NATO military struc-
tures as such. Again, as the exchanges of views 
within WEU, albeit on a purely official level, 
progress, we certainly hope to remain informed 
about further developments in this respect. 
Mr. Aarts asked whether Portugal could 
become a member. As I said earlier, we have dis-
tributed the platform also to Portugal and I 
expect that in the foreseeable future - I have 
indications in that direction - Portugal will ask 
the presidency to have certain orientative talks 
on the platform as such. If tl:).e conditions are 
met, it is a decision for the seven WEU members 
to extend invitations according to the treaty. 
Personally, I feel that if Portugal meets all 
these standards, so far as the Netherlands is con-
cerned - I am speaking in that capacity - we 
should favour this. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now ask 
members to put their questions in turn for you to 
answer them together. 
I call Sir Russell J ohnston. 
Sir Russell JOHNSTON (United Kingdom). -
The Minister rightly referred to the importance 
of human rights within the CSGE process. While 
it is too early to evaluate glasnost and perestroika 
and whether they represent any kind of genuine 
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change, one cannot have any illusion about the 
difficulty of loosening a dictatorial system or 
ignoring the relevance to our defence perceptions 
of progress in that area. Glasnost would have to 
be assessed according to some timescale. In 
response to an earlier question the Minister said 
that it was a matter of time. Could he give us 
some idea of his timescale and priorities in this 
essential field within the CSCE process ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Miranda Calha. 
Mr. MIRANDA CALHA (Observer from Por-
tugal). - I think that the question that I was 
going to put has been answered. It was about 
Portugal's entry into WEU. I think that the Min-
ister has answered that, and I am grateful to him. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Garrett. 
Mr. GARRETT (United Kingdom). - The 
Minister mentioned the co-operation of the 
European naval forces in the Gulf. A reputable 
British newspaper mentions that there is a possi-
bility of the Netherlands and Belgian mine-
sweeping forces' ships being withdrawn, in the 
case of the Belgians because of low morale 
among the sailors and, in the case of the Nether-
lands, because of the cost. Will he confirm or 
deny that report ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Declercq. 
Mr. DECLERCQ (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
want to ask a question about the choice of 
location for WEU's institutions. The platform 
clearly stresses that WEU is the European pillar 
of NATO. Will this be taken into account in the 
choice of location, particularly as regards the 
facilities for consulting experts, and the 
assurance of the American presence as the gua-
rantee of the West's defence? In other words, is 
it being explicitly borne in mind that WEU must 
not be seen as conflicting with NATO, but as a 
form of co-operation within NATO ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
Mr. van den BROEK (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council). - The first question shows the 
importance attached by the Assembly to 
improvements in political relations between East 
and West going hand-in-hand with arms control. 
I believe that if we do not succeed in making 
progress in that respect, which includes human 
rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
we will soon find limits to arms control agree-
ments. Confidence, which is the best instrument 
for arms control, can be brought about only by 
improving human rights. 
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I should hate to see a cut-off date. We feel that 
the final document in Vienna should be balanced 
and should contain substance. We should prefer 
to continue the conference for some time to 
achieve that goal. 
Progress is being made and will continue to be 
made on the first basket of the Helsinki final act 
on security and confidence-building measures 
and on the conventional stability talks mandate. 
Those are also clear priorities for the Soviet 
Union, but it attaches less priority to the third 
basket, which includes the human dimension, 
and to the seventh principle of the first basket, 
relating to human rights. 
If the western countries, in a unified role, do 
not ensure that the balance is set out in the final 
document of the follow-up conference in Vienna 
we shall probably never have another chance to 
restore the balance. That is why I am against a 
cut-off date, which would force us to achieve a 
result which might be unattractive to us, cer-
tainly in the longer term. 
As regards the article in the English news-
paper, I assure Mr. Garrett that no reasons of 
finance are at the moment influencing the con-
tinuation or discontinuation of our presence in 
the Gulf. We have an important responsibility 
there. In the longer term, if the threat from mines 
decreases, one may consider whether a rotation 
system among the participating countries of 
WEU could be instituted, but, as Dutchmen, we 
advocate this European operation under the 
Dutch presidency of WEU and we do not intend 
to withdraw unilaterally. There are close contacts 
with our partners. 
The final questioner said that the members of 
WEU should not gang up against other alliance 
partners, particularly the United States. The 
platform speaks clearly on that issue. 
I was asked when we would decide on the site 
for collocation. I hope - and our endeavours are 
geared towards this end - that we shall have a 
solution by the time of the ministerial meeting in 
April. Delaying a decision will slow down other 
elements of the reorganisation to make one 
entity of the agencies under a directorate that is 
responsible to the Secretary-General. We are 
motivated to continue our endeavours. We 
count the blessings of the past months during 
which progress has been made, but I agree with 
those who say that we must not get stuck 
halfway. That will not produce the result that we 
all seek. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. van 
den Broek, the applause you have just heard 
expresses the Assembly's appreciation of your 
full replies to its questions. 
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5. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this 
afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of 
the day: 
1. Political activities of the Council - reply to 
the thirty-second annual report of the 
Council (Resumed debate on the report of 
the General Affairs Committee and vote on 
the draft recommendation, Document 111 7 
and amendment). 
2. Draft budget of the administrative expend-
iture of the Assembly for the financial year 
1988 (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration and vote on the 
draft budget, Document 1121 and 
addendum). 
3. Address by Mr. Raimond, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of France. 
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4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 
- the auditor's report and motion to 
approve the final accounts (Presentation of 
and debate on the report of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
and vote on the motion to approve the final 
accounts, Document 1108 and adden-
dum). 
5. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second 
annual report of the Council (Presentation 
of and debate on the report of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments, Document 1116 and amend-
ments). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.) 
EIGHTH SITTING 
Tuesday, 1st December 1987 
SUMMARY 
1. Attendance register. 
2. Adoption of the minutes. 
3. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-
second annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on 
the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Doe. 1117 and amendment). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Caro, Mr. Martino, Mr. van 
der Sanden (Rapporteur), Mr. Caro, Mr. van der Sanden, 
Mr. Ahrens (Chairman), Mr. Burger; (point of order): Mr. 
Pieralli, Mr. Close, Mr. Caro, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg; Mr. 
Ahrens; (point of order): Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Caro, Mr. 
Pieralli, Mr. Reddemann. 
4. Address by Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
France. 
Replies by Mr. Raimond to questions put by: Mr. Soell, Mr. 
Rubbi, Mr. de Beer, Mr. Caro. 
5. Amendment of the Charter of the Assembly (Motion to 
amend the Charter, Doe. 1128). 
6. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1988 (Presentation of the 
report of the Commillee on Budgetary Affairs and Admm-
istration and vote on the draft budget, Doe. 1121 and 
addendum). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Linster (Chairman and 
Rapporteur). 
7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1986 - the auditor's report 
and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of 
and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to 
approve the final accounts, Doe. 1108 and addendum). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Linster (Chairman and 
Rapporteur), Mr. Burger. 
8. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second annual report of 
the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doe. 
1116 and amendments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Scheer (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Muller, Mr. Soell. 
9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 3.10 p. m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
l. See page 22. 
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3. Political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-second annual report 
of the Council 
(Resumed debate on the report 
of the General Affairs Committee 
and vote on the draft recommendation, 
Doe. 1117 and amendment) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the resumed debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee on the 
political activities of the Council - reply to the 
thirty-second annual report of the Council and 
vote on the draft recommendation, Document 
111 7 and amendment. 
I call Mr. Caro to speak in the resumed debate. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, it is a pleasure for me to be with you again 
in a debate which, in fact has little to do with the 
annual report of the Council for 1986 and is 
more concerned with the present state of WEU 
reactivation. You know how much I strove, 
during my three years as President, to ensure 
that the Assembly took part in the decisions that 
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the Council had to take to bring about that reac-
tivation. This meant first of all that the 
Assembly had to be informed of the Council's 
intentions but also that it had to be able to make 
its views known to the Council before it took any 
step committing the organisation for the future. 
That is why I instituted new procedures for dia-
logue with the three Chairmen-in-Office of the 
Council with whom I had to deal, namely Mr. 
Genscher, Mr. Andreotti and Mr. Poos, all of 
whom are still heads of the ministries for foreign 
affairs in their countries. All three co-operated 
with a determination to succeed to which I 
would like to pay tribute. 
Mr. van der Sanden, our Rapporteur, has 
rightly recalled that the development of these 
informal exchanges should not lead to their 
taking the place of the normal procedures for 
relations between the executive and legislative 
bodies. However, the official procedures are so 
slow and rigid in WEU that the only way to have 
a dialogue, which may have been imperfect but 
nevertheless allowed the Assembly, the main-
spring of WEU reactivation, not to be left on the 
touchline when it was being put into effect, was 
to break out of their constraining formality. So I 
think that whilst it may be necessary to reinstate 
the official exchanges between the two WEU 
organs as the Rapporteur requests, we should not 
for all that give up holding exchanges of views on 
a completely off the record basis. For the official 
exchanges, it is up to the Council to take the ini-
tiative and for the others the Assembly needs to 
organise its participation in the unofficial dia-
logue in such a way as to be able to feel that it is 
effectively represented. 
The purpose of the action I embarked upon -
with, I would stress, the consent of the whole of 
the Assembly - was in the first place to develop 
WEU's political activity by obliging the Council 
to respond in a concrete manner to Europe's 
problems as they arose so that WEU might assert 
itself as the voice of Europe for questions within 
its competence. What it did during the summer 
with regard to the Gulf affair largely meets that 
requirement even though joint action outside the 
NATO area always seems very difficult to 
mount, so great are the differences that still 
remain in our seven countries' perceptions of 
their foreign responsibilities. I am convinced 
that the approach they took in the Gulf question, 
whilst very timid, will need to be developed and 
above all structured in such a way as to leave no 
doubt that it is Europe that has embarked upon a 
joint action in this matter to maintain the 
freedom of the seas. 
However, it is only when Europe is in a 
position to speak with a single voice on specifi-
cally European problems that WEU will really be 
able to perform its role. In that connection, The 
95 
EIGHTH SITTING 
Hague platform is a definite advance because it 
sets out the main lines of a European strategy 
that is part of NATO strategy while allowing for 
the individual requirements, of the various 
member countries. It is credible because it has 
received the support of our American allies but it 
is still far from sufficient, for one thing because 
there is no obligation to take concrete action and 
for another because the manner in which it sit-
uates WEU reactivation in the setting of a wider 
movement, the platform for which is the single 
European act, is very vague. The reference to the 
single act in The Hague text: is obviously not 
enough to convince the public that what is done 
in the framework of WEU forms part of the 
general advance that should lead to real 
European union. 
The question through which the Council could 
have made this European vision clearer was, of 
course, the enlargement of WEU. It was faced 
with a choice: either to link accession to WEU 
with membership of the European Community 
or, on the contrary, to impose its own criteria. 
Sadly, as we can see, not only has it chosen the 
second of these alternatives but, in addition, it 
has imposed special conditions on Spain, a 
member of the Community, which at least one of 
the WEU member countries - France - does not 
fulfil. 
It is easy to understand that the Council did 
not want to hold out its arms to Spain too obvi-
ously at a time when that country's relations 
with the United States were in crisis over the 
renegotiation of the agreement on the mainte-
nance of American nuclear bases on Spanish ter-
ritory. But was that a reason to use accession to 
WEU to bring pressure to bear on Spain in that 
issue? Hoping to do so slJ_owed very poor 
judgment about the possible Spanish reaction 
and there is every reason to fear that this short-
sighted policy will have the effect of keeping 
Spain out of WEU for several more years 
without, for all that, making understanding with 
the United States any easier. 
The policy proposed by the Assembly was to 
invite those of the European Community 
member states whose rapid accession to WEU 
seemed desirable to take part in drawing up what 
was then called the charter and has become the 
platform on European security interests. The 
platform would then have become the basis for 
rapprochement of the members of the Com-
munity in the field of security. The line the 
Council has taken could turn it into an obstacle 
to WEU enlargement. 
Yet that enlargement is necessary if we want 
WEU to be not only the European pillar of the 
alliance, which it can only be in an imperfect 
manner so long as only some of the European 
members ofthe alliance are in WEU, but also the 
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organisation through which the European Com-
munity tackles its security problems. 
Of course it is no use bewailing lost opportun-
ities, but we need to learn lessons from this for 
the future, the main one in my view being that 
what reactivated WEU needs more than ever is 
that the stimulus its Assembly has given it in the 
past should continue during the next few 
years. 
That is why the Assembly should put all its 
weight behind the suggestions that Mr. Goerens, 
our President, made yesterday and the recom-
mendation that Mr. van der Sanden, our Rap-
porteur, has presented today. There will be no 
real reactivation of WEU unless all the WEU 
organs, Council and Assembly, play their full 
part in it. 
The Council has equipped itself with the 
means of fresh political activity and that is cause 
for satisfaction. It has enabled the Secretariat-
General, taking advantage of the reduction in the 
role and staff of the agencies, to mobilise the 
remaining agency in its service and to increase its 
own working capacity. That could be an excellent 
thing. But it is the Assembly that could be the 
loser in this operation if it is not given the 
financial resources, staff and information it 
needs to perform effectively the role that it ought 
to have in a reactivated WEU. In my three years 
in office I was able to see how close it was 
running to the limits of its capacity in this situ-
ation. Very soon, those limits could well be 
exceeded. 
Governments might be tempted to consider 
that the new slant taken by the Council's activ-
ities makes an active Assembly unnecessary. The 
idea has surfaced in press reports prompting one 
to wonder to what extent and by whom they are 
inspired. Whereas the papers up to now - and 
not without due cause - have always contrasted 
an active Assembly with a somnolent Council we 
now read disappointed or even insulting assess-
ments in our regard ranging from those reducing 
us to the role of " sounding board " for the 
Council, which no parliamentary assembly 
worthy of the name can accept, to the description 
in the British periodical Defence which recently 
labelled us a dead duck. In that periodical the 
Council is described as active, just as our Secre-
tary-General describes it, and the Assembly as 
half-dead. I hope this is a case of the press going 
too fast and using caricatures instead of basing 
itself on the realities that the Council and the 
Assembly, together, have been building for so 
many years. 
Let us make no mistake, there will be no 
lasting reactivation of WEU if this dialogue 
between an organ of intergovernmental consul-
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tation and a parliamentary assembly, which the 
modified Brussels Treaty introduced into a mil-
itary alliance for the first time in the history of 
the world, is not maintained. Today, the joint 
consultation on the situation in the Gulf may 
give some results. The diplomats were able to 
reach agreement on the principles of a European 
security policy. These, however, are achieve-
ments with no tomorrow that any kind of change 
of policy by one or other of our governments 
could put at risk if reactivated WEU is not based 
on European public opinion, on the parliaments 
of the member countries and on a public dia-
logue between the executive and parliamentary 
organs of the institution. If the Assembly were 
really to become the dead duck it is already 
accused of being WEU as a whole would be 
lamed and European defence would be in 
jeopardy. 
Is it not the incontrovertible political impor-
tance of our Assembly, now recognised by all, 
which incommodes those who in reality, behind 
the smoke-screens of their official statements, 
would like to stifle any action aimed at pro-
moting organised European defence? And would 
not those responsible for this perverse " dead 
duck " policy be the very ones who say their dog 
has rabies because they want it killed? 
So, before events place us in an intolerable sit-
uation, let us say clearly this very day that the 
time has come for governments to pay some 
heed to the very modest demands made by our 
President, Mr. Goerens, and Mr. van der Sanden 
concerning budgeting issues and the political dia-
logue. Let us show, through our firmness, that we 
are determined not to be reduced to silence or to 
become the dead duck of Europe which is of 
course, ladies and gentlemen, far from being our 
intention. 
Let me add at this time when the development 
of Europe depends upon the motivation of 
public opinion in all our countries, given the 
prospects opened up by the single European act 
and the 1992 target date - whereas the single 
European act has been in force since 1st July this 
year laying down the principles for political con-
sultation on defence, security and disarmament 
questions - that ultimately nothing can be done 
outside the existing treaties and that these 
include the modified Brussels Treaty. 
So our Assembly of Western European Union, 
which must be retained with the European Par-
liament, needs to conduct its business with the 
prospect of European political unity in mind in 
order to enable Europe to take its place at last in 
the dialogue of the continents where, yet again, 
we are going to see agreement being reached 
above - if not over - our heads this very month 
in Washington between President Reagan and 
Mr. Gorbachev. 
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For Europe to come alive it has to take its 
rightful place in the world. To occupy that place 
it also has to exist in the field of defence and, for 
that, it has to make itself heard in the Atlantic 
Alliance. That is the political equation facing our 
governments. It is the determination to solve 
that equation that our Assembly must unceas-
ingly assert. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you 
very much, Mr. Caro. 
I call the last representative down to speak, 
Mr. Martino. 
Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (Translation). - I am 
doubly grateful to you, Mr. President because, 
having arrived late for reasons beyond my 
control, I had already decided not to intervene as 
I was to speak at the next sitting. I am grateful 
because I now have an opportunity to offer my 
special thanks to Mr. van der Sanden for his 
work in a swiftly developing sequence of world-
shaking events. I am sure that it is only because 
you have such a clear view of the purpose of 
WEU that you have been able to produce a 
report which develops in logical terms a subject 
which dates far back into the past. 
We must not even now forget the concept of 
security and defence on which the Brussels 
Treaty was originally based. This has changed 
with the passage of time. Today our ideas on 
security and defence are very different from what 
they were. Today we are looking mainly at the 
world well into the future when there will be no 
further defence based on deterrence, on the 
political philosophy of Copernican SDI to meet 
the steady growth in the number of nuclear 
weapons opposed only by patient but determined 
hope. I say patient and determined hope because 
there were times last August when we would 
have wished our WEU to intervene more deci-
sively through its Council of Ministers. We were 
fully acquainted with the modified Brussels 
Treaty; we were thinking of paragraph 3 of 
Article VIII and we were expecting one of the 
contracting parties to act with the urgency which 
the facts showed to be all important, to bring 
together the ministers and the other contracting 
parties to decide on a policy for what happened 
immediately afterwards. 
I must confess that I thought then, Mr. Pres-
ident, of your status, your powers and even your 
duty; I thought of Rule 3 of our Rules of Pro-
cedure which if I am not mistaken provides that 
in exceptional circumstances the President may 
convene the Assembly in situations which 
appear to be extremely dangerous or important 
or such as to involve the wider interests of the 
seven countries convened to the Assembly to 
decide what political action should be taken. In 
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fact, neither I myself m31de any special 
approaches - a letter to Mr. Goerens remained 
in my drawer - nor did anyone else because we 
had a sense of responsibility and understood the 
political realities and hence the impossibility of 
doing anything in circumstances which are 
outside the scope of the action we can take and 
limit what we can do; we are '!ery well aware of 
the many diplomatic ties which bind many of 
our countries bilaterally with ~ountries beyond 
our frontiers; and we know that in diplomacy no 
great leaps forward are possible. Nature itself 
takes no leaps forward but diplomacy takes 
many fewer. 
There were - and I put the question today to 
the Chairman-in-Office of th~ Council - pre-
vious bilateral agreements which are difficult to 
set aside except by gradual action which is 
among our responsiblities. But there are still 
bilateral agreements limited to our seven coun-
tries and these are developing and, it seems to 
some of us, are creating obstacles to unity of 
action and political agreement1 within WEU. 
I personally do not think tHis to be the case. 
The process even when it goes ahead bilaterally 
within the concert of Europe seems to be a 
number of solo performances which must 
however be written into the score for that concert 
that has to be of a joint nature.' That is why I am 
not afraid of initiatives whichi seem to be of a 
local and limited nature withirl the broad sweep 
of political events. I think we shall be able to 
restore the fullest unity of action in relation to 
these world events. Never before had we been 
faced with such major issues as the reduction of 
armaments; never before had we been faced with 
the possibility of asymmetpcal reductions. 
Never before had the superpo"'jers accepted veri-
fication. 
So, in this context, it will be more and more 
difficult and not easier to move forward. We 
must rediscover our political way, our European 
way so that we can look forw~rd with peace of 
mind to future action. Let it ne!)t be said that on 
the other side of the Atlantic it may be difficult 
to understand our attitude. I would say that if we 
are to be a pillar we must be a united pillar and 
must not give the impression that we are moving 
apart. 
We are under moral press\lre. Let us look 
forward to the year 2000 and I let us rediscover 
the way we must take. We shalllnot stray from it. 
I am convinced of this because we are all of us 
responsible to our countries and above all to our 
Europe. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call Mr. van der Sanden, ltapporteur of the 
General Affairs Committee. 
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lation). - Mr. President, firstly, of course, I want 
to thank the members who have spoken for their 
contribution. I am very touched by the kind 
words used in the Assembly to describe this 
report and the recommendation. I feel this is the 
time and place to stress that a report of this kind 
can only be drawn up by a parliamentarian who 
also has responsibilities in his own country if he 
has the assistance of a secretariat in this 
Assembly which has capable people at its dis-
posal. And I commend the Assembly in this case 
too. Quite specifically I should also like to thank 
Mr. Burgelin for his assistance. 
Mr. President, almost all the many speakers 
have touched on numerous subjects which are 
covered by the report and which largely concern 
the events of the period since 1st July, which I 
spoke of yesterday afternoon in my introductory 
statement. I shall not go into all the various 
aspects again because I note that there is a wide 
measure of agreement over what has emerged 
from the Assembly in the last few days about 
WEU's future, following the decisions now taken 
by the Council of Ministers, and also, I would 
stress, about the position this Assembly will have 
to adopt in the near future, when it comes to 
dealing with the repercussions of the problems 
we face now that these decisions have been 
taken. I was particularly pleased by the com-
ments made by Mr. Aarts, among others, when 
he made the point that this Assembly is a demo-
cratic representative body. He said - and I want 
to emphasise this - that the need for monitoring 
will increase as reactivation begins to take 
effect. 
I am then in the happy or, as far as the General 
Affairs Committee is concerned, unhappy 
position of also being the Rapporteur at a future 
part-session on developments in the Council of 
Ministers since the decision on the platform was 
taken. So my message to the Assembly is: we 
shall be coming back to this point. Once again, I 
feel - this applies to all of us who sit here as 
members of our national parliaments - that, 
with the incentives now perhaps somewhat 
reduced, the need for democratic control over 
the Council's actions with respect to the reacti-
vation of WEU will be as great as ever. 
Some interesting remarks have also been made 
about the platform itself. They came from Mr. 
Antretter, Mr. Aarts, my friend Mr. Caro and 
some others. The Minister, the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council of Ministers, also talked 
about it this morning. It was quite clear that the 
line which has now been taken is one which has 
found favour with the Council of Ministers. The 
Assembly and the Minister too have this 
morning set a very clear course in accordance 
with the democratic influence emanating from 
the Assembly. 
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The third point on which I want to comment 
very briefly - it was raised by Mr. Antretter, Mr. 
Valleix, Mr. Burger and Mr. Gale - concerns 
public relations activities aimed at the media, on 
the one hand, and communications from the 
Council of Ministers to the Assembly on the 
other. I need not repeat what I said about this 
yesterday. We are not happy about it. I am now 
speaking only about the situation up to the 
Council's thirty-second annual report. I can say 
that since 1st June the information passed on to 
the Assembly and also to the media has been 
greatly improved, when I think of the press con-
ferences the presidency has given in recent 
months, when I think of the communication - I 
talked about this yesterday - on the meetings of 
the political directors, which used to be sur-
rounded with so much secrecy. 
I remember - and the Assembly will perhaps 
remember too - that when I last acted as 
rapporteur for the Assembly, I put a number of 
questions on a meeting of the political directors 
held, I believe, on 25th February 1985 in Bonn, 
and received a virtual denial that any such 
meeting had taken place. That is how secret 
things were in those days! I believe the situation 
really has changed to some extent and that as an 
Assembly we should be glad of it. But I would 
say to Mr. Burger that his amendment will not 
cause us any problems, because it concerns the 
provision of information to the public. Let me 
repeat something I said yesterday. If we want the 
reactivated WEU to be the forum in which 
political decisions on our security in Western 
Europe are given substance and form, it is 
essential that our constituents be sufficiently 
familiar with WEU. Our constituents are in fact 
the 250 million inhabitants of Western Europe. 
Mr. President, Mr. Gale and Mr. Burger com-
mented on the lack of information from the 
Council of Ministers on the fight against ter-
rorism. I sympathise. My report also contains a 
single comment on this. But I believe it was Mr. 
Burger who recalled this morning that the 
twenty-one countries of the Council of Europe 
bear considerable responsibility for the fight 
against terrorism at international level and that 
the Legal Committee has therefore set up a 
special sub-committee to keep a watching brief 
on the fight against terrorism at the level of the 
Council of Ministers. This does not, of course, 
alter the fact that we too will have to accept that 
within WEU the same ministers, if we are talking 
about the foreign ministers co-operating with the 
ministers of justice of the Council of Europe 
countries and the seven WEU countries, should 
be making a joint effort to curb and suppress ter-
rorism. I would just like to add today that, when 
we are back in our national parliaments, we 
should also take a look at the financial resources 
that these parliaments are prepared to make 
available, to Interpol, for example. I believe it is 
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less than we are demanding for the fight against 
international terrorism. 
Mr. President, this is where the difficulties 
start. I am thinking specifically of Mr. 
Wilkinson, who has probably had to leave for the 
United Kingdom for some important votes this 
evening. Or am I mistaken? He is still here. He 
has drawn up a ten-point programme regarding 
collocation, in which he has included not only 
the ministerial organs but also the Assembly. Mr. 
President, I call on you as President of this 
Assembly to state very clearly that - as far as I 
know - not a word has so far been said in any of 
this Assembly's committees about collocation, 
about the location of both the ministerial organs 
and the Assembly's organs in one place. This has 
not been under discussion. So if Mr. Wilkinson 
wants to come forward with practical proposals, 
like his ten-point programme, it seems obvious 
to me that they should first be discussed by the 
Assembly through the appropriate committee. As 
I see it, the Presidential Committee is the most 
appropriate body for this purpose. 
Mr. President, all the speakers yesterday and 
today have talked about the merging of the 
agencies, collocation and restructuring. Even Mr. 
Valleix paid particular attention to these aspects. 
In my view and according to the information I 
have at the moment, the situation is that the 
decisions taken by the Council of Ministers on 
27th and 28th October should be implemented 
in the short term. Yesterday I referred to 1st 
April in passing. This morning I listened closely 
to the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, 
when he spoke of a date close to the next minis-
terial conference to be held in April. 
Mr. President, Mr. Antretter and Mr. Burger 
also talked about the Franco-German brigade. I 
listened to their comments with great interest. 
They correspond fairly closely to the comments I 
made on this subject yesterday, which are also 
reflected in my report. 
Mr. President, the penultimate point is the 
question of the Gulf. Mr. Pannella and Mr. 
Martino spoke about this. What Mr. Martino 
said this morning naturally has my wholehearted 
support. In July, August and September we 
waited with some anxiety for Western European 
Union to do something. I stress the word 
" union " in this context, just as Mr. Martino 
did. This is not some chance grouping of seven 
governments that meet from time to time. No, it 
is a collective. A common policy is pursued on 
Western European security and on the protection 
of the international freedom of navigation. It is 
not just a question - as I said yesterday - of pro-
tecting national interests: international interests 
are at stake here. I feel that what the Minister 
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said about this this morning,again demonstrates 
how right the Assembly is in its thinking, which I 
am happy to say is now being largely adopted by 
the Council of Ministers. 
Mr. President, just a fuw words on the 
enlargement of WEU. Mr. Burger believes it 
must be enlarged. It was also referred to by Mr. 
Pannella, Mr. Aarts and Mr. Irmer, who linked 
enlargement specifically to the question of 
restructuring in the context of the accession of 
new countries. 
Today the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
of Ministers said for the first time that Portugal 
can now expect an answer shortly. This is the 
first time that the enlargement of WEU has been 
referred to in such positive !terms. He also said 
that the Council awaits rejlctions from some 
other countries. We do not 'eed to be too mys-
terious about this. Spain w~s referred to by a 
number of members yestdday and today. It 
seems to me that we should not bring any 
pressure to bear in the current political situation, 
when Spain is also engaged in talks with the 
United States about the bases in that country. 
But we should wait for the reply to the Council of 
Ministers from the Spaniards themselves after 
the platform has been forwarded to them. We 
should then await the outcome of the talks that 
will follow. I am pleased to see that a number of 
countries which are not members ofWEU but do 
belong to NATO are also attending this part-
session of the Assembly. 
You may rest assured that the Assembly - and 
more specifically, Mr. President, the General 
Affairs Committee - endorses the European 
pillar and feels it should be reinforced. We are 
very much in favour of enlargement, provided 
that it does not exacerbat~ existing conflicts 
between certain members ofWEU. There comes 
a time in this respect when we must call a halt. 
We shall be interested to se~ what progress the 
Council of Ministers succee4s in making. 
Mr. President, Mr. Irmer said something with 
which I agree wholeheartedly, He said that, when 
bilateral talks are held in Eutope, it often means 
that not much progress can be made at multi-
lateral level. If some progress is then made at 
bilateral level, it has a favourable effect on the 
multilateral talks. If a European solution is to be 
found to many security problems, he said, it will 
only be because we really want this European 
union. 
Mr. President, I endorse what Mr. Irmer said, 
and I would add the following. The Assembly 
must stand by the role in which its members, as 
representatives of the people, are naturally cast 
in their interaction with the ministers. This role 
must continue to be a critical one. 
Mr. President, the Assembly has instructed us 
to prepare a symposium, which will probably be 
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held in the autumn of 1988. We go along with 
the Council of Ministers in the context of the 
substantial report on its activities as far as the 
thirty-third annual report is concerned. I am 
optimistic about this, Mr. Chairman of the Per-
manent Council. Perhaps it will succeed this 
time. I would also say that the activities which 
the Assembly is developing in various areas will 
oblige it, today and in the near future, to go on 
working at the reactivation of Western European 
Union as the real European pillar within the 
NATO alliance. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - You wish 
to speak again, Mr. Caro? 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - To 
comply with the rules I should have asked the 
Rapporteur's permission to interrupt, but I 
would like to ask him a question. 
I wholly approve the general options advanced 
by our colleague and friend, Mr. van der Sanden, 
but I am deeply disappointed in the way he has 
dealt with the case of Spain and WEU 
enlargement. The fact that this country may have 
problems to settle with the United States of 
America with regard to the maintenance of 
American bases on Spanish territory is one thing, 
but the authority for our activity is an interna-
tional treaty calling for enlargement in the light 
of present political options. If Spain is to be 
asked to solve the problem of American bases on 
Spanish territory why is the government of 
France not asked to alter its policy and allow 
American bases on its territory? 
Each country has its national defence policy 
which is its own business but it can still perform 
an international role in the framework of a 
treaty. For us, the modified Brussels Treaty 
should be the platform - the word is apt - for 
bringing us together in the same way as the 
efforts made at the economic level and in par-
ticular in the European Community. 
I would very much like Mr. van der Sanden to 
confirm that this is his way of looking at things 
and that there is no pre-condition in his mind 
but that, on the contrary, the Assembly is right to 
consider that the Iberian peninsula is entitled in 
every way to share in the organisation of joint 
defence as the European pillar of the alliance. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Rapporteur, Mr. van der Sanden. 
Mr. van der SANDEN (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, there is a misunder-
standing between Mr. Caro and myself. I made 
myself fairly clear on these matters yesterday 
when presenting my report. I will repeat what I 
said yesterday and then follow up the remarks I 
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have just made that led to the interruption by 
Mr. Caro. 
What I said yesterday was this: at the moment 
two factors are important where the enlargement 
of Western European Union is concerned. The 
first is the Brussels Treaty, and the second is the 
platform. At the moment the ball is in the court 
of the countries which would now like to accede. 
These countries must now make their views 
known on the thinking of the Council of Min-
isters as set out in the platform, which is in 
addition to what is already stated in the modified 
Brussels Treaty. What does this mean? I have 
talked about burden-sharing and about the 
options referred to in the platform. That was yes-
terday's declaration of intent. But as I hear that 
Mr. Caro was held up by fog in Strasbourg I can 
fully understand his interruption. 
Today I simply said that, given the provisions 
of the platform and the Brussels Treaty, the 
Assembly should proceed with some caution for 
the moment, because it has already stated its 
requirements and it is now up to any applicant 
countries to make their views known, especially 
in relation to the platform. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Chairman of the committee, Mr. Ahrens. 
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, it is the custom of 
this Assembly that the Chairman of the com-
mittee should also comment on the report and 
the debate. I will be brief. 
I am very grateful to the Rapporteur and to the 
Secretary of the committee. The time available 
for this report was once again limited; never-
theless I am very pleased to say that it is not a 
botched-up job. 
As has rightly been said in the debate, the 
report is on the whole more positive and opti-
mistic than in past years. This is because we are 
noticing for the first time in the Assembly that 
our governments are serious about what can be 
called, depending on place and temperament, the 
reactivation, revitalisation or reanimation of 
WEU. Whether this change in our governments' 
policy stems from their own appreciation of the 
possibilities offered by WEU, or whether it is due 
to the rude awakening experienced by the Euro-
peans after Reykjavik, should not concern us. 
The fact remains that WEU is making 
progress. 
Neither the report nor the statement made by 
the Chairman of the Council today answer all the 
questions. It has rightly been complained that 
the ministers' reports continue to reach us 
extremely late. Mr. van den Broek gave us some 
explanation for this practice this morning. 
I am also sorry that we are unable to speak 
today of a positive decision by the ministers on 
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the enlargement of Western European Union to 
include Portugal - Portugal, because it is the 
only country which has submitted a formal 
application to join our organisation. 
The ministers were quite unable to bring 
themselves to make a decision in the Council. 
They raised fresh reservations, which I am con-
vinced are surmountable: Portugal will be able to 
satisfy the requirements. Even if - as the Rap-
porteur rightly said, and the Minister also men-
tioned this morning - a reaction is now awaited 
from Portugal and any other countries con-
cerned, we should not stop pressing for the ear-
liest possible decision in this matter. We as an 
Assembly must not shelve Portugal's appli-
cation. 
I would also point out that the Assembly has 
already anticipated Portugal's accession very 
pragmatically in some respects. We find Portu-
guese parliamentarians not only in the 
Assembly's plenary sessions but also in the com-
mittees, enjoying every right except the right to 
vote. I very much hope they are also taking full 
advantage of the opportunities to discuss aspects 
of joint security with us. 
The platform has not been discussed in every 
detail in committee. Some may find it does not 
go far enough; others may object that it goes too 
far. What is pleasing, however, is that this 
platform not only sets out current policy, but 
also contains new elements that point to the 
future: elements of the dialogue, as was said here 
today. 
I am concerned about the Ministers' very hes-
itant attitude to the urgent ·demand for the 
restructuring of our organisation. I am particu-
larly concerned that one member country is said 
to be making this restructuring conditional on a 
decision on location. It would be appropriate for 
the French Minister, who will be addressing the 
Assembly in a moment, to be asked about his 
country's position on this question. 
Mr. Wilkinson listed the criteria for the 
selection of WEU's location yesterday in a ten-
point programme, a veritable decalogue. I dis-
agree with him in one respect and completely 
endorse Mr. van der Sanden's view. The 
question of this Assembly's location is not under 
discussion at the moment, and no one will dare 
to take a decision on this without consulting us. 
Mr. Wilkinson's ten demands are undoubtedly 
justified, by and large, but they really leave only 
two options open. I told him yesterday that he 
should have added an eleventh criterion: the 
location must be a city with at least a million 
inhabitants, then London would really have been 
the only one left, and Luxembourg would have 
been excluded as an option. It is not for us to 
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decide this question, but it would be regrettable 
if all the restructuring were to be postponed until 
agreement was reached on the difficult question 
of location. 
It has rightly been said that improved and 
closer bilateral co-operation must not be allowed 
to disturb, let along endanger, the alliance. That 
is correct. I am, as you know, a member of the 
opposition in my country, and it is therefore cer-
tainly not for me to justify what the German and 
French Governments have agreed. Formal 
problems, and also perhaps practical ones, con-
nected with the formation of a Franco-German 
brigade have been discussed here. Mr. Close 
pointed out that things would be far more dif-
ficult if, say, a Dutch unit were to be added. 
I believe we should see things rather more 
pragmatically and not so formally. What is the 
aim? The Germans are undoubtedly trying to 
make it easier for the French through closer co-
operation to honour their commitments under 
the WEU treaty, that is, to improve the defence 
of southern Germany. That, ladies and gen-
tlemen, is ultimately in the interests not only of 
the Germans or the French but of us all. I 
therefore feel these ideas should be greeted with 
less distrust and believe with Mr. van den Broek 
that it is an undoubted advantage if the French 
and Germans co-operate even more closely in 
the military sphere than before. 
Ladies and gentlemen, it has rightly been said 
that our organisation's public relations activities 
are more than inadequate. Comparisons have 
been made with NATO and 1the European Com-
munity. It will certainly not be possible, nor 
perhaps would it be desirable, for us to spend as 
much as the Community on public relations. We 
should not necessarily seek to match the volume 
of paper distributed by the Cpmmission and also 
by the European Parliament. 
I nevertheless feel that out work, if we take it 
seriously, includes the task of informing our 
fellow citizens of defence needs and of our activ-
ities in WEU. We owe this information to our 
citizens. Therefore, Mr. President, we should 
never tire of demanding an improvement in the 
Assembly's public relations work, and this also 
applies to the staffing requirements. 
Ladies and gentlemen, as you will have 
gathered, the report was discussed at length in 
committee. It was approved unanimously. I 
would be happy if the Assembly endorsed this 
view. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We shall 
now consider the draft recommendation on the 
political activities of the Council - reply to the 
thirty-second annual report of the Council con-
tained in Document 1117 and amendment. 
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Mr. Burger and others have tabled 
Amendment 1 which reads: 
1. Add the following new text at the beginning of 
paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation 
proper: 
" Ensure that the permanent structure of the 
ministerial organs allows the establishment of 
a unit responsible solely for implementing an 
active policy for informing the public and the 
press and" 
I call Mr. Burger to speak to his 
amendment. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, several speakers ending with Mr. 
Ahrens have referred to the importance of 
informing the public. Personally I am against the 
kind of temporary solution we have at the 
moment. We must once and for all set up a 
proper unit concerned exclusively with imple-
menting an active information policy and co-
ordinating the national activities of the different 
member governments. I hope that Mr. van der 
Sanden agrees with me. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the 
amendment? ... 
I call Mr. Pieralli. 
Mr. PIERALLI (Italy) {Translation). - Mr. 
President, may we please vote on separate 
parts? 
The PRESIDENT {Translation). - Will you 
please explain what you mean? 
Mr. PIERALLI (Italy) {Translation). - Mr. 
President, I am in favour of the draft recommen-
dation but I wish to abstain on paragraphs (iii) 
and (v) of the preamble and on paragraph 5 of the 
operative text. I am in favour of the rest of the 
draft recommendation. 
The PRESIDENT {Translation). - I call Mr. 
Close. 
Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, we have already been through this 
process in full in committee. If we go back over 
the draft recommendation item by item we are 
going to waste valuable time. After the detailed 
examination we gave it in committee it seems 
pointless to me to go through it again at a public 
sitting. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. 
Pieralli, your request will be recorded in the 
official report. 
I shall first of all put the amendment to the 
vote and then the whole of the recommen-
dation. 
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I call Mr. Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, I fully understand the point that Mr. Close 
has just made but when a member asks for a vote 
on separate parts that request at least deserves to 
be considered by the Assembly. Even if that 
takes some of our time, it is a parliamentary 
right, it has always been recognised. I do not see 
why the Assembly should simply waive it. 
I can readily understand that the majority of 
the Assembly is against our colleague's request 
but I would prefer that we uphold a principle to 
which we are all attached. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
Surely, first of all, we have to dispose of the 
amendment. Secondly, I think that Mr. Caro 
does not understand what was asked for. What 
our colleague wanted to do was to vote for par-
ticular items in the report. His right to do that is 
perfectly correct, had he tabled amendments 
before the debate started. There is now no 
choice. You have to put this, Mr. President, 
according to the rules in its entirety. 
The PRESIDENT {Translation). - You are 
right, Sir Geoffrey. 
I shall first put Mr. Burger's amendment to the 
vote and after that I shall put the request for a 
vote on separate parts to the Assembly. 
What is the committee's opinion on Mr. 
Burger's amendment? 
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
{Translation). - Mr. President, the committee 
has not discussed this amendment, but I feel sure 
it coincides with the committee's views. The 
Assembly should approve this amendment. 
The PRESIDENT {Translation). - I now put 
Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Burger to the vote 
by sitting and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 1 is agreed to. 
I call Mr. Pieralli. 
Mr. PIERALLI (Italy) (Translation). - My 
request for a separate vote relates to paragraphs 
(iii) and (iv) of the preamble and paragraph 5 of 
the draft recommendation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that we vote first on paragraph (iii). 
I call Mr. Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - I wholly 
agree with what Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has just 
said. Probably I misunderstood. If the request is 
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for a separate vote that means voting paragraph 
by paragraph. In that case everyone votes the 
way he wants and then we vote on the whole 
thing. But we are not entitled to pick this or that 
paragraph and vote separately the way we want 
on that. We have to vote on each paragraph or 
else the whole report. 
I suggest to Mr. Pieralli that he should ask for 
a vote paragraph by paragraph because otherwise 
his request is not in order and our procedure 
would fall into anarchy. That being so, I suggest 
that we treat the statement by our colleague as a 
statement of vote because he has just told us his 
opinion. That will appear in the official report as 
you, Mr. President, have said and we can now 
vote on the recommendation as a whole. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Pieralli. 
Mr. PIERALLI (Italy) (Translation). -I accept 
the proposal that has just been made. I have 
nothing against voting paragraph by paragraph. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
Assembly will presumably be in agreement with 
the procedure that has just been proposed by Mr. 
Caro and our honourable friend. 
I call Mr. Reddemann. 
Mr. REDDEMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, our 
Rules of Procedure are quite precise: amend-
ments must be submitted in writing in time for 
the members of the Assembly to examine them 
prior to their discussion. An amendment must 
also be deemed to exist when it is moved that a 
separate vote be taken on a given point rather 
that on the text as a whole, as is the usual 
practice. 
I would therefore very much appreciate it if we 
kept to the present practice, abided by our Rules 
of Procedure and voted as we have always done, 
if only so that anyone else who wants a change 
made takes the trouble to table a written 
amendment, giving the members the oppor-
tunity to consider it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, since both interpretations are pos-
sible I opt for the one which Mr. Reddemann has 
just given and I shall put to the vote the whole of 
the draft recommendation as amended, since 
Mr. Burger's amendment has been agreed to. 
We shall now vote on the draft recommen-
dation in Document 1117, as amended. 
Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting 
and standing unless five representatives or sub-
stitutes present in the chamber ask for a vote by 
roll-call. 
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Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
That is not the case. The vote will therefore be 
taken by sitting and standing. 
I now put the amended draft recommendation 
to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The amended draft recommendation is 
adopted 1• 
The next order of the day is the address by Mr. 
Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, 
at 4.30 p.m. 
I propose that we suspend the sitting for a few 
moments pending Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond's 
arrival. 
The sitting is suspended. 
(The sitting was suspended at 4.25 p.m. and 
resumed at 4.35 p.m.) 
The sitting is resumed. 
4. Address by Mr. Raimond, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of France 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - It is with 
the greatest pleasure that we welcome Mr. Jean-
Bernard Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of France. 
It is an old-established tradition for a repre-
sentative of the French Government to address 
the Assembly during the second part of the 
annual session of Western European Union. Last 
year we were addressed by Mrr. Jacques Chirac, 
Prime Minister of France, ~ho proposed that 
there should be a European security charter. 
That idea inspired the work qf the Council that 
culminated, at the meeting at The Hague on 27th 
October, in the statement of pnnciples by which 
our countries' security policy should be guided. 
This is the first time that our governments have 
agreed to define the foundations of a paramount 
aspect of foreign policy in this way. Aware of 
France's keen interest in Western European 
Union and the decisive role that it has played in 
the revitalisation process that began in October 
1984 with the Rome declaration, we shall be lis-
tening to your address with the utmost 
attention. 
Please come to the rostrum, Minister. 
Mr. RAIMOND (Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of France) (Translation). - Mr. President, it is an 
honour and a pleasure for me to be granted this 
l. See page 23. 
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opportunity to address your Assembly. All the 
more so in that we are very happy to note that 
the renaissance of WEU is now acknowledged by 
one and all. 
We have just turned a very important page 
with the adoption, at the last ministerial session 
held in The Hague, of a platform on European 
security interests which stems from a proposal 
voiced in this very forum a year ago by Mr. 
Jacques Chirac. Co-operation in the field of 
security has become a central element for the 
construction of Europe. 
A year ago we set ourselves a goal: to draft this 
charter on Europe's security interests. In a 
rapidly-changing international context, one of 
the high points of which was the summit meeting 
between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev which 
had just taken place in Reykjavik on 11th and 
12th October 1986, the Prime Minister told his 
partners that Europe must be heard. This need, 
equally apparent to all member states, led to the 
publication last 27th October of a ministerial 
statement. I wish to emphasise here, with your 
kind permission, what I deem to be its most 
important aspects. 
First, this document presents the problems 
facing European security in a dynamic per-
spective, taking into account the entire East-
West context. 
Second, The Hague document is interesting 
insofar as it not only reiterates a number of prin-
ciples but also defines a programme. It identifies 
a number of crucial issues and determines con-
crete policy guidelines for the future. 
Third, the Seven clearly state that the task they 
are thus undertaking will eventually imply a 
wider European perspective, while respecting the 
main defence options of each country, in par-
ticular as regards the Atlantic Alliance. 
France, as you know, attaches great impor-
tance to the opening of the doors of our organ-
isation to Spain and to Portugal, and is thus very 
anxious that the Seven's present policy not be 
viewed as potentially exclusive. 
As regards principles, we are pleased to note 
that member states have been able to underscore: 
the fact that nuclear forces are irreplaceable for 
ensuring credible deterrence within our lifetime; 
the determination of one and all to shoulder 
their share of responsibility for guaranteeing 
mutual security, both as regards nuclear arma-
ments and conventional forces; the will of all 
seven member states to contribute to the 
strengthening of transatlantic relations; the 
importance of the United States' commitment to 
the defence of our continent, as illustrated by the 
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actual presence of nuclear and conventional 
forces on European soil. 
Need one emphasise, finally, how indispen-
sable it is today in disarmament, to recall, as 
does The Hague document, that it is essential to 
take into account Europe's specificity as regards 
both its vulnerability and its special interests. 
As regards the future, the Seven have pledged 
to strengthen their co-operation in accordance 
with the commitments undertaken in the 
Brussels Treaty and to improve consultation 
when crises occur outside Europe. 
For member states, The Hague declaration 
represents a first body of doctrine concerning 
their security. This is a considerable advance for 
Europe; it is a success for Europeans. 
The Hague document establishes cohesion 
between what is being done on a multilateral 
basis in the field of defence, and what is being 
achieved in the framework of various bilateral 
co-operation schemes. In particular, what France 
has undertaken with the Federal Republic of 
Germany is the necessary prerequisite and very 
beginning of a process which has complete 
affinity with our European policy and our 
defence options, and conversely, it is totally 
removed from the will to exclude that some seem 
to fear. 
In this context, France wishes to stress the sig-
nificance it sees in the development of its co-
operation with the United Kingdom- which, as 
another nuclear power, shares a number of 
common and basic concerns with France - as 
well as with its other European allies, and in par-
ticular those countries that border the Mediter-
ranean. 
Finally, we welcome the fact that the decla-
ration adopted in The Hague has given us all the 
opportunity to clear up a number of misunder-
standings that had emerged recently in the 
United States on the meaning of the task under-
taken by our seven countries. Evidence of this 
can be seen in the very positive responses elicited 
by our 27th October text, in particular that from 
President Reagan himself, who welcomed what 
he called "an impressive statement". 
The emergence of such a transatlantic con-
sensus on present trends for European 
co-operation in the field of security is, to my 
mind, very promising as regards a more cohesive 
and stronger Atlantic Alliance. 
But this achievement is a beginning, and not 
an end in itself. The Seven are now going to 
embark upon the weighty task of implementing 
the guidelines defined in The Hague, including 
the institutional change. The paucity of means of 
an organisation some see as obsolescent, with its 
eyes mainly on the past, have sometimes made 
this task quite difficult. 
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Today, the structures set up around the Per-
manent Council allow for close consultation 
both on a ministerial level and among adminis-
trations. They associate foreign ministries and 
defence ministries in an extremely innovative 
fashion, which has no equivalent except in the 
field of Franco-German co-operation. 
A pace has been set. The work thus achieved 
has yielded quite substantial results, as illus-
trated by the drafting of the charter on security 
interests, and consultations on problems in the 
Gulf and in the Mediterranean as the President 
of the Republic confirmed, in this latter con-
nection, at the recent Franco-Italian summit in 
Naples. 
I wish to take this opportunity to pay a tribute 
to the staff of the secretariat and the various 
agencies who, in difficult circumstances, have 
made all this possible and, first and foremost, the 
Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, who was good 
enough to take on this difficult task and has per-
formed it with unfailing talent and good will. 
I think it is important to recall all that has 
been accomplished in this respect, be it only in 
reply to your legitimate questions about the 
value of the reforms we have so far undertaken 
and on member states' resolve to pursue this 
policy. 
Nevertheless, our task is not done. We still 
have one very important step to take. And by 
this I mean finalising the reforms we have under-
taken by deciding on how and where we shall 
restructure the institutions presently headquar-
tered in London and in Paris. The question may 
seem to be of secondary importance. In actual 
fact, it is not, as the debate in this very Assembly 
has shown. 
We have all been convinced for a considerable 
time that bringing these institutions together is 
essential if we really want our organisation to 
live up to the ambitious aims we wish to achieve 
through it. That is why we welcome the fact that 
the recent ministerial session in The Hague offi-
cially agreed upon the collocation principle. Now 
we have to implement it. 
Member states have not yet reached agreement 
on the future location of the organisation. 
Further consultations are under way with a view 
to reaching a decision in what we hope will be 
the very near future. A number of proposals have 
been made, and France for its part has suggested 
that the relevant institutions all be housed in 
Paris, in this very building. 
To our mind, this would present three main 
advantages. The first and quite obvious 
advantage would be to bring the ministerial 
bodies together and close to the Assembly. This 
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would make for enhanced wo~king relations and 
co-operation, in accordance with wishes often 
expressed by those bodies. 
Second, the Paris option would, according to 
our preliminary estimates, have the advantage of 
being lowest in cost, a fact which under present 
circumstances is something we have to take into 
account. The organisation is the owner of most 
of the premises that it would be occupying. In 
any case, at a time when the Council is finding it 
difficult to cover the day-to-day costs of the insti-
tutions as they are now, including the Assembly, 
there can be no question of opting for a high-cost 
proposal. 
Finally, according to our survey, the move 
could be carried out very raptidly. This, to our 
mind, is essential if we do not want practical 
problems to bring our organisation to a standstill 
for too long, at a time when '"fe expect so much 
of it. 
Nevertheless, France has nothing against other 
options being considered, bu:t we think it is 
important to avoid any conflllsion, either with 
the Atlantic Alliance or with institutions for 
European political co-operation. The co-
operation aimed at in WEU has to be given the 
chance to confirm its own potential and that is 
why we have negatived the idea oflocating WEU 
institutions in the same European capital as 
institutions belonging to the Atlantic Alliance 
or in the sphere of European political 
co-operation. 
We personally feel that intensified co-
operation among member states is crucial at a 
time when East-West dialogue has quite obvi-
ously entered a new phase. In a few days, the 
intermediate nuclear forces atreement is to be 
signed at the Washington surt1mit. 
I 
Disarmament obviously ddes not cover the 
entire range of East-West telations: human 
rights, the human dimension and political dia-
logue, in the broadest sense, are also essential 
components of these relations. 
The INF agreement only concerns one aspect 
of disarmament, but it will be an important stage 
in this process for a number of reasons. 
After a long period of deadlock, Soviet lead-
ership has finally agreed to negotiate on the basis 
preferred by our allies. 
Furthermore, the INF agreement is the first 
disarmament agreement requiring the United 
States and the Soviet Union to commit them-
selves to an actual reduction of their nuclear 
stockpiles. Of course, these are only limited 
reductions, especially when compared to the sum 
total of the superpowers' nucledr weapons, which 
will be reduced by a mere 4%. But this agreement 
should normally restore priorit~ to bilateral stra-
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tegic negotiations - a priority they should never 
have ceased to have. 
Lastly, and I consider this to be a most 
important point, the provisions in the area of 
verification and inspection are unprecedented in 
their scope and nature. 
But, more generally, what should we think of 
this agreement in the light of the principles WEU 
solemnly reiterated in The Hague? First of all, 
these issues continue to be much debated in the 
United States, in Europe, in this very Assembly, 
and I doubt the controversy will come to an end 
overnight. 
Let me begin by recalling that France, which 
was not party to the twofold decision of 1979, 
has throughout been guided by two considera-
tions: European security interests, and solidarity 
with its allies. Secondly, I would point out that 
the USSR will still, INF agreement notwith-
standing, have a vast superiority over Europe in 
the field of nuclear, conventional, and chemical 
weaponry. It would perhaps have been preferable 
to take things in a different order because, 
however this may be, the USSR's strategic 
nuclear forces threaten Europe as much as they 
do the United States. And that is why we feel 
agreement on INFs cannot be assessed without 
taking the broader context into account. For this 
reason, we would very much like this agreement 
to be accompanied, or at the very least followed 
in the very near future, by progress in negotia-
tions on Soviet and American strategic arma-
ments, in accordance with the goal of a 50% 
reduction in all stockpiles agreed in Reykjavik 
last autumn. 
Furthermore, it is a known fact that there will 
be no genuine stability in Europe as long as the 
considerable conventional imbalance favouring 
the USSR and its allies has not been corrected. 
But we do not want to take the line of reasoning 
arguing that agreement on INFs need necessarily 
increase conventional imbalances. 
Indeed, strengthening conventional defence 
can only have one object: to ensure the credi-
bility of the alliance's global capability to deter. 
Conventional forces are not a substitute for 
nuclear forces. What nuclear forces aim at 
deterring is not conventional forces but war. 
To conclude, let me voice here a deeply felt 
belief: it is up to the countries in the alliance to 
make sure that the INF agreement which is 
about to be signed is, at the end of the day, in the 
best interest of Europe's security. 
Either the alliance allows itself to be led, as the 
Soviet Union seems to want, down a path whose 
outcome might well be the denuclearisation of 
Europe and the weakening of security links 
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between the United States and Europe, or the 
alliance continues to state clearly its perception 
of deterrence, namely that its security is based on 
a twofold linkage between nuclear weapons and 
conventional forces and between the United 
States and Europe. 
These are the reasons why we must, as Euro-
peans and allies, assert our own priorities in dis-
armament and arms control. This is the object of 
the work now being done in the Atlantic 
Alliance. But WEU must also go on with its work 
in the directions signposted by The Hague decla-
ration, and thus contribute to the global effort. 
Public opinion in our various countries will be 
a major, not to say crucial, element in the debate 
that will now start on this issue not only in 
Europe but also in the United States when the 
time comes to ratify the INF treaty. 
This is where your Assembly can play a vital 
role in our democratic countries. Political leaders 
are not there just to interpret but also to 
enlighten and guide public opinion, in particular 
in the field of defence and I believe that, today, 
that is indeed the issue. 
As regards security, Europe's real interests 
need to be explained and defended by well-
informed officials: that is one of the main mis-
sions in store for your Assembly; knowing its 
past record, I for my part am convinced it will 
succeed to the greater benefit of our common 
security and the building of Europe. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - On behalf 
of the Assembly, allow me to thank you, Min-
ister, for your address. You said you were pre-
pared to answer questions from representatives 
of the groups. 
I call Mr. Soell. 
Mr. SOELL (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. Minister, I shall speak in 
French; it will be simpler. 
Why does France now see so close a con-
nection between the restructuring decision taken 
by the Council of Ministers at The Hague in 
October, i.e. a single agency and one director, 
and the decision to be taken about WED's single 
headquarters? 
Given the political difficulties of security at 
the headquarters site, is there not a danger that 
the reactivation of WEU, which is also desired 
by our government, will be paralysed by this 
close connection? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. RAIMOND (Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of France) (Translation). - Mr. Soell, at the 
meeting in The Hague last October, the dis-
cussion about the WEU institutions took place at 
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dinner and one first point was clear to all: since 
October 1986 WEU reactivation had become a 
fact and the wishes of a certain number had been 
fulfilled, probably under the pressure of events, 
but in an extremely concrete, effective and rapid 
manner. After all, it had taken no longer -
almost less - than one year to arrive at the 
charter on European security or the platform that 
we have today. 
During dinner we all agreed that it was nec-
essary for practical reasons and working conve-
nience for the institutions to be brought together 
and therefore to be restructured with that object 
in mind. As I say everyone was agreed on this 
necessity. 
This left the problem of location since the 
institutions would be brought together. 
On this point, the French position is very 
clear. For obvious reasons, if the WEU institu-
tions were concentrated in Brussels the dis-
tinction between the Atlantic Alliance and WEU 
would, in practice, very quickly blur and in the 
end the specific character of WEU, bringing 
together as it does seven European countries rep-
resented both by their ministers, for foreign 
affairs and by their defence ministers, could well 
disappear. 
This, to me, seems a very sound argument and 
needs to be taken into account. That is what I 
have just said on this point in my statement. 
That leaves Paris. This possibility, which is what 
we propose, offers a number of advantages that I 
have spelled out. 
London was also considered as a possible site 
during that dinner. London and Paris are not 
quite the same. It seemed to us that, for many 
reasons, Paris was to be preferred but I would 
like to " anticipate " - as it were - what lies 
behind your question. 
I 
With regard to the reactivation, or rather the 
concentration, of WEU, it is not at all the 
intention of the French, or of any other partici-
pants for that matter, to turn it into something 
that would weaken the Atlantic Alliance or be 
directed against the alliance. The problem about 
Paris is simply a matter of quarrels that belong in 
the past. They are behind us. 
On the contrary, it seems to us that everything 
we are doing in WEU at the moment, particu-
larly with its strengthening of institutions, can 
only serve to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. It 
would not be a good thing to find ourselves back 
in the situation where we were, you will 
remember, after the Reagan-Gorbachev summit 
of 1986. Whatever the value and potential of that 
agreement it would be bad for Europe to 
respond, as it did then, individually or I might 
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say, without naming names, by <~:onflicting state-
ments within a particular country. 
So it is essential for Europeans, increasingly 
aware of the need to include the security aspect 
in the construction of Europe, to be able to 
consult together and define their positions as 
they have done and to express those positions to 
their allies and within the Atlantic Alliance. Here 
I only see a possible strengthening, not a 
weakness or a weakening of the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Raimond. 
I call Mr. Rubbi. 
Mr. RUBBI (Italy) (Translation). - Minister, 
you expressed the hope that after any agreement 
on medium- and short-range nuflear weapons it 
might be possible to arrive fair~y quickly at an 
agreement to reduce strategic weapons by pos-
sibly as much 50%. I am sure that we are all 
agreed on this. I would even say that we go 
further and I would like to ask you whether, in 
the event of an agreement - now mooted as a 
possibility - between the U nitoo States and the 
Soviet Union to reduce strategic weapons by 
half, the country which you represent and which 
is one of the five world nuclear powers would, in 
line with the recent declaration by the People's 
Republic of China, be prepared to join in negoti-
ations involving all the nuclear powers and to 
reduce your nuclear forces at that stage of the 
negotiations or even go so far as to give them up 
altogether. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. RAIMOND (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of France) (Translation) .. - Mr. Rubbi, I 
did not say that we were on the brink of an 
agreement for a 50% reductibn in strategic 
arsenals. It is a possibility that was considered at 
the Reykjavik summit between the United States 
and the Soviet Union in October 1986 but, for 
the Soviets, it was dependent upon calling a halt 
to the strategic defence initiative. There were 
other conditions at the time but only this one 
still remains. 
After the considerable progress made in the 
discussions this year - in particular at Wash-
ington before we met the officials of the Atlantic 
Alliance, the Japanese Minister, the Australian 
Minister and President Reagan at the United 
Nations in New York last September - the 
Americans and the Soviets let it be understood 
that their next objective, after signing the INF 
agreements, would relate to strategic weapons. 
According to the signals we are getting, mostly 
from the Americans, some very specific dis-
cussion is going on about strategic arsenals. I 
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shall not go into the details but progress has cer-
tainly been made. 
However, so far, there is nothing to justify the 
conclusion - although things may change - that 
the Soviets have given up any link at all with the 
strategic defence initiative. So nothing authorises 
me to say that there is going to be a break-
through. We shall know whether real progress 
has been made in that direction after the Wash-
ington summit that is to take place next week. 
This point is important because, as you know, 
there are about 12 000 nuclear warheads in the 
United States and 12 000 in the Soviet Union 
and, even with a 50% reduction, we would be 
back at the quantitative balance of ten years ago, 
i.e. 6 000 on one side and 6 000 on the other. 
We have always said that, in our view, the pri-
ority should be the reduction of strategic arsenals 
because agreements on intermediate-range 
weapons have so far only related to very much 
smaller figures, in no way comparable to those 
that I have just given. 
What is more, we all know that there is an 
ulterior objective the Soviets are driving 
towards. They are quite open about it and they 
are perfectly entitled to see things their way. 
Since 15th January 1986 and February 1987, 
their aims have included, beyond the present dis-
mantling of intermediate-range missiles, the 
elimination of all American nuclear weapons sta-
tioned in Europe. 
That is why we insisted on the priority for stra-
tegic arsenals. Up to now, the American position 
has been the same and we cannot but welcome 
the fact. 
I shall not go into the other problems which 
need to be discussed, i.e. the imbalances in con-
ventional and chemical weapons. 
That brings me to the French nuclear forces. 
Up to now they have not been involved. In their 
discussions with the Soviets the Americans have 
always maintained that the British and French 
nuclear forces were not to be part of any deal on 
the reduction of intermediate-range missiles in 
Europe and in 1985 the Soviets accepted that. 
This is a fact and, for the moment, the position 
remains unchanged. 
It has to be said that the French capability cur-
rently totals about three hundred nuclear war-
heads compared with 12 000 Soviet nuclear war-
heads on the same continent. 
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the two superpowers, a reduction in the conven-
tional imbalances and no breakthrough in stra-
tegic defence systems that would aggravate the 
imbalances. The French reply is still the same. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
de Beer. 
Mr. de BEER (Netherlands) (Translation). -
Mr. President, my question concerns the new 
Franco-German joint brigade. The Minister 
referred to it in passing when he was talking 
about the new Franco-German co-operation. I 
feel there are three options. The first is that it 
goes no further than this one joint brigade, which 
would mean that the co-operation would then be 
more of symbolic significance and we could 
welcome it, against the background of relations 
between the two countries in the last hundred 
years. 
The second option is that it is the beginning of 
a new form of multinational co-operation in 
which other NATO or WEU countries might 
also participate. In spite of the practical and, 
above all, organisational problems, a devel-
opment of this kind must surely be welcomed. 
But if the third option applies and this marks 
the beginning of a new and extended form of 
bilateral co-operation between the two countries, 
all kinds of questions arise. In particular, we 
would have to see if such a development would 
be in keeping with the existing treaties. My 
question to the Minister is which of the three 
options he believes will apply. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. RAIMOND (Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of France) (Translation). - Mr. de Beer, to me 
the question of the Franco-German brigade 
seems fairly simple. The original idea came from 
Germany - I shall say why in a moment - and 
France agreed to it. 
Work has begun and is continuing, in par-
ticular between the defence ministers. It has been 
agreed that this Franco-German unit would not 
be a symbolic unit, that its first commander 
would be French and that it would total 3 500 
men. It has already been decided to station the 
unit in Germany near Stuttgart. The brigade will 
not be under NATO command because it is pos-
sible to combine French troops with German 
troops not under integrated NATO command. 
The problem is being solved pragmatically, 
positively by stages, avoiding the major hurdles. 
After all, it fits into the framework of the Franco-
German treaty of 1963, whose twenty-fifth anni-
The precise answer to your question was given versary we shall shortly be celebrating, which 
by the President of the Republic in 1983 makes provision for Franco-German eo-ope-
speaking at the General Assembly of the United ration including military co-operation. That 
Nations. The conditions he listed were a co-operation, incidentally, already exists at the 
sweeping reduction in the strategic arsenals of level of the armed forces. A few years from now, 
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all German officers will have spent some time 
with the French army. We have joint 
manreuvres. 
That is my reply to your first question. 
My answer to your third is that I do not see 
what there is to criticise. For everybody of my 
generation, those who were nearing their 
majority after the war, the construction of 
Europe is based on the rapprochement between 
France and Germany. Forty years after the war, 
the possibility of a conflict between France and 
Germany has become unthinkable. This is an 
irreversible phenomenon whose importance 
should not be underestimated. Thus, everything 
that is done to bring France and Germany closer 
together also works towards the consolidation of 
Europe. 
Everybody knows, in any case, the extreme 
complexity of the construction of European 
defence because of the large number of para-
meters that have to be solved. In other words, 
the Franco-German rapprochement is aimed in 
the same direction as WEU rapprochement and 
WEU reactivation. 
Your second question, if I understand it cor-
rectly, relates to the extension of that rap-
prochement to other countries. There is no 
exclusivity but, even so, let us begin for the 
moment by dealing with this problem which is 
complex enough of itself and which we are 
therefore dealing with step by step. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Caro. 
Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). - Minister, 
my question concerns enlargement. First of all, 
may I remind you and the Assembly that we are 
on the eve of a near-historic occasion because the 
first European Council ofheads of state and gov-
ernment to be held since the ratification of the 
single European act is about to take place in 
Copenhagen. This conference will therefore have 
special importance as regards both the imple-
mentation of the single act and the political 
outlook for Europe. 
Second, I would refer to what was said by the 
French Prime Minister in this chamber on 2nd 
December 1986 with regard, among other things, 
to the fundamental principles that should govern 
political action with regard to European 
security. 
Lastly, I would like to say in perhaps a very 
simple manner but in any case without the 
slightest ambiguity that, for the Assembly, the 
basic doctrine of all its activities is to consider 
that everything we are in a position to do to 
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance strengthens that alliance. 
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You, too, advanced a similar argument, Min-
ister. However, if we are to judge by the effects 
no doubt induced by The Hague declaration, 
whereby the seven countries shoQlder the respon-
sibility for their share of our joint defence in con-
ventional and nuclear fields, this may have 
prompted certain questions in Spain in view of 
that country's nuclear position. But if, as our 
governments and in particular the French Gov-
ernment do, I reason on the basis1 of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, the principles that it defines, the 
duties and obligations it entails, the declaration 
made by the ministers at The Hague and, of 
course, at least the spirit of the single European 
act, how is it that the governments of the Seven 
have not, as the treaty allows, extended an invi-
tation to the two countries of the Iberian pen-
insula that we need to complete our arrange-
ments for the organisation of the European pillar 
in the alliance? If their excuse is that Spain still 
has unfinished business with the United States in 
matters concerning the missile bases, that is a 
bilateral matter which has nothing to do with the 
implementation of the spirit of the single act or 
the organisation ofthe modified Brussels Treaty, 
the authority for our work which allows each of 
our countries - as France is well aware - to 
pursue its own defence policy. 
I thought, Minister, that after ')rhe Hague dec-
laration the door was wide enougp open for these 
new members and that the governments of the 
Seven would take the initiative. [ hope that this 
is still the position of the French Government 
and if that is the case can you. tell us what is 
likely to happen in this connection? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. RAIMOND (Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of France) (Translation). - If it had been left to 
France, the invitation to Spain and Portugal 
would have gone out straight away. There is no 
problem for us although the adoption of the 
WEU platform did raise a few questions, particu-
larly in the Spanish press. 
These problems are now dispelled in the 
minds of the Spanish and Portuguese leaders, 
since first there was a meetin~ between Mr. 
Chirac, the French Prime Miqister, and Mr. 
Felipe Gonzalez, the Spanish Prime Minister, 
and then we were able to tackle ~he problems at 
routine meetings in Portugal. Whkm I saw the stir 
in the Spanish press, I myself wrote to my 
opposite number, Mr. Fernandez Ordoftez, to 
explain that it was a doctrinal platform which 
did not, for the moment, imply any decisions or 
measures about which either of the two countries 
could have misgivings. 
Indeed I agree with you, Mr. Caro, that if the 
seven countries agreed to enlarge WEU to 
include Spain and Portugal- given that both the 
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countries have intimated, the one in writing and 
the other verbally, that they want to join us - it 
would be a wholly useful step. It would 
strengthen European security not only at Medi-
terranean level but also through these countries' 
ideas on the security problems of Europe in 
general, which are very balanced. I simply think 
that what bothers these two countries is that they 
want to be sure that their membership would be 
welcome. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Minister, for replying to these four questions. 
5. Amendment of the Charter of the Assembly 
(Motion to amend the Cluuter, Doe. 1128) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I inform 
the Assembly that a motion to amend the 
Charter of the Assembly has been tabled by Mr. 
Pannella and others in accordance with Article 
XII (a) of the Charter. 
This document has been distributed as Doc-
ument 1128. 
The motion will be referred to the Committee 
on Rules of Procedure and Privileges for consid-
eration. 
6. Draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1988 
(Presentation of the report of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affain and Administration and 11ote 
on the draft budget, Doe. 1121 and addendum) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration on the draft budget 
of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1988 and vote on 
the draft budget, Document 1121 and 
addendum. 
I call Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur 
of the committee. 
(Mr. Soe/1, Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
·the Chair) 
Mr. LINSTER (Luxembourg) (Translation).-
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, on the 
resumption of our thirty-third ordinary session 
yesterday, Mr. Goerens, our President, Mr. 
Valleix, Rapporteur for the Presidential Com-
mittee, and Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee and a number of 
members in the debate on the relevant reports, 
already drew the political inferences from the 
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budgetary situation facing the Assembly after the 
Council meeting in The Hague. 
If I am not to indulge in boring repetition, all I 
have to add at political level to what has been 
said and to the conclusions that have been drawn 
is that if our Assembly wishes not just to survive 
but to assert with increasing firmness its emi-
nently political role, the President and the 
Assembly must return to this subject again and 
again. 
They must not give way to disillusionment, in 
other words, we must not fall into the trap of 
letting time wear away our resolve. 
In any case, the construction I place on the 
papers I have and the information I was able to 
obtain on the fringe of the official meeting so to 
speak prompts me to believe that, since the 
meeting of the Council and the Assembly in Lux-
embourg, the climate with regard to the 
Assembly in both the Budget Committee and the 
Council has improved at the level of the budg-
etary discussions as well as in other respects. The 
separation of the pensions budget from the oper-
ating budget was a clear step forward releasing 
relatively large additional resources to the 
Assembly although there is a difference of view 
between the Council and ourselves on how the 
texts are to be interpreted and the concrete con-
clusions to be drawn from them. 
Admittedly, and this still happens too fre-
quently, the financial experts seem not to have 
the same instructions as the various foreign 
affairs representatives. 
This is a point on which I would appeal to you 
members of parliament. When you seek support 
in your countries with regard to our budgetary 
problems do not look to our foreign ministries 
only, but also and above all tackle your country's 
financial and budgetary policy-makers. 
The thing to remember, however, is that the 
general atmosphere, and The Hague has also 
helped, is much more favourable. Let me 
explain. 
Making my excuse the fact that the budget and 
the political conclusions to be drawn from this 
situation after The Hague decisions - and there 
are not one hundred and one ways of drawing 
those conclusions - were discussed yesterday, I 
would like to use the little time allowed me this 
afternoon to show you where we stand with the 
figures to prove it. After all, the job of the 
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration is surely to talk 
figures. I agree it is not very exciting, particularly 
after the speech by the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of one of our organisation's great member 
countries, but, in this Assembly - as I have said 
before - discussing figures also means discussing 
politics - via the budget, so to speak. 
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The committee's estimates as communicated 
by the President to the Budget Committee and 
the Council were for an operating budget in 
which expenditure and receipts were put at over 
nineteen million francs and a separate budget for 
pensions for some two million francs. Now, after 
Luxembourg, that the principle of a pensions 
budget is no longer a matter of dispute and since 
the Council has made no comment on the 
amounts that it implies for 1988, I need say 
nothing further about it. Some comments are 
however called for with regard to the operating 
budget. 
As you know, since the Luxembourg decisions, 
the operating budget consists of what we con-
sider to be two distinct parts inasmuch as the 
Assembly is only able to take more or less inde-
pendent decisions with regard to Heads II, Ill, 
IV and V, its influence over Head I, permanent 
staff, being strictly non-existent. This was 
brought home to us once again - at our cost -
this year. The point was sufficiently stressed by 
our President, Mr. Goerens, and Mr. Valleix and 
Mr. van der Sanden yesterday. 
The figure proposed by the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration for Head I 
was 11 313 000 francs, an increase of 1 355 400 
francs over the figure for 1987. 
This relatively large difference stems from the 
fact that the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration had based its estimates on 
the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk that 
the Assembly has requested so many times, that 
the Presidential Committee approved on 4th 
November 1986 and that Mr. van der Sanden 
has once again demanded on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee in paragraph 9 of his 
recommendation: " ... Accord the Assembly 
without delay the funds and staff necessary for 
restructuring the Office of the Clerk. " 
Appendix I of my report sets out the details of 
that restructuring, which is discussed explicitly 
enough in my written report for me not to go 
through the details again. So let me just make the 
point now that, apart from the normal incidence 
of the triennial adjustment and certain regra-
dings, the increase essentially involved the cre-
ation of four new posts. 
Unfortunately, on the advice of the Budget 
Committee, the Council did not agree to the cre-
ation of these four posts and struck out the addi-
tional appropriations included for that purpose. 
The total concerned is slightly over one million 
francs which should be compared with the 
Assembly's overall budget of nearly twenty 
million francs. This figure should also be set 
against the fact that, in the ministerial organs, 
the organisation will be making savings of some 
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five million francs from the do~en or so jobs not 
being filled. 
That, therefore, is the financial background to 
the refusal to let us restructure the Office of the 
Clerk. 
I leave you to draw your own conclusions. 
However, on this subject of1 the restructuring 
of the Office of the Clerk, it is possible to report 
some slight improvement compared to decisions 
in earlier years because this time the committee 
and therefore the Council too has not purely and 
simply rejected the principle or the need for the 
creation of these four posts. 
They have simply ruled that the appropria-
tions for these four posts should again be deleted 
for the time being - but without prejudice to 
" eventual decisions that may be taken when the 
Council is able to conclude its wider study of the 
future staffing needs of WEU ". 
That is not an outright refusal, nor is it a post-
ponement sine die - or should I say until 
London is no more - only until the time deci-
sions are taken on the reassessment of the struc-
tures of the organisation as a whole and therefore 
including decisions about the agencies and the 
possible collocation of the organs or some of the 
organs of the organisation as decided by the 
Council at The Hague on 27th' October. 
After the meeting of the Council in The Hague, 
it emerged that the relevant decisions might be 
taken in the near future. 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs of France has 
just stressed the vital need for swift decisions on 
these practical questions, including collocation, 
so that there are no obstacles to decision-making 
on the real problems. Some rumours - to which 
Mr. van der Sanden alluded - even give April 
1988 as the date. Personally I am rather sceptical 
because of the fact that France - as Mr. Ahrens 
emphasised this afternoon and the debate after 
the address by the Minister for foreign Affairs of 
France showed - seems to want to link the 
problem of the reassessment of WEU structures 
with a prior decision on the collocation site or, as 
Mr. Raimond has called it, " the concentration of 
institutions ". 
However this may be, it is no longer all that 
unrealistic to imagine that the decision about the 
restructuring of the Office of the Clerk might 
possibly be taken during 1988. Were that to 
happen the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration would clearly table an ad hoc 
supplementary budget. I should say, in passing, 
that it will have to produce a supplementary 
budget in any case to make up for certain fresh 
pension liabilities. 
With regard to the other heads ofthe operating 
budget, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
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Administration has taken a very strict line. 
Details of its proposals are set out in sections 3 
and 4 of my written report. Since, what is more, 
the various appendices are very explicit on this 
subject I shall confine myself to the comment 
that, for Heads 11 to V inclusive, the committee 
had made provision for appropriations totalling 
7 886 500 francs. 
The Council has changed our proposals: first, 
it has increased the appropriation under Head 11 
for temporary staffby 50 000 francs, this increase 
being made necessary by the refusal to allow the 
four new posts we had proposed; second, it has 
reduced the appropriations under Head V, Other 
expenditure, by 42 000 francs. 
It is true that because of the Assembly's bud-
getary independence with regard to Heads 11 to V 
inclusive these can only be proposals on the part 
of the Council. 
It is also true that at its meeting yesterday 
morning, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration recommended that the 
Assembly should agree with the Council on this 
proposal whilst underlining the principle that, 
because of its budgetary autonomy, the 
Assembly could switch appropriations between 
the various items and heads if that were to prove 
necessary during 1988. 
Those are the comments that I felt I had to 
make as Rapporteur for the Committee on Bud-
getary Affairs and Administration enlarging on 
my written report. 
But, whilst I recommend that you adopt the 
Assembly's budget for financial year 1988 as set 
out in Document 1121 and addendum, I would 
like to make one further remark of a general 
nature concerning the operating budget and 
more specifically the appropriations under 
Heads 11 to V, i.e. the operating appropriations 
not related to permanent staff. 
As long as the crippling inheritance of the 
shortfalls of the past has not been overcome, in 
other words as long as these generally opera-
tional appropriations are not adjusted to real 
requirements, the old and unpleasant growth rate 
quarrel will keep raising its head even apart from 
the zero growth issue, an illogical term because 
there can be no such thing as zero growth. Zero 
and growth are mutually exclusive. The term is a 
contradiction and only used to hide the fact that 
there is no growth at all. 
Until serious heed is paid to our real needs, 
until the budget is, once and for all, aligned on 
those needs, no growth rate will be realistic 
whether it is based on the budget of the other 
WEU organs, the European Economic Corn-
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m unity institutions, the organs of the Council of 
Europe, or the headquarters country of the 
Assembly. 
We first have to have a budget that corres-
ponds to the political objectives of the Assembly 
of the members of parliament and the represen-
tatives of the member countries of the 
organisation. Only then will we be able to discuss 
the way in which the growth rate for our budget 
should be calculated each year. 
That, Mr. President, is our real quarrel with 
the Council. The Office of the Clerk has to be 
restructured in order to provide some minimal 
answer to our staff needs. We have to make up 
for the gaps and shortfalls of the past so as to be 
able to face up to our real financial and staff 
needs. 
It is only then, in other words when we have 
built up to a rate of work that corresponds to the 
real needs of our political function, that we shall 
be able to hold worthwhile discussions on the 
growth rate the Assembly needs in order to 
maintain what we regard as the essential pace for 
the political reactivation about which so much 
has been heard since Rome and which has been 
discovered anew first in Luxembourg and then 
The Hague. If all the ministers really want the 
Assembly to be a political organ of the 
organisation, let them give us the wherewithal, 
not in high-sounding phrases but in deeds, in 
other words good, hard cash. 
(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Your 
report seems to' have unanimous support, Mr. 
Linster, because no one has asked to speak. We 
can therefore proceed to the vote on the draft 
budget. 
Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting 
and standing unless at least ten representatives 
or substitutes present in the chamber ask for a 
vote by roll-call. 
Are there ten members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. 
We shall therefore vote by sitting and 
standing. 
I now put the dra'ft budget of the adminis-
trative expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1988 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft budget of the administrative expend-
iture of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 
is agreed to unanimously. 
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7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 -
the auditor's report and motion to approve 
the final accounts 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, 
Doe. 1108 and addendum) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration on the accounts of 
the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1986 - the auditor's report 
and motion to approve the final accounts and 
vote on the motion to approve the final 
accounts, Document 1108 and addendum. 
I call Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration. 
Mr. LINSTER (Luxembourg) (Translation).-
You have Document 1108 in front of you, ladies 
and gentlemen. You also have a motion to 
approve the final accounts of the Assembly for 
the financial year 1986. This was approved unan-
imously by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
In the motion, the committee proposes that 
" the Assembly, having examined the final 
accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 
1986, together with the auditor's report, in 
accordance with Article 16 of the Financial Reg-
ulations, approves the accounts as submitted and 
discharges the President of the Assembly of his 
financial responsibility". 
Mr. van der Velde, the auditor and Premier 
President de la Cour des Comptes of Belgium, 
also reached the same conclusion and I therefore 
propose that the Assembly adopt the commit-
tee's report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is open. 
I call Mr. Burger. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
I thank Mr. Linster for his excellent work and 
these two reports. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
Does Mr. Linster wish to speak? 
Mr. LINSTER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
No, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Under Rule 
33 the Assembly votes by sitting and standing 
unless at least ten representatives or substitutes 
present in the chamber ask for a vote by roll-
call. 
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Are there ten members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. 
We shall therefore vote by sitting and 
standing. 
I now put the motion to approve the final 
accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 
1986 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The motion is agreed to unanimously. 
8. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second 
annual report of the Council 
(Presentation of and debate fill the report 
of the Committee on Defence QuestiOns and Armaments, 
Doe. 1116 and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translat~on). - The next 
order of the day is the presentaq.on of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments on disarmament -
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the 
Council, Document 1116 and amendments. 
I call Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Repziplic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President; ladies and gen-
tlemen, this report by the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was approved in 
November. It concerns the Cquncil's report on 
the second half of 1986, wijich reached the 
Assembly on 24th April 1987. The committee's 
report also considers the Council's report on the 
period from January to June 
1
1987, which the 
Assembly received on 16th November, rather 
too late for it to be discussed in depth in com-
mittee. This period covers new developments 
specifically associated with the events in the Gulf 
region. In connection with difarmament there 
have, of course, been events in the last year that 
have come as a surprise to many people. This is 
particularly true of the debate in this 
Assembly. 
I would remind you in this: context that the 
Assembly has not submitted a report on disarm-
ament or has been unable to reach a consensus 
on disarmament questions for three years. We 
have come through a period in !which there have 
been serious disagreements among the Western 
European countries and within the North 
Atlantic Alliance on the main focus of disarm-
ament policy. The arguments over this ulti-
mately resulted in an accumulation of differences 
of opinion in the Assembly which could not be 
resolved satisfactorily. 
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We all recall the debates during the Assembly's 
part-session last December and the debates on 
Mr. Amadei's report in the spring. In the end, 
Mr. Amadei was unable to vote for his own 
report, because of the differences of opinion 
reflected in numerous amendments. 
I believe that, given what has occurred in the 
Assembly and the events of recent months, but 
above all in view of what awaits us in the future, 
we must again achieve a basic consensus on the 
main issues here in the Assembly in the coming 
period. In view of the disagreements, however, a 
consensus on all points is unlikely. I will name 
the main points of controversy in a moment. But 
apart from these, there are a number of very 
important basic issues on which, at least to judge 
from recent months, we are agreed. It is 
important to reach a consensus on this basis, at 
least, and it will be vital in the immediate future 
for agreement to be reached in the West on the 
next steps to be taken. 
Compared with the total lack of movement in 
disarmament policy over the last few decades, 
some of the recent developments have been rev-
olutionary. Disarmament or arms control agree-
ments concluded in the past have concerned two 
different aspects. The SALT I and SALT 11 agree-
ments sought to fix common upper limits, some 
of which were not even realistic at the time when 
the agreements were concluded. Furthermore, 
these agreements concern only what are known 
as strategic systems, that is, nuclear weapons 
aimed directly at American or Soviet territory. 
There are other agreements which I would like 
to call non-armament agreements, those in 
which a given course of action is renounced for 
given areas and given categories of weapons. The 
two most important agreements of this type are 
the non-proliferation treaty, which was signed in 
1968, entered into force in 1970 and has since 
been signed by over 120 countries, and the ABM 
treaty, which renounced the development and 
deployment of defensive missile systems in 
space, together with the relevant components. 
Both this treaty and the non-proliferation treaty 
are still in force today. One might add that the 
nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 between the 
United States of America, the United Kingdom 
and the Soviet Union is also a non-armament 
treaty, inasmuch as it prohibits nuclear testing 
above ground, in the atmosphere and under 
water. In 1975 France followed suit in practice, 
although it has not signed this treaty. China, the 
fifth nuclear power, has done the same. 
There was then no agreement on the weapons 
systems and problems in Europe of immediate 
interest to us. Where European nuclear weapons 
were concerned, all we had were negotiations 
connected with the INF negotiations. Since 1973 
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there have been the MBFR negotiatwns in 
Vienna, which have yet to produce any results. 
The reason for this is not simply that the Warsaw 
Pact has been unwilling to make concessions. 
The real causes lie deeper. The reductions sought 
in the MBFR negotiations - nine hundred 
thousand soldiers on each side within the MBFR 
area - have been accepted in principle for over 
twelve years. But progress has never been made 
in the debate on the question of rates of 
reduction in East and West, that is, on the pro-
portion ofthe total reduction which each country 
might accept. This question has never been dis-
cussed in depth even in the West. So far the West 
has not worked out a position as to how it per-
ceives the implementation of an MBFR 
agreement in the western countries. 
When even such obvious questions have not 
yet been settled, the conclusion of an agreement 
cannot, of course, be expected. The basic 
requirement for the conclusion of an agreement 
is, after all, that the concept should not only be 
correct in itself, but should also be supported by 
a consensus in the West. Then we can negotiate 
with the other side, which has undoubtedly had 
specific problems of its own preventing any 
major progress towards an MBFR agreement. 
To summarise, we can say, in view of past 
experience with disarmament and arms control, 
that the European problem was not given ade-
quate consideration and that awareness of the 
problem and ideas on how to reach disarmament 
agreements were not particularly well 
developed. 
Although there have been numerous proposals 
for further action - including some from the 
Assembly of Western European Union - they 
have had no constructive influence on events. It 
can be assumed that the political will has not 
been sufficiently strong, that not enough political 
emphasis has been placed on disarmament, that 
other problems have attracted greater interest 
and that the Western European countries have 
probably failed by and large to develop the kind 
of informed opinion that might have enabled a 
joint position to be adopted. 
A great deal has now changed in this respect, 
both in East-West relations and in the West. The 
INF agreement is about to be signed. The foreign 
ministers have agreed the terms and the 
American President and the Soviet General Sec-
retary intend to sign the agreement on 7th 
December. Today - a few days before the event 
- we can assume that the signatures will be put 
to this agreement, eliminating a whole category 
of weapons, land-based medium-range missiles, 
on both sides, regardless of the number of mis-
siles present on the two sides. This is 
undoubtedly a turning point in post-war history: 
it is the first real disarmament agreement, the 
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first agreement to take account of the European 
problem. 
There have also been a number of very 
important declarations of intent by both the 
Warsaw Pact- the joint declarations of Budapest 
and East Berlin, for example- and NATO. Both 
sides are preparing themselves and have 
expressed the desire for broadly based conven-
tional disarmament in Europe and also for a con-
tinuation of the process of nuclear disarm-
ament. 
It is important for us in this situation - as I 
said at the start - to begin to emphasise the 
points on which there is agreement in principle 
between East and West, and within the West, so 
that we can discuss the various stages of imple-
mentation in the future. The big chance we have 
now is that it is no longer a question of whether 
there will be disarmament - there is no disputing 
that any more - but of how the various steps 
should be taken. 
The basis on which we in the West are now 
working is that during the negotiations in Vienna 
on a joint mandate for a European disarmament 
conference, we have already agreed in principle 
with the Warsaw Pact countries that it should 
cover the area from the Atlantic to the Urals. We 
are agreed that it is not simply a question of the 
same reduction quotas for individual weapons 
systems, which would in any case be very dif-
ficult because comparing conventional weapons 
with ~ach other is harder than comparing nuclear 
weapons. 
Consequently, it will be necessary in these 
matters of conventional disarmament to 
examine the doctrines which cause particular 
distrust of the other side. In other words, it is no 
longer primarily a question of the simple prin-
ciple of numerically equal reductions, because 
this would be to ignore fundamental problems. 
There are, of course, imbalances in certain cate-
gories of weapons, the geographical areas taken 
as a basis differ, and the military strategies and 
doctrines differ too. 
All this complex of questions must be dealt 
with if a result is to be achieved, if there is to be 
no repetition of what has happened in Vienna: 
fourteen years of negotiations, to no avail. 
It is not as if we could afford this delay, since 
the need for disarmament is indicated by a 
number of basic facts. It is not just the danger 
inherent in military potential which is always 
there and would undoubtedly still be there if 
there were fewer weapons. What we are seeing 
throughout the world and quite specifically on 
the Soviet side, indeed in all the Warsaw Pact 
countries, is that these countries can no longer 
afford to sustain their efforts in the armaments 
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field amounting in some cases to well over 10% 
ofg;oss national product, because ifthey.do they 
will be quite unable to meet the economic ne~ds 
of their people. They are already h~vmg 
enormous difficulties in this respect, and If the 
current priorities remain unchanged, th~se 
problems will be insoluble. Reason therefore dic-
tates that the forces of reform in the Warsaw Pact 
countries shift their priorities from military to 
civil activities. 
But we in the West also have fundamental 
problems of this kind, thCj>ugh they ~re not as 
serious as in Eastern Europe. The Umted States 
has considerable budgetary problems, which 
have grown in the last five years. The United 
States and the Soviet Union alone account for 
55% of expenditure on arms in the world. In the 
last six years there has been a 70% increase in 
military spending. This has taken place in the 
middle of a persistent world economic structural 
crisis which shows no sign
1 
at all of coming to an 
end ~ structural crisis both in the relationship bet~een North and South and within the West 
itself, not to speak of the economic structural 
crises in Eastern Europe. 
The United States' growing budgetary diffi-
culties are bound to result in even louder and 
more urgent appeals to Western Europe to 
increase our military spending, because the 
Americans find it difficult to see why their mil-
itary spending should be higher that our~ in 
Western Europe, when they have more senous 
budgetary problems than we do. 
But we also know that the welfare state, which 
has become a permanent fixture in Western 
Europe, would allow an increase ~n ~ilitary 
spending only at the expense of maJor mtern~l 
difficulties, particularly in the social sphere. T~Is 
means that we too must contemplate a change m 
structures. We must always remember that we in 
Europe are living in the continent at whose 
centre the East-West con$ict takes place - the 
continent where the dividling line between East 
and West lies - and that this is the continent 
with the greatest arms burden. 
So there are many rea~ons prompting us to 
change gear in favour of an accelerated process of 
disarmament. The positive aspect of these devel-
opments is that the questions of principle we are 
discussing today are also being discussed by the 
Warsaw Pact countries, in the same form in 
some cases, so there is a good chance of 
achieving a new basis. The key words here are, to 
recapitulate very briefly: do not think solely in 
terms of individual categ9ries of weapons, but 
consider imbalances on all sides, and above all 
change the doctrines to allow for more 
confidence-building, particularly where they 
concern the capacity for aggressive acts. The con-
clusion to be drawn from l!lll this is that we must 
establish this consensus. 
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In addition, there will be - I should not like 
this to go unmentioned - a number of grave 
problems in the future which we cannot yet con-
sider on the basis of consensus. In the report we 
- and this applies to me too, as Rapporteur -
have not emphasised these points of potential 
conflict, because our primary objective was to 
re-establish a basis for consensus. But I should 
now like to indicate in a few sentences the trends 
and the various options that arise, which must be 
left to a future debate between governments and 
here in the Assembly. 
We agree that the next opportunity would 
probably be for a reduction by perhaps 50% in 
what are known as strategic weapons. In all like-
lihood this too will be discussed on: 7th 
December. 
Leaving aside the points on which we are 
agreed, it is still unclear how progress can be 
made in Europe in future as regards the problem 
of reducing nuclear weapons, and how this can 
be reconciled with the doctrine of nuclear deter-
rence. It is also unclear over what range, geo-
graphically speaking, we are discussing conven-
tional disarmament. There are various positions 
on this. As regards the preparation of the 
mandate for Vienna, is it conceivable that the 
negotiations will be confined to conventional 
weapons? This would certainly not be to the 
liking of countries in the centre of Europe - the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg. We have in the 
centre of Europe an enormous number of nuclear 
weapons, which entail the constant danger of 
total destruction. This means we shall have to 
insist on shorter-range nuclear weapons occu-
pying a central place in future negotiations. 
There are those who say conventional and 
nuclear disarmament should be linked. Whether 
this would be wise should be discussed in greater 
depth. There are those who say there should be 
parallel negotiations on conventional and 
nuclear disarmament, with perhaps an attempt at 
linking the two when an agreement is concluded, 
or perhaps with two separate agreements. There 
are certainly proposals to the effect that priority 
should now be given to negotiations on the possi-
bility of reducing the stockpiles of short-range 
nuclear missiles. 
At all events, as soon as it is a matter offurther 
reduction in nuclear weapons in Europe, the 
present doctrine of deterrence will have to be 
reviewed in the West to determine how, if most 
governments want to abide by this principle for 
some time to come, deterrence might still be 
guaranteed after the deterrent weapons on both 
sides have been withdrawn from Central Europe. 
The question of minimal deterrence will 
therefore have to be discussed in the future. 
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None of the points I have just mentioned is 
made in the report, for the reasons I have given. 
But it will certainly be incumbent on us - and 
this is why I have touched on it now - to think 
very carefully in the future about the various 
roads to disarmament. The more we can do this 
on the basis of a consensus on the points that are 
now in the report, the more constructive and cre-
ative this debate will be. I believe that would be 
in all our interests. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Scheer. 
The debate is open and I call Mr. Muller. 
Mr. MULLER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, I wish, of course, to comment primarily 
on the aspect of Mr. Scheer's report on which we 
have placed particular emphasis: the question of 
disarmament. But before I do so, I will comment 
briefly on something which is also in the report 
but which Mr. Scheer did not single out and 
which is perhaps less important. But I feel it 
should be mentioned because the French Min-
ister also referred to it this afternoon. It is the 
question of the accession of other countries to 
Western European Union. 
I will mention Portugal once again in this 
context because I feel that all the criteria which 
have been established apply in Portugal's case. I 
do not see why - it has become very clear that 
this is the Council's attitude, since the French 
Minister made the same connection - the 
decision on Portugal can be taken only in con-
nection with the decision on Spain. I think this 
attitude is wrong. I would not go so far as to say 
that it degrades Portugal, but it is an inappro-
priate attitude towards this country, which is 
being treated as no more than an appendage to 
Spain. The fact that the two countries occupy the 
Iberian peninsula does not mean that one of 
them should be penalised. I felt it essential to 
make this preliminary comment. 
As regards the question of disarmament, I will 
begin by saying that there is no doubt that the 
scene has changed tremendously, not least 
because of the meeting in Reykjavik and what 
followed. This tremendous change has led to 
some aberrations in the debate on disarmament. 
The double zero option for INF weapons and the 
implications of these INF reductions are all 
issues which, in my opinion, were not clearly dis-
cussed and resolved early enough in the West, in 
NATO and in WEU. 
There has been a great deal of confusion. I will 
simply remind you that different statements 
were made on the timing and on the scale 
involved. I would remind you of the debate that 
took place in the Federal Republic on the Per-
shing lA missiles, for example. None of this 
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would have been needed if consensus had been 
reached earlier in the western camp. 
If we are going to talk about disarmament, we 
must take up something that Mr. Scheer has also 
taken up in his report, the question of the credi-
bility of what is introduced into the debate in 
this context by the Warsaw Pact. As the report 
quotes from the Warsaw Pact document adopted 
at the Berlin meeting on 29th May 1987, I should 
like to refer to a passage which is not quoted in 
the report but is also quite interesting. It begins 
by saying- the Warsaw Pact document is repro-
duced as Appendix Ill - that the military doc-
trine of the Warsaw treaty is subjugated to the 
task of preventing war, both nuclear and conven-
tional, and that there must never be a military 
solution outside the socialist system. 
This is in principle a perpetuation of the 
Brezhnev doctrine, because it explicitly provides 
for restraint in the taking of military action only 
outside the Warsaw Pact, not on Warsaw Pact 
territory itself. So no complaints can be levelled 
if there should be a second march on Prague or 
somewhere else. 
Another question that arises in this context is 
how the relationship with Afghanistan is dis-
cussed within the Warsaw Pact, because it might 
well be that Afghanistan is not simply - as Mr. 
Scheer believes- a negative example of the cred-
ibility of this doctrine not being assured until 
Soviet troops have been withdrawn from 
Afghanistan. The interpretation in the Warsaw 
Pact countries might be that Afghanistan, with a 
socialist government in Kabul, presents a com-
pletely different situation, to which this Warsaw 
Pact provision - the peaceful use of political 
means - need not in any way apply, and that this 
in no way conflicts with what is stated there. 
Nevertheless, it must be said that the disarm-
ament debate is under way again, that we are 
now hearing the Warsaw Pact make a statement 
that was made in a different form in 1969 by the 
then American President, Mr. Nixon, when the 
United States military doctrine was changed 
from strategic superiority to an adequate arms 
level and balance. This is now being reintro-
duced into the debate by the Warsaw Pact, and it 
is above all emphasised by Mr. Gorbachev in his 
book on perestroika and in his many statements, 
including a television interview recently given to 
an American television station. 
Of course, the announcement that the Soviet 
Union, or the Warsaw Pact, intends to replace 
the present offensive doctrine by one based on 
maintaining a sufficient level for defence must be 
examined very carefully. There will undoubtedly 
have to be a great deal of verification in the next 
few months. 
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There is no denying that the Warsaw Pact's 
military doctrine in the past has been offensive. 
All the experts on this iss~e agree that both the 
deployment of the Soviet l]nion's armed forces 
- in Central Europe for example - and the 
instructions they are given are attuned to an 
offensive strategy - some even say a Blitzkrieg 
strategy. No statements, including those of the 
Soviet Defence Minister,' Mr. Yasov, in an 
interview with Pravda on 27th July 1987, are 
enough to make Soviet intentions really clear. 
In this context I should Jlike to quote a deputy 
director of the American disarmament agency, 
Mr. Lynn Hansen, who recently said something 
that is worth thinking about where we in the 
West are concerned, becau~e in a parliamentary 
democracy our military debates start from com-
pletely different premises. from those of the 
eastern bloc. After a visit to Moscow he observed 
that Soviet diplomats or people responsible for 
such questions in the Central Committee -
perhaps even military peoPle- may certainly say 
things in conversation that are similar to what is 
said in the West, but that completely different 
views are encountered iq direct contact with 
officers who are active in tlie army and not in the 
Central Committee or diplomatic apparatus. 
This is always a problem, of course, in a 
country where there is no d~mocratic control and 
it is what distinguishes the' two systems in terms 
of political structure. I believe these are issues on 
which we shall be focusing as the debate con-
tinues. 
What is interesting is trlat the vague, unclear 
announcements from official quarters on this 
defensive strategy always , require explanations, 
which are then forthcomi~g, not from the mil-
itary apparatus but from lthe Central Commit-
tee's propaganda apparatus, either from some 
deputy editor or from an editor-in-chief, or an 
assistant in the foreign ministry or a Tass corre-
spondent, who then try to ran in with something 
that corresponds to our western speech modes, 
but does not correspond to the semi-official 
statements made on the other side. 
In his comments on the disarmament negotia-
tions that are needed, Mr. Scheer referred to 
asymmetry, which was required particularly 
when it came to the conventional sphere. The 
proof of the pudding will, of course, be in the 
eating. What can be said in support of his line of 
argument is that asymmetrical disarmament is 
already occurring in the INF negotiations, 
although - as he himself _pghtly admitted - the 
nuclear sector cannot be djirectly compared with 
the conventional sector. 
The difficulties we have experienced in 
the MBFR negotiations fe)r almost two decades 
demonstrate where the re&~ problem for the dis-
armament negotiations will lie. Clarification will 
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therefore be needed as early as possible, particu-
larly in this question of asymmetrical negotia-
tions in the conventional sphere. Without this, I 
believe the whole process of disarmament would 
very soon come to a standstill again and be con-
fined to what may now have been achieved in 
the direct INF negotiations. 
To conclude, it is for these reasons that per-
manent, rapid and above all independent consul-
tation within WEU, and among the European 
members of the North Atlantic pact, is so tre-
mendously important as a means of facilitating 
the prompt co-ordination by Washington and 
Europe of decisions on the measures needed if an 
appropriate, timely and consolidated answer is to 
be given to anything that the Warsaw Pact may 
introduce into the debate. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Soell. 
Mr. SOELL (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, first of all I should like to express my 
praise for the report. I particularly welcome the 
way in which it reappraises the various disar-
mament negotiations and the progress achieved 
in them. It does not gloss things over or indulge 
in effusive optimism: it is a cautiously optimistic 
appraisal. 
It also points out - and I now come to my first 
comment on the contents - that the INF treaty 
will be followed by a wide range of extremely 
detailed provisions. They will concern a very 
rigid verification system, the details of which are 
still virtually unknown to us. But it is important 
that the organs of Western European Union 
should find out at an early stage what these pro-
visions are. 
We are faced with the fact that the provisions 
of this agreement are to be verified over a period 
of thirteen years, that each side will be able to 
make up to twenty challenge inspections in the 
first three years and that this rigid monitoring 
system is also needed because we do not yet 
know enough about what actually exists in this 
sphere or in the spheres of chemical and many 
other weapons. This is proved by the fact that all 
our assumptions on the numbers of Soviet war-
heads and reloadable systems have had to be 
substantially increased as a result of the figures 
which have come to light in recent weeks. It is 
now being said that over three thousand war-
heads will have to be dismantled in this sector by 
the Soviet Union alone. 
Secondly, the report refers once again to the 
reductions in connection with the MBFR nego-
tiations in Vienna. I feel the French objection 
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that the area of reductions has always been far 
too limited has now proved to be justified, in this 
respect at least. It will be crucial for everyone 
with substantial troop concentrations in the now 
projected enlarged area between the Atlantic and 
the Urals to be involved. This is, of course, an 
appeal to France to play an active part in the dis-
cussions and negotiations. 
It will no longer simply be a question - on this 
I fully agree with the Rapporteur - of fixing 
quantitative thresholds and eliminating quanti-
tative asymmetries but also of taking the geo-
graphical problems into account, and the doc-
trines as well. 
Mr. Muller has just spoken ofthe Warsaw Pact 
countries' offensive doctrine. Seen against the 
background of the Soviet Union's past expe-
rience - and we Germans played no small part in 
that - it is more of an offensive defensive doc-
trine. In other words, the Soviet Union is saying 
- as it again confirmed at the meeting of the 
Warsaw Pact's Military Committee in Berlin on 
29th May 1987 - that, in the event of a conflict, 
it and its allies would at once try to carry it into 
the territory of the other side. 
We know, however, that some governments in 
Eastern Europe are interested in seeing a change 
in the doctrines towards an unmistakably non-
provocative defence policy. This too we must 
discuss in depth, and here again we must use our 
bilateral contacts - in talks with the political 
authorities and governments in Eastern Europe, 
not only in the Soviet Union, but also in Poland, 
the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslo-
vakia and other countries. 
But it is not just a question of quantitative 
asymmetries, or of changing military doctrines: it 
is also a question of the quality of weapons and 
the debate on zones where the presence of 
weapons particularly suitable for attack varies, 
interpreting the word weapons not only in its 
original sense of tanks, aircraft and artillery, but 
also in the sense of all the logistical equipment -
for bridge-building, etc. - needed to cross large 
rivers and take offensive action. 
Lastly, it is a question of making headway with 
the favourable experience we have now gained in 
the area of confidence-building measures. We 
should take a close look at the report of the 
inspectors who have recently observed 
manoeuvres, particularly under the Stockholm 
agreement of September 1986. These reports 
clearly show that very specific reappraisals are 
possible and that the process of confidence-
building has continued but they also show that 
we need to put forward a number of additional 
demands and that it will probably be necessary 
in the longer term to establish something like a 
crisis control centre covering the whole of the 
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East and West in Europe, given the still very dif-
ferent assessments in East and West of the role of 
nuclear weapons and their impact within the 
overall strategy. 
To conclude, I should like to reiterate the 
concern that I formulated yesterday as a question 
during the debate on the Secretary-General's 
report. If Western European Union and its 
organs are to take part in this constructive dia-
logue between East and West, they must organise 
themselves very much better and obtain infor-
mation at an early stage. We must participate 
actively in this dialogue if we Western Euro-
peans, who form an essential part of the North 
Atlantic Alliance, are not to fall further behind in 
this competition of ideas. After all, western 
political forces and even peace studies have in 
recent years given the European public a great 
many ideas and concepts, a great deal that is now 
being favourably received in current discussions 
in the Soviet Union - although not yet in very 
great detail in many cases - and it would be a 
great pity if recognition of their western 
authorship were to be lost. 
I therefore call on everyone who is able to join 
in this constructive dialogue both at national 
level and within Western European Union to 
increase their efforts in this respect. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is adjourned. 
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9. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its J1lext public sitting 
tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 2nd December, 
at 10 a.m. with the following otders of the day: 
1. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second 
annual report of the Council (Resumed 
debate on the report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc-
ument 1116, addendum and amend-
ments). 
2. Military use of computers - towards a joint 
European defence research programme 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions and votes on the 
draft recommendation and draft order, 
Document 1118). 
3. Address by Mr. Melior, Minister of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of 
the United Kingdom. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speaW. ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 6.25 p.m.) 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• · 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second 
annual report of the Council 
(Resumed debate on the report 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, Doe. 1116, addendum and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the resumed debate on the 
report of the Committee on Defence Questions 
1. See page 27. 
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thirty-second annual report of the Council, Doc-
ument 1116, addendum and amendments. 
In the resumed debate, I call Mr. Baumel. 
Mr. BAUMEL (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, disarmament 
efforts should always be supported, especially at 
a time when the threats to the world are growing. 
One must therefore be prejudiced in favour of 
any effort to limit arms. Why is it then that the 
forthcoming agreement on the double zero 
option, which is virtually certain to be signed a 
few days hence, raises so many reservations and 
worries? It is because in the final analysis this 
agreement is not good for disarmament, Europe, 
the Atlantic Alliance or the interests of peace. 
It is not good because any disarmament effort 
must be balanced, verifiable and significant, and 
the fact is that the agreement based on the 
double zero option, which has cost some effort, is 
not balanced thanks to the clever strategy of Mr. 
Gorbachev which has placed the Americans 
exactly where he wanted them, that is to say 
under an obligation to accept reductions on very 
favourable terms. 
It is also true that the agreement is putting the 
cart before the horse in the sense that it starts by 
getting rid of the few European missiles which 
have maintained a difficult balance between East 
and West over the last forty years. 
It is not good because it leaves the central stra-
tegic arsenals untouched and has the wrong 
starting point, as it eliminates all told a mere 5% 
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of the world's nuclear arms stockpile and 
therefore presents an illusion lacking in reality. 
Nor is it good for the Atlantic Alliance as, 
whether we like it or not, it contains the seed of a 
possible split between the Europeans and the 
Americans. This is something we shall expe-
rience in future years in spite of today's official 
statements, whose emptiness is clear to anyone 
with a slight knowledge of history. 
Lastly the agreement is not good for Europe, 
which has only played a minor role in the matter. 
The Europeans have not really been involved in 
this Soviet-American policy. They were greatly 
surprised to learn the substance of the Reykjavik 
summit and they reacted separately in a manner 
which demonstrated debility and resignation 
rather than a determination to master the situ-
ation. Even today the body of European opinion 
comforts itself by simulating acceptance of an 
agreement which removes a large part of 
Europe's protection. Indeed, a whole strategy 
based on nuclear deterrence as a counterpart to 
conventional superiority is to end in a few days 
without our having any real back-up strategy. 
What is to become of the flexible response 
which was the centre-piece of the Atlantic 
Alliance? When the United States felt that its 
own territory was under the threat of Soviet mis-
siles, it invented this doctrine to delay its nuclear 
engagement as long as possible by attempting to 
limit the war to a European conflict with conven-
tional weapons. 
What becomes of this graduated response if 
two of the ladder's essential rungs are with-
drawn? The truth of the matter is that we are in 
an entirely new situation and Europeans must 
react if they do not wish to become the mere 
onlookers and pawns of history. 
In this crisis, the possibilities for a European 
defence emerge more clearly, and, as optimism 
must always be maintained, I think this is the 
right moment for Europeans to awaken a little 
from their forty years' apathy during which their 
need for security has been lulled by the relaxing 
assurance of American protection. Europeans 
must realise that the defence of Europe is pri-
marily the responsibility of Europeans helped by 
the Americans and not of the Americans with 
varying degrees of European support. This 
means a complete reversal of the political and 
strategic situation. Will WEU be able to seize the 
chance which is on offer? 
No doubt there are some very reassuring signs, 
including especially the adoption and signing of 
The Hague security platform which unques-
tionably expresses new determination with 
regard to the defence of Europe. Will this 
platform turn out to be only an empty gesture 
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made by a number of WEU countries in reply to 
the French proposal and without any determi-
nation to follow it through, or does it mark the 
start of a necessary reorgarlisation of WED's 
foundations, structure, aims aind political will? If 
the latter is the case, bravo. The Reagan/ 
Gorbachev agreement will have had at least one 
favourable result. 
But that also means that the establishment of 
the genuine European pillar which does not at 
present exist requires morel than after-dinner 
speeches and addresses in this forum which I 
have been listening to for fifteen years to no 
avail. The European pillar is not a reality 
because the Americans did not want it and the 
Europeans did not attempt it. A new determi-
nation is needed if we really want to create a 
European pillar, and the nat"\lral framework for 
such a pillar can only be WEtJ which is the sole 
institutional organisation for the defence of 
Europe. 
Following the platform adopted at The Hague, 
this therefore means that our authorities must 
seek ways of laying real foundations for the 
European pillar. How are they to do this? First, 
by bringing about a genuine European union 
expressed in a shared attitude to the problems of 
European defence and the political issues of the 
West. Second, and work has already been done 
in this direction, there must be a development of 
military, strategic and political co-operation. 
I 
The mechanisms of WEU must become more 
efficient and heavy and unWieldy bureaucracy 
must stop impeding the progress of a number of 
operations. There must be real political will, 
without which we shall be left with speeches, 
motions approved in a context of general indif-
ference and a complete lack of genuine 
achievement. 
At the risk of upsetting certain conformist 
views here or elsewhere, I would say that the 
Franco-German military co-operation furnishes 
a significant example. It demonstrates that when 
governments, political leaders, a political com-
munity and the advocates ~f a policy wish to 
move forward together, the)! really can do so. 
Our history with Germany goles back a long way, 
heaven knows, but recent years have witnessed 
the establishment of a positive and realistic joint 
defence organisation which is beginning to bear 
fruit. 
This Franco-German miiitary co-operation 
must not exclude other defence efforts. There 
can be no question of creating a Paris-Bonn axis. 
That would be a serious mistake and is not the 
wish of either the Germans or ourselves. 
However, the co-operation does provide a model 
of what could be achieved at WEU level by a 
series of advances in highly rpecific areas. 
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We still have a long way to go in this con-
nection: firstly with regard to co-ordination of 
our strategic policies, secondly in the 
harmonisation of our programme, and thirdly in 
the standardisation of our equipment. It is 
absurd that our European countries use so many 
different equipment types, as if our forces had to 
fight side by side it would be impossible for one 
to help the other with munitions or supplies. It is 
not enough to organise a few meetings, we have 
to go much further, and we can do so. 
Of course we will have to overcome our natio-
nalistic attitudes, the lobbies of the military 
equipment manufacturers and the very legit-
imate wish of every country to keep its own 
models and standards. It is at the earlier stage of 
preliminary research that some of the solutions 
are to be found. I do not wish to be too long-
winded, but I think finally that we should also 
try to adopt a resolute policy with regard to our 
American partner. 
It must constantly be repeated that there is no 
alternative to NATO. Anyone who, consciously 
or otherwise, proposes an alternative is playing 
Moscow's game. It is within the Atlantic Alliance 
that progress must be pursued and it is in 
agreement with NATO that the European pillar 
should be developed, not in rivalry with the 
Atlantic Alliance but as the necessary coun-
terpart to its American element. Clearly, Europe 
cannot defend itself without American pro-
tection and it is equally clear that Europe cannot 
defend itself with conventional weapons. 
WEU's platform of The Hague contributes 
three fundamental elements, and I am glad that 
our governments have given it their backing. 
First, it confirms that the defence of Europe 
needs American support. Second, it maintains 
the need for both nuclear and conventional 
deterrence. I know that some of our German 
neighbours display extreme nervousness on 
nuclear matters and there are reasons for their 
attitude. We must try to understand the line of 
German thinking and not overreact to it. But we 
must explain to everyone that Europe will not be 
able to defend itself without a minimum nuclear 
deterrent. Third, the platform recognises the rele-
vance and importance of the British and French 
forces within the framework of the alliance's 
common defence. 
These three positive elements are grounds for 
hope that we shall be able to advance further if 
we wish to do so, if we have a plan and a clear 
programme and if the declaration made at The 
Hague is followed by some concrete achieve-
ments. 
The essential point at present is to adapt 
WEU's structures to the terms of this decla-
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ration. For this to be done, the platform must be 
followed by the formulation of a clear plan ena-
bling Europe's defence to be reinforced in the 
only conceivable way - that is through WEU. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Fourre. 
He does not appear to be here. 
I call Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - Yes-
terday the Dutch Foreign Minister said that if 
WEU did not exist at this time we should have to 
invent it. A good reason for the continued exis-
tence of WEU is that we should all continue to 
benefit from the exposition of strategy by our 
friend Mr. Baumel, who put his finger on many 
important aspects of Europe's security policy. He 
rightly emphasised that Europe should awake out 
of its long apathy on defence matters. Inasmuch 
as The Hague declaration has now been issued, I 
think we can be confident that the seven member 
countries of WEU hold certain principles 
firmly. 
In the first post-war phase of European 
security policy the principle was one of massive 
retaliation to any aggression, but that first phase, 
underpinned by our American allies, was accom-
panied by a realisation that threats to western 
interests were not limited to Europe alone. 
Therefore, although the NATO alliance was the 
first of the western collective security arrange-
ments, there was also a Central Treaty Organis-
ation in the Middle East and a South-East Asia 
Treaty Organisation in South.-East Asia. Those 
last two alliances unravelled and the Europeans 
began a process of withdrawal from empire, ini-
tiated by the British in 194 7, followed by the 
French from Indo-China in 1954, taken further 
by the British, who allowed Aden to fall into 
Marxist hands in 1967, and by the revolution in 
Portugal and the Marxist coup d'etat in Angola 
and Mozambique in 1974. The second phase of 
European security policy began with the Harmel 
report in 1967 and the enunciation of the doc-
trine of flexible response. 
What I shall use as my text in my brief 
remarks is the first of the recommendations from 
our Rapporteur in his reply to the thirty-second 
annual report of the Council. He said that the 
Council should continue its discussions on all 
aspects of European security and disarmament 
and ensure that European interests were safe-
guarded in the present strategic debate. Since 
European withdrawal from empire, the Euro-
peans have been far too reluctant not only to pay 
due attention to events in the wider world, but to 
pay enough for their collective security in this 
continent. 
On the first point - taking a fair share of the 
western burden for common security interests in 
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the wider world- there have been hopeful signs. 
The British reacted effectively to Argentinian 
aggression in the Falklands in 1982 and the 
French, to their credit, have reacted extremely 
effectively to Libyan aggression in Chad in more 
recent days. We now have a five-nation naval 
force in the Arabian Gulf helping to maintain the 
freedom of the seas and the right of navigation in 
international waters and supporting our 
American friends in this important task. 
At the same time, the doctrine of flexible 
response is in danger of unravelling in our own 
continent. In no period have I been more 
anxious than now because the political and psy-
chological offensive of the Soviet Union is at 
present perhaps more dangerous to western 
security interests than the overt threat to 
Western Europe that existed during the cold war. 
In my judgment, compensation really is the 
name of the game: compensation in the widest 
sense; compensation for Soviet superiority in 
chemical and biological weapons; compensation 
for the voluntary withdrawal of the keystone, 
the arch, of flexible response, namely, the 
intermediate-range cruise missiles and Pershing 
lis deployed here at our wish on our behalf by 
our American friends; and compensation not just 
in the nuclear sphere, for which we shall need 
enhanced air forces and the modernisation of the 
French and British deterrents, but in the conven-
tional sphere as well. 
I think that over the years the Europeans have 
proved themselves exceedingly unwilling to 
provide an adequate conventional defence. 
Indeed, our French friends have always main-
tained that such defence is inherently incredible. 
I think that we, too, have felt the same. 
Now we are going to need to improve our con-
ventional forces. Above all, I would say that, at a 
time of acute budgetary crisis for our American 
friends, we must come to terms with the reality 
of the decline of American economic and mil-
itary power. It is no good for Europe to continue 
to enjoy a semi-client status. As Mr. Baumel 
said, we have to provide more for our own 
defence and we have to help the Americans 
around the world. 
We must also realise that there is no change in 
Soviet grand strategy. General Najibullah is still 
kept in power in Afghanistan by 110 000 Soviet 
troops. A puppet government is still kept in 
power in Cambodia by Vietnamese surrogate 
forces. An abominable regime in Ethiopia, which 
uses starvation as a weapon of war against its 
own people, is kept in power with Soviet and 
East German advisers and Cuban troops. In 
Angola the Marxist forces have been sustained 
by the Soviets in the biggest offensive they have 
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ever launched against UNIT A forces, and in 
Central America the Nicaraguan Government 
still have full political and material support from 
the Soviets. 
At no time in our organisation's history has its 
role been more important - to enhance our 
defence in Europe and, at the same time, to 
realise that Europe in concert ought to play a 
more effective role in the wider world. Even our 
Canadian friends are making us reassess our 
commitments and priorities by their decision to 
withdraw the Canadian sh~p-transportable 
brigade from the northern flank and two air 
squadrons that used to go with it. 
To conclude, I welcome the report because it 
focuses our attention on many key issues. I 
support the declaration of principles enunciated 
at The Hague, but unless those principles are 
translated into effective action,· we shall have 
done ourselves damage because we shall have 
raised our hopes only to have seen them wither 
on the vine. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Cox. 
Mr. COX (United Kingdom). - It was inter-
esting to hear my British colleague, Mr. 
Wilkinson, speaking, but I take a somewhat dif-
ferent attitude from his. I do not dispute that this 
is an important debate and I hope that, as one 
sees attitudes changing between East and West, 
that is something on which this Assembly and its 
representatives will work together so that there 
will be meaningful stage-by-stage reductions of 
all classes of armaments. 
The size and growth of our nuclear weapons 
has undoubtedly fortified people throughout the 
world and the more we talk, the more we under-
stand the differing views of East and West, the 
better will be the chance of pro$ress. 
I warmly support the recommendations of the 
Assembly, because the report outlines, both at a 
world level and at a European level, what we 
need to achieve. All of us would agree that those 
whom we represent will fully support any efforts 
by the world's nations to seek meaningful reduc-
tions in nuclear weapons. There 
1
is no doubt that 
Mr. Gorbachev has shown clearly that he has 
major objectives within the Soviet Union and, 
because of that, there will undoubtedly be a 
change of attitude in the defence policy of the 
Soviet Union. In turn, that will undoubtedly 
affect the foreign policy of that country, and we 
should welcome that. 
However, I hope that the A~sembly and the 
nations from which we come will also note that, 
although progress is being made between the 
world's major powers, we must also take 
increasing action about the arms trade 
throughout the world. Enormous amounts of 
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money are spent on armaments and military 
equipment - about $2 million every minute of 
every day. 
Many arms are bought by developing and 
third world countries that face enormous 
problems. Mr. Wilkinson cited the regime in 
Ethiopia. I do not support that regime and I 
know that vast amounts of that country's limited 
resources are spent on arms. Similar things are 
happening throughout the third world. 
The Assembly has discussed the Iran-Iraq war 
on previous occasions. Thousands of soldiers on 
both sides, many of whom were little more than 
boys, have been brutally killed. The ~ar has con-
tinued because dealers have been selling arms to 
both sides. We should deplore that trade and our 
nations should make it clear that they oppose it. 
I oppose the sale of arms wherever it occurs -
and I know that it happens in the East and in the 
West. Many arms go to poorer natio~s. Vt(e h~ve 
seen television pictures of the confhcts m thud 
world countries and we know that dictatorships 
in many parts of the world are ke~t in power ~Y 
arms purchases. Naturally, world disarmament IS 
our principal interest, but we must not close our 
eyes to the arms trade. 
All the signs are that there will be a meaningful 
agreement in Washington on INF missiles. There 
is no limit to what could be achieved after that. 
Europe will be forced to examine its sec.urity 
needs. The initial discussions between President 
Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev caused problems for 
many European countries and a successful con-
clusion to the talks in Washington will add to 
those problems. It may be unpalatable to some of 
our leaders, but they must face facts. 
I hope that reductions in the number of 
nuclear weapons will not be followed by the 
development of chemical weapons, which cause 
great fear throughout the world. I have read 
reports that the United States will seek a greater 
deployment of such weapons in Europe. The 
Assembly should discuss that matter and we 
should oppose any such move. 
We talk about the reactivation of WEU, but I 
have not seen much sign of that reactivation 
since our special conference in Rome some years 
ago. However, if we commit ourselves to 
working towards general disarmament - and no 
organisation is better suited to that role - the 
people of Europe will respond. 
I welcome this very good report and particu-
larly the recommendation that there should be 
closer liaison between East and West. We should 
encourage that. If we act on these recommenda-
tions we shall be proud of our achievements in 
the future. Whatever our political views, we all 
wish to see meaningful reductions in all types of 
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armaments. Our report and the discussions 
between Mr. Gorbachev and President Reagan 
can be the first steps along that road. 
(Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Close. 
Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I wish first 
of all to thank Mr. Scheer for his objective, thor-
oughly researched and well-thought-out report 
on a matter of burning current interest. 
During this session the Assembly has regis-
tered echoes of the reservations and even the 
anxiety aroused in some quarters by the INF 
treaty on two essential points: firstly, what might 
be called creeping denuclearisation, and secondly 
the considerable imbalance in conventional 
forces and chemical weapons. We should of 
course welcome the catalytic effect of the INF 
treaty on the political revitalisation of Western 
European Union, and the situation has evoked 
some excellent statements of position and decla-
rations - all of outstanding quality. However, I 
believe these would be pointless if they were not 
accompanied by concrete measures, as Mr. 
Wilkinson has rightly indicated. 
It appears to me that we are currently faced by 
a twin-track decision very similar to that of 
December 1979, which was exclusively con-
cerned with the deployment ofEuromissiles. The 
new twin decision concerns the need to 
strengthen and even restructure our conven-
tional forces and negotiations to maintain those 
forces at the minimum level by asymmetrical 
reductions with the Soviet Union. The articles I 
have read today in the Herald Tribune seem to 
demonstrate that Mr. Gorbachev would be 
inclined to follow this line for reasons of his own 
which we can well understand. When I suggest 
that these two actions should go hand-in-hand, I 
do so because the first of them- reinforcement-
is subject to three constraint~. The first is d~mo­
graphic since, as you know, It has resulted m an 
appreciable drop in yearly numbers call~d up for 
service in the various NATO countnes. The 
second is financial and I have spoken at length 
on this point in previous interventions. I would 
remind you that according to the most reliable 
estimates the European fighter aircraft will cost 
DM 110 million, which is a very high figure and 
could cause the Bundestag to revise its budget 
allocations. The third constraint is that of public 
opinion which, in the wake of many peace dem-
onstrations on the Chernobyl incident, clearly 
views with repugnance the whole nuclear 
spectrum, in both its military and peaceful 
aspects. 
In conclusion I will suggest some practical 
measures which might alleviate the problem 
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both for our Assembly and for the Council of 
Ministers. 
Mr. David Abshire, the United States Ambas-
sador to NATO and, I believe, one of President 
Reagan's leading advisors, has visited the 
various capitals to underline the shortcomings in 
our operational position, especially in Central 
Europe. These include inadequate forces and the 
distortion between peacetime and wartime 
deployment, in other words the absence of 
" sustainability " or staying capacity which, in 
the event of a surprise attack, might create an 
unprecedented catastrophe. This is reflected in 
The Hague platform which we were recently dis-
cussing. 
Parallel with Mr. Scheer's proposals, consider-
ation must also be given to the dynamic aspects 
of arms control and not only to static reductions. 
I wish to put to you a dual proposition according 
to which the major opposing forces should both 
be withdrawn by about 250 to 300 km to the 
Rhine/Danube line on one side and the Oder/ 
Neisse line on the other. It might be objected 
that this would amount to demilitarisation, but 
that is in fact not the case as forces are currently 
deployed over the whole breadth of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Furthermore, these troops 
would not be withdrawn, but would simply be 
redeployed to eliminate the danger of a surprise 
attack. 
My second proposal- and I have already dis-
cussed it with the Soviets without getting a satis-
factory reply - is for a confidence-building 
measure whereby munitions would not be 
carried on combat vehicles in peacetime. You 
must bear in mind, ladies and gentlemen, that it 
takes twelve hours to arm fully a tank battalion 
and that twelve hours are equivalent to 150 km 
of movement over land. This would also be a 
measure against a surprise attack, which we 
rightly fear. 
Briefly, that is what I had to say. If we do not 
adopt a concrete approach to certain problems I 
am very much afraid that all we are doing here 
will be considered a futile and superficial 
exercise far removed from the expectations of 
the public. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Reddemann. 
Mr. REDDEMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, ladies 
and gentlemen, I first wish to thank the 
Rapporteur and the committee for the report, 
which presents the reality of Western European 
Union in cool and precise terms and refers with 
slightly less coolness and precision to the hopes 
nursed by many in Europe with regard to current 
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developments. I would like to make a few obser-
vations on both topics. 
My first remark is of a purely technical nature. 
I thank the committee for the recommendation 
that in future the Secretary-General should be 
directly represented at the foreign rministry of the 
country exercising the presidency1· n-office of the 
Council of Ministers at any time. believe that it 
will be possible in this way to ovetcome many of 
the difficulties otherwise associated with a 
change in chairmanship. It will make it easier to 
forestall the creation of bureaucratic structures. 
In this connection I would like to thank Mr. 
Baumel, who has just drawn attention to the 
danger of bureaucratisation. May I also take the 
opportunity of repeating an idea which I previ-
ously advanced in this forum some years ago, 
namely that officials should not be appointed to 
the present central agency on a permanent basis. 
It should be possible for the various govern-
ments to delegate top officials to the agency for a 
fixed period. This would make contact with the 
real situations in member states closer than is 
sometimes possible in the ivory towers of 
London or Paris. 
My second observation, Mr. President, con-
cerns the question of the location of the head-
quarters of Western European! Union. This 
subject has already been broached yesterday in 
another context, and I raise the point again, as 
the committee argues strongly for !Brussels in the 
report, which emphasises that this is the opinion 
not only of the Rapporteur but also of the com-
mittee. Personally, I have nothing against the 
capital ofthe kingdom of Belgium, but I do have 
worries when I read the arguments advanced for 
shifting the headquarters to Brussels. In the final 
analysis these arguments imply that Western 
European Union should be allowed to become a 
subdivision of NATO. 
I do not have the smallest objection to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. On the con-
trary, I share the Rapporteur's view that whoever 
wishes to be a member of Western European 
Union must also be a member of NATO. 
However, in recent years revitalisation has con-
ferred additional political tasks on Western 
European Union, and these tasks should be 
further extended. It follows that it would be 
wrong for us to move into the sha~ow ofNATO. 
If we were to agree to the Rapport~ur's proposal, 
the members of the WEU Permanent Council 
would be identical with our representatives on 
the Permanent Council of NATO, and I would 
not welcome that. 
Mr. Scheer claimed that there was a certain 
identity of interests, and I do not deny that that 
is partially true. But this identity is insufficient. 
It is my belief that Western European Union can 
only be a truly autonomous institution if the Per-
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manent Council concerns itself full-time with 
Western European Union, without being tied 
either to the NATO Council or, as is the case at 
present, to the Court of St. James via the ambas-
sadors accredited there from the various member 
states. 
Our proposal, which I believe should be tabled 
in the coming months, should rather be to set up 
our own permanent council. I do not mean to 
imply that we should set up a new ambassador's 
conference or assign permanent ambassadors to 
WEU headquarters. It might be much more ben-
eficial if the ministry officials permanently con-
cerned with Western European Union were to 
form themselves into what might be termed a 
permanent council. With present-day facilities 
for travel this would present no problem, and the 
arrangement would have the primary advantage 
that, as experts, these officials would no longer 
have to consult others about their pronounce-
ments in the Permanent Council. We would have 
the experts immediately available on the spot. 
The third point which I consider important is 
the question of new members, and the report 
contains a proposal on this subject. I would like 
to emphasise strongly that if Western European 
Union accepts new members - and we should 
not resist this - they should have the same rights 
and obligations as the other members. We must 
not try to offer future members, prior to their 
accession, special arrangements based on what 
this or that country has obtained over the last 
thirty years. It would be a bad thing if we were to 
finish up with a Western European Union con-
taining some countries with less and others with 
more rights. In my opinion, the rights and obli-
gations must be the same for everybody. I regard 
this as an essential criterion for the acceptance of 
new members. 
Mr. President, perhaps I might add a few 
remarks concerning the hopes expressed in the 
report. Ultimately it is a matter of what the 
chances for disarmament really are. Mr. Baumel 
mentioned that we may well be putting the cart 
before the horse by not beginning with disarm-
ament in the conventional area, where it is most 
urgent. However, I am grateful for the forth-
coming success represented by the signing of the 
INF treaty next week. 
I would just like to remind you ofthe intensity 
and length of our debates on this subject and of 
the controversies that arose over whether any 
dialogue at all could be conducted with the 
Soviet Union after the rearmament of NATO, 
with the majority of this Assembly claiming that 
disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union 
would only stand a chance of success when such 
rearmament was not merely presented as a possi-
bility but also, if necessary, implemented. The 
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fact that a particular political view has proved 
correct in the present instance does not neces-
sarily mean that this will always apply, but when 
we are debating the question of SDI, for instance, 
I must point out that we have seen similar con-
frontations. 
We have heard some sharp criticism of 
American policy, and what the report has to say 
about SDI also strikes at least a somewhat 
restrained note of criticism. Now we suddenly 
learn - from yesterday's statement by the 
General Secretary of the Soviet Communist 
Party, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev - that the Soviet 
Union is also working on a form of SDI, that is 
to say on something it had portrayed as the acme 
of evil and the greatest threat to peace. When we 
hear the General Secretary qualify his words by 
saying that the Soviet aim is merely to conduct 
research and not to build such a system, I ask 
you not to take that too seriously, as Soviet 
policy statements of this kind have, as we are 
well aware, all too often served only to cloak 
plans already nearing realisation. 
I therefore ask the Assembly to subject the 
Soviet SDI to the same careful appraisal that 
many of us have directed towards the United 
States. 
A final observation: I regard it as a matter of 
urgency that we should now pay special attention 
to conventional arms and disarmament. The 
more the nuclear shield is withdrawn, the more 
important does the question of the Warsaw 
Pact's conventional strike capability become. If 
it is truly our aim to safeguard peace by 
depriving both sides of the ability to attack, then 
I consider it necessary to study the superiority of 
the Warsaw Pact in conventional weapons with 
special care. This must be done, not in global 
terms, as we are too prone to do, but in relation 
to the individual areas of Europe, so that the 
issue does not figure largely in a sector where 
there is no real danger anyway while a sudden 
concentration of conventional weapons arises in 
another sector, giving rise to the fear that our 
present disarmament policy is not safeguarding 
but actually endangering peace. 
As this is not our wish, and as it is our 
intention that the incapacity to strike should be 
ensured on both sides, not only by treaty but also 
in reality, I earnestly appeal to the Assembly to 
make its vital contribution to this important 
subject in the immediate future. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Gabbuggiani. 
Mr. GABBUGGIANI (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, the most recent developments in 
the world situation and in particular the summit 
meetings between the United States and the 
Soviet Union make it essential for Europe to 
assume, with determination, an effective, inde-
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pendent and specifically European role in inter-
national politics. Europe cannot, we believe, be 
merely a passive or reluctant witness to a pos-
itive international process that needs to develop 
to the full and meet wider interests than just 
those of the two superpowers. 
Today, all this has become a more realistic 
prospect than has long been the case given the 
clearly changed ideas and new attitudes dis-
played by the present Soviet leadership at the 
international level. Europe needs to be in a 
position to take full advantage of this new phase 
in the improvement of relations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, between 
East and West and to assert its own initiative in 
international politics so that progress can also be 
made towards a solution of the regional conflicts 
and a major change in North-South relations and 
so that decisive advances can be made by negoti-
ation towards solving the disarmament problems 
on which European security is more particularly 
dependent. 
In this way we shall make sure of a bigger cast 
of actors on the world stage and avoid a return to 
bipolarisation. Now that the nuclear imbalance 
in favour of the Warsaw Pact countries has been 
overcome, with the agreement between the 
United States and the Soviet Union on the elimi-
nation of medium-range missiles, there should 
be no coldness or fears on Europe's part towards 
the double zero option treaty. Instead, Europe 
should look forward in confidence towards the 
possibility and need for further steps on the road 
to disarmament, but must of course combine this 
receptiveness with a careful and realistic view of 
Europe's security requirements. 
The Italian Communist Party has shown this 
awareness of the correlation to be established 
between Europe's commitment to the peace of 
the world and its efforts to guarantee the security 
of the continent in many of its official docu-
ments, a recent contribution being the resolution 
on a European security strategy tabled by Mr. 
Galluzzi and approved by the European Par-
liament at its sitting on 14th October. 
There can therefore be no possible misunder-
standing on the subject of European security in 
terms of the need for an effective European pro-
disarmament role in international politics, for 
co-operation between the various countries and 
for peace. These judgments are shared by a broad 
front of democratic forces and the European left. 
We consider that further agreements on the 
reduction of nuclear armaments, including tac-
tical atomic weapons, are essential for Europe so 
that the security of our continent depends less 
and less on the nuclear deterrent. We also feel 
that a new balance in conventional weapons, 
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where superiority lies with the Warsaw Pact, is 
also necessary in Europe. Obviously, that new 
balance needs to be sought and agreed at the 
lowest level, not the opposite. Similarly the 
development of Europe's political unity should 
be matched by a joint vision of defence and 
security to further the construction of the 
European pillar of the Atlallltic Alliance. We 
heard some interesting views on the construction 
process this morning. 
We are, therefore, Mr. President, against the 
formation of a third - European - military bloc 
and the idea of creating a European nuclear 
deterrent by strengthening and Europeanising 
the French and British deterrep.ts, because in our 
opinion this would pull in the opposite direction 
to the process of disarmament and the reduction 
and control of nuclear weapoms now begun with 
the double zero option. 
In many political, cultural and religious circles 
throughout the world, voices are heard criticising 
the vast waste of resources on the arms race to 
the detriment of a solution 'for the economic 
problems from which many countries are suf-
fering and, more generally, the senselessness 
from the human and social s-uandpoints, of mil-
itary expenditure. It is now possible to reduce 
that spending without jeopardising security. The 
road to be taken, in preference to all others 
therefore, is that of negotiation with the object of 
developing the disarmamtjnt process and 
bringing secure peace to all the peoples on this 
planet. 
To conclude, Mr. President, I would like to 
express our thanks to the committee for the 
interesting report on disarm-.ment that we are 
debating and to the honourable member who has 
presented it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Malfatti. 
Mr. MALFATTI (Italy) (Translation). -
Ladies and gentlemen, this WEU session is being 
held on the eve ofthe signature ofthe agreement 
on intermediate nuclear weapons in Washington. 
To my mind, this agreement is extremely pos-
itive. The fact that for the fitst time agreement 
has been reached not to reduce, but to eliminate 
completely an entire weapons system, the fact 
that this agreement has been reached in spite of a 
considerable asymmetry between the forces con-
cerned - as the Rapporteur Mr. Scheer has 
pointed out, the Soviet Union will have to 
destroy 1 600 warheads compared with the 348 
that the Americans will have 1o destroy, plus 100 
or so SS-23s and SS-12s versus 72 Pershing !As -
and the fact that for the first time the Soviets are 
accepting inspection and verification on their 
own territory, all this could well open the way for 
other significant advances in reducing nuclear -
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I refer to strategic weapons - chemical and con-
ventional weapons which are the most vital. 
Nor do I share the opinion of those who, 
though rightly considering the Soviet threat to 
have increased militarily and in terms of 
potential political pressure when the SS-20s were 
deployed, now consider that same threat to have 
increased again, this time precisely because, as 
well as the SS-20s, the Pershing and cruise mis-
siles that it was decided to install to restore equi-
librium with the Soviet Euromissiles are to be 
destroyed. 
Nor, of course, do I share the opinion of those 
who see this agreement as a functional move in 
the direction of a denuclearised Europe. The 
Hague platform, which I think has been judged 
positively by all the major groups present in this 
chamber, states specifically in this connection - I 
would like to read out that paragraph to you: 
" In the present circumstances and as far as we 
can foresee, there is no alternative to the 
western strategy for the prevention of war, 
which has ensured peace in freedom for an 
unprecedented period of European history. To 
be credible and effective, the strategy of deter-
rence and defence must continue to be based 
on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and 
conventional forces, only the nuclear element 
of which can confront a potential aggressor 
with an unacceptable risk. " 
I would like to revert to the subject of tomor-
row's Washington agreement to say that I fully 
share the Rapporteur's view, namely that it has 
come about through the belated acceptance of 
the western proposals by the Soviets and that -
in spite of its truth - the fact may well be 
obscured, as regards its impact on public opinion 
today, by the glare of glasnost. For that reason I 
think it useful to go back over the important 
milestones in this affair. 
Faced with the installation of the SS-20s, we 
reacted firmly and for many years effectively 
resisted all the pressures from inside and outside 
our countries against the twofold NATO 
decision of 1979. It was we in the West who pro-
posed negotiations - to be more exact, it was a 
European initiative, it was we who caused the 
Soviets to reconsider their refusal to negotiate -
in the first few months after the December 1979 
decision and the reaction of Mr. Brezhnev and 
the Soviet leadership - and their insistence on 
making negotiations subject to inacceptable con-
ditions, it was we who resisted the extreme 
pressure from the Soviets when their delegation 
left the negotiating table in Geneva, and it was to 
the West that the credit must go for having pro-
posed the so-called zero option from the outset 
of the negotiations. The fact that the negotiations 
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have today reached a successful outcome is also 
due to the fact that we won acceptance for our 
view that there was no justification for the Soviet 
claim to involve the British and French nuclear 
forces or to link the negotiations with others on 
strategic nuclear weapons and strategic defence 
initiative problems. 
The success that we have had with our negoti-
ating positions and with the specific proposal we 
made for negotiations to eliminate this type of 
weapons is therefore clearly demonstrated by the 
facts. 
It is equally clear, conversely, that this success 
could cause incalculable damage were the treaty 
on intermediate nuclear weapons not to be rat-
ified - damage at the level of public opinion, 
damage to the credibility of the West in its nego-
tiations and damage to the cohesion between the 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance. It is therefore 
right and proper that our Assembly should cast 
its vote urging speedy ratification of this 
agreement by the American Senate. 
We are, in spite of this highly positive 
agreement, left with a number of unresolved 
problems that I have no wish to pass over. The 
imbalance in conventional weapons, the need to 
update the Atlantic strategy of the flexible 
response and the global European perception of 
arms limitation issues are, together with others, 
problems to which we undoubtedly still have to 
find solutions and about which we have cause for 
legitimate concern. The strengthening of the 
European pillar of the alliance is a similarly 
unresolved problem. I would just like to stress 
that these problems existed before the 
deployment of the SS-20s and will still be on the 
table after they have gone. In other words, they 
are not going to be solved in any way by the 
agreement on intermediate nuclear forces. 
I hope that, now, there will be greater 
awareness of these problems. Hence our position 
in favour of the WEU reactivation that began in 
Rome and has now been consolidated in The 
Hague platform. It is the development and appli-
cation of that platform that may enable us to find 
positive answers to our unresolved problems. 
The platform does not give any guidelines in its 
very proper reference to the common objective 
of an integrated Europe and the construction of 
European union in accordance with the single 
act. The platform signposts the road towards a 
European defence identity that will implement 
more effectively the commitments entered into 
in the modified Brussels Treaty and the North 
Atlantic Treaty. This is why, whilst not wanting 
to pass judgment and with no preconceived 
ideas, I consider that recent bilateral initiatives, 
however interesting and worthy of consideration 
they may be and concerning, as they do, non-
NA TO-integrated military forces, as Mr. 
Raimond, the French Minister for Foreign 
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Affairs, said yesterday, cannot, by definition, 
perform a central role in applying the principles 
to which I have referred, which include the pro-
motion of a European military identity and 
therefore the strengthening of the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. 
Effective WEU reactivation can in fact be put 
to the test of truth only in terms of these two 
imperative requirements in the more general 
framework of the global construction of 
Europe. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, I will not discuss the speeches by 
members who agreed with the arguments 
advanced in the report, only the speeches in 
which additional suggestions were made or where 
I feel the approach should be re-examined. 
First, the speech made yesterday by Mr. 
Muller from the Federal Republic of Germany. 
He said - as did many other speakers - that 
there are asymmetries. Reference is also made to 
this in the report. But I must add that - when I 
think, for example, of Mr. Stokes's report, which 
we also have to discuss here - the asymmetries 
are not only to the West's disadvantage but in 
many areas to the East's disadvantage. 
This is particularly true if we take an overall 
view. There is, for example, no denying that 
there are asymmetries in the West's favour in the 
Pacific sector. It is probably equally undeniable 
that as regards the air forces there tends to be an 
asymmetry in the West's favour because of the 
special technological standards of western 
weapons systems. This asymmetry is qualitative, 
not quantitative: the numbers on the two sides 
are approximately the same. 
These are all problems to be considered in the 
negotiations. A glance at the MBFR negotiations, 
which I talked about yesterday, reveals that the 
Warsaw Pact's fears primarily concern the West's 
air forces and that our fears in the West pri-
marily concern the East's land forces. During the 
negotiations, reductions in land and air forces 
will probably have to be discussed together. This 
is probably the only way to reach a successful 
conclusion. 
This means that we have to establish asymme-
tries. A uniform numerical reduction in the 
various categories of weapons is usually the least 
suitable concept. Account must be taken of the 
quality of everything concerned, and asymmet-
rical solutions must therefore be found. 
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Mr. Soell spoke of considerable progress in 
verification. I should like to emphasise this once 
again. The fact that the Soviet Union is now 
willing to accept on-site inspettions under, say, 
an agreement on chemical weapons or in con-
nection with the monitoring system provided for 
in the agreement on intermediate-range missiles 
is a political sensation, considered against the 
background of the last thirty years. For reasons 
of principle the Soviet Union wanted to make 
inspections on its territory conditional on its 
approval. This is no longer the case. The com-
mitment to allow inspections has become to 
some extent axiomatic in all international nego-
tiations. 
This means that, once this old principle has 
been cast aside and inspectiont are accepted, the 
same will apply to any future agreement. In other 
words, one of the most serious obstacles to dis-
armament agreements in the past has been 
removed. We can but underline the importance 
of this. 
I do not agree with what Mr. Baumel said 
about the agreement on intermediate-range mis-
siles. He was very critical of it on two grounds. 
He argued, firstly, that it would give rise to an 
imbalance to the West's disadvantage and sec-
ondly that the West would then be unprotected. I 
should like to explain very briefly why I do not 
consider this position sound. 
The fact is that the East, that is the Soviet 
Union, will have to dismantle far more warheads 
under the INF agreement than 1the West. In other 
words, in terms of the number of weapons 
systems to be dismantled it is an asymmetrical 
agreement, under which the West has advan-
tages. That is the first point. But what is of prime 
importance is that, if this situation is compared 
with the situation in 1979 and earlier, the only 
conclusion to be drawn is that, if Mr. Baumel's 
argument is correct, NATO was always unpro-
tected before 1979, in fact s~nce its inception. 
Can that be a serious claim? I doubt it: not only 
that - I challenge it. 
Looking again at the situation in 1979, there 
were at that time some seve~ hundred Soviet 
intermediate-range missiles, whereas the West 
had none at all. A zero option would now result 
in the West's again achieving the pre-1979 situ-
ation, that is, there would be no land-based 
intermediate-range missiles, whereas the Soviet 
Union would have seven hundred fewer than in 
1979. How can it then be argued that the INF 
agreement will leave the West unprotected in 
future? Ifthat were so, NATO would in principle 
have failed to fulfil its security mandate at any 
time before 1979. But that would not be true. 
Therefore I do not believe that we are in a time 
of crisis. In fact this is a time when crises are 
being resolved. That is a fundamental difference, 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Scheer (continued) 
and in this context I should like to take up what 
Mr. Wilkinson said. Mr. Wilkinson - like Mr. 
Baumel - spoke of the need for the Western 
European countries to take action either to com-
pensate for disarmament agreements or to com-
pensate for American weapons and troops that 
had been withdrawn. 
I do not think is the right road. Although it is 
necessary - there is a consensus on this, and the 
report also refers to it - for us to have a 
European pillar which guarantees the greatest 
possible degree ofWestern European sovereignty 
over security policy, the question is: how do we 
achieve this? Do we achieve it by making addi-
tional efforts of our own in the armaments field 
under the general heading of compensation, or 
by some other means? If we were to construct the 
European pillar in such a way that we were 
merely providing a European replacement for 
the American troops and weapons now stationed 
in Europe, we would, in my opinion, be choosing 
the wrong course, and it could not be sustained 
either politically or economically. The result 
would be that the two principal military factors 
in the world, the Soviet Union and the United 
States of America, would be joined by a third 
strong factor, Western Europe. But is it our task 
to be, as it were, a third engine of high-tech 
armament? Given all our problems, given the 
problems faced equally by all the countries of the 
world in all kinds of political issues, the North-
South relationship, the resolution of the eco-
nomic crisis and the challenge of the ecological 
problems, is that our task? 
I therefore feel it is not a question of compen-
sation but of helping to ensure that the Soviet 
Union's and Warsaw Pact's contingents are 
pared down, but the same must apply to the 
NATO countries, including the United States, 
safeguarded and supported by agreements, so 
that we have disarmament without the need for a 
substitute, a reduction in arms without the need 
for a substitute. This does not mean that certain 
improvements might not be necessary here or 
there. They will always be needed. But the funda-
mental question is this: restructuring of the 
Western European security policy without dis-
armament, or restructuring in line with the dis-
armament process? I consider the latter to be the 
only responsible approach, and numerous argu-
ments can be advanced in support of this 
view. 
Over and above what I said yesterday, I should 
like to make a distinction between subjective and 
objective arguments. Subjective arguments are 
ethical arguments, the reduction of the danger of 
war and of distrust caused by stockpiles of 
weapons. Then there are objective arguments. 
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Mr. Close mentioned a number of objective 
arguments, which I should like to emphasise, 
even though he may not endorse all the sub-
jective arguments I referred to, or the justifi-
cation for them. There are the demographic argu-
ments, for example. It will not be possible for the 
troops to be maintained at their present level 
because there will not be enough young people 
from the early 1990s onwards, and this is not 
only true of the Federal Republic. He also men-
tioned financial limits. That is absolutely correct. 
There is also public opinion to consider: in a 
democracy public opinion must not be regarded 
as ballast but as an essential element of 
democracy. 
I should also like to mention the question of 
the future of our own economy. If we com-
pensate for arms reduction completely or largely 
on our own, it will mean developing new 
weapons, it will mean doing what the Americans 
are doing, gearing more and more technological 
skills to the great technological challenges which 
the arms race entails today. This means the 
increasing involvement of civil technologies in 
the security sector, because civil and military 
technologies are growing ever closer together. 
This is apparent from the overall trend in elec-
tronics. It also means having to declare more and 
more industries as relevant to security, and so 
exclude them from foreign trade. 
The reason why North America is now at such 
a grave economic disadvantage in competition 
with the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Europe as a whole, and above all with Japan, is 
that the Americans have isolated themselves 
from the international market in high-tech 
products by classifying these technologies as rel-
evant to security. Even now there are confer-
ences of American physicists which may not be 
attended by foreigners, not even Western Euro-
peans, on security grounds. The idea behind this 
is that all advances should be made indepen-
dently. Japan, on the other hand, is gearing its 
industrial efforts and the development of pro-
ductivity to civil products. If Europe were to 
emulate the United States, it would be at the 
expense of its economic development. It would 
result in East-West trade being increasingly 
restricted rather than expanded and in our 
largely closing the doors on Europe's largest 
potential markets. This cannot be in the interests 
of our overall development. We cannot confine 
our economic relations to the improvement of 
relations between Japan, North America and 
Western Europe. We must not ignore all the 
markets in which there is demand for new 
products. Wrong priorities must not lead to our 
forgoing these markets. 
The object is certainly not to establish a 
European pillar as a counterweight to America. 
The object is to form a European pillar in line 
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with the disarmament process, in close con-
junction with and supported by the United 
States and taking into account the East-West 
relationship and its restructuring. 
Mr. Close referred to a really central issue. It 
does not appear to be very important but I con-
sider it highly significant. I am referring to the 
proposal that precautions should be taken during 
disarmament negotiations to rule out the possi-
bility in military terms and in terms of weapons 
technology of a surprise conventional attack. 
Redeployment measures and above all a 
reduction in ammunition stockpiles should make 
such an attack impossible in future. The military 
effect of these measures should eliminate the 
capability of a surprise attack. 
I consider measures such as those mentioned 
by Mr. Close to be highly significant. Thinking 
on security policy should always be based on the 
worst-case scenario. What is the worst that could 
happen? Let us imagine a surprise conventional 
attack. Let us imagine a protracted conventional 
conflict. It should, of course, be remembered that 
the Soviet Union could never risk a conflict of 
this kind, because the West is economically far 
stronger and economic strength plays an 
essential role in protracted military conflicts. 
Accordingly, in security policy, the central 
issue concerns the options available for coun-
tering a conventional surprise attack. All the dis-
armament measures we take can and should be 
geared to this. This also indicates where the 
emphasis should be placed in disarmament in 
the conventional sector. Reductions must go 
hand in hand with confidence-building factors. 
To conclude, I do not believe that Western 
Europe has been suffering from apathy where 
defence questions are concerned, as has been 
said here. What apathy there was related to the 
will to review disarmament in context. This was 
undoubtedly due in part to the fact that the pros-
pects for disarmament were not particularly good 
in the past. It is not a choice between disarm-
ament and security, as some speakers intimated. 
Nor is there any truth in the far too apprehensive 
claim that disarmament is a threat to security. 
We should concentrate on getting used to the 
idea that, if it is constructive and consistent, dis-
armament may even improve security. In the 
final analysis, then, disarmament and security 
are the issue. That is the message of the 
report. 
(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Scheer. 
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4. Address by Mr. Melior, Minister of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the 
United Kingtfom 
The PRESIDENT.- The next order of the day 
is the address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the 
United Kingdom. 
Mr. Melior, I should like to welcome you to 
our deliberations and to say how much we appre-
ciate your visit, particularly at a time when I 
understand parliamentary business is very 
demanding. 
I must also express to you, both in the name of 
the Assembly, and on my own behalf, my grat-
itude for the very kind and generous welcome 
which I received on my recent visit to 
London. 
Mr. MELLOR (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United 
Kingdom). -I thank you, Mr. President, for that 
warm reception and for what you have just said. 
It was a great pleasure for me to host your visit 
to London as a way of showing the significance 
that we attach to the work of'the Assembly, a sig-
nificance that I hope further to enhance by 
coming here this morning. 
I also come here fresh from the Gulf where I 
had the opportunity of seeing the effectiveness of 
WEU discussions in the work of the various 
naval forces from WEU countries in the Gulf. 
I have had the opportunity of studying the 
decor here while waiting to speak. I am not sure 
whether that very charming tapestry on the wall 
behind you, Mr. President, illustrates one of the 
more exciting parts of your1 visit to London or 
WEU activities in the Gulf. Perhaps I shall be 
told in due course. 
The security of Europe is once again top ofthe 
international agenda. It is appropriate, therefore, 
that we should be meeting at this exciting time. 
Next week, in Washington, a historic treaty will 
be signed between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. It will lead within a few years to 
the elimination from Europe and elsewhere 
throughout the world of American and Soviet 
land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. 
That will mark a major new departure in rela-
tions between the superpowers. 
At the same time, mm1sters of this 
organisation have issued our platform on 
European security interests, which sets out in 
unambiguous terms the principles on which we 
believe our security should be based for the fore-
seeable future. It contains clear commitments to 
continued nuclear deterrence, to the mainte-
nance in Europe of United States nuclear and 
conventional forces, and to the particular 
responsibilities and commitments of WEU 
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member countries themselves in both the 
nuclear and conventional fields. I hope in this 
speech to consider both the significance of the 
INF agreement and to look a little beyond it to 
the issues of European security which are 
touched on in the platform. 
I begin with INF. There are six major achieve-
ments for the West in the agreement. First, it has 
proved that to negotiate from strength and to 
maintain alliance solidarity is the way to achieve 
arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. 
Unilateral gestures could never have brought the 
Russians to talk. Had we made those unilateral 
gestures, we would today face a greatly increased 
threat from Soviet missiles with no counter-
vailing forces on our side. 
Secondly, in terms of numbers, it is important 
to appreciate the asymmetry of the agreement 
because it will result in the elimination of some 
two thousand Soviet warheads against some 
three hundred and fifty United States warheads. 
We know that the principle of asymmetry will 
have to be carried forward into succeeding arms 
control negotiations. 
Thirdly, and perhaps even more importantly 
on the military side, the SS-20 and SS-22 threats 
to our cities and to the airfields where our inter-
mediate nuclear forces are based will have been 
removed. This has taken ten years to achieve - a 
pretty pointless and expensive journey for the 
Soviet Union - but we have at least achieved 
this important objective. We have reversed the 
tide from those darker days of the mid-1970s 
when the Soviets thought that by bringing in a 
new generation of nuclear missiles they could 
achieve a supremacy in Western Europe, which 
none of us would have been prepared to 
counter. 
Fourthly, for the first time in the nuclear age, 
nuclear weapons will have been reduced, admit-
tedly only by some 3%, but that has a signifi-
cance all of its own. Let us hope now that we 
shall see not only further reductions in strategic 
nuclear weaponry but also progress in reductions 
in the non-nuclear fields - chemical and conven-
tional weapons - which we ignore at our peril. 
Fifthly, under the terms of the INF treaty a 
stringent, effective and mandatory verification 
package will be put into place that will allow 
both sides to establish and maintain confidence 
in the continuing effective operation of the 
treaty. That verification regime is crucial. It is 
more far-reaching than any previous regime. We 
shall have to build on it to produce even more 
searching verification regimes if future talks on 
more complicated matters, where a zero option 
will not be available, are to flourish. 
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Lastly, and perhaps most important of all, if 
the INF agreement is faithfully implemented, 
mutual confidence will be significantly increased. 
We sometimes think of the arms race as a 
problem on its own, but the arms race is merely a 
symptom of a more fundamental problem - the 
lack of confidence and trust between East and 
West. 
I believe that the agreement is a success, and it 
was gratifying to all of us that yesterday in 
Brussels it received unanimous support from 
NATO's Defence Planning Committee. I hope 
that th~ United States Senate will recognise the 
unanimity in Europe in favour of the treaty and 
will ratify it speedily. 
Those who have doubts about the agreement 
have them on one, two or all three counts: first, 
that whatever the nature of the Soviet threat, the 
systems that NATO will lose are essential for 
deterrence; secondly, that the agreement will lead 
in time to the complete denuclearisation of our 
continent; thirdly, that the agreement will 
somehow decouple the United States from the 
defence of Europe. All those doubts are properly 
aired, but I believe that they are all 
ill-founded. 
Deterrence worked perfectly well in Europe 
prior to the introduction of the SS-20s, the 
Pershings and the cruise missiles and I believe 
that it will continue to work perfectly well when 
those missiles are gone. To deter an aggressor no 
magic number of nuclear weapons has ever been 
necessary. What deters is NATO's overall 
nuclear and conventional capability and the 
political cohesion that underlies it. 
We are in the business of deterrence, not of 
nuclear war fighting. Our political commitment 
to nuclear deterrence must be reflected in 
systems that are militarily effective. But we do 
not need to have every conceivable target 
covered. There is no contradiction between the 
requirements for deterrence, which we have set 
out clearly in the platform adopted by ministers 
at The Hague, and an INF treaty. 
We should perhaps recall that NATO will in 
any case still have some four thousand nuclear 
weapons in Europe even after the elimination of 
the INF missiles. Certainly we shall continue to 
need an adequate nuclear element in our force 
posture for the foreseeable future. History has 
shown that there has never been such a thing as 
conventional deterrence. Nuclear weapons deter 
because of their awesome and certain destructive 
power. They have kept the peace in Europe for 
over forty years and we must never make Europe 
safe for conventional war again. So no 
impression should be created by the INF 
agreement that the first step on the road to a 
denuclearised Europe has been taken. It has not. 
The agreement makes sense in its own right in 
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security terms. That is why we all support it. We 
will not seek to circumvent it, but the alliance 
will maintain the minimum numbers of nuclear 
weapons necessary to safeguard deterrence. That 
will mean continuing, as we always have done, to 
adjust our force structure and keep it up to date. 
I do not see any possibility whatsoever of the 
INF agreement eroding the security bond 
holding together the two sides of the Atlantic. As 
Lord Carrington has pointed out, what couples 
us is not some variant of arcane nuclear phi-
losophy. It is the flesh and blood of 320 000 
United States troops based in Europe who share 
the same risks as their European counterparts. It 
is the United States' overall interests, not some 
particular weapons system, and the shared values 
of freedom and democracy, which the United 
States would never lightly abandon, that bind us 
together. 
Fears have been voiced in some quarters in 
Germany that the remaining Soviet short-range 
missiles east of the Elbe would fall mainly on 
German soil in the event of war and that zones 
of unequal security would consequently be 
created within the alliance. I recognise, as 
we all do these German anxieties about "singularis~tion ", but I ask our German frie!lds 
to examine seriously how far such fears are JUS-
tified. Five allied countries, including, of course, 
Britain, have forces stationed in Germany. 
Indeed one-third of our army is committed to 
the fo~ard defence of West Germany in the 
event of trouble. 
Of course, those forces are subject to the same 
risks as German citizens and all our countries 
could, anyhow, still be attacked by Soviet 
nuclear systems, which are not limited to short-
range missiles. Soviet strategic systems are tested 
down to a very low range, and that is not to 
mention their nuclear-capable aircraft and sub-
marines. So an attack on one of us will remain, 
in practice as well as in the obligations enshrined 
in the North Atlantic and Brussels Treaties, an 
attack on us all, and it will be resisted by us all. 
An INF agreement was not intended to resolve 
all of Europe's security problems and it will not 
do so, but it points the way forward to further 
arms control arrangements which will enhance 
and not reduce our security. 
I want to look ahead to our next priorities, 
which NATO has already established with unan-
imous agreement. They are a 50% reductio~ in 
strategic nuclear weapons held by the Um!ed 
States and the Soviet Union, a worldwide 
chemical ban and in particular, the elimination 
of the enormou~ conventional imbalance in 
Europe, which affects all of us. The key is.sue. in 
conventional forces is the sheer quantitative 
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superiority of the Warsaw Pact- 3 to 1 in tanks, 
more than 3 to 1 in artillery and almost 2 to 1 in 
tactical aircraft. Some people say that that is 
merely bean-counting and that we should look at 
the qualitative advantages of the West's 
weaponry, which would result in the imbalance 
not being so great. Quite a lot of those assess-
ments are based on somewhat tendentious argu-
ments and I recall the words of Lenin who said 
that quantity had a quality of its own. 
The report on the threat assessment, submitted 
on behalf of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments by Mr. Stokes, argues in 
the direction of scaling down the size of the dis-
crepancy. Unfortunately, it has been seized on by 
the media in recent days to suggest that western 
claims of Warsaw Pact superiority are exagge-
rated. We need to be clear about our bases of 
comparison in this exercise. For example, the 
Warsaw Pact has more tanks of its newer models 
on the central front than the West has there alto-
gether, and thousands of older, but far from 
obsolete, T-54s and T-55s are being refitted and 
modernised. 
We have to ask ourselves why the Soviet 
Union and its allies retain such enormous forces. 
If their purpose is purely defensive, why do they 
need so many? Of course, those in the Warsaw 
Pact claim - they would, wouldn't they? - that 
their intentions are defensive. But their opera-
tional concepts, training methods and force dis-
positions are largely based on surprise attack, 
pre-emption and rapid armoured 11?-obility. 
Viewed from the West, these are offensive pos-
tures, and the West has legitimate fears not just 
about numbers, but about attitudes. 
That brings us to transparency, which is of 
great importance. If there is' to be trust between 
East and West about each other's intentions, 
surely we should both be ready to reveal our 
force figures and dispositiQns. NATO already 
does so. The Warsaw Pact I can purchase for a 
small sum all the relevant NATO publications. It 
would be a major step towards increased trust if 
the Warsaw Pact would take similar measures. 
At present, we have to go OJ:!l our ow~ estimates, 
which show for example, a Soviet defence 
burden of 130ro to 15% of gross domestic product, 
compared with just over 5% in the . United 
Kingdom and most of our other countnes. 
In 1986, when all the ne'*spapers were full of 
talk of glasnost and the new attitudes that, up to 
a point, we all accept, the Soviets were qui~tly 
and steadily building up their forces, addmg 
tanks at the rate of eight a day, fighter aircraft at 
two a day, pieces of field artillery at six a day and 
warships at one a month. That is perestroika in 
the wrong direction. 
Some people say that we overestimate the 
numbers. We all got a bit of a shock when the 
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Soviet Union disclosed the number of INF mis-
siles it had. We thought that it had to get rid of 
about 1 500 such missiles as part of the deal. It 
turns out that it will have to give up nearly 2 000 
and when we come to realise it, those estimates 
were actually underestimates, and we need to 
bear that in mind. If our estimates are wrong in 
these assessments, let the Soviets demonstrate 
that to us. Let them set out, as Mr. Gorbachev 
hinted they might be ready to do, what they have 
and where they have it. That will help to build 
confidence. 
I would refer to the talks in Stockholm and to 
the agreement. Observations and inspections 
pursuant to the Stockholm agreement have gone 
well this year. It is essential that we build on that 
success in our future work on confidence-
building and arms control. By " building-on " I 
mean taking real steps, not declaratory measures. 
Now the Soviet Union proposes, as it has, that 
we compare military doctrines. I do not see the 
point in indulging in discussion of vague general-
ities. If what the Soviets really mean is dis-
cussion of numbers, structures and dispositions 
of the armed forces themselves, we are all for 
that. We are all for making progress with con-
crete treatment of what is in reality a nuts and 
bolts issue. 
What of the European role in non-nuclear 
arms reduction and what about chemical arms 
control? That is something about which we in the 
United Kingdom have taken a recent initiative 
to bring about the eventual elimination of 
chemical weapons. There is a great deal to be 
agreed here and even in the civil chemical 
industry there must be a truly effective means of 
verification. There must be some element of 
openness from the Soviet side about chemical 
weapons. The Soviets have them, though they 
denied it last year. However, the visit to the 
Soviet chemical weapons installation at 
Shikhany showed us nothing more recent than 
1952. We would have difficulty in finding out 
how much had been done since then. 
Overall, however, one of the points that the 
WEU platform makes clear is that arms control 
is only one aspect of our security policy. The 
other, of course, is the need while we negotiate -
and those negotiations will take a long time, with 
the setting out of an agenda - to maintain strong 
defences. Sometimes Americans ask why the 
Europeans do not look after their own defences. 
The contribution we make to the allied forces 
stationed in Europe is over 90% of the man-
power. That comes from Europe. We provide 
over 85% of the tanks, 95% of the artillery and 
50% of combat aircraft. At sea we provide over 
70% of the fighting ships. Our commitment is 
clear to the forward defence of Germany in 
deploying 67 000 officers and men of the army 
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and air force stationed all the tlme in the Federal 
Republic, as well as providing sizeable naval 
forces to NATO. 
As Europeans we must also pull our weight. 
On the nuclear side we have made clear in the 
platform that we have a major responsibility in 
this field. The co-operative arrangements that 
some of us maintain with the United States are 
necessary for the security of our continent. They 
represent our determination to carry our share of 
the defence burden. 
I make it clear that we in the United Kingdom 
are determined to preserve the credibility of our 
independent nuclear forces, which make a signif-
icant contribution to overall deterrence and 
security. As well we must ensure that the 
European voice continues to be heard and that 
European security requirements are met. The 
platform sets out as clearly as possible the 
parameters for this work which sit firmly in the 
framework of alliance solidarity. As the Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Ho we, said in Brussels in 
March: 
" A Europe which gets its own ideas straight is 
a far more rewarding partner for the United 
States; and is far more likely to have its views 
taken seriously than a Europe which speaks in 
a multitude of voices. " 
But the platform itself says that all this does 
not mean that we are suddenly in a position to go 
it alone. It is right for the platform to stress that: 
" the construction of an integrated Europe will 
remain incomplete as long as it does not 
include security and defence. " 
It is wrong to conclude from this that a common 
European defence policy is near at hand or that 
WEU can provide some means of integrating 
European forces into a joint command structure 
separate from NATO. 
WEU is not an operational forum and Article 
IV of the modified Brussels Treaty makes that 
clear. It is difficult to imagine a faster way to get 
the Americans unilaterally to pack up and go 
home than to start multilateral military planning 
that excludes them. Force planning decisions 
must continue to be taken in NATO. 
What is the role of WEU? I set it out with 
some diffidence. If it is not operational, what is 
it? A number of people have put this question to 
me indicating enthusiasm in this Assembly for 
reactivation, and your parallel fear that it is not 
quite apparent in which direction we are sup-
posed to be heading. The problem is well put by 
Mr. van der Sanden in his reply to the Council's 
thirty-second annual report, which you have 
debated this week. He argues that we have yet to 
find a satisfactory solution to the dilemma posed 
by reactivation. In setting up new institutions 
and procedures in this Assembly we have" trans-
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formed the character " of our exchanges but with 
no specific agreement about what new character 
we are trying to create. 
This has led to uneasiness on the part of many 
and, as we feel our way across uncharted ter-
ritory, we seem, increasingly, at risk of getting 
lost. 
Let me try to describe the target as we see it 
from London. The WEU Council's chief value is 
as a discussion forum for Europeans to define 
their security interests, bringing clear views into 
alliance deliberations. The primary focus of our 
attention has to be the central front. WEU's 
tightly-knit membership gives it unique possibil-
ities in this area. I say that with all due allowance 
for the role in discussing Mediterranean security 
that our French and Italian colleagues justifiably 
emphasise. 
We have among us all the Europeans, and they 
are gathered here, who contribute forces to the 
defence of the central front, and also all of the 
European INF-basing countries. The common-
alities of our interests should allow us to use 
WEU as an effective consultation mechanism to 
help strengthen our defences in the region. The 
clarification and concertation in bringing 
together our views can facilitate, and will facil-
itate, the alliance decision-making process where 
we can transform our reflections into practical 
steps within the NATO alliance structure. 
This does not necessarily require a large WEU 
bureaucracy nor the drafting of large numbers of 
reports or papers. However, it requires a will-
ingness to talk through problems frankly and 
honestly together as they arise. That is what 
makes this Assembly so vital. 
Bringing the forum close to the centre of 
alliance and European decision-making would 
help that and that is the reason why we in the 
United Kingdom see collocation of WEU's min-
isterial organs to Brussels as the key devel-
opment in securing its future role. This would be 
a radical and far-reaching step in the interests of 
us all and in this context I welcome the part of 
Mr. Scheer's report that draws the same conclu-
sions. 
I was particularly taken with his references to 
the early history of WEU, which shows that not 
only the agencies but even the Assembly in the 
1950s was located in Paris, deliberately to be 
close to NATO headquarters. That is why we are 
here now. The world has moved on, in that 
context not always in the happiest of directions. 
The validity of that principle in our own time 
has not been lost on the Assembly. Let us hope 
that all WEU governments do not lose sight of it 
either. 
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Ironically, the best practical results of WEU 
consultations so far have not been in the central 
front but in the Gulf, where I was last week. Our 
success in sending mine-sweepers there under 
WEU auspices provides an ex~ellent example of 
how we can make use of our forum to pursue our 
own interests and support our allies. I was most 
impressed to see just off Bahrain the mine-
sweepers of the United Kingdom, the Nether-
lands and Belgium working together to clear up 
the mines laid by the Iranians. So far four have 
been recovered: four threats
1 
to international 
shipping have been removed, all of them under 
the protection of a United Kingdom warship. 
That is how our co-operation should work. 
I am glad that it was within the forum of 
WEU, which proved itself invaluable in 
thrashing out the policies behind the operational 
decision that was then taken!. All that should 
provide us with a pointer to the way ahead. The 
basis of such action is fully justified by Article 
VIII of the Brussels Treaty, as Mr. Scheer and 
Mr. van der Sanden noted in their reports. With 
this WEU umbrella permanently in place, we 
should be prepared to consult frankly and hon-
estly under its protection. W~ need not always 
think in terms of action by all WEU members. A 
consultation among the seven could help to 
support the activity of a smaller number of us, .if 
that is what our governments chose to do, m 
some part of the world. 
Lastly, Mr. President, I come back to the 
Assembly, and your role in rt:1activation. This is 
the only European public forum specifically 
designed for security discussions. That is why 
your function is important and could have a key 
role in developing public understanding of the 
major security and defence issues as they affect 
the man in the street. This involves dialogue 
with governments and it means providing cri-
tiques of our policies to keep !us up to the mark 
and it will inevitably involve interpreting and 
explaining to public opinion the significance and 
meaning of some of the exchanges that occur in 
the arcane world of European and international 
security discussions. 
I recall the comment made by the current 
Chairman of the Council to my friend and col-
league, the leader of the British Assembly Dele-
gation, when asked why the WEU platform was 
in such incomprehensible English. It is, he said, 
for the Assembly to disentangle such complex-
ities and help the ordinary public to understand 
them. That is the task, and I wish you all well in 
·taking it on. There is no way that that task will 
become less relevant as WEU goes forward. 
I look forward to the chance of a stimulating 
discussion with members now. We have seen a 
chrysalis. The old WEU is a chrysalis which has 
lain dormant for many years out of which 
emerges, we hope, an attractive and useful but-
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terfly. Certainly, I see the organs of WEU as 
complementing each other. Urgently, too, we 
must ensure that WEU does not become an alter-
native focus for European security discussions to 
the detriment of the existing organs, but comple-
menting the work of the overall alliance, particu-
larly in the discussions involving our friends 
from France, particularly in our ability to grapple 
with the central thrust of the nuclear policy on 
which our security is based. 
Thank you very much, Mr. President, for wel-
coming me here this morning and for tolerating 
this contribution, with only the bare minimum 
of people finding greater solace in the news-
papers than they found in my speech. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Minister, for your address to our Assembly and 
also for your readiness to answer questions. 
I call Lord Kinnoull. 
Lord KINNOULL (United Kingdom). - First, 
I should like to add my warm welcome to the 
Minister on his first visit to the WEU Assembly. 
I wish to congratulate him not only on his com-
paratively new responsibilities and the clear 
mastery of the subject that he has already 
achieved but on the positive message of hope 
that he has brought to the Assembly today 
against the background of this historic agreement 
which is to be signed next week in Wash-
ington. 
The Minister is the first minister of whom I 
know to have touched upon the Gulf. The 
Assembly would enjoy hearing more from him 
about his impressions in the Gulf, more on the 
morale of the naval forces operating there and 
more on the value that he sees for future 
co-operation should the need arise. I am sure 
that we would welcome his impressions and any 
further comments. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MELLOR (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United 
Kingdom). - I am grateful to Lord Kinnoull for 
his kind words. 
I think that the Gulf war is an issue that will 
remain with us for some time to come, and it is 
important, for all kinds of reasons, that we 
should focus on it. 
My impression is that this war will not come 
to an early end. I am afraid that the United 
Nations process has been running out of steam, 
for two reasons. First, there is the reluctance of 
the Iranians principally to come to terms with 
Resolution 598. Thus far they have successfully 
been able to prolong discussions with the Secre-
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tary-General showing enough positive qualities 
to cause some - though not to take in all of us -
to be reluctant to move on to further measures, 
whilst making it clear that they are completely 
out of sympathy with Resolution 598. 
Secondly, we hoped that, spearheaded by the 
five permanent members working together -
which was a novel and welcome experience in 
recent months - we could have a follow-up reso-
lution ready by now in the event of the parties 
backsliding, but, largely due to Soviet reluctance 
to engage in this, no follow-up resolution with an 
arms embargo has been agreed. 
In my discussions in the Gulflast week I could 
see no early prospect of an end to the war. 
However, there is a prospect of the war spilling 
over to other parts of the Gulf and bringing into 
it countries not currently involved. This will be 
gravely damaging to all our interests. All of us 
have large trading relationships with Gulf coun-
tries. We depend to a greater or lesser extent on 
them for our oil, as well as a ready, willing and 
friendly market for our manufactured goods. 
Some of us- particularly the United Kingdom-
have long ties of history and friendship. That 
means that we cannot abandon our friends in 
their hour of need, and we would not do so. 
But the Iranians cynically feel themselves free 
to attack any one of the 500 merchant ships that 
at any time are in the Gulf. We cannot let it be 
seen and caricatured as a significant issue for the 
United States to get involved in the protection of 
interests that matter as much to us and, indeed, 
should matter not only to us but to the rest of the 
world community - third world as well as first 
world nations, nations that do not have navies as 
well as nations that do. 
We are asking our forces in the Gulf to 
perform a difficult task. The British Armilla 
patrol, which consists of three front-line war-
ships, has accompanied three hundred and 
twenty ships through the Gulf this year. Some 
seventeen million tonnes of shipping has been 
accompanied in the last three months, almost all 
of it on constant procession through the Strait of 
Hormuz at action stations, which, as those who 
have been sailors know, is the most debilitating 
way to proceed, as no one is allowed a moment's 
relaxation. We have the example of the Stark to 
guide us when we consider whether relaxation 
can be justified. We are asking our naval forces 
to do a difficult but crucial job. It is a job where 
still there is a great deal to be done by the rest of 
the world community, particularly having regard 
to the number of ships that can still be attacked 
because they do not have protection. 
On mine-sweeping, which is the key WEU 
interest, I warmly welcome the decision to send 
the European mine-sweeping force. It is a 
humanitarian gesture, because there can be no 
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more disgusting and vile act than to lay mines in 
the path of innocent shipping. I believe that our 
WEU force - although perhaps the closest inte-
gration has been between the United Kingdom, 
the Belgians and the Dutch, but we keep in close 
touch with the Italians and the French - is 
playing a vital role. All involved have added 
lustre to their forces by the work that they have 
done. 
At the moment there seems to be a lull in the 
laying of mines, but we have plenty of reason to 
think that the Iranians have large stocks, 
including perhaps more modem types than the 
rather ancient first world war mines that have 
been laid so far. I believe that the maintenance of 
our mine-sweeping forces will be crucial as a 
deterrent, as well as to pick up the mines that we 
still believe are out there. 
Some people talk of the Gulf as if it were a 
little lake that could be cleared of mines in about 
a week. The answer is that it is a large area and 
there is a great deal of that area still to be covered 
where there are suspicions. 
I am sorry if that was rather a long answer, but 
I think that the Gulf war is something that we 
have perhaps ignored for too long. We cannot 
ignore it now. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Gale. 
Mr. GALE (United Kingdom). - The Minister 
of State has offered the Assembly the wide-
ranging and thorough assessment that those of us 
who know him have come to expect as a matter 
of course. Therefore, it seems almost churlish to 
suggest that there was an omission from what he 
said, but there was. It is a subject that I think is 
of great interest to what he described as the man 
in the street. 
The Minister of State will be aware that the 
thirty-second annual report of the Council of 
Ministers to the Assembly contains a mere six 
lines of reference to the subject of terrorism and 
that the first part ofthe thirty-third annual report 
contains no reference to terrorism. That fact was 
the subject of some criticism in the chamber yes-
terday. 
Will the Minister reaffirm that the defeat of 
terrorism is of the greatest interest to the Council 
of Ministers? Will he confirm that it is not only a 
proper but a vital matter for consideration in this 
Assembly as well as by the Council of Europe 
and the European Parliament? Will he seek to 
ensure that a restatement of the Council's 
position on terrorism is placed back on the 
agenda? Perhaps most importantly, will the Min-
ister condemn all those who, through negotiation 
and deals with terrorist organisations, give credi-
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bility to their cause and encourage their activ-
ities, their murderous attacks and their taking of 
hostages? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MELLOR (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United 
Kingdom). -Yes. We find ourselves once again 
confronted with terrorism on a grand scale, with 
the emerging evidence that one, and perhaps 
two, large airliners have been. blown out of the 
air by terrorist action in the last week alone. 
None of us can afford to drop our guard. All the 
countries of the civilised world must stand 
together against terrorism in our deeds as well as 
in our rhetoric. For instance, when we in the 
United Kingdom found clear evidence of high-
level involvement of members of the Syrian 
Government in a cynical plot to blow up an El AI 
airliner packed with innocent people, we took 
action against the individual responsible and the 
country. We were glad of the support of our 
European partners. 
If we do not all hang togethf.r - as the English 
saying goes - on an issue like tlhis, surely then we 
shall hang separately. We cannot effectively 
combat terrorism when by terrorism one means 
not just individual bands of outlaws but also 
states which as a key part of lheir foreign policy 
sponsor and support terrorism and gain benefit 
for themselves through their links with ter-
rorism. It is clear that some countries are com-
mitted to state-directed terrorism and every time 
that we give them credibility by becoming 
engaged in discussions with them on those issues 
we lead them to believe that they can profit from 
those activities. 
That is why I believe that unity is strength. If 
we are to purge terrorism from the face of the 
world, we must not only be tough with the indi-
vidual terrorists, but with those who offer the ter-
rorists support and a haven. Until we do that, the 
terrorists will exploit the incoherence in our 
national response, so we should take every 
opportunity to restate, in deed as well as in word, 
our total abhorrence of terrorism. I hope that 
that opportunity will be takem once again at the 
summit in Copenhagen and at any appropriate 
WEU forum. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Close. 
Mr. CLOSE (Belgium) (Translation). - Min-
ister, you have already partially answered my 
question which is specific and concerns the 
regrouping of the bodies making up our 
organisation. When he spoke yesterday, the 
French Foreign Minister expressed clear reserva-
tions to say the least on the collocation of the 
organs of WEU and NATO in the same place, 
that is in Brussels. If my memory is correct, as I 
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beheve It IS, this Assembly never became Ameri-
canised when NATO was only a kilometre 
distant at the Porte Dauphine. The French 
Foreign Minister's argument therefore seems 
misconceived and without substance. One could, 
in fact, turn it round and claim, as I believe you 
have done, that it would be beneficial for us to be 
close to NATO. Since, moreover, Brussels is the 
headquarters of the Commission of the European 
Communities, our presence in that capital would 
add defence to the political dimension. I would 
like to know your views on the subject. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MELLOR (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United 
Kingdom). - I associate myself completely with 
what has just been said. The fact that I answer 
briefly does not mean that I have no great 
thoughts on the matter. I agree with everything 
that Mr. Close has said. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - In 
welcoming my friend and colleague, Mr. Melior, 
can I ask him why he made no reference to the 
considerable budgetary problems of the United 
States and their implications for European and 
alliance defence? Is he aware that the United 
States expends some 50% of its budgetary outlay 
on defence for the defence of Europe within 
NATO and has an expenditure on defence of 6% 
of GNP, whereas Western Europe as a whole 
spends only 3.7% of GNP? Surely 374 million 
West Europeans with an aggregate economy of 
$3.5 trillion need not depend quite as heavily as 
they do on 241 million Americans with a GNP of 
only $1.9 trillion. As the Americans are 
expending in dollar terms ever more on their 
325 000 troops stationed in Europe, as a result of 
the ever-growing decline of the dollar, should not 
we in this organisation devote much more 
attention to taking some of the burden off their 
shoulders? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MELLOR (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United 
Kingdom). - There is a great deal in that. We 
have recognised it in the United Kingdom by 
increasing defence expenditure by 20% in real 
terms during the lifetime of the present gov-
ernment. The proportion of our GDP spent on 
defence - at 5% - is pretty much equivalent to 
that in the United States. 
The extent to which we in Europe bear the 
burden of our own defence is sometimes under-
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estimated. I hope that I made clear the extent to 
which we contribute to our own defence, but 
plainly we have to be aware of America's budg-
etary problems. We hope that the principal 
targets for budget cutting will be easier to decide 
as a result of agreements that we hope lie within 
our reach. The last place to start would be the 
front-line defence of Central Europe. 
If the Americans ask why we do not do more, 
we must reply that one of the central functions of 
WEU is to discuss the European pillar, but we 
cannot let the Americans get away with sug-
gesting that only altruism keeps them here. Let 
us be clear that the Americans are in Europe to 
defend their own interests. America without 
Europe is inconceivable. America needs Europe 
for its commercial activities and for the role that 
it sees for itself. Even viewed from Kansas and 
Iowa, America cannot exist as a world power 
without a strong Western European axis. 
There is sometimes unhelpful rhetoric on both 
sides of the Atlantic. We are in bed together 
because being in bed together is the only way that 
we can be. The sooner people realise that fact, 
the better. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Lord 
Mackie. 
Lord MACKIE (United Kingdom). - I may be 
under a misapprehension, Minister, but I 
thought that at the end of your speech you rele-
gated the Assembly to a public relations role. I 
had hoped that the Council of Ministers would 
listen to us as well as telling us what to put about. 
Perhaps you would like to correct my impression 
if it is a wrong one. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MELLOR (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United 
Kingdom). - I am sorry that you got that 
impression. - I shall check the text, but I men-
tioned a range of other matters as well. I said that 
the function of WEU must be closely tied to the 
need to develop public understanding. That is 
certainly right. However, I also said that your 
function involved a dialogue with governments 
and providing critiques of our policies so that we 
could keep up to the mark. More power to your 
elbow in that regard. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Some 
points can be clarified by the dialogue. 
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
The Minister has just said: " More power to your 
elbow. " The revitalisation of WEU will involve 
the concentration of agencies, which may release 
more funds for the use of the Assembly. I should 
like to ask the Minister a specific question. Will 
he be prepared to try a little bit of British parlia-
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men tar: practtce and allow the detailed dis-
cussion of the budget to take place between poli-
ticians - our Presidential Committee - and 
ministers, rather than being conducted second-
hand through civil servants and ambassadors? 
Frankly, we do not believe that the nuances that 
we are trying to get over ever get to ministers. 
Will the Minister give some thought to that pos-
sibility? I think that 1l would be a welcome step. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MELLOR (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United 
Kingdom). - During my time in office, I have 
tried to develop close links with parliamen-
tarians in my country, led by you, Geoffrey, 
because I think that we must be a seamless web. 
After all, the object of organisations such as 
WEU is to draw us together and not to provide 
further opportunities for dissent and fragmen-
tation. I will certainly give serious consideration 
to what you have said. If the Assembly feels 
strongly about the matter, it ought to be 
addressed by the Council of Ministers. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Minister. 
The final question will be asked by Mr. van 
der Sanden. 
Mr. van der SANDEN (Netherlands). - You 
spoke about nuclear forces and referred to the 
independent nuclear forces of the United 
Kingdom and France. I should like clarification 
of the word "independent". You said that the 
United Kingdom independent force was 
attached to the allied force. How independent or 
integrated are the United Kingdom nuclear 
forces? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. MELLOR (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United 
Kingdom). - They are independent in the sense 
that they are United Kingdom forces which exist, 
in the last analysis, to defend United Kingdom 
interests. Of course, it is inconceivable that any 
United Kingdom interest would not be the 
interest of the broader confederation of states 
with which we are in alliance. I must leave my 
friends from France to speak for themselves, but 
that is our view. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I thank 
you, Minister, on behalf of the Assembly for your 
address and your replies to the many questions. 
The Assembly is most grateful to you. I take the 
opportunity of wishing every success to the 
British presidency which will start on 1st July 
1988. 
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5. Military use of computers - towards a joint 
European defence research programme 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and votes 
on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doe. 1118) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order ofthe day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions on the 
military use of computers - towards a joint 
European defence research programme and votes 
on the draft recommendation and draft order, 
Document 1118. 
I call Mr. Fourre, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions. 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). -
Thank you, Mr. President, for having drawn del-
egates' attention to this report. The hour is late 
and the time for its presentation may be ill 
chosen. I am somewhat used to the fact that the 
discussion of techniques and technology in a par-
liamentary forum never evokes much surprise, 
though whether this is due to indifference or 
unqualified agreement I do not know. What I am 
sure about on the other hand is that there is a 
serious lack of understanding of this subject 
which is characterised by a difficult juxtaposition 
of technology and politics. 
However, a fundamental question has to be 
asked - should we remain blind to the situation 
which I have attempted to outline in the report 
before you? The report contains some quotations 
from the EDIS report compiled by a European 
defence industry study team on behalf of the 
IEPG defence ministers which shows clearly that 
the European defence industry is competitive in 
almost every equipment sector with exceptions 
including electronics, which is an area vital to a 
wide range of future developments in defence 
hardware. 
For many years, figures, comparisons and 
tables published in specialised journals have 
been drawing attention to Western Europe's 
backwardness compared with ils main compet-
itors, the United States and Japan. 
Perhaps I may mention a few items never-
theless. France regards itself as being in the fore-
front of development in the military research 
field, but in very high-speed integrated circuits it 
is currently working on one micrometre chips 
whereas the Americans are simultaneously using 
a 0.5 micrometre chip for their own programme. 
This means that we are at least two years behind. 
At the present time approximately two hundred 
supercomputers have been set up throughout the 
world and the figure is likely to reach a thousand 
by the early 1990s. These very powerful super-
computers used in the military field are the 
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future's most important tool. Japan had no share 
of the world market in 1981 but by 1986 it had 
acquired 40%. Europe has produced none to 
date. 
On software, Europe used to be well placed. 
Ada machine language, which is recognised as 
originating from France, was even adopted as the 
national standard by the American Defence Min-
istry, but today the situation has changed entirely 
and the United States has 50% of the world 
market and two-thirds of the European market. 
Nor is Europe's position any better with regard 
to semiconductors, which are properly referred 
to as the crude oil of the twenty-first century. 
According to an American defence committee 
report the United States' share in this world 
market dropped from 67% in 1975 to 50% in 
1986 whereas Japan's share increased from 25% 
to 39%. This progress was, of course, achieved at 
the expense of European and American com-
panies. Western Europe's share dropped from 
12.3% in 1978 to 8.5% in 1982. 
The table given in paragraph 94 of my report is 
also significant and marks the patterns of devel-
opment of the major world semiconductor man-
ufacturers based on sales volume. In 1975 the 
top European company was in fifth place; by 
1980 it had climbed to number three, but by 
1986 it had fallen back to seventh place. My 
remarks are also borne out by two other tables in 
the document. Of the twenty-five leading world 
computer manufacturers in 1985, the leading 
European company occupies the eleventh place 
on the world computer market. 
This situation has already been considered by 
the Assembly. In 1985 we examined a report and 
then adopted Recommendation 419, which 
unfortunately produced only fine words but very 
few commitments. 
The Hague platform has nothing to say on this 
subject, which I personally regret. However, the 
realisation of the situation is perhaps real. The 
speech made by the Secretary-General of WEU 
the day before yesterday points in this direction, 
even if efforts are still very modest. 
I will quote two examples to illustrate my 
scepticism. First, after a delay of nearly a year, 
the European Council reluctantly adopted last 
September a framework research programme for 
an amount well below our expectations. Second, 
the technological programmes instituted in the 
IEPG framework receive far lower budgets than 
national resource programmes. 
In recent years Europe has, however, taken 
several timid steps towards co-operation. For 
example, to meet the technological challenge of 
the world market, the European Community has 
drawn up a framework research programme 
140 
NINTH SITTING 
which is highly competitive in a number of 
important areas. Everybody knows about the 
Esprit and Race programmes, which are strictly 
non-military, and outside the Community the 
Eureka programme is attracting attention. This is 
very different in character and encompasses pri-
marily industrial projects as it is the firms them-
selves which are evaluating the market openings 
to be targeted. 
Lastly, since 1985, several sectors have been 
involved in co-operative, technological projects 
dependent on IEPG, and as you know these are 
government funded. Bilateral and multilateral 
co-operation agreements also exist, but these 
operate only between individual countries or 
companies and cannot necessarily be regarded as 
forming part of a truly European policy. Despite 
this movement towards co-operation, it must 
also be noted that there is still a tendency to give 
priority to national programmes. 
It is a fact that all, or nearly all, Western 
European countries are pursuing one or more 
data technology research programmes. Although 
they are all aware that the size of their national 
markets cannot support the enormous costs of 
research, development and marketing, which are 
essential to achieve a solid position on the inter-
national data-processing market, they never-
theless devote the largest part of their resources 
to such programmes, and all of course hope that 
their industry will achieve a position as an effi-
cient and sought-after European partner. 
The position which has developed over the last 
few years therefore represents a mosaic of 
national markets side by side with a homoge-
neous American market to which European 
manufacturers have difficulty in gaining access, 
while the European market is barely accessible to 
the Europeans themselves, such is the force of 
the relevant standards and of certain protec-
tionist practices. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, what 
answers can we produce to these problems 
known to us all? We have an Esprit programme 
which subsidises particular programmes but 
nonetheless remains dominated by political 
whims and narrowly nationalist objectives. We 
also have a Eureka programme which is admit-
tedly much less confined but lacks a predeter-
mined programme since it is closely dependent 
on decisions taken by industry. 
I personally think that we should pursue the 
course of multilateral co-operation with simulta-
neous research conducted under bilateral or mul-
tilateral co-operative arrangements within the 
Community or outside, but sustained by a 
political will. 
In this forum in which all the WEU countries 
desirous of participating in such an initiative are 
associated, we have the potential to promote a 
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truly joint European research programme on 
defence issues. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is open. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
I call Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - I 
should like to put on record on behalf of the 
committee our appreciation for the most 
excellent work that Mr. Fourre has done, which 
is of great significance for European security. He 
has worked long and hard and, of course, 
capacity in computers is of fundamental impor-
tance to the operational effectiveness of our joint 
armed forces and is an essential element of the 
European defence industry. May I add on behalf 
of my committee our wholehearted approval of 
his work and the appreciation with which we 
hope the Assembly will unanimously endorse it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Wilkinson. 
We shall now proceed to vote on the draft 
recommendation in Document 1118. 
In accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and 
standing unless five representatives or substi-
tutes present in the chamber request a vote by 
roll-call. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
That is not the case. 
We shall therefore vote by sitting and 
standing. 
I now put the draft recommendation con-
tained in Document 1118 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft recommendation is adopted 
unanimously 1• 
We shall now proceed to vote on the draft 
order in Document 1118. 
l. See page 28. 
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In accordance with Rule 33, the Assembly 
votes by sitting and standing unl~ss ten represen-
tatives or substitutes present in the chamber ask 
for a vote by roll-call. 
Are there ten members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
That is not the case. 
We shall therefore vote by sitting and 
standing. 
I now put the draft order in Document 1118 to 
the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft order is agreed to unanimously 2• 
6. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this 
afternoon at 3.15 p.m. with the following orders 
of the day: 
1. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of 
Defence of the Netherlands. 
2. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second 
annual report of the Council (Resumed 
debate on the report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments and 
votes on the draft recommendations and 
draft resolution, Document .1116, addendum 
and amendments). 
3. Recent developments in Soviet external 
policy (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee, 
Document 1111 and addendum). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m.) 
2. See page 29. 
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6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. 
The sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, 
Minister of Defence of the Netherlands 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The orders 
of the day now provide for an address by Mr. 
van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Nether-
lands. 
I. See page 33. 
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I bid you a cordial welcome, Minister. This 
Assembly is already very familar to you. You 
were indeed a member for many years and the 
reports which you prepared are very well remem-
bered. 
I wish to express my thanks for the major part 
you have played in the reactivation of Western 
European Union to which you attach such 
importance. The Presidential Committee has 
witnessed the energy of the Netherlands presi-
dency during the first six months of its mandate 
and I again express my gratitude on behalfofthe 
whole Assembly. I now invite you to take the 
rostrum. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Minister of Defence of the 
Netherlands). - It is an honour for me to be in 
the Assembly again, where I see many old 
friends. I have always attached great importance 
to the work of the Assembly. The quality of its 
work and its reports is excellent and I am happy 
to be here this afternoon. 
No one can doubt that the defence and 
security policy of the European nations is in a 
state of flux. The number of bilateral and multi-
lateral consultations has increased considerably 
in recent years. Western European Union was 
reactivated and published its platform on 
European security interests. The discussions on 
the security implications of the double zero INF 
outcome made us once more aware of the com-
plexities of western defence policy. 
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The Western European countries, together 
with their North American partners, are engaged 
in a serious debate on security requirements and 
disarmament opportunities in present-day cir-
cumstances. There is nothing wrong with that. 
On the contrary, the alliance would be ill-served 
if recent developments were left without 
reflection and discussion. 
First, our present security and defence policy is 
strongly influenced by the breakthrough in the 
INF negotiations and possible progress in other 
fields of arms control. 
During the ministerial sessions of the 
Eurogroup, which I chaired last month, it 
became clear that the European allies were 100% 
behind the INF agreement and that our faith in 
the NATO strategy offlexible response was undi-
minished. My colleagues have authorised me to 
go to Washington to make clear to United States 
senators that the Eurogroup ministers favour a 
speedy ratification of the INF treaty. I have 
already informed my new American colleague, 
Mr. Carlucci, who appreciated our position. The 
conclusion of an INF agreement reinforces the 
need to elaborate a comprehensive concept of 
arms control, as was emphasised during the 
meetings of the Eurogroup on Monday and the 
DPC on Tuesday and this morning. Such a 
concept should integrate on the one hand the 
need to negotiate a stable balance of nuclear and 
conventional forces at the lowest possible level 
and, on the other hand, the continued viability of 
our military strategy. 
Secondly, the present situation is characterised 
by the far-reaching impact of advanced tech-
nology. At the strategic level this leads us to an 
assessment of strategic defence and its implica-
tions for East-West relations, the nuclear 
deterrent and the cohesion of the alliance. At the 
same time, the application of new technologies 
has important implications for the procurement 
of armaments for our conventional posture. 
We are obliged to make our contribution in 
answering these questions to have due recog-
nition of the European security dimension but 
without undermining Atlantic solidarity and 
cohesion. This is all the more important against 
the background of the relative decline of national 
security consensus since the late seventies in 
several European NATO countries. The dis-
cussion on European security co-operation is 
also a search for more public support that leaves 
behind the rifts of the years past. 
The military realities offer no easy way out for 
NATO or for the European allies. The conven-
tional disparities have not diminished. Nuclear 
reductions, however important as a result of 
arms control, render more important still the 
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conventional force comparisons in Central 
Europe. But conventional defence improvements 
have to be realised in conditions of severe budg-
etary constraints; real growth of defence expend-
iture will be limited. 
Western European Union in recent years has 
played an increasing role in the discussion of our 
future security policy and it should continue to 
do so. In this respect the platform is an 
important mark. On the one hand, it contains a 
number of base-line convictions. The platform 
sets out the indivisibility of the alliance and it 
stresses the fact that security of Western 
European countries can be ensured only in close 
association with our North American allies. Fur-
thermore, the platform underlines that, to be 
credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence 
and defence must continue tQ be based on an 
adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and con-
ventional forces. Given Soviet conventional 
superiority, only the nuclear element can con-
front a potential aggressor with unacceptable 
risks. 
Against that background the platform wel-
comes an agreement on the elimination of land-
based INF missiles. I do not agree with the 
recent Financial Times report on the post-INF 
situation which concluded that " Europe pines 
for the good old days ". Because of the contra-
dictory reactions to the INF agreement the 
European allies were even compared with a 
battery of fevered frogs. 
For my part, I fully agree with Lord Car-
rington's recent statement that we are mature 
enough to accept a good disarmament success if 
we have one. A positive element of the INF 
agreement is the asymmetry of reduction, which 
reflects the existing imbalance of forces between 
East and West. The principle of asymmetric 
reductions, which has evidently been accepted by 
the Soviet Union, should be applied to other 
facets of arms control as well, particularly to the 
conventional negotiations. Moreover, an INF 
agreement does not affect the improvement and 
modernisation of nuclear systems in Europe, 
which was initiated in 1983 by the Montebello 
decision. 
In dealing with the conventional imbalance, 
we shall be faced with a particularly difficult 
problem. We should aim at reducing the Warsaw 
Pact capability for massive and surprise attack 
which rests upon its superior numbers in tanks 
and artillery. Enhancement of our security would 
require deep reductions and asymmetrical reduc-
tions. I think that we should start informing our 
public of these stark realities. 
Apart from the base-line convictions that I 
mentioned, the WEU platform presents a 
number of challenges. In European defence 
policy we should always realise that Western 
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European Union is essentially a political body. 
There is no integrated military structure of 
WEU. Therefore, WEU is not in a position to 
decide upon or to implement strictly military 
measures. We can and must, however, concert 
our views on defence in order to facilitate and 
enhance military co-operation within the inte-
grated structure of NATO, or to stimulate 
bilateral co-operation. 
The discussion of Europe's contribution to 
western defence forces our nations to come to 
terms with military realities. WEU member 
states perform their military tasks in one geo-
strategic theatre. Their political approaches and 
economic interests are converging. Therefore, 
they bear a special responsibility for bilateral and 
regional defence co-operation in Europe. In this 
respect the growing French-German military 
co-operation as it recently has been evolving is 
most promising. It is important that France and 
the Federal Republic have underlined the 
European perspective of their co-operative 
endeavours. Participation by other countries is, I 
understand, not excluded. At this moment 
Western European Union is not the body to take 
over this kind of initiative. We should not try to 
create something like a WEU brigade - a W euro-
brigade. WEU should, above all, be a forum for 
exchange of information and for stimulating 
bilateral or multilateral arrangements for 
European defence co-operation. 
It is therefore important that the European 
partners are kept informed about the French-
German brigade and the common defence 
council. The same goes for out-of-area issues 
such as the maritime presence in the Gulf area -
and here we can take a further step. There is no 
WEU naval force under integrated command in 
the Gulf. But the contribution of Western 
European Union in enhancing political and mil-
itary co-ordination of the various national activ-
ities is positive. We should continue and further 
develop that co-ordination. It can serve as a 
model for future operations. 
Apart from political and military operational 
advantages, European defence co-operation is 
worth while for economic and efficiency reasons. 
The concept of European defence forces us to put 
our own house in order. We should, for instance, 
look for opportunities of common performance 
of similar military tasks and joint training and 
exercises. There have been some promising 
experiences in this respect. The Netherlands, for 
instance, has a long tradition of maritime co-
operation with the British. We are also studying 
opportunities for closer Benelux co-operation. I 
have already referred to the German-French 
co-operation. 
We should not be too reluctant to consider 
new approaches to defence co-operation. The 
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alternative is waste by duplication, lost oppor-
tunities of economies of scale, ever-rising costs 
and, in the end, what is called structural disarm-
ament. 
Before regional defence co-operation can be 
successful, some mutual suspicions must be 
overcome. Sometimes the wish for co-operation 
is a barely disguised effort to get rid of certain 
defence burdens. On the other hand, we can no 
longer confine ourselves to national solutions. Of 
course, this holds true for smaller countries such 
as the Netherlands and Belgium, in particular. 
One of the promising trends is that the bigger 
nations, too, are increasingly coming to the con-
clusion that, for political, economic and military 
reasons, closer defence co-operation is the only 
way. From the outset, however, it has to be clear 
that our goal is " more output for the same 
input " and not a free ride at the expense of our 
neighbours and allies. 
In this way the debate on European defence 
can sharpen our attention for efficiency and 
effective resource allocation. In the spring of 
1988 the Netherlands will host an expert seminar 
on aspects of resource management problems. In 
the first place, financial budgetary aspects of 
defence planning will be discussed at this 
seminar. Secondly, attention will be devoted to 
the growing problem of manpower planning of 
our armed forces. Thirdly, the development of 
defence technology will be discussed. I appreciate 
the vivid interest that the Assembly has in the 
military application of advanced technology. I 
refer to the report on the use of computers by 
your Rapporteur, Mr. Fourre. The report deals 
with matters of substance - which technologies 
do we need?- and with the organisation oftech-
nology development - how do we finance and 
produce new technologies? In this respect, the 
report makes some interesting suggestions, such 
as the establishment of a joint European defence 
research programme. It is to be hoped that such 
proposals will be discussed not only in this 
Assembly but in the national parliaments. 
Apart from the management of military 
resources, we should pay attention to the macro-
economic dimension of European security 
policy. Western Europe should maintain and 
enhance a European defence industrial base, as is 
eloquently recommended by the European 
defence industry study (EDIS) of the IEPG. 
Europe should remain able to produce techno-
logically complex defence systems. Much 
remains to be done in this respect. The process of 
economic integration has had a beneficial impact 
on the pooling of investments and research and 
development capabilities. Nevertheless, the 
defence equipment market is still far too much 
divided along national lines. We should create an 
open European defence equipment market in 
which competitive consortia can operate in com-
mercial conditions. National governments 
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should no longer protect their cherished defence 
industries. The long-term benefits of one big, 
homogeneous home market are self-evident. The 
report on a joint European research programme, 
presented by Mr. Fourre, is a welcome contri-
bution that is in tune with the recommendations 
of the EDIS report. 
Here I should like to touch upon the institu-
tional problem of Western European security 
policy. We should use all available European 
forums. In the longer run, however, the 
European Community cannot do without a 
security dimension. Industrial, monetary and 
internal market policies, defence and foreign 
affairs cannot be treated as separate segments of 
the European union: they are closely interre-
lated. 
The single European act gives some formal 
opportunity for maintaining the economic and 
technological conditions for the security of the 
member states. Prudently and without jeopar-
dising the institutional balance of the EEC, we 
should explore the possibilities of removing 
existing impediments. For the time being, 
however, Western European Union and of 
course the Independent European Programme 
Group will continue to play important roles. 
An interesting insight into the relationship of 
WEU and IEPG can be found in Mr. Bassinet's 
report on European armaments co-operation, 
which the Assembly will discuss tomorrow. This 
politically provocative report offers an adequate 
description of the difficulties that we face in 
European armaments co-operation. However, 
the situation is not as bleak as is sometimes sug-
gested. We must realise, first and foremost, that 
the different forums of European armaments 
co-operation are to be used in a complementary 
and not in a duplicating or even conflicting way. 
With respect to the operationalisation of the 
European defence industry study, that means 
that the action plan, based on the recommenda-
tions of the study, should be drawn up by the 
organs ofiEPG, in accordance with the decisions 
made by the IEPG ministers at their Seville 
meeting last June. On the other hand, we should 
not exclude the possibility of WEU conducting 
specific supportive studies for IEPG, if IEPG 
makes a request to that end. Problems that arise 
or delays that occur should, as a general and self-
evident rule, be solved by the organisation 
responsible for the implementation of ministerial 
decisions. 
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of co-operative opportunities in the use of space 
for security purposes. Furthermore, we could 
explore the harmonisation of operational con-
cepts as a prerequisite for and a stimulus to suc-
cessful armaments co-operation. 
In many respects governmen~s give preference 
to IEPG as the primary fotilm of European 
armaments co-operation. In al way, IEPG has 
been doing the work that the fqunding fathers of 
WEU envisaged to be the task of the Standing 
Armaments Committee. Therefore, we should 
review the position of the Standing Armaments 
Committee, which has not met since late 1985. 
In addition, the working methods and proce-
dures of WEU have drastically changed since the 
revitalisation of 1984. Many activities are being 
conducted under the aegis of the special working 
group, in which officials of the ministries for 
foreign affairs and defence convene. Regularly in 
the context of the special working group 
meetings are held to discuss aspects of defence 
policy. The armaments co-opemtion activities of 
WEU should become an integrated part of this 
structure. 
It is also crucial to develop' further relations 
between WEU and IEPG. The Assembly could 
discuss the ways and means to enhance the 
public debate on all aspects o£ European arma-
ments co-operation, including'· those within the 
competence of IEPG. There is no institutional 
link between the Assembly and IEPG, and in 
present circumstances we should not aim at 
establishing any formal relationship. Never-
theless, the Assembly could, for instance, invite 
the acting Chairman of IEPG to address the 
Assembly in order to exchange views, as is pro-
posed in the draft recommendation of Mr. Bas-
sinet's report. As far as the presidency is con-
cerned, we shall support such an invitation by 
the Assembly. 
Western European Union has made consid-
erable headway in defining European security 
and defence interests. Base-line convictions have 
been laid down in the WEU platform. Future 
challenges have been defined. Together we are 
responsible for each country's continued contri-
bution to western defence. Together we must 
demonstrate our determination to defend any 
member country at its bord~rs. Together we 
must investigate ways and m~ans to realise a 
more effective use of existing military resources. 
Launching a platform is one thing but to use the 
same metaphor, we can be satisfied only if WEU 
is put into orbit. 
WEU must define its own role in European The PRESIDENT (Translation). - You kindly 
armaments co-operation. It should concentrate agreed to answer questions, Minister. 
on the more general aspects, such as the broader I call Mr. Hardy. 
context of economic and technological co-
operation among the governments of the Seven. Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - I thank Mr. 
Another subject for discussion could be the study van Eekelen for his thoughtful and serious con-
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tribution. He mentioned the Franco-German 
brigade proposal and touched on various areas in 
which there has been co-operation. He also men-
tioned the Gulf and he will know that there has 
been some publicity about a lack of integration 
of various naval forces in the area. That public 
perception may not be accurate- we cannot say 
- but will the Minister accept that if the public 
are fully to appreciate the work of WEU there 
will have to be further co-operative develop-
ments and a greater awareness of the level of 
co-operation that has existed in some areas for 
many years? 
The Dutch Marines and the Royal Marines 
have co-operated in Norway for many years, but 
future developments cannot rest on calls for an 
open defence market or publicity about the 
development of the Franco-German brigade. 
The Council of Ministers will have to make 
firmer arrangements for inter-force co-operation 
at all levels. Otherwise, many of the calls that are 
being and have been made will be seen to be false 
and frustrating calls. 
What steps does the Minister expect the 
Council to take over the next two years to ensure 
that there are developments within the alliance 
in addition to the Franco-German initiative? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Minister of Defence of the 
Netherlands). - Mr. Hardy has raised an 
important point and I agree with the gist of his 
remarks. I, too, think that we should do our 
utmost to improve co-operation through con-
crete projects. However, over the past year, espe-
cially, much has been done. I mentioned the 
Franco-German co-operation, which goes much 
further than was envisaged until recently. 
The offer of the French Government to the 
Netherlands Government to allow training of 
our mechanised brigades on French territory is 
another welcome example of bilateral co-
operation. 
Mr. Hardy mentioned the Gul£ Perhaps we 
have not gone as far as some members wished or 
as far as I would wish, but what has been done in 
the Gulf is unprecedented. Belgian and Nether-
lands ships are working under joint command 
outside the NATO area, with close tactical 
co-ordination and protection from the United 
Kingdom's Armilla patrol. I hope that that 
co-ordination will gradually extend to Italian and 
French forces in the area. 
It is a step-by-step process that we should 
encourage and cherish. It takes time, but it is a 
bit like watching grass grow: if you watch it, 
nothing seems to happen, but if you turn your 
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back the lawn needs cutting by the end of the 
week. The examples of co-operation that I have 
outlined are of great importance to public 
opinion and we should continue to help them 
along, provided - here I speak as a practical 
Dutchman - that they are militarily useful. We 
should not engage in actions that are only of 
symbolic value, valuable though symbols are 
from time to time. Over the longer term, military 
significance must be the primary consideration. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
van der Sanden. 
Mr. van der SANDEN (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, I should like to thank 
the Minister for his interesting statement. I have 
two questions directly connected with what he 
has said. 
I noted with great interest the Minister's 
remark that we should review the position of the 
SAC, the Standing Armaments Committee. In 
my report and also in my reply to the Assembly 
yesterday I was assuming that the SAC would 
occupy approximately the same position as the 
three agencies that have now been merged into 
one. This was the Council's decision. The SAC 
has - as the Minister himself said - not met 
since 25th September 1985, though a few fairly 
small working groups have been active to some 
extent. But I was surprised - and I should like 
further clarification - to hear that, in the pros-
pects outlined by the Minister, the SAC is obvi-
ously not going to be abolished, as I had assumed 
in my report to the Assembly. 
My second question concerns an equally inter-
esting remark by the Minister. He said here in 
the Assembly that it should be considered how 
far the Treaty of Rome, the EEC treaty, needs to 
be revised to take account of the position with 
respect to European security. This is precisely 
what I was afraid of earlier on. In 1984 we heard 
of the decisions taken in Rome to revitalise 
WEU. At the time I was the Rapporteur on the 
thirtieth annual report. The Minister will 
remember the time. I have now been the Rap-
porteur on the thirty-second annual report. On 
both occasions I said we did not want to be used 
as a temporary instrument to make up for the 
absence of European political co-operation, EPC. 
To be honest, I must say that the Minister has 
now worried me slightly with the remarks he has 
made today, when he said literally: " for the time 
being, Western European Union ... will ... " etc. I 
am very worried about this. I should like a 
further explanation from the Minister. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Minister of Defence of the 
Netherlands) (Translation). - Mr. President, I 
shall try to answer Mr. van der Sanden in his 
own language. 
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His first question concerned the Standing 
Armaments Committee. I want to make it very 
clear that I was talking about this as Chairman of 
the WEU Council, because, where the substance 
of the matter is concerned, I agree with Mr. van 
der Sanden. The Netherlands believes that the 
SAC can now be abolished and its tasks and 
activities transferred to the special working 
group. But this decision has yet to be taken in the 
Permanent Council of Ministers. That is why I 
said the matter still had to be reviewed. 
As regards the EEC treaty and WEU's position 
in it, I would point out that the Luxembourg 
single European act emphasises that countries 
wanting to go further in the area of security 
co-operation can use WEU for the purpose. Now 
it is a matter of opinion whether this is regarded 
as a permanent situation or as a gradual merging 
of the two. I myself have some hope - although I 
will admit that this is at best a very long-term 
prospect - that European political co-operation 
and WEU can eventually merge where security 
aspects are concerned. On the other hand, I 
admit that the immediate prospects of this are 
not good. What I said was in no way meant to 
imply that WEU's activities, which have just 
been so satisfactorily revitalised and will con-
tinue to be so, should be regarded as very tem-
porary. I hope we can agree that this state of 
affairs will undoubtedly be maintained for a 
good few years and that we can later discuss in 
greater depth the ultimate objective which will 
then be discernible. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
May I ask a question which I asked your col-
league who, rightly, referred it back and said that 
I should put it to you. If a minesweeper from 
nation N were to be sunk by Iranian action, do 
the armed ships there carry any sealed orders 
that would authorise them to take immediate 
action? I do not ask what the action would be. I 
do not wish to know. I should merely like to be 
assured that the governments concerned, 
through WEU, have considered this and know 
what they would do and would not have to spend 
forty-eight hours looking for a solution before 
coming to a decision. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Minister of Defence of the 
Netherlands). - This question requires a 
somewhat lengthy answer: I cannot just say yes 
or no, because in the participation of the five 
WEU countries in the Gulf activities there is a 
difference in the intensity of contacts and co-
operation. 
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The Italian vessels in the area have a different 
mission from the others. The Italian task is quite 
directly the escorting and protection of Italian 
vessels, escorting them if necessary all the way to 
their destinations in the Gulf. The other naval 
ships have different missions. They are aimed 
more at providing either a protection in a general 
area, or, as in the case of Belgium and the Neth-
erlands, are restricted to clearing certain areas of 
mines. 
Your question, Sir Geoffrey, applies particu-
larly to these joint operations by mine-sweepers 
in the direct vicinity of frigates or other kinds of 
naval vessels. As the Belgian and Netherlands 
task group, we have made a very good 
arrangement with the United Kingdom and the 
Royal Navy, and that is still in being in those 
areas where there is a threat, be it by air or 
surface, to our mine counter-measure vessels, so 
that we are protected by the Royal Navy. We 
have to be clear that in such circumstances, when 
we operate in a particular area as a joint decision, 
the Royal Navy will treat our Belgian and Neth-
erlands mine-sweepers on the same basis as they 
treat their own Royal Navy mine-sweepers, so 
there is no difference in protecting them if some-
thing occurs. I hope that I have responded suffi-
ciently in that context. With either Italy and 
France no such arrangements have been made. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Pieralli. 
Mr. PIERALLI (Italy) (Translation). - Min-
ister, I read in today's Le Monde that Frank 
Carlucci, the American Defence Secretary, said 
he hoped that negotiations between the Atlantic 
Alliance and the Warsaw Pact on the reduction 
of conventional forces in Europe could start in 
1988. " We hope " said Carlucci, " that the 
United States proposal will be approved by the 
allies by the end of this year so that we will be 
able to present a joint position at the beginning 
of next year. " My question to you, Minister, is 
should the European cou~tries in the Atlantic 
Alliance simply endorse the American proposal 
for the reduction of conventional weapons or 
should they not, rather, work out a common 
platform for those negotiations - for discussion 
of course - in order to hammer out a common 
position with the United States? In the latter 
case, do you not think that time is very short and 
that the governments of the European countries 
of the Atlantic pact thereforte need to take the ini-
tiative immediately? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Minister of Defence of the 
Netherlands). - The answ~r to that question is 
yes. I shall explain why. The foreign ministers of 
NATO, when they met in Reykjavik earlier this 
year, agreed that we needed to establish what 
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they called a conceptional framework linking 
arms control and defence needs. It is important 
that we Europeans make an input into that con-
ceptional framework because, after all, it is on 
our territory that, we hope, that conventional 
balance will be restored. 
On the other hand, it is clearly in the interests 
of the alliance to do that within an alliance 
framework. For us Europeans that is probably 
the most important item on the agenda in our 
consideration of East-West relationships to bring 
about a good position on conventional arms 
control. 
First, we have to agree a mandate for the con-
ventional stability talks now taking place in 
Vienna. However, time is running out. We have 
to reach agreement within the next few 
months. 
The second problem is the substance of our 
position. I have already indicated that I see as 
our most important task the drafting of pro-
posals to induce the Warsaw Pact to make the 
same kind of asymmetrical conventional reduc-
tions that we have negotiated in the INF 
agreement - perhaps even more asymmetrical. 
I have seen a study that says that if our 
security is to be enhanced we not only need deep 
cuts and not symbolic measures but cuts in the 
tens of thousands discussed in the MBFR 
context. That study says that anything less than 
one in five is insufficient and does not increase 
our security. 
If that is so, we first have to agree it among 
ourselves, and then we have to try to negotiate 
something like that, which will not be easy if it is 
asymmetrical in those terms. 
I agree that this is probably the most 
important item for next year, and I hope that the 
WEU Assembly will also be able to make known 
its views on that point. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Lady 
Jill Knight. 
Lady Jill KNIGHT (United Kingdom). - Some 
colleagues had very high hopes that WEU would 
take a much more effective role after the Rome 
meetings intended to reactivate this body some 
four or five years ago. One really cannot say that 
those hopes have been realised. I would say that 
they have been dashed. We have some money, 
but not enough to make the contacts that we 
could make, and we worry endlessly about small 
budgetary matters as well as big. We have no 
power - I am not sure that we want power - but 
we should like to feel that we had some 
influence. 
148 
TENTH SITTING 
One is bound to wonder what is the real effect 
of our reports, no matter how carefully we write 
or debate them. In view of the very last words of 
the Minister's speech, the very last phrase that he 
used how does he think WEU genuinely can be 
reactivated in such a way as to play the part in 
the defence of Europe that we would all wish? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Minister of Defence of the 
Netherlands). - I understand Lady Jill Knight's 
preoccupation, but I think that the picture that 
she paints is not as bad as all that. Personally -
but then I speak as a Minister of Defence - I 
think that WEU has taken a tremendous step in 
enlarging the ministerial deliberations from min-
isters for foreign affairs to include ministers of 
defence. To give an example, these meetings 
twice a year are some of the few opportunities 
that I have, in a multilateral context, to discuss 
security questions with our French colleague. In 
that way we have given ourselves a tremendous 
advantage. This is the only place where such dis-
cussion can take place. I see my colleagues in 
NATO at least four times a year, but of course 
the French Minister of Defence is not present. So 
I find the revitalisation of WEU of great signifi-
cance on that score. 
Secondly, during the past six months of the 
Netherlands' presidency- of course the Luxem-
bourg presidency had already done excellent pre-
paratory work - we had two examples. First, we 
had the platform. Six months ago even the most 
enthusiastic members of this Assembly would 
not have expected the platform to have been 
ready in such a short time after the first ideas 
were voiced in this Assembly a year ago. You 
should not underestimate the importance of this 
Assembly in that process either. In addition, the 
practical military co-operation in the Gulf is not 
ideal. I have already said, in response to Mr. 
Hardy, that we could have managed even closer 
co-operation than we have achieved, but I am 
confident that, step by step, we shall manage to 
improve it. We also need the help of this 
Assembly, so that in your countries you will say 
that considerations about emphasising the 
national role should be less significant in deter-
mining activities in the Gulf. 
We all share the opinion that we should be 
neutral in the conflict. We are directing our activ-
ities against no one. Our only purpose is to ensure 
safe passage through important international 
shipping routes. That is all we are doing, and we 
are showing that is also a European interest. After 
all, our existence to a large extent rests on safe 
imports of oil from that area. I think that 
European responsibility there is important. 
Finally, as I tried to make clear in my speech, 
it is in the political underpinning of these activ-
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ities where I see a particularly useful role for 
WEU and the Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - In this 
frank and thoughtful speech, which I greatly wel-
comed, the Defence Minister of the Netherlands 
mentioned arms control and armaments collabo-
ration. 
On arms control, is he apprehensive about the 
force of 55 Soviet SSC-4 cruise missiles with a 
range of 3 000 miles? Does he feel that these 
ought to have been included in the INF 
agreement? If that force were to grow, what 
action would he suggest to the other members of 
the Council of Ministers? 
Secondly, on armaments collaboration, should 
Europe go further in naval co-operation? In par-
ticular, does the Minister believe that we have 
moved far and fast enough towards bringing the 
eight-nation NATO frigate for the 1990s - the 
NFR 90 - to project definition? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Minister of Defence of the 
Netherlands). - I share Mr. Wilkinson's anxiety 
about the development of these cruise missiles 
with a fairly long range. We shall have to watch 
that development closely. I do not think that 
technically it can be brought under the INF 
agreement, because that specifically refers to the 
various catagories of ballistic missiles involved 
and the cruise missiles on the European side. 
One thing that we have to watch for with such an 
agreement is that it is not circumvented by other 
weapons systems taking over the role of the bal-
listic missiles, as these cruise missiles could. We 
have to keep a watch on that. 
Naval co-operation is very important. Unfor-
tunately, it is a subject that has shown a number 
of failures during the passage of history. 
However, I think we now have a chance. This 
naval frigate for the 1990s seems to meet the 
needs of at least eight countries, and that is on an 
unprecedented scale. We in the Netherlands are 
favourably inclined to join in that development. 
Unfortunately, there have been some delays as a 
result of the fact that one country, and then two 
countries, felt that a final decision on the design 
still had to await further clarification of the air 
defence system on the frigate. We in the Nether-
lands hope that it will be possible to conclude a 
memorandum of understanding, leaving that 
feature for further consideration. 
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we manage to standardise our requirements, and 
it will be of great benefit to the ministries of 
defence if, as a result of eoonomies of scale, the 
price of the ship is less than it would otherwise 
be. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Fourre. 
Mr. FOURRE (France) (Translation). - May I 
first thank you, Minister, for your words con-
cerning the report which I presented to the 
Assembly this morning. I owe you double thanks 
because this is the second occasion on which I 
have presented a report on a highly technical 
subject relating to the whole future of micro-
electronics and its influence on military forces. I 
have the impression that there is a general indif-
ference on the subject in t~is Assembly as else-
where. 
Without wanting to labour the point and 
without wishing to malign the seven members at 
the sitting when I presented my report, which 
received their unqualified approval, I asked 
myself this morning whether this was a case of 
indifference or of unqualified agreement. This 
morning's vote gave me the answer - it would 
seem that it received unqualified support, though 
also with a measure of indifference on a subject 
which seems to me vital to the construction of 
the Europe we want, especially in the military 
field. 
You referred to a number of points in my 
report, Minister, but I would be grateful if you 
would give us your opinion on my proposal 
which has now been unanimously adopted by the 
Assembly and which calls for the launching of a 
joint European defence research programme 
associating round the WEU member countries 
all the Western European countries wishing to 
take part. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Minister of Defence of the 
Netherlands) (Translation). - I entirely agree 
with Mr. Fourre on the importance of this 
subject. Technical details are often difficult for 
politicians and you have had a hard though per-
fectly accomplished task and have rightly 
stressed the political importance of these tech-
nical issues. 
I am sometimes extremely surprised to note 
the wide diversity of communications techniques 
in our armies, for example. I am equally sur-
prised to find that the air force, the army and the 
navy often use entirely different systems of infor-
mation technology. Sometimes equipment 
The answer is yes, this is a very promising differs even within the same service. It follows 
co-operative subject. It will be of great advantage that if different hardware systems are used joint 
to the European ship-building industries, too, if operating practices cannot be within reach. 
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In principle, I am also in entire agreement with 
your recommendation - all the more so as the 
Independent European Programme Group, in 
the report by the wise men which I mentioned in 
my introductory remarks, has also stressed the 
need for a common research programme which 
has the full support ofthe Netherlands. Unfortu-
nately, no agreement was reached at the group's 
Seville meeting in June, but I am certain that this 
recommendation will be on the orders of the day 
of the next meeting as it represents an obvious 
need. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Dudley Smith. 
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). - May 
I say how pleasant it is to see an old friend and a 
former valued member of the Assembly occu-
pying such an important place. I am sure that we 
are all delighted about that. 
The Minister rightly referred to the imbalance 
of the forces between East and West. There is 
now a certain amount of superficial euphoria in 
the media and elsewhere about the movement 
towards the control and abolition of nuclear 
weapons, which we welcome. In view of that, 
does he agree that it is now more important than 
ever for us to show the commitment and 
political will, as members of Western European 
countries, to redouble our efforts to arm properly 
where conventional forces are concerned? He 
mentioned how this has been eroded because 
free countries have many commitments other 
than defence, which has always been regarded as 
an insurance policy. Given the move towards the 
reduction and eventual abolition of nuclear 
weapons, does he not feel that it was never more 
important to reaffirm the need for a proper, 
up-to-date conventional force that can obtain 
parity with the East? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Minister of Defence of the 
Netherlands). - Yes, I agree with Sir Dudley, 
whom I thank for his kind remarks. I also agree 
with him that the need to address the conven-
tional imbalance is greater than ever. 
There are various ways of dealing with this 
problem. On the one hand, there is arms control. 
I have already gone into that. That would be the 
most desirable way because it would potentially 
enhance our sense of security in the best feasible 
fashion. However, things have changed since we 
were looking at MBFR fourteen years ago, unfor-
tunately without success. We are now talking 
about security between the Atlantic Ocean and 
the Urals. To me, that means that we can no 
longer use the exclusive criterion of manpower. 
It is now necessary to go further and to discuss 
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weapons systems and, especially, tanks and 
artillery, which play an important role in the 
invasion capability of the Warsaw Pact - the 
capability for large attack and surprise attack at 
the same time. That is why I said that we must 
focus on that and, if we are to manage that, these 
reductions really must be asymmetrical. 
On the other side of the coin - Sir Dudley 
referred particularly to this - are our efforts in 
the meantime to strengthen and improve our 
conventional forces in Western Europe. We must 
be sober enough to admit that large quantitative 
increases are probably not everything. Five 
European countries are now meeting the NATO 
challenge of 3% real growth. A few have 
somewhat smaller growth, including my own 
country, and some countries have a zero-line 
budget. In those circumstances my emphasis is 
twofold. In the first place, we must try to round 
off programmes that are already in execution so 
that they will make the best possible contri-
bution. With ships, aircraft and tanks, we should 
see that they are equipped with the necessary 
weapon systems or sensors. We should try to 
round off a particular force contribution to the 
common defence. 
Secondly, if there is additional money, we 
should concentrate on what NATO calls the con-
ventional defence improvements. NATO, with 
all its shortcomings, has had at least one 
important achievement in the past three years to 
define in a better way than ever before priorities 
for defence spending. In the past, NATO prior-
ities were often a shopping list of all three major 
NATO commanders together and now they have 
pinpointed what they regard as the highest prior-
ities. For example, in the case of my country, 
that is clearly air defence, anti-tank weapons and 
bringing up to level ammunition stocks. That 
gives me a tremendous support in a national pro-
gramme and in defending a national budget 
based also on real growth. You put it into a mul-
tilateral framework and make it clear to your 
public that that is the best way to spend limited 
resources. 
My clear preference is to continue setting 
improved priorities for conventional defence 
and to include armaments planning in a multi-
lateral context so that the smaller countries know 
what will be done in the alliance, what possibil-
ities are emerging, what decisions should be 
taken and when equipment will become 
available. We need that framework to make our 
plan more useful. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Russell Johnston. 
Sir Russell JOHNSTON (United Kingdom). -
I associate myself with the congratulations 
offered to the Minister on his very constructive 
remarks. Has he given any thought to the fact 
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that if balanced conventional force reductions 
are successful, as we all hope, they will take place 
against a background of generally high unem-
ployment in Western Europe and will pre-
sumably contribute to making it even higher? 
Wijat longer view does the " practical 
Dutchman " take of that fact and of the pressures 
that it will produce on the disarmament 
process? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Minister. 
Mr. van EEKELEN (Minister of Defence of the 
Netherlands). - I am worried about unem-
ployment, especially as we have a high rate in the 
Netherlands. It is going down, but not as fast as 
we had hoped. 
I assume that Sir Russell was referring to 
longer-term developments. Demographic trends 
in Europe do not favour defence. For example, 
the Federal Republic of Germany is already 
having great difficulty in meeting its defence per-
sonnel targets and I believe that many countries 
will have to face a similar problem. When the 
children of the children born after the war grow 
old, the next generation will be smaller and 
defence will have to compete with other areas for 
qualified people. As defence will require even 
more highly-qualified people in the future, it will 
not be an easy battle. 
The pill will have a later impact in my country 
than it has had in West Germany. We are secure 
until the mid-1990s but then we shall have diffi-
culty meeting our personnel targets. 
I hope - I admit that it is only a hope - that 
unemployment in Europe is a fairly short-term 
problem and that in the 1990s we may again be 
looking for people to fill jobs. It may be said that 
new technological developments will require 
fewer workers, but I hope that the problem posed 
by Sir Russell will not be so serious in the long 
term. Anyway, if our security is enhanced by 
arms control measures, they should take prece-
dence over economic considerations. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - On behalf 
of the Assembly, I thank you, Minister, for this 
interesting and fruitful exchange of views. 
I ask for your understanding of our obligation 
to carry on with our work. I know that with your 
dedication to democratic parliamentary prin-
ciples you will not object if we proceed, bearing 
in mind the size of the task confronting us. 
I repeat my thanks and hope that the Nether-
lands presidency which will come to an end at 
the conclusion of the first half of 1988 will prove 
entirely successful. 
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4. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second 
annual report of the' Council 
(Votes on the draft recommendations and draft resolution, 
Doe. 1116, addendum and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We shall 
now resume consideration of the report of the 
Committee on Defence Que~tions and Arma-
ments on disarmament - reply to the thirty-
second annual report of the Council, Document 
1116, addendum and amendments. 
As the Rapporteur spoke this morning, I now 
call the Chairman of the committee, Mr. 
Kittelmann. 
Mr. KITTELMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Ladies and gen-
tlemen, I should just like to make a few com-
ments on the debate we have had and on the 
report that I hope we shall be approving in a 
moment. I will begin by reiterating the sincere 
thanks extended to the Rapporteur by the com-
mittee for the work he has done. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I believe the style of the 
political debate we have had today - and the 
Assembly noticed this yesterday as well - has 
been gratifying. We have debated objectively and 
fairly and, without emotively enflaming existing 
disagreements, we have had an objective 
exchange of views on them. This is remarkable, 
and the goal referred to by the Rapporteur when 
he began the presentation of his report, namely a 
consensus, has thus been largely achieved. 
We should all take up this offer of a consensus 
in the very near future, and I believe we shall 
again find we have a great deal in common when 
we discuss the report by Mr. Stokes tomorrow. 
The common ground in the Assembly of 
Western European Union is one of the reasons 
why we are taken seriously in the Council, and 
those members of the public who are interested 
certainly judge us by the extent to which the 
emphasis is placed on this common ground, 
without glossing over other q~estions. 
I should now like to make a few comments on 
questions that have been put. Mr. Reddemann 
questioned whether we, the committee as a 
whole, approved of the Rapporteur's intention to 
recommend Brussels as the seat of WEU. I 
would like to explain that this was the 
Rapporteur's opinion. The As$embly has taken it 
out of the draft recommendation with an appro-
priate amendment. We are still considering 
together where the seat should properly be, 
without ruling out Brussels. 
We have also discussed the question of new 
members. After agreeing on several occasions 
that Spain and Portugal sh~uld join Western 
European Union, we also concluded in our dis-
cussions that the two countries should be treated 
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separately if that is what they want. Portugal 
should not be left standing at the door simply 
because we are not yet sure if Spain wants to 
become a member at the moment. They are sep-
arate countries, each has the right to be treated 
separately, and they naturally set store by that. 
This is the eve of an important day, the day on 
which the INF treaty is signed. I think Mr. 
Reddemann was right to stress - this accounted 
for a major part of our debate, after all - that the 
vast majority believe the INF negotiations would 
never have succeeded if there had been no 
NATO twin-track decision and therefore no tem-
porary arms build-up. This should cause us all to 
stop and think. 
The second thing I should like to emphasise is 
that, while we have had a heated debate here on 
SDI, almost leading to a split, even the Soviet 
Union is now taking a calm, relaxed view of SDI, 
in stark contrast to its original nervousness. 
These are two facts that should cause us to 
stop and think about our forthcoming political 
activities. I say this without taking sides in any 
way. 
As Mr. Baumel's and Mr. Wilkinson's 
speeches have shown, we constantly question 
what is now going to happen about conventional 
armaments and what will become of the conven-
tional imbalance once the INF treaty has been 
signed. 
Ladies and gentlemen, now that the INF nego-
tiations have been concluded, what we must do -
and here again I feel we should emphasise the 
common ground rather than constantly focusing 
on our differences - is to consider how Soviet 
conventional superiority, the real existing 
danger, can now be reduced. After all, we now 
have no means left, no lever to force the Soviet 
Union to agree to conventional disarmament. 
We can now only wait for the Soviet Union to 
prove how seriously it takes Europe's security. 
The Rapporteur put forward some ideas on 
structural changes, for instance whether we 
should make structural changes without disarm-
ament or, as he thought, structural changes 
should be accompanied by disarmament. He also 
had some - somewhat philosophical - reflec-
tions on the effect which the Soviet Union's con-
ventional superiority would have on the eco-
nomic imbalance between East and West, if the 
Soviet Union took advantage of its conventional 
superiority. 
I agree that this should be considered, but I 
would issue one warning. The ministers' state-
ments in particular have shown that there is 
agreement in Western European Union, and the 
platform, which cannot be praised highly 
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enough, demonstrates the recognition that the 
emphasis must now be placed on conventional 
balance, however one likes to put it. In view of 
the massive superiority ofthe Warsaw Pact, even 
thinking about the concept of " conventional 
balance" is very daring in the European situ-
ation, but it is important not to forget it. 
In defence policy one thing is important for us 
parliamentarians: we in particular have a duty 
constantly to remind the Council of Western 
European Union of the fine and outstanding 
declarations it adopts and the deeds that follow. 
It is an important matter of credibility not only 
that agreement be reached at meetings on all the 
things that need to be done, but that there should 
be mutual checks a year later to see what has 
actually been done in the past twelve months on 
the basis of the decisions jointly taken. This 
would certainly cause even some members of the 
Council of Ministers to blush, unless of course 
they are now far too professional to be capable of 
it. 
We have a favourable basis on which to work, 
one that is relatively encouraging. We have had 
over forty years of peace in Europe, not least due 
to the partnership between Europe and America. 
This indicates that any thoughts of, say, strength-
ening WEU without the Americans are suicidal 
rather than realistic. We must constantly stress-
and this is extremely important, in order to give 
the Americans this certainty - that we want to 
strengthen the European pillar through WEU, 
without in any way casting doubt on Europe's 
urgent need for co-operation with America and 
for the American presence. This must always be 
kept in harmony, so as to avoid any puzzling 
confusion about the alleged possibility of a 
European military power emerging to face the 
potential adversary, the Soviet Union or the 
Warsaw Pact. 
The starting position is also relatively encour-
aging for us, because European integration has 
made progress, European political co-operation 
has provided the basis for a common European 
foreign policy and some successes are discernible 
in the definition of the security policy identity of 
the European NATO members. If it is then 
repeatedly emphasised that it is only natural for 
a Europe that is growing in strength to assert its 
own interests, without there being any conflict 
between European unification and the Atlantic 
Alliance, what we are saying, rightly I feel, is that 
the two complement each other, that the two are 
mutually indispensable. 
Ladies and gentlemen, the report before you is 
a fair one. This is apparent, for example, from 
the fact that it was adopted unanimously in the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments, with, I think, just two abstentions. I 
would be pleased if this report, which must be 
seen as a complement to Mr. Stokes's report, 
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were to be regarded as an area of common 
ground for the future and if we always appre-
ciated that it remains our task to give the 
Council constructive encouragement to achieve 
-as I said just now- goals which it has set itself. 
If we approve this report today, we shall have 
together helped to ensure that Western European 
Union and above all its Assembly are doing their 
duty. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Kittelmann. 
We now have to vote on the draft recommen-
dations and the draft resolution in Document 
1116 and addendum. I shall therefore invite the 
Assembly to vote, in order, on the draft recom-
mendation replying to the thirty-second annual 
report of the Council, the draft recommendation 
on disarmament and the relevant amendments 
and finally the draft resolution on the INF treaty. 
We shall first proceed to vote on the draft 
recommendation replying to the thirty-second 
annual report of the Council in Document 
1116. 
Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting 
and standing unless five representatives or sub-
stitutes present in the chamber request a vote by 
roll-call. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. We shall therefore vote by 
sitting and standing. 
I now put to the vote the draft recommen-
dation replying to the thirty-second annual 
report of the Council. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft recommendation is adopted 1• 
We shall now take the draft recommendation 
on disarmament in Document 1116. 
I have been advised of twelve amendments 
and one amendment to an amendment. These 
will be considered in the following order: 
Amendments 5, 6 and 7 by Mr. Pieralli; Amend-
ments 1 and 2 by Mr. Eisma; Amendments 8, 9 
and 10 by Mr. Reddemann; Amendment 4 by 
Mr. Soell; Amendment 3 by Mr. Eisma; Amend-
ments 11 and 12 by Mr. Reddemann; and the 
amendment to Amendment 12 by Mr. Scheer. 
I call Mr. Stoffelen. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - In fact, Mr. 
President, the order would be for the amend-
I. See page 34. 
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ments to be treated separately, Amendment 12 
and then the amendment to1 the amendment. I 
have them in a different order. I think that you 
would be advised to reorganise several amend-
ments and then have Amendment 12. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). Mr. 
Stoffelen, the procedure is very clear and my pro-
posals are fully in accordancf with the Rules of 
Procedure. We shall first vot~ on the first eleven 
amendments and will then discuss Amendment 
12 and Mr. Scheer's amendment to Amendment 
12. The vote will be taken in the reverse order -
first on the amendment to Amendment 12 and 
then on the amendment. 
Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Pieralli reads as 
follows: 
5. In the preamble to the draft recommendation 
on disarmament, place paragraph (i) after para-
graph (vi). 
I call Mr. Pieralli. 
Mr. PIERALLI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, if you will allow I shall speak in 
support of my three amendments to save time. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I have in 
fact two more Amendments, 6 and 7, also tabled 
by Mr. Pieralli. They read as follows: 
6. In paragraph (ii) of the pr~amble to the draft 
recommendation on disarmament, leave out 
" progress on a properly verifiable INF 
agreement" and insert "the agreement". 
7. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation on disarmament, leave out 
"should" and insert "must''. 
I call Mr. Pieralli. 
Mr. PIERALLI (Italy) (Translation). - My 
purpose is to lay maximum emphasis on the 
treaty on the destruction of intermediate missiles 
which will be signed in five days' time in Wash-
ington. The treaty is beneficial to the Atlantic 
Alliance as it means eliminalting a category of 
weapons in which the Soviets have marked 
superiority. 
There is a double advantage. As Lord Car-
rington remarked at the meeting of the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly in Oslo, the Soviets 
were preparing to replace the SS-20s by more 
modern and effective missile~. 
I would add that public opinion in our coun-
tries is now far more confident in this agreement 
and in the Reagan-Gorbachev summit generally, 
and I therefore suggest that from the start the 
recommendation should underline the impor-
tance of the agreement. The p~ragraph relating to 
the INF treaty should in fact be updated as it 
concerns not merely an agreement but an already 
established treaty. 
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I emphasise that my proposals are framed in 
the same spirit in which the Assembly requests 
that the United States Congress ratify the treaty 
as soon as possible. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against Amendment 5? 
I call Mr. Scheer. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - We could accept the substance 
of what the author of the amendment is seeking 
to achieve. But it must be remembered - Mr. 
Pieralli probably could not have known this -
that the committee has submitted an additional 
opinion, which is to be put to the vote. This 
opinion is headed " Motion for a resolution ". 
The text was originally submitted by Mr. 
Stoffelen, then taken over by the committee as a 
whole. The idea is that it should be adopted sepa-
rately. It deals exclusively with the INF 
agreement. As that covers everything, I do not 
think any more is needed. I would therefore keep 
the original text, but in conjunction with the text 
I have just mentioned. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - You 
propose therefore that Amendment 5 be 
rejected? 
What is the committee's opinion on Amend-
ments 6 and 7 which have already been sup-
ported by their author? 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - In view of events, Amendment 6 
should of course be adopted. I also recommend 
the adoption of Amendment 7. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I shall now 
put Amendment 5 to the vote. 
Mr. PIERALLI (Italy) (Translation). - In the 
circumstances I withdraw Amendment 5 and 
maintain Amendments 6 and 7. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Amend-
ment 5 is withdrawn. 
I therefore put Amendment 6 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 6 is agreed to. 
I now put Amendment 7 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 7 is agreed to. 
I should now take Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. 
Eisma which reads as follows: 
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1. After paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation on disarmament, add a 
new paragraph as follows: 
"Urging the United States Senate to advis.e 
and consent as a matter of urgency to the rati-
fication of the INF agreement; " 
However, the committee has adopted a draft 
resolution on the INF treaty which is contained 
in the addendum to Document 1116. In the cir-
cumstances I ask the committee whether the 
amendment is not now pointless. 
I call the Chairman of the committee. 
Mr. KITTELMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, if the 
additional amendment, which was unanimously 
approved by the committee, is adopted here as 
well, Amendment 1 would be superfluous. It 
would not then need to be considered further. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - As the 
amendment is not moved, we shall not consider 
it. 
Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Eisma reads as 
follows: 
2. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation on disarmament, after " ABM 
treaty" insert "in its traditional interpre-
tation". 
Does anyone wish to speak in support of this 
amendment? ... 
As the amendment is not moved, it will not be 
examined. 
Amendment 8 tabled by Mr. Reddemann and 
others reads as follows: 
8. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation on disarmament, leave out " in 
different armaments and forces". 
I call Mr. Reddemann. 
Mr. REDDEMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, para-
graph (vi) concerns the search for ways of 
removing imbalances and asymmetries. The 
committee's draft contains a restriction. It refers 
to different armaments and forces. This might 
lead to the assumption that the proposal is for 
the search to be confined to certain armaments 
and forces. I therefore request that the words 
"different armaments and forces" be deleted to 
make it clear that we want these studies to relate 
to all armaments and forces. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the 
amendment? ... 
What is the opinion of the committee? 
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(Translation). - We should keep to the original 
text. It is quite clear that the text concerns all 
weapons. There is a quite specific reason for the 
reference to " different armaments and forces ": 
we realise, of course, that not all the various 
aspects can be dealt with at the same time or 
even, in some cases, at the same level of negoti-
ation. This has basically emerged from the nego-
tiations in Vienna on a mandate. The discus-
sions will not, of course, concern worldwide 
disarmament nor, probably, as I said this 
morning, all categories of weapons at once. The 
criteria vary. This is to some extent a description 
of the basis for a differentiated negotiating 
process, without of course committing it in any 
way. That is the point at issue here. This is not a 
question of principle. The thinking behind the 
wording is as I have just explained. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now put 
Amendment 8 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 8 is negatived. 
Amendment 9 tabled by Mr. Reddemann and 
others reads as follows: 
9. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation on disarmament, add a 
new paragraph as follows: 
"Noting in this connection that in Prague on 
lOth April 1987 General Secretary Gorbachev 
confirmed the existence of such imbalances 
and asymmetries for historical and other 
reasons;" 
I call Mr. Reddemann. 
Mr. REDDEMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, dif-
ferent views have been expressed in the 
Assembly on the question of whether there are 
asymmetries within the defence forces of the two 
camps. Where the Warsaw Pact is concerned, we 
now have the very clear statement made by the 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union on lOth April1987. Although I cer-
tainly do not want to call Mr. Gorbachev as a 
witness for everything conceivable, if he admits 
to an asymmetry in the Soviet Union's favour, I 
feel we should point this out in the report, so as 
to save ourselves possible arguments in the 
future. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the 
amendment? ... 
I call Mr. Scheer. 
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passage - I do not have the text with me, so I 
cannot quote it verbatim - say~ something like 
" where such imbalances exist ". I would 
therefore ask you to consider this: we should not 
assume from the outset - as Mr. Stokes's report 
also points out - that there are imbalances in 
every area to the West's disadvantage. This 
could in effect cause a breakdown in the negotia-
tio~s at the very time when they are to begin 
agam. 
Now, this sentence does not make it clear on 
which side the imbalances exist ih each case. The 
situation does in fact vary from one category of 
weapons to another. The situation differs as 
between land forces and naval forces and as 
between Central Europe and other regions. I am 
therefore opposed to Mr. Reddemann's 
appraisal. But as this appraisal is not as conclu-
sively stated in the text, and if it is considered in 
rather more neutral terms, it might be 
acceptable. I am only opposed to misunder-
standings arising. 
The ·PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now put 
Amendment 9 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 9 is agreed to. 
Amendment 10 tabled by Mr. Reddemann and 
others reads as follows: 
10. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper on disarmament, after "in Europe" 
insert " and the various regions concerned ". 
I call Mr. Reddemann. 
Mr. REDDEMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, this is 
an interpretation which is surely acceptable even 
to those who have so far disagrceed with what I 
have proposed. The amendment concerns the 
question of balance, which may differ substan-
tially from one region of Europe to another. I 
therefore propose that instead of speaking gen-
erally of balance in Europe, we . should refer to 
Europe's various regions. I hope the Rapporteur 
will be able to agree with me in this case. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the 
amendment? ... 
I call Mr. Kittelmann. 
Mr. KITTELMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation).- The Rapporteur and I 
agree that this amendment should be approved. I 
would just point out that as the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments has not dis-
cussed these amendments, neither the 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) Rapporteur nor I can do more than give our per-
(Translation). - The quotation referred to is sonal opinions. This also explains the variation 
correct. One problem is that the following in the way we have voted. In this case, as I have 
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said, we are agreed, and support the 
amendment. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now put 
Amendment 10 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 10 is agreed to. 
Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Soell reads as 
follows: 
4. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recom-
mendation proper on disarmament, leave out 
" with priority to negotiations on the Central 
European region". 
I call Mr. Klejdzinski to move the amendment 
in place of Mr. Soell. 
Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - I have nothing to say 
except that the words " with priority to negotia-
tions on the Central European region " are to be 
deleted from the end of paragraph 1. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amend-
ment? ... 
I call Mr. Scheer. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - I would normally be sceptical, 
but as we have now adopted Amendment 10, 
which refers to" various regions", and have thus 
made it clear that there are problem regions of a 
particular type, the amendment can be 
approved. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now put 
Amendment 4 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 4 is agreed to. 
Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Eisma reads as 
follows: 
3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation 
proper on disarmament, after "ABM treaty", 
insert "in its traditional interpretation". 
As Mr. Eisma is not here to move the 
amendment it will not be considered. 
Amendment 11 tabled by Mr. Reddemann and 
others reads as follows: 
11. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation 
proper on disarmament, after " military 
strategy " insert " and doctrine " and leave out 
the words to the end of the paragraph. 
I call Mr. Reddemann. 
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Mr. REDDEMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Even if I am now at 
odds with the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments, I have the impression that this 
recommendation goes on rather too long and yet 
fails to refer to an important aspect, military doc-
trine. Although the Rapporteur explicitly 
emphasised this aspect in his presentation yes-
terday afternoon - and I therefore hope to have 
his support - I believe we could delete every-
thing after the clear reference to military doc-
trine, because it merely repeats what is said else-
where. Or to put it another way, the wording of 
the text is slightly unclear, with the result that I 
at least do not quite understand what the com-
mittee wanted to say. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the 
amendment? ... 
I call Mr. Stoffelen. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - If it is just 
the insertion of the word "doctrine", I would 
have to ask about its meaning. If it means mil-
itary and technical doctrine, I could understand 
it, but if it means ideology, I would strongly 
oppose it. 
The amendment causes another problem -
leaving out the rest of the paragraph. The rest of 
the paragraph is extremely useful. I cannot 
understand how the committee could accept an 
amendment to delete essential words. 
I cannot understand the amendment. It must 
be completely illogical. Therefore, I oppose it. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - What is the 
opinion of the committee? ... 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - I feel - and I can now say this on 
behalf of the whole committee - that the 
wording should be left as it is, especially as we 
have now deleted a distinction elsewhere, despite 
my opposition. We have the same problem here. 
Here at least the wording is so clear that 
everyone knows what it is about. It should 
therefore be left as it is. Otherwise, the text will 
become rather too simplistic. It would then 
simply be a general manifesto with which it 
would not be so easy to work. I therefore ask you 
to leave things as they are. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I now put 
Amendment 11 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 11 is negatived. 
Ladies and gentlemen, following paragraph 4 
of the draft recommendation proper, I have 
Amendment 12 tabled by Mr. Reddemann and 
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others, to which Mr. Scheer and Mr. Stoffelen 
have tabled an amendment. 
In accordance with Rule 29, paragraph 7, of 
the Rules of Procedure we shall first discuss 
Amendment 12 and then the relevant 
amendment thereto. The vote will be in the 
reverse order. 
Amendment 12 tabled by Mr. Reddemann and 
others reads as follows: 
12. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommen-
dation proper on disarmament, add two new 
paragraphs: 
"Call on the Warsaw Pact to renounce its 
offensive military and technical doctrine and 
give its armed forces a structure clearly 
designed for defensive purposes and which 
does not allow it to undertake an offensive 
against other countries; 
In the framework of disarmament, ensure that 
in each case both sides make reductions to the 
lowest level. " 
I call Mr. Reddemann. 
Mr. REDDEMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, this 
concerns a structural problem posed by the 
Soviet military doctrine, a structural problem 
connected with the overall defensive strength of 
the Soviet Union and eastern bloc. I just want to 
make that clear. I do not think I need explain 
this proposal further. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the 
amendment? ... 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Ifi may, I would rather speak in 
favour of the amendment to the amendment 
then against Amendment 12. In fact, they belong 
together. I would be in favour of the adoption of 
Amendment 12 if the amendment to the 
amendment, which I will explain straight away, 
is added, because it is needed to round things off. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I first ask 
your opinion on Amendment 12 tabled by Mr. 
Reddemann. I have already said that 
Amendment 12 would be discussed first, fol-
lowed by the amendment thereto. The Rules of 
Procedure provide for voting in the reverse 
order. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - The amendment to the 
amendment has, as it were, been triggered off by 
Amendment 12. The fact of the matter is that, if 
Amendment 12 and the amendment to the 
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amendment were adopted, the ttecommendation 
would on the whole be more rounded out. 
What we have here in principle are two 
problems which make this virtually the crux of 
the recommendation. On the one hand, the aim 
is to overcome the offensive strategy pursued by 
the Warsaw Pact, as oppos~d to NATO's 
defensive strategy. So, the Warsaw Pact will owe 
us something during the negotiations. 
The second problem concerns technical 
resources that can be used for offensive purposes, 
in other words, weapons systems which both 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact have. This is not 
true of the whole arsenal, but there are aspects of 
the arsenal of weapons - NATO's as well as the 
Warsaw Pact's - which give rise to this fear of 
offensive capability, even though our strategy is 
defensive. 
The amendment to the amendment therefore 
begins by proposing that the Wjirsaw Pact - as 
Mr. Reddemann suggests - sliould be called 
upon to review, to change its offensive strategy. 
It then calls on NATO and the Warsaw Pact to 
work towards the renunciation through negoti-
ation of offensive technical capacities, because 
simply changing the strategy does not, of course, 
help at all if arms potentials point in another 
direction. 
The amendment to the amendment also 
stresses - I have almost finished - the objective, 
which is the creation of mutual non-provocative 
confidence-building defence structures. I feel it 
would also be in the interests of the author of the 
amendment if it was rounded out in this way. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I advise 
you that under the Rules of Procedure if the 
amendment to Amendment 12 is agreed to and 
Amendment 12 is negatived, the two texts fall. 
Mr. Scheer and Mr. Stoffelen have tabled an 
amendment to Amendment 12 proposed by Mr. 
Reddemann and others. It reads as follows: 
In amendment 12 to the drtaft recommen-
dation on disarmament, after" countries;", add 
a new paragraph as follows: 
"Call on NATO and the Warsaw Pact to 
renounce offensive technical capacities in 
favour of the creation of mutual 
non-provocative, confidence-building defence 
structures; " 
I call Mr. Scheer. 
Mr. SCHEER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - I move the amendment to 
Amendment 12. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against the amendment to 
Amendment 12? ... 
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In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, I 
now put to the vote the amendment to 
Amendment 12. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The amendment to the amendment is agreed 
to. 
I now put to the vote Amendment 12 as 
amended. I inform the Assembly that if this 
amendment is not agreed to the amendment to it 
becomes irrelevant. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 12, as amended, is agreed to. 
We shall now proceed to vote on the amended 
draft recommendation on disarmament. 
Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting 
and standing unless five representatives or sub-
stitutes present in the chamber request a vote by 
roll-call. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. The vote will be taken by sitting 
and standing. 
I put to the vote the amended draft recom-
mendation on disarmament. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The amended draft recommendation is 
adopted'· 
We shall now proceed to vote on the draft 
resolution on the INF treaty in the addendum to 
Document 1116. 
Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting 
and standing unless ten representatives or substi-
tutes present in the chamber request a vote by 
roll-call. 
Are there ten members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. The vote will be taken by sitting 
and standing. 
I put to the vote the draft resolution on the 
INF treaty in the addendum to Document 
1116. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft resolution is adopted 2• 
1. See page 35. 
2. See page 36. 
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5. Recent developments in Soviet external policy 
(Presentation of and debate on 
the report of the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 1111 and addendum) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the General Affairs Committee 
on recent developments in Soviet external 
policy, Document 1111 and addendum. 
I call Mr. Pecriaux, Rapporteur of the General 
Affairs Committee, to present his report. 
Mr. PECRIAUX (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, the report I 
present on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee is entitled "Recent developments in 
Soviet external policy" and has been unani-
mously adopted by our committee. 
The purpose of the report is to consider to 
what extent the changes which have taken place 
in the last two years in the style of Soviet 
diplomacy also relate to its aims and methods 
and to study how WEU and the member coun-
tries of the Atlantic Alliance in general can and 
must react to the new Soviet external policy. The 
reactivation of WEU has caused Soviet author-
ities to give some thought to the present and 
future of this organisation. 
It fell to the General Affairs Committee to 
suggest to the Assembly the political conclusions 
to be drawn from the exchanges in Moscow of 
April 1987 between the Presidential Committee 
delegation and a delegation of the Supreme 
Soviet. 
However, this report does not look at disarm-
ament, which has been dealt with by another 
Assembly committee. It is accompanied by a 
draft order which instructs the Presidential Com-
mittee to pursue the dialogue started in April 
1987. 
Disarmament is currently a matter for the 
United States and the USSR, and, whether we 
like it or not, Europe has no direct part in the 
negotiations. On the other hand, it is directly 
involved in other aspects of detente, so that the 
WEU Assembly can properly make recommen-
dations in this area. This required an analysis of 
the current Soviet situation aimed at identifying 
the factors behind the new direction taken and 
the forces in opposition as well as the rela-
tionship between the line publicised in ideo-
logical terms and the policy actually conducted 
in the three contexts of internal Soviet reform, 
European questions and issues outside the 
boundary of Europe. 
During the seventy years since the Bolshevik 
revolution, Soviet ideology has undergone con-
siderable development, definition and change 
but it has not always been possible to know how 
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the trend should be interpreted. These ambigu-
ities have not been removed by Mr. Gorbachev. 
On assuming power he appears as the represent-
ative of the new generation nearest to power at 
the opportune moment. 
In an important passage of his speech to the 
twenty-seventh congress of the Soviet Com-
munist Party, Mr. Gorbachev outlined an 
entirely new concept of the relations between 
capitalist and communist countries: " The pre-
vailing dialectics of present-day development 
consists in a combination of competition and 
confrontation between the two systems and in a 
growing tendency towards interdependence of 
the countries of the world community." 
This does not mean that the USSR is giving up 
its key positions, its domination of the people's 
democracies, its activities on the world chess 
board, its propaganda efforts, its security objec-
tives or its determination to play the role of a 
world power. 
It is no longer a question of using peaceful 
coexistence to prepare for war but of using it to 
organise peace. As soon as the West seeks to 
develop its relations with the USSR and its 
allies, these relations become, at least in the 
expressed view ofthe chief Soviet leader, a factor 
for peace and not of confrontation. 
Naturally the West cannot base its own 
security policy merely on the words of the Soviet 
leaders but must judge the realities behind these 
words. In recent years Soviet diplomacy has been 
most actively concerned with European affairs, 
especially with regard to disarmament. One of its 
objectives is to eliminate any risk of conflict in 
the region so as to ensure calm for its period of 
economic and political change. It wishes to 
redirect its investments and to develop its 
external trade with both Eastern and Western 
Europe. However, even if they are perfectly 
sincere, Soviet disarmament proposals are also a 
propaganda instrument designed to weaken the 
cohesion of the West. 
It is notable that Soviet policy with regard to 
CMEA - the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance - has been reactivated. 
Similarly, it will be recalled that the Helsinki 
and Stockholm conferences brought about 
progress on matters of security and co-operation 
and that the USSR made it clearly understood 
that it wanted to develop East-West co-operation 
in the areas of science, technology, transport, 
energy and agriculture as well as displaying 
interest in the Eureka programme. More and 
more the Soviet authorities are seeking to 
promote mixed enterprises to encourage the par-
ticipation of western capital in their economic 
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development and no doubt also to promote their 
exports to the West. 
However, there are two obstacles to the devel-
opment of such co-operation - economic 
espionage and the extent of activities with mil-
itary associations in the Soviet economy. 
This rapid glance at internal reforms, 
European questions and economic relations 
brings us to the issue of Soviet policy outside 
Europe. One paragraph of the report deals with 
the Middle East, and another with the Far East. 
Perhaps I may say in conclusion that Mr. 
Gorbachev's administration is giving Western 
Europe an exceptional opportunity to consol-
idate peace and make progress. But Europe must 
not buy these results either at the cost of any 
sacrifice of liberty or at the expense of its 
security. 
The role of WEU, the single European 
organisation with competence in defence 
matters, is to make known the requirements of 
European security at a time when the two super-
powers appear ready to reach an understanding 
on the limitation of nuclear weapons. 
Disarmament must not be limited to 
intermediate-range nuclear weapons but must 
extend to strategic, conventional and chemical 
armaments. It must lead to an equilibrium and 
allow of genuine verification. 
Detente cannot be limited to disarmament but 
must aim at bringing the two halves of Europe 
together on the basis of the principles defined in 
Helsinki. 
The search for peaceful solutions to the crises 
in parts of the world outside the NATO area is 
essential to the maintenance of peace within 
Europe itsel£ This is not a matter limited to the 
two superpowers but must necessarily involve 
the active and autonomous intervention of 
Europe. 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, a draft 
order accompanying the report instructs the 
Presidential Committe to pursue the exchange of 
views started in Moscow in ..f\,pril 1987. For us, 
this is a way of projecting tb.e voice of Europe 
rather than that of the individual nations in the 
East-West dialogue. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Pecriaux. 
The debate is open. 
I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
May I start by complimenting Mr. Pecriaux on a 
wide-ranging and interesting report. It covers an 
enormous amount of ground and I believe that 
he has done the Assembly a great service. He 
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ranges from technology to human rights and no 
one could quarrel with his assumptions. That 
was indicated by the fact that the draft recom-
mendation was unanimous. That is not always 
so in this organisation. 
However, we must be aware of three criteria. 
First, there is no evidence that the basic elements 
of Russian foreign policy have changed since the 
days of Peter the Great. Communist commissars 
do not differ in that respect from Tsarist min-
isters. This is not in any way condemning what is 
happening at the moment. It is merely being real-
istic. All Soviet moves on glasnost must be seen 
in that light. 
Secondly, how much freeing of the log-jam has 
taken place so far - the release of dozens from 
the gulags, leaving how many tens of thousands 
rotting away and the granting of a few score of 
visas to refuseniks, leaving how many thousands 
of all religions still persecuted for their desire to 
believe in God? Are the citizens of the Baltic 
states allowed to resume their independent 
status, which was so brutally and illegally stolen 
from them in 1940? Are the people of Poland 
allowed their free trade unions or, indeed, free 
elections? How much importance is really 
attached to human rights in a meaningful way? 
Nothing that I have said is intended to deni-
grate what Mr. Gorbachev has said and done so 
far, although I do not think that anyone would 
quarrel with me if I were to say that he has said 
rather more than he has been allowed to perform 
so far. I say" allowed" because Mr. Gorbachev 
is engaged in a game of chess and he does not 
know the moves that other elements within the 
Soviet Union will let him make in the end. Of 
course, we must seize every opportunity of 
helping him to achieve progress in those fields 
which will benefit all mankind, East and West 
alike, but not if it will be an unbalanced benefit 
for the East. 
Thirdly, why are moves being made? Why has 
there been an apparent change in Soviet policy 
since the age of the old men? Clearly, Mr. 
Gorbachev was able to persuade his colleagues in 
the Politburo that the Soviet economy could not 
sustain military expenditure at its present high 
level and deliver to its citizens even some of the 
benefits that had been promised by communism 
over the past seventy years. 
Mr. Gorbachev has staked a great deal on 
achieving various disarmament measures. His 
very future may depend on a form of payment by 
results. He will have to show those in the Soviet 
hierarchy who are suspicious of him that he is 
able to achieve results that could not be achieved 
by those who believe that the old policies are 
more likely to benefit the Soviet Union. As Mr. 
160 
TENTH SITTING 
Pecriaux's report says, it must be in the West's 
interests to co-operate as far as we can, commen-
surate with our safety and with our over-
whelming belief in the right of men to have their 
freedom, irrespective of the form of government 
under which they live. 
I have painted a gloomy picture. The efficient 
eastern propaganda machine has been able to 
make a great impression in the West because too 
often we respond rather than say what we 
believe. If we walked into the streets of Paris, 
Amsterdam, Berlin or any of our capital cities 
and asked the average citizen why the INF treaty 
was being signed, would he know? Would he 
know that a decade ago the West said that it 
would not deploy cruise and Pershing if the Rus-
sians did not put in SS-20s? 
We know that the only reason why we went on 
burdening ourselves with extra weapons was that 
the Russians were not prepared to cease sta-
tioning SS-20s and the like in positions that were 
dangerous to the West. The Soviets win the prop-
aganda battle all along, even though the West has 
a better story to tell. I do not wish to be too pro-
vocative, so I shall say instead that our story is as 
good as theirs, but we do not tell it. 
The only aspect of the contribution by the 
Dutch Defence Minister this morning that dis-
turbed me slightly was that he did not seem to be 
too keen to have a propaganda machine talking 
about the achievements of WEU unless there 
were lasting military achievements, such as the 
signing of the INF treaty. I believe that ifWEU is 
to do its job, it must point out time and again 
that it is working to get a form of security in 
Central Europe that will satisfy East and West 
and is not neglecting the fundamental issue of 
human rights. How many of our citizens know 
that? 
The Assembly has been starved of funds and 
that may be one reason why we are not putting 
out these stories. However, the Secretary-
General's department and the Minister's 
department have not been starved of funds, yet 
still we hear so little. 
Will any colleague put up his hand if he has 
received from WEU over the past two years any 
piece of paper setting out its achievements? I do 
not believe that anyone has had such a piece of 
paper. I certainly have not, yet every month I 
receive a four-page sheet from the Soviet 
Embassy telling me what it is doing. If anyone 
from the Secretary-General's office is present, he 
might try to enlist our help in our common battle 
to persuade the public that we are doing a val-
uable job. 
I do not believe in making long speeches and I 
have only one more thing to say. Mr. Pecriaux's 
report and speech were masterpieces of balance 
and common sense. We have to continue on the 
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same path, with flexibility and safeguards. Those 
safeguards can be reduced or eliminated only 
when we have cast-iron replacements in place. 
Words are not enough; we need deeds. Some-
times, too much thought paralyses action. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Muller. 
Mr. MULLER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, I think I can readily support what the 
previous speaker, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, has just 
said, and endorse Mr. Pecriaux's excellent report, 
because it really is a good review of recent devel-
opments. 
While supporting the previous speaker, I 
would like to focus on something of which we 
should always be aware when we are considering 
Russian foreign policy. I am deliberately not 
saying " Soviet foreign policy " but " Russian 
foreign policy". We should realise that we must 
consider not only the ideology contained in the 
word " Soviet " but also the long-term strategy, 
the long-term objectives of Russian foreign 
policy. 
Ladies and gentlemen, since the days of the 
brothers Orlov's squadron, which sailed out into 
the Mediterranean during the reign of Catherine 
the Great, Russia's desire to command the 
straits, the warm Mediterranean seas, has been a 
basic ingredient of its foreign policy. If we 
observe Russia's foreign policy through the 19th 
century until the October revolution and what 
followed, we shall detect a certain degree of con-
tinuity, only briefly interrupted ideologically by 
Lenin's pronouncements on the right of the 
peoples to self-determination, and other pro-
nouncements which constituted exceptions and 
were very soon followed by a return to the 
standard line of Russian foreign policy. 
It is really surprising that hardly any other 
country in Europe has so consistently pursued 
the same foreign policy for decades and cen-
turies. Remember, for example, that the secret 
protocol appended to the Hitler-Stalin pact set 
out in precise terms the guidelines for the 
interests of Russian foreign policy in the Medi-
terranean in particular, the Middle East, the Gulf 
and even the east coast of Africa. Remember that 
at the conference of foreign ministers held in 
Paris after the war the Russian foreign minister 
demanded that the Soviet Union be given the 
mandates over the former Italian colonies. Its 
aim was to have a base at Massawa in Eritrea, a 
base obtained there long ago by the Soviet Union 
as a result of its long-term policy. 
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nelles. This has clearly been Russian policy for 
decades and centuries. 
Many aspects of current Soviet policy in the 
third world - I have mentioned Eritrea, for 
example - show that the Soviet Union is still 
pursuing these long-term Russian foreign policy 
objectives. 
In recent months, however, we have been 
experiencing something completely new to the 
West. We are seeing a Tsar, a General Secretary 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
attempting to pursue Russian foreign policy with 
media ideas and western media techniques. And, 
ladies and gentlemen, this foreign policy of his is 
extremely successful! If you look at the opinion 
polls in my country, the Federal Republic, and 
other European countries, you will see that most 
people - the man in the street, as they say - are 
convinced that it will be primarily due to Mr. 
Gorbachev, not some western statesman, if dis-
armament negotiations and peace talks now get 
under way. The opinion polls in the Federal 
Republic reveal that Gorbachev is believed to 
have a greater desire for peace than, say, the 
American President. 
This is indicative of the many years of expe-
rience of the western media world gathered by 
Mr. Dobrynin, the new man responsible for 
foreign policy in the Centrail Committee, the 
Soviet Union's party apparatus, who was ambas-
sador to the United States for twenty years. Mr. 
Dobrynin - I once had the opportunity to talk to 
him for two hours in Washington many years 
ago - is a shrewd man who knows exactly how 
policy can be made in the United States with the 
help of television, for example. 
It is surprising that the book Gorbachev has 
written on perestroika has become a bestseller in 
the United States. He did not, of course, publish 
it through the central publishing house of the 
Communist Party in Moscow but through a capi-
talist publisher in the United States, to ensure 
that it would be marketed properly. 
Mr. Gorbachev is capable, for example, of 
admitting in a television interview transmitted 
yesterday something that has always been denied 
by the Soviet Union: that the Soviet Union, just 
like the United States, is conducting research 
into SDI or space weapons. He does this with a 
smile, on television, in such a friendly way that 
instead of seeing it as a threat one gets the feeling 
that it is "business as usual", just as when the 
prime minister or president of a western country 
makes the same kind of statement before the tel-
evision cameras as the General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union did in this 
case. 
Or think of the Soviet Union's ultimatum to Ladies and gentlem~n, I am surprised that the 
Turkey even before the war was over, demanding public in the United States, for instance, should 
military establishments and bases on the Darda- blow hot and cold like this. For many years the 
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Soviet Union or Soviet politicians were seen by 
the public as what I would call absolute 
Beelzebubs. Today they command a completely 
different position. This rapid change from one 
position to the other is something that worries 
me, because I feel it is necessary in such situa-
tions to keep a clear head, which means neither 
disparaging nor admiring anyone unduly. 
Nor are we careful enough in our use of the 
language, the terms. Let me give you an example. 
When the Chairman of the Moscow Soviet, Mr. 
Yeltsin, was dismissed, the headlines in my 
country read: "Yeltsin voted out of office". 
Ladies and gentlemen, no one was voted out of 
office in Moscow, he was dismissed. But terms 
like this are not used any more. The terms that 
are taken for granted in our democratic systems 
are used instead. Here he would have to be voted 
out of office or resign. These terms are used for 
the processes of a different system, which helps 
to obscure the facts, so that the reality is no 
longer seen. 
There have been one or two interesting state-
ments from Mr. Gorbachev which have in fact 
made it clear that not a great deal has changed. 
There was, for example, an interview with the 
editor of the French communist newspaper 
Humanite, in which Gorbachev was asked about 
the state of pluralism of opinion in the Soviet 
Union. Gorbachev's answer was - rightly -
frank: We do not have pluralism of opinion, we 
have socialist pluralism of opinion. But of course 
that is quite different from what we understand 
by pluralism of opinion. 
When asked if there were any political pris-
oners in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev answered: 
No, there is not a single political prisoner in the 
Soviet Union. All this under the heading of 
glasnost and perestroika, two terms once used 
even in Lenin's day. They are by no means new 
inventions. 
Let me give you one final example. You know 
that a major problem in the relationship between 
the Poles and Russians - I repeat: Poles and 
Russians- is the tragedy ofKatyn, the fate ofthe 
Polish officers captured during the war and liqui-
dated by the Soviet NKVD, because the Soviet 
Union marched into Poland from the East at the 
beginning of the second war. Perestroika should 
mean telling the truth about this. But what is 
happening? A Russo-Polish commission has now 
been set up to look into the matter. 
The first interim report, which appeared in the 
organ of the Communist Party of the Federal 
Republic, Unsere Zeit, on 30th October 1987, 
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fascist German murderers". I am a historian, 
ladies and gentlemen, and I am now taking a 
completely non-political view of this event, 
simply as part of history. But how can there be a 
new beginning, how can there be greater honesty 
- in the relationship between Poles and Rus-
sians, say - without a willingness to accept 
certain historical facts of this relationship which 
were disagreeable. 
If you read Gorbachev's speech on the seven-
tieth anniversary of the October revolution - I 
have done so: it is a very long and wide-ranging 
speech - it must be acknowledged that attempts 
are being made to achieve a new position, but 
that Gorbachev is being extremely cautious 
about making genuine admissions. When ref-
erence is made to the thousands of victims of 
bureaucracy under Stalin, it should in reality be 
to the millions of victims of a whole system 
installed by Stalin. 
So Gorbachev is very cautious in his state-
ments. Perhaps he has to be because his own 
apparatus, the apparatus from which he comes is 
still unable and unwilling to grasp all the disa-
greeable events that have occurred in the history 
of that great European country now known as the 
Soviet Union. 
I therefore feel - and here I agree with the pre-
vious speaker and the Rapporteur - that we 
must be frank, that we must be prepared to talk, 
but that in these discussions we must never 
forget where we stand. We are representatives of 
democratic countries, who stand up for freedom 
and human rights. We must always introduce 
these demands for freedom and human rights 
into the discussions, even though we are all con-
vinced that everything possible must be done to 
preserve peace and reduce the stockpiles of 
weapons. But this must not be allowed to make 
us forget the great objectives that distinguish us 
as democracies: freedom, human rights and 
human dignity. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Rubbi. 
Mr. RUBBI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. Pre-
sident, ladies and gentlemen, the report that Mr. 
Pecriaux has put before our Assembly today 
describes in a full and convincing manner the 
most important aspects of significant develop-
ments in Soviet foreign policy over the last few 
years. 
Naturally, divergent opinions could well be 
expressed about some of his judgments and 
views but the fact remains that this is a highly 
praiseworthy and comprehensive study and 
deserves the approval of our vote. 
states that the commission had agreed there was There is no doubt that Soviet foreign policy 
fresh and much stronger evidence that these has undergone changes and developments in its 
Polish officers had been killed by " gangs of principles and orientation during the course of 
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the last two years that could well have appeared 
unthinkable only a short time ago. Our 
Rapporteur, too, wonders whether the change is 
genuine. The answer cannot be simply a matter 
of trust, it has to be put to the test of fact, and 
one extraordinary fact is that in Washington in a 
few days' time, the United States and the Soviet 
Union will be signing an agreement for the dis-
mantling of medium- and short-range nuclear 
weapons and will lay the foundations, or at least 
we hope they will, for reaching even more 
important agreements in the near future on stra-
tegic nuclear weapons and chemical weapons. 
There is no doubt that such agreements, 
together with the possibility of negotiated settle-
ments to regional conflicts and tensions, would 
make the climate of international relations 
calmer and the foundations of coexistence and 
peace more secure for the peoples of the whole 
world. 
But is there not a risk that, following this 
agreement between the two great powers, the part 
of the world in which we live may find its 
security threatened? We should be grateful to the 
Rapporteur for identifying a close connection 
between the new direction of Soviet foreign 
policy and Western Europe's security because it 
is on that point that conflicting judgments and 
views remain. To my way of thinking, the point 
is that in some countries and certain governing 
parties in Western Europe old and out-dated 
concepts are dying hard in political and military 
thinking. The kind of response they see to the 
exciting challenge of disarmament and a new 
equilibrium and basis for international relations 
postulates a third, European, military bloc, based 
on the French and British nuclear capabilities 
and built up around improbable new alliances 
between a number of European countries. 
Western Europe will not ensure its security in 
that way; instead it should be playing an active 
part in the disarmament processes now under 
way which need to be extended to theatre nuclear 
weapons and conventional armaments, with 
their balanced and controlled reduction to lower 
and lower levels in view. What we need on this 
side of the continent is a similar development in 
concepts and policy on how the problems of 
security and defence have to be formulated 
today, in terms of gradual disarmament, political 
guarantees and growing East-West and North-
South co-operation. 
There is one other and final aspect of the 
report that I feel deserves consideration, 
however brief. Will not these profound changes 
taking place in the USSR result in a stronger 
Soviet Union? Is it therefore in the interests of 
the West to lend its support to the new directions 
taken by the Gorbachev leadership on the inter-
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national and domestic fronts? Mr. Pecriaux was 
very right to ask us these questions because they 
are at the root of the opposition and concern to 
which the new Soviet trend has given rise in the 
West. Is not this, perhaps, the reason why 
attempts are being made in the United States to 
raise the voices of groups who could like to 
oppose not only ratification! of the agreement on 
missiles but also confirmation of the commit-
ments of the ABM treaty and the political set-
tlement of disputes from central America to the 
Middle East and from Afghanistan to South 
Africa? But what real interest could Western 
Europe have in obstructing this radical change of 
direction in the Soviet Union's foreign and 
domestic policy? If the reform is likely to help 
bring results abroad in the way of disarmament, 
easing of tensions and new relations of trust and 
co-operation and if, at home, it is a move in the 
direction of democratisation, political reform, 
the recognition of fundamental human rights 
and economic, social and civil development, is 
not all this, apart from ~erving the primary 
interests of the people of tlie Soviet Union, also 
in our own interest? Is it not in the interests of a 
Europe that has, for forty years, suffered too 
much from the effects of division and antag-
onism and now needs to set its feet again on the 
path of trust, co-operation and unity? 
If, with this change in pol~cy, the Soviet Union 
comes out the stronger I ~elieve that we shall 
have nothing to fear becaus~ of the results it will 
bring in those directions. On the contrary our 
reasons for continuing in our efforts to ensure 
that the great values of peace, democracy and 
social and civil progress prevail will be all the 
more compelling. 
' 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Declercq. 
Mr. DECLERCQ (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I will begin by thanking Mr. 
Pecriaux and congratulating him on this 
excellent report. It is extremely up to date, and it 
contains some very interesting information. 
I agree with the previous speakers who pointed 
out that the West and especially the younger gen-
eration see Gorbachev at the moment as a kind 
of angel of peace with a message that is very 
appealing to young people. As a result the public 
is currently gaining a rather distorted impression 
of the Soviet Union. 
I find it highly appropriate that the report 
should consider these problems and that Mr. 
Pecriaux's conclusions should be very cautious. 
None of us can say for sure at the moment if 
glasnost and perestroika are empty words, words 
without substance, or if they will lead to real 
change in Russia and throughout what I will call 
" the Soviet Empire". But it is obvious that a 
negative attitude towards the openness that 
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Russia is trying to initiate will get us nowhere 
with the public and especially with young people 
in the West. We must therefore look for ways to 
test the " good will " that the Soviet Union is 
showing us. We must forward formulas that 
supply the proof of the pudding, perhaps by once 
again resorting to the three baskets of Helsinki in 
each case. Above all, we must refer to those 
aspects which are surely characteristic of a demo-
cratic society and which we are entitled to 
require Soviet Russia to satisfy. I have in mind 
freedom of movement, trade relations, normally 
structured practical respect for human rights. 
What I am saying, therefore, is that, by building 
on the cautious conclusions drawn by Mr. 
Pecriaux and taking a number of initiatives, we 
must try to establish how sound and genuine the 
glasnost offensive is. 
. -\nother problem is this: I am glad that Mr. 
Pecriaux also discusses the Middle East problem 
in his report. I should like to champion the idea 
of Western European Union's supporting a peace 
conference on the Palestinian question in which 
Russia would take part. I know there is a ten-
dency towards aloofness in some countries, but I 
am convinced that nothing will ever be achieved 
unless Russia takes part in a conference of this 
kind. 
My second argument is that Russia must be 
involved - indirectly perhaps - in the 
organisation of peace in the Middle East. This 
will also mean that we can appeal to Soviet 
Russia with regard to one of the gravest dangers 
threatening the western world today, the 
movement towards integration and the spread of 
fundamentalism in the Islamic world. Only ifwe 
can also involve Soviet Russia in discussions on 
this problem shall we be able to seek worthwhile 
solutions. But the price to be paid - and I do not 
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think it is too high - is that we allow Soviet 
Russia to attend an international peace con-
ference on Palestine. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is adjourned. 
6. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public sitting 
tomorrow morning, Thursday, 3rd December, at 
10 a. m. with the following orders of the day: 
1. Recent developments in Soviet external 
policy (Resumed debate on the report of the 
General Affairs Committee and votes on 
the draft recommendation and draft order, 
Document 1111 and addendum) . 
2. Threat assessment (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments and 
vote on the draft recommendation, Doc-
ument 1115 and amendment). 
3. Public information activities on security 
and defence matters in WEU member 
countries (Presentation of and debate on 
the report of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations and vote on 
the draft resolution, Document 1112). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.) 
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The sitting was opened at 10 a. m. with Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the 
Chair. 
The PRESIDENT. - The sitting is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT.- The names ofthe substi-
tutes attending this sitting which have been 
notified to the President will be published with 
the list of representatives appended to the 
minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT.- In accordance with Rule 
21 ofthe Rules of Procedure, the minutes of pro-
ceedings of the previous sitting have been dis-
tributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. Recent developments in Soviet 
external policy 
(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs 
Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and 
draft order, Doe. 1111 and addendum) 
The PRESIDENT.- The next order of the day 
is the resumed debate on the report of the 
General Affairs Committee on recent develop-
I. See page 38. 
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ments in Soviet external policy and votes on the 
draft recommendation anq draft order, Doc-
ument 1111 and addendum. 
I call Mr. Hill. 
Mr. HILL (United Kingdom). - Thank you, 
Mr. President, for calling me so promptly. Mr. 
Pecriaux, who has made such an admirable 
report on developments in Soviet external 
policy, has presented a balanced report. Some of 
yesterday's speeches took away my main 
debating platform. Certainly the problem of why 
the moves being made by Mr. Gorbachev at this 
time are being made is a matter for deep thought 
among the left and right of the political parties in 
Europe. The left, of course, see this as another 
bursting of a clear sun over a very gloomy 
Europe. They are reading so much into the 
present moves by the USS.R that their expecta-
tions must be proving a serious handicap to Mr. 
Gorbachev. 
Mr. Gorbachev has alreaay had his problems 
inside Russia. The conflict petween himself and 
the gentleman responsible for Moscow has been 
given prominent publicity, but most of those 
who have already spoken have emphasised the 
once bitten, twice shy political approach. Mr. 
Khrushchev entered a great period of detente, 
rapprochement and peace between the USSR 
and the rest of the western world. It was not until 
he took off his shoe at the United Nations that 
we began to realise that it was still the same 
Khrushchev beneath the surface. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Hill (continued) 
We have seen the same approach from Mr. 
Gorbachev in his handling of the Moscow affair. 
He acted almost in a Stalinist manner by 
repressing his colleague, removing him from 
office and, oddly, appointing him to a less 
important post within three weeks. We do not 
know how the master chess player of politics will 
cope with the signing of the INF agreement. 
Mr. Gorbachev had a spectacular success on 
American television. The NBC interviewed him 
in Moscow and, although the only new matter to 
come out was the information that Moscow was 
still pursuing its own star wars research, the 
overwhelming impression was that President 
Reagan, who has become almost a recluse in tele-
vision terms, will have a hard battle to match 
Mr. Gorbachev when he plays to the American 
television cameras. The public relations 
in-fighting has already begun and even the most 
hardened observers agree that Mr. Gorbachev is 
winning hands down. 
The report before us mentions Mr. 
Gorbachev's public relations successes, but also 
covers the CSCE process in which thirty-five 
nations are involved. Much good has come out 
of the Vienna meetings and the nations of WEU 
are determined to get a workable European 
security operation. The British Foreign Office 
Minister, Mr. Mellor, told us earlier this week 
about the harmonisation of our forces in the 
Gulf. The WEU nations are acting collectively 
for the first time. Unfortunately, the Soviet 
Union is not backing Resolution 598 from the 
United Nations Security Council. The Russians 
could be an enormous force for good in the 
Iran-Iraq conflict. 
We are unable to make many moves towards 
dialogue with the Supreme Soviet because we do 
not want to become embroiled in a public rela-
tions campaign. Our friends in the United States 
do not want us to move closer to the Soviet 
Union, even if only through dialogue with the 
Supreme Soviet, whose members are not elected 
representatives. 
The Rapporteur's difficulty has been to 
balance his reports with the fact that the situ-
ation is moving extremely quickly. The CSCE is 
the yardstick against which we should measure 
the behaviour of all the countries of Europe. It is 
a blueprint for Europe. It was not achieved by 
the European Community and it is free of bar-
riers. 
We have consistently pressed the human rights 
issue that is set out in the Helsinki final act. Mr. 
Gorbachev will be considering that seriously. It 
is one area where he could show that the key to 
success of detente or glasnost is a Soviet will-
ingness to register advances in human rights. 
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Discussions will revolve around the INF treaty 
and the subsequent security of Europe. We have 
heard that the number of nuclear missiles 
involved is only 3% of verifiable stocks, and the 
British Prime Minister has spelt out her fears 
about conventional weapons and stocks of 
chemical weapons. We have a long way to go. 
Mr. Gorbachev is being urged on with enormous 
good will, but he is a creature of a system that 
could remove him as easily and effectively as he 
removed his Moscow colleague. 
Let us wish Mr. Gorbachev as much success as 
he can obtain in moving towards peace and 
security in Europe. However, we must also 
wonder how long he can remain in power. We all 
know that logic does not always prevail in pol-
itics. 
The report makes it clear that we must 
advance slowly, though with all the good will in 
the world. We have not had much success in our 
dealings with the Soviet Union and while its mil-
itary capability remains so massive we must 
weigh our words carefully. As the British Foreign 
Secretary has said, we must have realism, vigi-
lance and an open mind in our negotiations with 
the Soviet Union. 
The report goes a long way towards my 
thinking. It was agreed unanimously in com-
mittee and I regard it as a balanced report which 
can do only good. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Soell. 
Mr. SOELL (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, ladies and gen-
tlemen, I should first like to thank the 
Rapporteur for presenting a very balanced 
report, with a wide range that is all the more 
praiseworthy because in many respects we still 
know too little of the details and analytically 
ascertainable elements of the process of reform 
in the Soviet Union. 
The delegation from the Presidential Com-
mittee of the Assembly of Western European 
Union certainly had a number of interesting dis-
cussions and also gained some on-the-spot 
impressions during its visit to Moscow. But we 
largely rely on information obtained through the 
media and the same undoubtedly applies to the 
Rapporteur. This is a major problem and one 
that has already been referred to by various 
speakers in our debates. Western European 
Union and its organs must greatly improve their 
analytical instruments if they are to be able to 
study longer-lasting processes in the Soviet 
Union and their influence on international pol-
itics. 
On the basis of information available through 
the media the Rapporteur has analysed develop-
ments in the Soviet Union to some extent. His 
work here ought really to have been done, as part 
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of their preliminary work, by Western European 
Union's organs, especially the agencies, who 
should, of course, have made use of the scientific 
apparatus, the experts on the Soviet Union and 
those who are experienced in the analysis of 
communist systems of the Soviet type. 
The important thing here, as far as I can see, is 
that for the first time in recent years an attempt 
has been made to present the Soviet Union's 
foreign policy in a broader historical and interna-
tional context, and also the inherent dynamism 
of the Soviet system and the obstacles the Soviet 
Union will encounter when it comes to pursuing 
a more rational and co-operative foreign 
policy. 
We now know that processes have taken place 
in the Soviet Union in past decades, including 
developments in the area of disarmament, which 
have remained largely concealed from the West. 
Many analyses of the threat from the Soviet 
Union fail in effect to consider that Stalin's mass 
armies of the 1940s and early 1950s were greatly 
reduced by Mr. Khrushchev between 1955 and 
1962. According to western estimates based on 
research in the last few years, he reduced these 
armies by between 1.2 and 2 million men. 
Western countries did not know about this, 
partly because the Soviet leaders did not want 
them to know. There were certain economic con-
ditions that forced the Soviet Union to reduce 
mass armament. This is an example of some-
thing being concealed for decades because the 
West obviously lacks a sufficient analytical appa-
ratus, although some of the information we now 
have was available in the Soviet press. 
The second point I want to discuss is also 
raised in the report. It has rightly been pointed 
out that Mr. Gorbachev refers to the new eco-
nomic policy (NEP) of the early 1920s, and so to 
Lenin, to justify his current reform policy. At 
that time this policy did not get beyond its initial 
stages and was replaced by Stalin's policy of 
five-year plans and industrialisation in the mid-
and late 1920s. This being the case, certain fore-
casts can, of course, be made, seeing that the 
time set aside for the Soviet reforms is again very 
short. A comparison with, say, the changes in the 
system in China in the nine years since the prop-
agation of the four modernisations by Deng 
Xiaoping in 1978 shows that the Chinese eco-
nomic and social reforms are based on quite a 
different timescale. Lack of time may be one of 
the most serious threats to Soviet reforms and 
although it will certainly not have any direct 
implications for East-West relations, there are 
bound to be indirect implications. 
I feel it was right that the report should also 
refer to the difference in the perception of the 
threat in Western Europe and the United States. 
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We know that this perception is not only subJect 
to very frequent change but also to a shift of 
phase: when the threat is seen as relatively 
limited, or more limited, in Western Europe, it 
often expands in the eyes of opinion-leaders in 
the United States. And vice versa: when the 
threat is rated lower in the United States, it very 
often grows larger in Western European eyes. We 
have just had this debate at the conference of 
NATO foreign ministers, where a study by the 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff was discussed, 
which rated the threat from the Soviet Union's 
conventional forces lower than previous studies 
by the Pentagon. 
Another important point is that the report 
refers to the difference between Western 
Europe's and the Soviet Union's concept of 
human rights. It is not just that the emphasis is 
placed on the human rights of the individual in 
the West and on collective social human rights in 
the East but that, as the Soviet Union and other 
communist systems see it, there are no human 
rights outside the state, no human rights that the 
individual enjoys as a matter of course. That, to 
my mind, is a fundamental difference, more fun-
damental than the distinction between collective 
and individual human rights. 
Furthermore, it is undoubtedly right - and I 
will conclude with this - that the tenor of the 
report should not be too et,tphoric about the 
Soviet Union's attempts at internal reform, or 
draw rash conclusions from it for western policy. 
But it is also important that we seize the oppor-
tunities presented by this reform policy, because 
when I compare the present situation with the 
1960s, when the West made its first attempts at 
detente, I must say that things look rather more 
favourable at the moment. 
I recall that in the mid-1960s Charles de 
Gaulle, the then head of state of our host 
country, France, considerably advanced this 
debate in the West with his triad "detente, 
entente, co-operation " at a time when internal 
events in the Soviet Union were causing 
enormous difficulties. At that time - the 
Khrushchev era had just been brought to an end 
and, with it, the attempt to take a first real step 
towards destalinisation- the party apparatus hit 
back and reversed the attempts at reform made 
under Mr. Khrushchev. Nevertheless, the goal of 
" detente, entente, co-operalion " was being 
propagated at that time. 
We know that many events in foreign policy-
including the estrangement between China and 
Moscow - actually enabled a policy to be 
pursued that led to the first measures of detente. 
But we also know how fragile that was, when 
there was a fresh arms build-up in the latter half 
of the 1970s. 
We cannot expect the Soviet leaders to give up 
communism in order to achieve a more peaceful 
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situation and closer co-operation between East 
and West, so we have to live with this system. 
We must weigh up the prospects for East-West 
relations under the new Soviet leadership with 
the same care that has been taken in the 
report. 
I should like to thank the Rapporteur once 
again and express my appreciation for the 
attitude he has adopted in drawing up this 
report. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Atkinson. 
Mr. A TKINSON (United Kingdom). - I con-
gratulate Mr. Pecriaux on an excellent and well-
balanced report, although, as I shall point out, 
there are some omissions that should be taken 
into account in considering the recommenda-
tions. There is no doubt that the most significant 
word for the future of Western European Union 
since we ourselves discovered the word " reacti-
vation " is " glasnost ". That was not a word in 
our vocabulary at the time of the Rome decla-
ration. Now it is used more frequently than any 
other in our circles. As our Rapporteur reminded 
us in paragraph 2 of his report, our reactivation 
combined with glasnost has led to the estab-
lishment of an unprecedented dialogue with 
Moscow. We look forward to the political con-
clusions of the General Affairs Committee when 
it reports to this Assembly in due course. 
It is essential that those conclusions are real-
istic and that they are firmer and clearer than 
those before us today. Of course Mr. 
Gorbachev's initiatives should encourage in us a 
renewed sense of optimism. They are in such 
contrast to the moribund Brezhnev-Chernenko 
years which Mr. Andropov's brief spell could do 
little to change except to pave the way for Mr. 
Gorbachev himself. 
ELEVENTH SITTING 
the people of Romania rose up tomorrow, as 
they have every reason to do, would the Kremlin 
regard it as an internal matter? I doubt it. We 
should also recall that neither Mr. Khrushchev 
nor his reforms survived, because they 
threatened too many vested interests and petty 
empires in the party and in the bureaucracy. 
As the Rapporteur warns, Mr. Gorbachev may 
yet suffer a similar fate, because we know that his 
stagnating economy cannot be reversed without 
changes so radical politically that they may not 
be tolerated. We may yet see such a reaction to 
them and to him that could restore both terror 
within and a return to the cold war without. We 
should remind ourselves also that there is no evi-
dence that Mr. Gorbachev's democratisation 
means what we would like it to mean, that is, our 
system of parliamentary democracy, which we 
know to be the system that best provides pro-
tection for human rights. 
He has made it plain, and of course, he has no 
choice other than so to do, that the dominating 
role of the communist party is not in question, 
although it may be removed from the day-to-day 
running of his new enterprises, which would be a 
wise move to avoid blame for failure that might 
follow. Nor is the KGB, that hallmark of the one-
party state and of the Stalin terror, to be dis-
mantled. 
We should accept, also, that any new leader of 
the Soviet Union desperately needs to face up to 
the chronic failure of the socialist system to 
deliver and to embark upon economic reforms if 
he is to satisfy his people. We should appreciate, 
as you reminded us, Mr. President, that all those 
dissidents who have been released number no 
more than a few hundred compared with the 
thousands of prisoners of conscience who 
remain, and that they have been highly selected 
and that they are highly symbolic because we in 
the West have made them household names 
through our campaigns on their behalf. They 
became public embarrassments to the Kremlin. 
These initiatives imply - although they have 
yet to deliver, as many speakers have reminded 
us - the end to the oppression of the Soviet 
people and genuine attempts to increase their Nor are there any proposals to change Soviet 
standard of living, which we must welcome. If policy so that Christians and Jews who want to 
these changes come about, we must hope that emigrate to countries where they can bring up 
they will lead to further reforms to satisfy both their families in a religious manner will no longer 
the consumer demands and the political feel the need to leave the land of their birth. As 
demands of the Soviet people. Our optimism, this report concentrates on the effects of glasnost 
however, must be tempered with realism and, on Soviet external policy in particular, we should 
indeed, by scepticism as we remind ourselves note, as it does, that the Red Army continues to 
that we have all been here before, as several occupy Afghanistan and that the Soviet Union is 
speakers have already said. doing little to encourage Vietnam to evacuate 
Cambodia. We should note too, as the report 
As James Hill has pointed out, at the twentieth does not, that Soviet officers are taking an even 
party congress in 1956 Mr. Khrushchev also more influential role in the conduct of the war in 
denounced Stalin and all his terror and Angola and that Soviet advisers remain in 
announced reforms not too dissimilar to glasnost Ethiopia: so, tragically, does the famine as a con-
and perestroika at that time. Yet within months sequence. To the Kremlin, Marxism comes 
the Red Army was in the streets of Hungary before aid. It is essential that such realities are 
crushing that country's attempt to break free. If borne in mind in any recommendations dealing 
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with Soviet foreign policy under Mr. 
Gorbachev. 
I agree that we must seek a balanced result in 
our negotiations in the CSCE in Vienna, 
however long it takes. There must be no conces-
sions to the Soviets on trade or aid or credits or 
technology, nor any development in scientific 
and cultural relations, without similar conces-
sions from them on the real implementation of 
the humanitarian and human rights provisions 
of Helsinki. Our interests must be linked with 
theirs not only by promises but by actual per-
formance. The recommendations before us could 
be more emphatic about that. 
Finally, the report does not address the Soviet 
proposal to hold a conference on human rights 
within the Helsinki process in Moscow next year. 
It is important that this parliamentary Assembly 
expresses a view. Personally, I do not believe 
that we should agree to hold such a conference in 
any place where human rights are so denied. 
Instead we must signal to the Kremlin that the 
rhetoric of glasnost must first be turned into 
deeds and that those deeds must include the 
release of all prisoners of conscience, the end to 
all jamming of all external broadcasts, the end to 
all controls preventing the freedom of movement 
and the freedom to emigrate, the unrestricted 
sale of western newspapers and journals, and 
legal protection for all the human rights and Hel-
sinki monitoring groups that have recently been 
established. 
When all these have come about, then can we 
really sit up and accept that Mr. Gorbachev has 
gone further than any of his predecessors, and 
that he is indeed someone with whom we can, 
with vigilance, do business. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Bordu. 
Mr. BORDU (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, the report pre-
sented by Mr. Pecriaux and the General Affairs 
Committee calls for a number of comments, to 
be seen, of course, in the context of the pre-
vailing sentiment of this session. 
I know that the chief concern of the WEU 
member states and of many parliamentarians in 
this Assembly is to make the most strenuous 
efforts to extricate themselves from what they 
refer to as "Gorbachev logic". This stands in 
curious contradiction to the judgment formed by 
most people in our countries including the 
United States, where this logic is not only greatly 
appreciated as a positive development but was in 
fact that of the western world ten or so years ago. 
Equally curious is the hypothesis prevailing in 
some quarters according to which the Soviet 
Union is the aggressor in all circumstances. 
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These prophets of good or ill fortune perceive 
two possibilities: either the Soviet Union will not 
succeed in building up a competitive economic 
policy and will consequently have to develop 
military power to compensate for the set-back at 
the cost of a reduced social policy, or the Soviet 
Union will become a modern and competitive 
industrial society which will then have the 
capacity to build up a formidable army. 
It is the old story of wavering between 
optimism and pessimism and above all reflects 
the attitude of those who draw their revolvers as 
soon as there is any mention of peace. It is in fact 
a great problem demonstrating that for some 
people- and there are many ofthem- one of the 
problems is still dominated by the imperialist 
strategy of forcing the Soviet Union into heavy 
expenditure on armaments so that it may suffer 
at the economic and social ldvel. 
The closer we get to 8th December, when the 
historic document is to be signed by Mr. Reagan 
and Mr. Gorbachev, the more the hawks are put 
out at seeing themselves deprived of their bel-
licose ideology. Having become accustomed to 
an attitude of febrile anti-Sovietism, they will 
have no alternative but to reconstruct a strategy 
in which the dove triumphs over nuclear evil. 
Even though the arms trade today yields scan-
dalous profits, the burden of armaments and 
armies weighs heavily on every country 
including especially the United States of America 
whose policy is to pass on some of the load to its 
partners. This is exemplified by the costly French 
military programme law. 
Today, the situation of the third world, with its 
debts, insolvency and frightful poverty affects 
the developed countries; and in the same way 
our so-called civilised countries which are 
claimed to champion human rights are involved 
in the development of the fo\llrth world. In fact, 
social policies and equality o~ countries require 
democratic development encompassing both the 
need for a new world economic order and the 
recognition of man as a central element in 
human activities and their fruition. This calls for 
a revolution in our ingrained ,ways of thought, a 
change of attitudes and an accommodation to 
t~e new facts of history. 
Against this background, an examination of 
the reasons inducing the Soviet Union to change, 
without embroidering on the real facts and 
without underestimating the difficulties, also 
demands that we consider the reasons why the 
western countries should also make changes in 
confronting the destiny of all mankind. 
We know that tangible realities of the kind 
which make change inevitable spring from exam-
ination of the objective necessities demanding 
adaptation in an environment which we are all 
destined to share. Every individual is therefore 
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bound by his initial situation, and it seems to me 
that the first phase consists of political will, veri-
fiable actions and applied measures followed by 
the first observable changes. 
For the Soviet Union, the Reagan-Gorbachev 
agreement is clearly a concrete fact whose conse-
quences produce pleasure or antagonistic growls 
but leave nobody unmoved. What is more, in the 
Soviet Union the availability of information, 
openness, the right to leave the country, freedom 
of expression, etc. are problem areas where quite 
considerable progress is being made if serious 
observers of every colour of opinion are to be 
believed. 
Is it not conceivable that the continuation of 
this progress may produce in our own countries 
consequences favourable to an improved social 
and economic policy, which will of course have 
to be imposed on the owners of capital? 
Clearly, all the reports presented at this 
session, be they concerned with policy, science or 
research, accept the logic of a militarisation of 
the economy; this logic is to be condemned but is 
caught up in attitudes of mind which make their 
authors into sorcerer's apprentices. 
It is time to get our acts together instead of 
indulging in what is often an auction between 
conservative and social democratic forces. At a 
time when peoples are yearning for peace and 
welfare we are far removed from the thinking of 
those two great statesmen, General de Gaulle 
and Herr Willy Brandt. 
Our age signals a new international order of 
genuine humanism based on solidarity rather 
than on aid and on the necessarily reciprocal 
nature of our interests with due consideration for 
the most deprived. 
In my opinion, despite some positive aspects, 
Mr. Pecriaux's report is very pessimistic, too pes-
simistic and therefore bars the way to a fuller 
dialogue with the socialist countries in every area 
of security for which the CSCE provides the 
proper forum. The fact is that the results 
achieved at CSCE provide evidence of a real 
commitment by the socialist countries towards 
more democracy, as is borne out by paragraphs 
39 and 44 of Mr. Pecriaux's report. 
The world is confronted by a challenge whose 
elements are democracy, freedom and peace. 
Can we not take up and win this challenge 
together regardless of the social system chosen by 
nations, which we shall not remould in this 
Assembly? 
Why should we not have greater Europe based 
on co-operation? This is so obvious that interna-
tional politics are currently dominated by what is 
happening in the socialist countries, and particu-
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larly in the Soviet Union. The event must be 
measured at this international level. 
Co-operation and the identification of new 
paths along which the world can advance despite 
current fears and the lethal danger generated by 
existing nuclear arsenals undoubtedly constitute 
what must be the dominant philosophy, to the 
special advantage of surviving third world coun-
tries. 
I repeat that Mr. Pecriaux's report, though it 
presents an interesting analysis, is nonetheless in 
my view too pessimistic to win our vote. 
What is more there is a wide gap between the 
estimable position of such a report and the 
reality of the over-armament policy pursued by 
the WEU states. Regardless of the report the 
general sentiment remains - the more we talk of 
disarmament between the Soviets and the Amer-
icans, the more we pursue a policy of over-
armament in the West. 
Allow me to quote a sentence used by Mr. 
Gorbachev in his interview on American tele-
vision. He said in substance: " If the Soviet 
Union and the United States undertake to cal-
culate the attempts made on both sides since the 
war to gain a march on the other, we shall see 
that it leads to nothing but the simple ruination 
of our countries. " 
Mr. President, it is my wish that language of 
this kind should become common throughout 
the world in the immediate future. 
Because it is very properly a major question 
here, I also hope that a conference on human 
rights may be held in Moscow and that it may 
produce new initiatives to advance their cause in 
that country. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom).- I may have 
misheard Mr. Atkinson's introductory remarks 
but I gather that he actually suggested that you 
become president of the Young Conservatives. 
Since we entered the House of Commons 
together rather a long time ago, that seemed to be 
stretching the boundaries of possibility, but I 
share the congratulations that Mr. Atkinson 
offered you on your assumption of the chair 
today. 
I am glad to be able to speak, interspersed as I 
am among a long list of British conservative 
members, all of whom have surprised me in this 
debate by expressing overflowing good will to the 
Soviet Union. So remarkable is their generosity, 
that Mr. Atkinson would rather like Mr. Rupert 
Murdoch to have ample access to Soviet news 
stands. I cannot expect that the Soviet Union 
would be as stupid as western powers which 
allow the morality of their nations to be cor-
rupted by a very unsatisfactory press. 
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We should not make too many extravagant 
demands. I accept that, as Mr. Hill said, the 
Assembly today is overflowing with good will for 
the Soviet Union. Indeed, we are so eager to 
exhibit our good will that we have showered 
advice upon it in every possible direction. We 
seem to be convinced that Mr. Gorbachev is 
capable of working miracles. We expect Mr. 
Gorbachev within a short time to put right 
everything that we feel is wrong within the Soviet 
Union, yet at the same time as we demonstrate 
our good will we also demonstrate our cynicism, 
our scepticism, and our commitment to the 
aggressive capacity that we have long been dem-
onstrating. 
Mr. President, in your speech yesterday you 
referred to Peter the Great. It is right that if we 
are properly to evaluate our relationship as the 
splendid first recommendation suggests, if we are 
properly to carry out that task, clearly we need to 
understand Russian history, and clearly, it is 
right that we should look at the outstanding per-
sonalities in that history such as Peter the Great. 
However, we need to look at much more recent 
history than that if we are properly to understand 
the Soviet Union. We must look at its recent 
history, at the way in which its armies were 
destroyed in the first world war. It is often said 
that the allied forces were lions led by donkeys. If 
the generals on this side of Europe were donkeys, 
how appalling was the leadership of Tsarist 
Russia at the beginning of the first world war? 
Is it not understandable that after that horror, 
incompetence, deceit and oppression Marxism 
should eventually emerge? Should we not als.o 
understand that in the 1920s the western powers 
tried to strangle this new revolutionary state at 
birth? Is it not understandable that the western 
powers in the 1930s preferred fascism to the 
communist state? 
Is it not a fact that the western powers still fail 
to understand that in the second world war more 
Russians died than men from any other country 
and that more areas of Russia were devastated 
and destroyed than in any other country? Is it 
not reasonable for us to expect that the Soviet 
Union would never put itself in the position of 
being at risk of experiencing the same death and 
the same destruction as it experienced in the 
second world war? 
We have to understand the historic forces. 
Sometimes in this Assembly I think we fail to 
make such an appreciation. I am not suggesting 
that we should accept every Stalinist gesture, 
every imperialist posture that the Soviet Union 
demonstrates. We have responsibilities to our 
own nations as well. We have a responsibility to 
maintain our own security. I am not suggesting 
that we should shrink from that. However, there 
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are those in this Assembly who believe that dis-
armament is advantageous to Russia. They 
believe that Russia could benefit from reducing 
its enormous capacity to inyest in military 
weapons. But do they not understand that we, 
too, would benefit from such al reduction? 
We should be prepared to m~ke genuine ges-
tures to the Soviet Union. The good will that we 
demonstrate should be much .more than skin 
deep or transient. That is why I commend Mr. 
Pecriaux's report. We should have a dialogue. 
We should demonstrate a willingness to disarm 
in a balanced way. 
I certainly worry that if we have a dialogue 
with the Supreme Soviet the conduct of some 
members of this Assembly would be unsatis-
factory. Some members of this Assembly would, 
for example, almost be prepared to lead an expe-
ditionary force to free Lithuania or Latvia. Some 
members of this Assembly would spend their 
time denouncing the Russians, quite properly, 
for their invasion of Afghanistan. But they would 
not look to those things where our house is not in 
order. 
Therefore, I suggest that, btfore we have a 
proper dialogue with the Soviets, we should 
understand that we shall have to show restraint, 
that our good will has to be genuine and that our 
appreciation of Mr. Gorbachev's efforts will 
have to be sincere. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Martino. 
Mr. MARTINO (Italy). - Thank you, Mr. 
President. With your permission I would first of 
all like to congratulate Mr. Pecriaux for his 
report which includes a very broad analysis even 
though there have been complaints that it does 
not have the wealth of data that only the detailed 
research of experts in Soviet studies could 
provide. All in all, I do not think that this was 
Mr. Pecriaux's job; on the contrary, I would say 
that his report is of a very high level and 
extremely informative as far as this Assembly is 
concerned. 
His is a broad analysis that has, whatever else 
it may or may not have done, expressed the full 
meaning of the ideological problem underlying 
Soviet Russia's domestic and foreign policy 
stances. 
Today we all feel that many of these stances 
are changing. A few days ago, replying to a jour-
nalist who asked him to knock down the Berlin 
wall, Mr. Gorbachev replied in blunt, bald and 
point-blank terms that this was an internal 
matter for the German Democratic Republic. 
The statement of that position, Mr. President, 
comes at a time when the constellation of the 
East European countries, unquestionably shaken 
by Mr. Gorbachev's reform in the Soviet Union, 
is deep in the throes of adjustment and at a time 
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when, inter alia, the effects of the lack of 
advanced technology are becoming even more 
acute and the shortcomings of the general eco-
nomic situation in those countries even more 
evident. We should not forget, Mr. President, the 
statements made by the number two in Soviet 
energy, Mr. Semionov, when he was being ques-
tioned here in Paris about Chernobyl and when 
he said that the number of nuclear power sta-
tions in the Soviet Union would need to be 
increased by a factor of five over the next few 
years. Then there is the agricultural situation 
which is extremely bad in the East European 
countries. 
This is an adjustment syndrome, therefore, 
that the East European countries are suffering, 
rather like an illness, and which we hope will 
have salutary effects in terms of their devel-
opment towards a form of real democracy. 
Mr. President, I would only be repeating what 
so many other speakers have said and what Mr. 
Pecriaux has written in his report ifl indulged in 
further hopes about the evolution of the Soviet 
situation in the direction of democracy. I also 
want to keep within the time allowed for 
speeches in the Assembly and I shall therefore 
conclude with a point on the Soviet Union's 
recent foreign policy declaration about the 
problem of SDI - the space defence system or 
rather initiative. Mr. Gorbachev's admission 
about this system, although tied to problems of 
theoretical technology - but I wonder what tech-
nology can remain purely theoretical - smooths 
over some of the earlier difficulties in the 
conduct of relations between East and West. 
It is my conviction that, beyond this 
admission, an opportunity can be glimpsed for 
progress in the intensified quest for tranquillity 
and peace, and this must be our wish for a better 
future. Thank you, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Lord. 
Mr. LORD (United Kingdom).- May I join in 
congratulating you, Sir Geoffrey, on your 
election as a Vice-President and on chairing the 
debate this morning. It is an honour for me as a 
new member of parliament to become a member 
ofWEU and to speak, albeit briefly, in the debate 
this morning. 
I congratulate Mr. Pecriaux on an excellent 
report that deals thoroughly with a series of 
complex issues. The matters discussed in this 
session - disarmament, Soviet foreign policy 
and, later today, threat - have a common thread 
which in many ways is one and the same 
problem. Disarmament stems from a great 
longing on the part of the West to reduce the 
tension from which we have all suffered for 
many years and also to see a major reduction in 
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the great volume of arms that have been accu-
mulated. It is real longing which, I hope, is now 
slowly beginning to permeate the Soviet Union. 
Perhaps the Soviets, too, are now beginning to 
think that there are advantages in proceeding 
this way. 
However, after forty years of peace it is 
essential that any moves that we make do not 
make the world a more dangerous place in which 
to live. For the sake of our future generations, we 
must tackle these problems but, at the same 
time, they would never forgive us if, after forty 
years of peace, we damaged and endangered their 
future. 
It is essential to have an asymmetrical 
reduction in both nuclear and conventional 
arms. I shall not repeat the arguments of not just 
this session but recent years for the need to keep 
a nuclear deterrent behind us. If both sides 
reduce their nuclear forces, yet the Soviets are 
still left with superior power in conventional 
arms, there may be more temptations down that 
avenue for them to consider taking warlike steps 
than if nuclear arms are available. With conven-
tional arms there is much less chance of radi-
ation contamination. There may be temptations 
down that road that might make the world more 
dangerous. 
We must not do anything to endanger our 
links with the United States of America. 
It would be disastrous for the West if, during 
negotiations or changes made in future months 
and years, the United States thought that it was 
less necessary to the defence of Europe. WEU 
has a crucial role in ensuring that the United 
States appreciates that it is important to us and 
that it must stay linked with the defence of 
Europe for ever. 
In talking about dismantling nuclear forces, I 
think of the analogy of an explosive device that 
has been carefully constructed and has been in 
place for many years. If we wish to dismantle 
such a device, we must do so with the utmost 
care, step by step and checking carefully every-
thing we do. Otherwise, the device will blow up 
in our face. 
Peter Hardy spoke about the comments of 
some conservatives. He exaggerated a little, but I 
forgive him, particularly as he kindly gave me a 
lift here this morning. He talked about the good 
will and advice flowing towards President 
Gorbachev and accused us of cynicism and scep-
ticism. I hope that I speak for my conservative 
colleagues when I say that there is no cynicism, 
but there is scepticism. We are right to be scep-
tical. Indeed, if we are not to endanger the world, 
our people must depend on our being reasonably 
sceptical. 
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Mr. Hardy also mentioned Soviet history. I am 
sure that he knows more than I about that 
subject, but I am prepared to accept that, like 
many other countries, the Soviet Union is 
scarred by its history and that that fact colours its 
general approach. However, the Soviet Union 
has had sixty years or more to accept its past, to 
learn and to change. It is important that it should 
appreciate our history and where we stand. The 
signs coming out of Russia may demonstrate 
that it accepts that the time has come to move 
forward. Until now there has been a stubborn 
refusal to accept that view. Let us hope that 
times are changing. 
David Atkinson said that " reactivation " was 
the most important word to have come out of 
our recent discussions. The most important word 
for me is "trust". I know that our interpreters 
have a difficult job, but I hope that they will not 
mind too much if I stretch them a little with four 
words of Latin. My old school motto, fide sed cui 
vide, means, " Trust, but see in whom ". There 
could not be a better motto for WEU in present 
circumstances. 
Trust does not just happen. It is not hope or 
guesswork; it must be earned through honesty 
and openness and be built over a long period. 
There are signs that the Soviets are at last pre-
pared to move. If we can make progress in a 
painstaking way, with checks and balances 
throughout, it will be an enormous achievement. 
However, we must remember that our expe-
rience of dealings with the Soviet Union is that 
our expectations have not been realised. 
Members have mentioned the internal 
problems of the Soviet Union and its approach 
to its satellite nations. I do not now want to dwell 
on those matters. If we can trust each other in the 
way that I have described, the Soviets may come 
to see the benefits for their economy of fewer 
arms and less spending on arms. Such expend-
iture reductions could benefit the economies of 
other nations as well. If we can build up trust 
carefully and painstakingly, it will be a mar-
vellous achievement. 
I congratulate Mr. Pecriaux on his report. His 
final paragraphs sums up the issue. It says: 
"The West must therefore continue to seek 
balanced concessions in every field and not 
lower its guard until agreements have been 
concluded on the limitation of armaments 
subject to the necessary verification guar-
antees." 
My only quibble is that I should like to 
strengthen that sentence by changing " not lower 
its guard" to "never lower its guard". 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Lord. 
Your use of Latin tempts me to say that the 
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motto that I should prefer to use is that of my 
home town. Non sibi sed toti means, "Not for 
self, but for all". That could be the WEU motto. 
I know no Greek, so I shall lealve it at that. 
I 
I call Mr. Burger. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. 
Pecriaux's report, characteristic of his serious 
approach and perfectionism, i~ based on very 
detailed research and leaves us~ all to form our 
own opinion of present Soviet wreign policy. 
The political scene is at present so mobile that 
the Rapporteur has not been able to keep up. I 
speak here of events in Poland and Romania. 
The Rapporteur insists that internal economic 
and social problems are at the root of the new 
foreign policy. Taking a glotlal view as the 
Rapporteur has done, it is clear that the youthful 
Mr. Gorbachev has taken many speedy steps of a 
character likely to surprise the Warsaw Pact 
countries as much as the NATO countries, and 
indeed the entire world. 
The first question in my mipd concerns the 
new policy of restructuring and c(>penness and the 
reaction it has produced in the USSR. Oppo-
sition in Mr. Gorbachev's entourage has resulted 
in the dismissal of the false comrade Mr. Yeltsin. 
Here I quote Mr. Gorbachev: "Unreined per-
sonal ambitions camouflaged under pseudo-
revolutionary phraseology do a great disservice 
to the common cause and the J1>arty's authority. 
Rapid movement is needed on the two elements 
of the restructuring process - democratisation 
and economic reform. " Particular attention has 
been turned to senior managers, of whom it has 
been said that " They must be firmly discarded if 
they do not accommodate themselves to 
perestroika ". 
There is no doubt that the new internal policy 
has also been imposed on the Warsaw Pact allies, 
some of whose obstructive reactions have no 
doubt surprised Mr. Gorbachev and his Warsaw 
Pact chiefs. The lack of commitment of the 
Polish electors probably springs from the com-
plete apathy of the Polish peo~le. 
When it is appreciated that the reforms 
covered by the referendum will nonetheless be 
applied at a " slower " pace, it must be asked 
whether Mr. Gorbachev will not attempt to 
convert this defeat into a success by a " media 
operation " presenting the referendum as an 
approach to democratisation taking the lead 
from human rights. 
What happened on 14th November in 
Romania points to a political cleavage in that 
country. As world public opinion is focused on 
the Warsaw Pact and its behaviour in respect of 
the convention on human rights, the Romanian 
leaders had to opt between the habitual massive 
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repression and a sincere effort to respond to 
legitimate complaints. In the event twenty or so 
individuals were imprisoned and the local party 
chiefs were sacked, including the heads of the 
works where the demonstration started. 
For Mr. Gorbachev, therefore, the economic 
and social difficulties which existed already have 
been aggravated by the problems arising from 
reorganisation and openness. 
I would note, in passing, that, since Tito's 
time, Yugoslavia has been benefiting from a 
number of advantages compared with the other 
members of the Warsaw Pact. 
At difficult times, this country has always col-
laborated with the West at the economic and 
social levels, preferably with France, looking for 
its support to plead its cause to the member 
states of the European Economic Community. 
This is proof that the West does not refuse to 
enter into an honest dialogue with Eastern 
Europe on political, economic and other 
issues. 
Returning to Soviet external policy it is 
therefore understandable that Mr. Gorbachev is 
looking for successes abroad to calm minds 
within the Warsaw Pact. 
In this context the General Secretary of the 
Soviet Communist Party cannot accept any 
reduction in power of the USSR or the Warsaw 
Pact, and, if I may make brief reference to 
Western European security, it can therefore be 
inferred that the agreements to be reached in 
Washington will certainly not be to the disad-
vantage of the Warsaw Pact. The fact is that the 
removal of nuclear weapons with a range of 500 
to 5 500 km is reassuring to the East as these 
weapons were a direct threat to their territory. 
Simultaneously, the West has lost the political 
weapons of deterrence while itself being heavily 
dominated by the East in conventional arms. 
The American Congress would be well advised to 
demand that an annex be appended to the 
double zero agreement calling for the estab-
lishment of equilibrium in conventional forces at 
the earliest possible moment. 
With regard to human rights, I would say that 
only peace enjoyed in full liberty can lead to the 
East-West detente which the great majority of us 
desire. 
In the third basket, side by side with freedom, 
is the issue of education, culture and a respect for 
the independence of every state. 
If peace and detente are to be the goal, nursery 
school children must not be indoctrinated with 
hatred for the capitalists of the West to the 
exclusion of any other form of culture. 
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If peace and detente are the goals, the athletes 
of the East must not be prohibited from culti-
vating private contacts with western athletes at 
European or Olympic level. 
If peace and detente are the goals, there should 
not be a constant extension of the time-limit for 
the repatriation of some of the 115 000 Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan. 
If peace and detente are the goals, opportun-
ities are not seized to test the possibility of 
detaching Europe from the Atlantic Alliance. 
In his report Mr. Pecriaux talks about the 
house of Europe, but looking at Mr. Gorbachev's 
book I see that that refers only to Western 
Europe and Eastern Europe. 
I might go on with references to the Berlin 
wall, racism and the religious problem. 
With regard to security, I think the most pos-
itive feature of the agreement signed in Wash-
ington is the text relating to mutual arms con-
trols and verification. 
In conclusion, I will say that I have confidence 
in the single European act and in the political, 
economic, ecological and cultural aspects of 
Europe. I have confidence in WEU's security and 
defence platform while respecting the Atlantic 
Alliance and the nuclear independence of France 
and the United Kingdom. 
I do not look upon Mr. Gorbachev as a man in 
the dock. In my personal view he must be given 
the benefit of the doubt, and it is my hope that 
one day we shall attain the detente and the peace 
I was talking about a moment ago. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Lord Mackie. 
Lord MACKIE (United Kingdom). - With 
you, Mr. President, impartially in the chair, you 
will not mind if I voice some mild criticisms of 
my conservative colleagues for a lack of prag-
matic realism. 
We should look at the Soviet Union, which is 
the subject of this excellent report, and the recent 
developments in Soviet external policy. They, of 
course, hinge on Soviet international policy. I do 
not think of the Soviet Union as a vast revolu-
tionary body. It is a great big centralised conser-
vative bureaucracy; that is conservative with a 
small "c ". It is a perfect example of an 
immovable object resisting an irresistible force. 
When we look at what Mr. Gorbachev is trying 
to do- and we can see examples that have been 
quoted by other speakers - it is enormously dif-
ficult to change this very conservative, highly 
centralised bureaucracy. 
We can also see that though the economic and 
political imperatives are forcing this change, the 
Soviets are not going to degenerate into a 
backward military power. They have got to raise 
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their standard ofliving and also raise their GNP. 
They cannot afford to spend the enormous 
amount of money on arms that they have been 
spending. 
As Mr. Hardy said, that is to our advantage. I 
believe that general thinking in the Soviet Union 
has changed enormously with the impact of com-
munications with the West and, certainly, 
Chernobyl has changed thinking and caused 
great fear among people in the Soviet Union, and 
brought home to them quite clearly, as to many 
in the West, the appalling results of any possible 
use of nuclear weapons. In particular, we should 
have a pragmatic realism while keeping up our 
guard. While realising that the Soviet Union can 
step backward, we must try to assist Mr. 
Gorbachev, who is trying to change this 
bureaucracy which under Stalin was as evil a 
system as one might ever meet. 
I do not think that we should look at what is 
happening with the Soviet Union's armed forces. 
Of course they keep on producing more tanks 
and more warships. We should look at the indus-
trial and military complex. It is difficult to stop 
that industrial and military complex in Russia 
and it will take Mr. Gorbachev a long time to 
achieve it. 
We should understand - as WEU is trying to 
do - what the simple result of that momentum 
could be. It may be the result of an attempt to 
deceive the West in these matters. That is 
implicit in the report, which is a great credit to 
the Rapporteur and his committee. 
I am sure that we should back it unanimously. 
The West is losing the propaganda war, and the 
more we quibble and the more we go back into 
the past, the more likely we are to lose that prop-
aganda war. A great opportunity is here, as the 
report says, and all possible advantage should be 
taken of it. 
The PRESIDENT. - The debate is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. PECRIAUX (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I will 
endeavour to reply to the various speakers and 
wish to say how gratified I am at the active and 
constructive response of the members of this 
Assembly. 
The subject under discussion is of topical 
concern and it is important that the Assembly 
should deliberate on it at an interesting juncture 
in the evolution of WEU's relationships and 
positions. 
I have the impression that two major positions 
have been expressed in this debate. The first, 
encompassing those who are " for " the report, is 
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in a clear majority as all the members except one 
endorsed the report. The other position repre-
sents the member who is " against " the report, 
and I use the singular advisedly as only one 
member has taken that line. 
The dominant note of the favourable 
responses is, it seems to me, an urge for realism. 
In the first speech made yesterday, by Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg, I noted the questions relating 
to the status of the Baltic states and the Polish 
people and also the thought expressed by the 
President of today's sitting when, speaking as a 
member, he likened the situation to a game of 
chess. Mr. President, I am not today in a position 
to answer your questions! 
I share your view that we need to be extremely 
cautious. If we want answers on the problems of 
Poland, the Baltic and human rights, we must 
put the questions directly to those concerned, 
that is to say to our interlocutors in a dialogue 
which we must take every opportunity of culti-
vating. 
The second subject which struck me yesterday 
is publicity and, more particularly, publicity via 
the media. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg referred to this. 
After presenting the somewhat professorial and 
therefore extremely interesting historical ana-
lysis, Mr. Muller told us he was very worried 
about the position, the role and the use of the 
media. He made the point that the media could 
convey a message which might at some point be 
presented or interpreted far too generously. He is 
right in this, and we must pay close attention to 
the problems of language and communication 
via the media. 
Mr. Rubbi asked whether present develop-
ments were genuine and whether there was not 
some risk that current agreements might be 
delayed. He also referred to the problems of dis-
armament. It seems to me that we are not called 
upon to defend ourselves against an ideology. 
We have to consider such forces as actually exist, 
and no ideological change can force us to accept 
an imbalance which endangers our security. 
Developments in the Soviet Union appear to 
suggest the possibility of detente, but there can 
be no genuine detente without disarmament to 
ensure our security. As Mr. Scheer dealt with dis-
armament in his own report I refrained from 
doing so. This was not the concern of the 
General Affairs Committee. 
To Mr. Declercq I would reply that it is not 
enough to verify the authenticity of glasnost. I 
am convinced of its substance. What we need to 
know first and foremost is whether power in the 
USSR is at present sufficiently firmly established 
to ensure that glasnost or openness will finally 
prevail. Today, 3rd December 1987, I am obvi-
ously unable to answer that question. Mr. 
Declercq also drew attention to the part of our 
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report dealing with the Middle East and urged 
that a peace conference be organised by WEU. In 
my position as Rapporteur, I cannot reply, but 
the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee 
may have an opinion to offer, and I thank him in 
anticipation. 
Mr. Hill is right, restructuring does not signify 
democracy, but it must be acknowledged that 
this media aspect of Mr. Gorbachev's policy is 
helping to open a debate and to promote change 
for the better in the Soviet Union. It is true, 
however, that there is still a very long way to go 
in all areas of disarmament and we are still only 
at the beginning. All the same is there any reason 
to react negatively provided we safeguard at all 
times the necessary means to ensure our own 
security? 
I much appreciated Mr. Soell's remarks on the 
difficulty of making analyses when not all the 
necessary information is available. This is indeed 
a difficult process and we are highly dependent 
on the gathering of information which needs to 
be accurate. When we visited Moscow - and Mr. 
Soell was a member of the delegation that visited 
the Soviet capital - we realised that there were 
some questions to be asked to which no replies 
would be received, even on the spot. This has to 
be acknowledged as a fact which must be 
accepted, as another barrier to be overcome. If 
we need information we must do our best to 
procure it. 
A number of speakers have said how 
important it is that we should address the 
problems of human rights and the CSCE. While 
this is true, Mr. Soell has rightly pointed out that 
our own perception of human rights may not be 
identical to the current Soviet view. I noted the 
phrase: "For them, human rights are directly 
linked to the state. " I well understand what Mr. 
Soell means. There is indeed a direct relationship 
between society and the state, between the state 
and the individual. Here we must, I think, 
address conceptual issues. The concept in 
question is a profound one, which is political, of 
course, but in my opinion also and mainly philo-
sophical, and perhaps ethical and even moral. 
What do we mean by human rights? How should 
human rights be interpreted from our respective 
standpoints? 
As Mr. Atkinson reminded us, Mr. 
Khrushchev's reforms also encountered diffi-
culties. Liberalisation of the people's democ-
racies is clearly essential and must be 
encouraged, but it is naturally a goal which must 
be pursued with great caution. To a large extent 
the failures in Poland, Hungary and the German 
Democratic Republic brought about Mr. 
Khrushchev's downfall. What is the position 
now? This is a question we must put to our-
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selves, and I am grateful to Mr. Atkinson for 
having raised this matter. 
I am also grateful to Mr. Hardy and Mr. 
Burger for their support. 
To Mr. Hardy I would reply that it is not for us 
to go back on history and revive the old opposi-
tions. In our opinion detente and disarmament 
are a sufficient justification for the analysis of 
current realities. Today's situation does not have 
to be judged against the backdrop of the past, 
and it is clearly advisable to turn to good account 
every positive element to further the causes of 
detente, understanding and co-operation. 
Mr. Burger made some very kind remarks, for 
which I thank him. He took a global view, 
embracing young people, the Olympic games, 
openness, co-operation and the house of Europe. 
I entirely share his thoughts. However, there is 
no more to say if we fail to pursue a genuine dia-
logue, and it is at this point that the key question 
arises. 
Mr. Burger mentioned the present situations 
in Bucharest and Warsaw. The events which 
occurred in Warsaw three days ago, if my 
memory serves me right, are also of historic sig-
nificance at political level, although it seems 
probable that General Jaruzelski will not take 
much notice of the result of the referendum. 
The Romanian situation has been referred to 
by a number of speakers. I will not say here that I 
necessarily cherish any admiration for Mr. 
Ceausescu's actions to date or that these are in 
line with any criteria of mine. Any such 
statement would be excessive and misrepresent 
my view. 
Lord Mackie referred to the vast bureaucracy 
existing in the Soviet Union, which I would 
describe simply as a" colossus". He called for a 
spirit of pragmatic realism. He wishes to help 
those who wish to promote the democratic cause. 
This is indeed important and realistic. 
I also greatly appreciated Mr. Lord's inter-
vention, which very humorously expressed sym-
pathy with Mr. Hardy early on. From what he 
said I noted a Latin tag which seems to me to 
summarise the report. The tag says in trans-
lation: " Trust, yes, but be careful in whom ". 
Indeed, the whole problem revolves round trust 
and in whom it should be placed. Our Latin tra-
dition stands us in good stead and suggests a 
fruitful line of thought for 1987. 
I have mentioned first those members who 
reacted favourably to the report, and I tender 
them my thanks. I have mentioned all except 
Mr. Martino, whom I also thank for his collabo-
ration. The negative side - and there are always 
pros and cons - was presented by Mr. Bordu. 
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I cannot conceal a measure of surprise, not at 
Mr. Bordu's words which were proper to the 
democratic process; but I do not detect profound 
pessimism in the report. That we are able in 1987 
to present in WEU's parliamentary organ with 
the unanimous, I repeat unanimous, approval of 
the General Affairs Committee, a report sug-
gesting that we should approach the other side, 
pursue dialogue and endeavour to reach a 
position of mutual accommodation surely 
reflects an optimistic rather than a pessimistic 
attitude. 
If I wished to be caustic, I would simply reply 
to Mr. Bordu that I am not in Lourdes or 
Zagorsk but here in Paris in WEU. So please give 
due consideration to the joint efforts of all the 
members of the General Affairs Committee, who 
accepted the present changes as a genuine new 
departure. This is something I would ask you to 
bear in mind. 
I will end my remarks as Rapporteur by ten-
dering my sincere thanks to all my associates and 
friends who assisted me with this truly inter-
esting exercise. My thanks go first to our former 
President, Mr. Caro, for the dynamism he dis-
played during our Moscow visit, which proved 
highly important and was appreciated by the 
members of the Presidential Committee. 
My very warm thanks also go to Mr. Ahrens, 
who, as Chairman of the General Affairs Com-
mittee, showed a true sense of dialogue which 
enabled him to balance the differences of view in 
our committee. This is a point to which I partic-
ularly wish to draw your attention, Mr. Bordu. 
Mr. Ahrens certainly has no easy task. 
The PRESIDENT.- I call Mr. Ahrens. 
Mr. AHRENS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, allow me to be 
the first continental European to congratulate 
you on your election as Vice-President. I see in 
you a committed European and a man who 
knows the Charter and Rules of Procedure well. 
We shall therefore be able to meet with a clear 
conscience under your chairmanship. 
I am very grateful to our Rapporteur, Mr. 
Pecriaux, and also to the committee's secretary, 
Mr. Burgelin. 
Mr. President, you described this report yes-
terday as a masterpiece of commonsense and 
balanced thinking. I do not think there is any 
better way of describing it. It is a very wise 
report, a report without euphoria and a report 
that has not succumbed to the temptation to 
speculate. 
The committee discussed this report at three 
meetings - further proof of our awareness of its 
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importance. May I also thank those who spoke in 
the debate on the report yesterday and today and 
without exception voiced theilr approval of it. 
During the discussion it w~s repeatedly said 
that Soviet foreign policy da~es not from 191 7 
but from the time of Peter thlGreat and is thus 
an extension of the policy Q Tsarist Russia. I 
believe this to be true. Th former Federal 
German Chancellor Helmut chmidt pointed it 
out a few months ago in a remarkable essay. 
What General Secretary Gprbachev has evi-
dently set out to achieve therefore seems to me 
all the greater, all the harder and all the riskier, 
signifying the abandonment not only of a 
70-year-old Soviet policy but also of a 250-
year-old Russian policy. 
When we consider the Soviet Union's 
enormous involvement in the Middle East, for 
example, its policy here too has its roots in the 
pre-Lenin era. It too dates back to Tsarist 
times. 
I feel we should also take this opportunity -
and I am grateful to Lorq Mackie for his 
reminder - to consider what ~ffects this policy, 
which we call foreign policy,' is bound to have 
within the Soviet Union. It )Vill mean nothing 
less than that millions of S<l>viet officials and 
their families will have to a(:cept very serious 
implications for their social p~sition, occupation 
and social standing. This is tr\lly an undertaking 
that it would be difficult to compare with any 
other at the present time. 
Many speakers have demanded that in talks 
with the Soviet Union the West should insist on 
the protection of human rights. It is not sur-
prising that we place such emphasis on this, not 
only because of Helsinki and not only because all 
of us here are also members of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, an insti-
tution that, more than any other, has made the 
protection of human rights its goal: we also feel 
bound to insist again and again on the protection 
of human rights, because ea(:h of us has been 
democratically elected and is therefore under an 
obligation to protect and def~nd them. 
The Chairman-in-Office of the Council, the 
Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, intimated 
the day before yesterday that the extent to which 
a satisfactory settlement wits found for the 
human rights issues would also determine the 
scope of the disarmament policy. I agree with 
him: any country - I repeat, any country - which 
disregards and violates the human rights of its 
citizens, which tortures people physically and 
mentally, is bound to be distrusted by its neigh-
bours. Disarmament cannot, however, be based 
on distrust, and since it depends on trust there is 
an indispensable link between human rights and 
disarmament. 
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Mr. President, it will not surprise anyone to 
hear that the passage in the report which advo-
cates a continuation of contacts with the 
Supreme Soviet was the subject of a particularly 
lengthy and even heated discussion in com-
mittee. I should like to make one thing clear: we 
are not interested in inviting spokesmen of the 
Supreme Soviet to the Assembly to speak from 
the rostrum. We do not want to develop a PR 
campaign, and we are not out to draw attention 
to ourselves or others. What we do want in our 
committees with members of the Supreme Soviet 
is a down-to-earth discussion on ways of aligning 
our interests. That is all. 
But - and this, Mr. President, goes beyond the 
actual text of the report - we should not forget 
one thing: the Warsaw Pact comprises several 
countries. There is no doubt at all that the key to 
the solution of our problems and to the gradual 
healing of the division of our continent is to be 
found only in the Kremlin, not in Budapest or 
Sofia, let alone Warsaw or East Berlin. None-
theless, we should take account of the self-esteem 
and self-confidence of the other countries, which 
might be especially sensitive in this particular sit-
uation. We should not therefore close our doors 
to contacts with the parliaments of our other 
eastern neighbours. 
It has repeatedly been said during the debate 
that the public are not sufficiently aware of our 
work. It really is regrettable that the public take 
so little notice of what we do. Comparisons have 
been made with the effective public relations 
activities of the Soviet Union. In particular I 
would like to see an interest being taken in our 
present debates, not just in Europe but also by 
our counterparts in the American Congress, who 
have important decisions to take shortly. The 
impression they should gain, not only from the 
debate on this report, but generally, from the 
debates we have had since Monday, is that we 
Europeans consider things objectively and realis-
tically, including the risks inherent in a policy 
which is, however, giving us cause for hope for 
the first time in many years. 
Mr. President, as Chairman of the committee I 
ask the Assembly to approve Mr. Pecriaux's 
report. 
The PRESIDENT.- We shall now vote on the 
draft recommendation contained in Document 
1111. 
Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless 
five or more representatives or substitutes 
present in the chamber request a vote by roll-
call. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
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That is not the case. The vote will therefore be 
taken by sitting and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing). 
The draft recommendation is adopted 1• 
We shall now vote on the draft order con-
tained in Document 1111, addendum. 
Under Rule 33 of the Rules ofProcedure, the 
Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless 
ten or more representatives or substitutes present 
in the chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there ten members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
That is not the case. The vote will therefore be 
taken by sitting and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft order is adopted unanimously 2• 
4. Threat assessment 
(Presentation of tuUl debate on the report 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 1115 and amendment) 
The PRESIDENT.- The next order of the day 
is the presentation of and debate on the report of 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments on threat assessment, Document 1115 and 
amendment. 
I call Mr. Stokes. 
Mr. STOKES (United Kingdom). - This 
report, which we are now going to discuss, was 
submitted in preliminary form in December of 
last year but was not discussed. It has been 
debated at length in the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, and I must apologise 
once again for the delay and inconvenience 
caused by my absences due to my wife's 
illness. 
It is an honour for me to present this report as 
I am still fairly new to the Assembly of Western 
European Union. It is also profoundly satisfying 
to me, as someone who served throughout the 
last war in the British army, to witness the 
strength cohesion and growing confidence of 
WEU. The report that we are about to discuss 
was agreed to by the committee nem. con., with 
four abstentions. 
I should like to pay tribute to all those in many 
countries whom I interviewed, as set out at the 
beginning of the report, and to thank them all for 
the help and co-operation that they gave me. 
1. See page 39. 
2. See page 40. 
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I must say at the outset that certain news-
papers seem to have got the report all wrong. 
There is no conflict whatever in the report with 
NATO and with our conclusions. I believe that 
they are absolutely right. 
Although I cannot vouch in every instance for 
the mass of figures that are quoted in the report, 
I do not believe that they are seriously at var-
iance with the NATO figures - and, of course, 
figures can be differently interpreted. 
All of us in this Assembly realise only too well 
that, as we study reports which have been pre-
pared over many months, great events may be 
taking place in the outside world which are 
bound to have some effect on our reports. We 
have had the rise of Mr. Gorbachev and the 
appearance of a new policy of so-called openness 
in the Soviet Union. I have been fortunate to 
have had the opportunity of meeting Mr. 
Gorbachev in London on two occasions. There is 
one thing of which I am quite certain: he is an 
expert in public relations. Therefore, from that 
point of view, he is somewhat to be feared. 
We have also had the limited disarmament 
talks between the USSR and the United States 
about intermediate nuclear weapons, which are 
now likely to form the basis of a treaty in the 
near future. 
Meanwhile, Mr. Gorbachev's position may not 
be as strong as some people thought, and we 
therefore continue to live with uncertainty as 
regards the leadership in the Soviet Union. 
I believe that we need to look more carefully 
than ever at our conventional arms in the West 
as the nuclear element is being reduced. The 
Soviets, as the British Prime Minister recently 
said, can afford to be generous in cutting conven-
tional forces, whereas NATO forces are 
stretched. We shall, of course, now enter a wholly 
new era of force comparisons, with the physical 
inspection of nuclear weapons sites by both the 
West and the Soviet Union. 
I should like now to outline the scope and 
purpose of the report. It will be noticed that 
while I believe the report is moderate and bal-
anced in tone, and stresses the need for making 
fair and sensible comparisons of force levels, it 
does not deny that the Soviet threat is still there, 
that the Soviets still occupy Afghanistan and the 
Baltic states, that Cuban troops are still in 
several parts of Africa, that the Berlin wall has 
not yet been pulled down and that, in spite of all 
the care and attempts at accuracy in our force 
comparisons, we cannot deny that the Soviet 
forces are superior to those of the West in a 
number of cases, that they are poised for attack 
and not defence, as are the NATO forces, and 
that, apart from their superiority in aircraft, 
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tanks and guns, the huge growth of the Soviet 
navy in recent years and the threat that that 
poses to reinforcing the Atlantic convoys 
remains, as well as the Soviets' ability to develop 
a powerful thrust into the heart of Europe from 
their strong and large forces concentrated there. 
In addition, I heard only yesterday that the 
Soviet Union has stockpiles of weapons which 
are three times the amount that the West has for 
stockpiles, which is only thirty days. 
Yet NATO has certain advantages. We believe 
in freedom, we have better trained and better 
motivated forces and more cohesion compared 
with the Warsaw Pact forces, and we also have 
greater technological knowledge. There is no 
point in exaggerating the Soviet threat too much, 
and they on their side have serious weak-
nesses. 
We have outlined those facts in the report and 
I believe that its conclusions are fair and rea-
sonable. Certainly much more remains to be 
done in co-ordinating the various NATO and 
national efforts to obtain more accurate force 
comparisons. I realise, of course, that this is not 
an easy matter, and force comparison is a very 
difficult subject. 
My task was a huge one and the report is in 
parts highly technical. I realise, too, that it can be 
criticised for not including every aspect of the 
threat which the Soviets pose against the West. I 
have not, for instance, dealt with the large and 
important subject of subversion and spying by 
the Soviets and the constant threat that this 
always presents to the West. In the propaganda 
war, which goes on continuously, the Soviets will 
now, I am sure, intensify their efforts to decouple 
the European and United States forces if they 
possibly can. 
One strong impression that I received from 
interviewing many senior officers and defence 
specialists in different countries was that 
undoubtedly Mr. Gorbachev and, I believe, 
some of the present Soviet rulers are trying as 
hard as they can for some disarmament to allow 
the Soviets to have a better deal for their people 
in providing more consumer goods. They cannot 
do this when so much of their gross national 
product goes towards the armed forces and their 
mass of expensive armaments. This is a most 
important and hopeful factor in the relationship 
of the Soviets with the West. 
We in the West must keep up our guard, as 
Lord Carrington constantly and rightly reminds 
us, but there are some grounds for hope that the 
old Stalinist approach to arms and armed forces 
in the Soviet Union may at least be somewhat 
modified. Nevertheless, in the end it is deeds and 
not words that we want from the Soviet lead-
ership. I very much hope that the Council will 
take heed of this report and do much more to 
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encourage the co-ordination of all sources of 
information about Soviet strength. 
I should like to end by quoting from the 
statement on the platform on European security 
which was adopted at The Hague on 27th 
October 1987: 
"We have not yet witnessed any lessening of 
the military build-up which the Soviet Union 
has sustained over so many years. The 
geostrategic situation of Western Europe 
makes it particularly vulnerable to the superior 
conventional, chemical and nuclear forces of 
the Warsaw Pact. This is the fundamental 
problem for European security. The Warsaw 
Pact's superior conventional forces and its 
capability for surprise attack and large-scale 
offensive action are of special concern in this 
context. " 
With those remarks, I commend the report to 
the Assembly. 
(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, took 
the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Stokes. 
The debate is open and I call Mr. Speed. 
Mr. SPEED (United Kingdom). - I welcome 
and congratulate my distinguished colleague, 
John Stokes, on an excellent and well-balanced 
report. If I have a few remarks of criticism, it is 
perhaps to endorse and strengthen the report and 
what he has said because he admitted that the 
report could not completely cover all the sub-
jects, as he and other committee members would 
have seen. Certainly, the threat in one or two 
aspects is understated rather than overstated. In 
these heady days of INF agreements, talk of 
glasnost and perestroika and even the refe-
rendum in Poland just a few days ago, it is never-
theless important that we do not allow these sig-
nificant and encouraging developments to blind 
us to the threats still posed to the West by 
Warsaw Pact forces. As Mr. Mellor reminded us 
yesterday, the armaments of the Warsaw Pact, 
particularly in conventional armaments - ships, 
aircraft and tanks - are still being added to at a 
frightening rate. We in our democracies cannot 
hope to match that rate, not least because we see 
other priorities in social spending that rightly 
pre-empt our budgets. 
Paragraph 5.19 correctly states that the Soviet 
navy is divided into four fleets, two of which are 
confined by Danish and Turkish straits. 
Denmark and Turkey are active partners in 
NATO. The report also reminds us that for a 
considerable part of the year the ice-free passage 
from Murmansk to the North Atlantic is 
restricted. However, if there were a conflict it 
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would be on Soviet terms and I cannot envisage 
there being a conflict while the Soviet fleets were 
bottled up in their home bases. I believe that we 
would see one of the many exercises in which the 
Soviet fleets take part every year. There was a 
significant exercise this year when virtually all 
the Soviets' Baltic and North Sea fleets were in 
the Atlantic. We have to rely on intelligence to 
decide whether these are merely exercises or 
whether ships are being put into place for pos-
sible hostile acts. We should be unwise to rely on 
bottling up the Soviet fleet. 
I know that Mr. Stokes appreciates that, as Mr. 
Mellor said yesterday, the older Soviet tanks are 
being substantially uprated with new guns, new 
armour and, perhaps equally important, new 
firing control systems. We should be unwise to 
write off those tanks. The newer models are on 
the central front facing NATO armies. 
More important qualitatively is that over the 
past ten years, across the board, but particularly 
in terms of armour and submarines, the Soviets 
have been catching up quickly on the marked 
technical lead that the West used to enjoy. That 
closing of the gap has been due in no small part 
to espionage and betrayal by some keen service 
personnel in western navies and elsewhere, who 
have passed on important secrets to the Soviet 
Union, and to the transfer of high technology 
from western countries, including Japan, to the 
Soviet Union, whose new submarines are now 
quieter, faster and more difficult to detect. I 
should have been happier if the report had dwelt 
on the fact that our lead has diminished. 
Notwithstanding the economic problems faced 
by the Soviet Union, it has a lot going for it in 
the quality of its stealth technology for aircraft 
and the new armour for its tanks. We would not 
have considered that possible only a few years 
ago. 
The Rapporteur mentioned the disparity 
between NA TO's thirty days of war stocks and 
the Warsaw Pact's ninety days' stocks of ammu-
nition and key elements of fighting. In fact, the 
situation is even worse, because few NATO 
countries meet their thirty-day commitments in 
all respects. Once our defence budgets come 
under review - a euphemism for cuts - it is com-
paratively easy to cut war stocks, whether of 
ammunition, petrol, oil or lubricants. People 
cross their fingers and hope for the best. My 
guess is that many NATO and WEU countries 
do not have full thirty-day war stocks. In any 
case, the experiences of the United Kingdom 
forces in the Falklands war show that a 
thirty-day stock is inadequate. The Warsaw Pact 
has another qualitative advantage in that area, 
which is a substantial part of its threat. 
I generally welcome the report, but I have a 
reservation about paragraph 8.4, which says that 
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we should not exaggerate the Warsaw Pact capa-
bility for political purposes. One cannot disagree 
with that statement, but it is important to realise 
that there is a disparity in conventional weapons 
and we need to know much more accurately 
where the Warsaw Pact's conventional weapons 
are located. Glasnost has not been forthcoming 
in that respect. 
There are other areas where the Warsaw Pact 
has an advantage over NATO. First, the Warsaw 
Pact does not have a three thousand five 
hundred mile reinforcement and resupply line 
across the Atlantic. More importantly, that line 
for NATO depends on hundreds of merchant 
ships, even in a time of tension before the start of 
hostilities, let alone after the war has begun. We 
should need a constant stream of merchant ships 
in the first months of hostilities, but there has 
been a decline in the merchant fleets of all 
NATO countries, while the merchant fleets of 
the Warsaw Pact, particularly the Soviet fleet -
which, to all intents and purposes, is under the 
control of the Soviet navy- have been increasing 
and adopting a blue water, or worldwide, role, 
with international bases in all the oceans of the 
world. 
Secondly, as John Stokes reminded us and as 
is pointed out in The Hague platform, NATO is 
a defensive alliance. If attacked, we cannot sac-
rifice space for time to concentrate our forces 
against a main attack on the central front. The 
space that our forces would sacrifice would be 
the Federal Republic of Germany, which is one 
of our key partners. That would not be 
acceptable to NATO, to WEU or to me. The 
Warsaw Pact does not have such constraints, 
with the large plains of East Germany and 
Poland within which to operate. We have to con-
sider the geography within which they operate, 
which favours them and their organisation, their 
military doctrine, the fact that Soviet forces place 
emphasis on mobility, surprise, deception and 
offence while NATO is always the defensive 
force. 
For all those reasons, which I think are 
important components of the threat, I do not 
believe that the report goes over the top. I 
welcome it and hope that the Assembly will 
adopt it, but we must realise that, even today, the 
threat is substantial. 
The report, the proposed amendment and, I 
hope, my thoughts have reminded the Assembly 
that, as a conservative in the nineteenth century 
said - I hope that I will carry socialists with me -
the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. We shall 
neglect that fact at our peril. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Soell. 
ELEVENTH SITTING 
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September 1986. The reports we now have, some 
of which have also been discussed in the national 
parliaments, or at least in their disarmament and 
arms control committees, give us more certainty 
about our past assessments and confirm various 
conclusions that had already been drawn, but 
they also indicate the need for further careful 
checks. 
To conclude, I should like to raise another 
point. Paragraph 2.4 rightly says that the Soviet 
Union is a world power only on the basis of its 
military capability. It could be added that it is 
also a world power because of its huge land mass 
and its potential, even though this potential has 
yet to be fully developed economically. Greater 
emphasis should be placed in this context on the 
stimuli provided by the current reform process, 
which we have already discussed. If it is true that 
military capability is the determining factor in 
the Soviet Union's role as a world power, it is 
equally true that the enormous part played by 
military capability in the Soviet economy may 
also be to blame for what is referred to in the 
report as " sclerosis ". 
It is not just a question of military costs as a 
proportion of gross national product: 13% to 15% 
according to estimates available to us. We know 
that over half of all Soviet engineers, over half of 
all skilled Soviet workers and over half of all 
Soviet research scientists are employed on arms 
technology and arms production, which also 
absorbs, of course, the most valuable raw mate-
rials. What we have here is a classic case of arma-
ments sclerosis. This situation has been noted by 
western observers for years but is obviously seen 
in a different light by the Soviet leadership. 
Some western analyses point to the danger of a 
build-up in Soviet armaments and of the threat 
growing again if the reforms in the Soviet Union 
show a measure of success. That is one possi-
bility. 
But I consider it more likely that, given the 
conditions of modern information and commu-
nications that will also prevail in the Soviet 
Union in the medium and longer term, both the 
material and immaterial values of civil pro-
duction will gain more ground in Soviet society 
and in the upper political strata, which are, of 
course, similarly involved in the scientific and 
economic process. This is in fact quite a soundly-
based hope, not just an abstract idea. 
We must still insist - and I endorse the case 
made for this in the report - that Western 
European Union and the Western Europeans as 
a whole need more of a large variety of resources 
- including electronic installations - so that they 
can obtain their own data and achieve effective 
results in exchanges with others who have large 
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volumes of raw data. Collecting raw data is one 
side of the coin. Consensus on the establishment 
of criteria and qualitative standards of 
assessment is the other. There must be a political 
debate and political decisions on this. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Klejdzinski. 
Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, ladies 
and gentlemen, Mr. Stokes has presented a com-
prehensive report, an extensive and detailed 
study that contains many facts. I should like to 
thank him for this good and informative 
report. 
As far as today's debate on the report is con-
cerned, Mr. Stokes, I agree with you that certain 
things must be borne in mind. For any 
assessment of the threat posed by the Soviet 
Union in the view of the Atlantic Alliance, there 
must be, firstly, a political appraisal of Soviet 
foreign policy and, secondly, the Soviet Union's 
conduct vis-a-vis the West must be considered. 
Thirdly, the Soviet Union's presumed military 
intentions must undoubtedly be studied. Finally, 
military potentials must also be included in the 
assessment. That is the first point of the 
preamble to the draft recommendation. 
As for the second point - you dealt with it 
once again in your statement, Mr. Stokes - I 
have a few difficulties where the wording and 
intention are concerned, especially as, even after 
critical consideration, I cannot agree with you 
that friendly relations with the Soviet Union 
should be made conditional on giving equal 
status to the occupation of Afghanistan and the 
occupation of the Baltic states, as you called 
them, or the Soviet republics of Latvia, Lith-
uania and Estonia. The occupation of Afghan-
istan must be condemned. But as worded here, in 
conjunction with the occupation of the Baltic 
states, the statement clearly contravenes the 
spirit of the CSCE documents. If we were to 
develop this line of thinking we would also have 
to consider whether large areas of Poland have 
not, as it were, been displaced, and not all Euro-
peans, including the Germans, would like to see 
the clock simply turned back, because that would 
in no way help detente and peace, particularly at 
the present time. 
Mr. Stokes, you said just now that you had 
served in the last war. I was a small boy living in 
the Ruhr district during the war, when American 
and British bombers were destroying our cities. 
As a child sitting in the air-raid shelter I heard 
my town falling in ruins around me. That expe-
rience taught me what war means. I respect your 
impressions, but I just wanted to explain how 
things look from a different angle. As worded, I 
would call this a reversion to the policy of the 
cold war. 
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On the positive side, Mr. Stokes, you have 
made a comparison of performance in the 
various technologies, although I feel sure it was 
impossible to do this with the necessary pre-
cision. What I am criticising in your report, 
therefore, is not the meticulously assembled 
data, but simply the conclusions you have drawn 
in this particular respect. We should not, for 
example, be afraid of more extensive disarm-
ament. We should take seriously the statement 
made by the Warsaw Pact countries in East 
Berlin on 28th-29th May 1987, proposing steps 
towards nuclear and conventional disarmament. 
I believe we should follow up these proposals 
with deeds. The Geneva negotiations and their 
very positive outcome have surely made it abun-
dantly clear to all of us that genuine and 
mutually verifiable disarmament is possible. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I am also convinced 
that both superpowers, the Soviet Union as well 
as the United States, want more extensive dis-
armament. This desire for disarmament is also 
extremely important because of the continuing 
disparities between the two blocs. The critics of 
disarmament are undoubtedly right when they 
claim that the superiority of the Warsaw Pact in 
the conventional sphere and where short-range 
missiles are concerned still poses a threat to us 
Western Europeans. That is a fact and I am not 
attempting to dismiss it. 
But what does this mean to the West? It means 
that we must develop an overall policy for peace 
and security, a programme on the model of the 
INF treaty, that is to say asymmetrical reduction 
to zero or to a common maximum level. I 
believe that programmes for disarmament (a) in 
the conventional sphere (b) in the sphere of 
chemical weapons and (c) in the sphere of tac-
tical nuclear weapons and battlefield weapons 
are now more urgently needed than ever. 
However, these programmes must be incorpo-
rated in a common security policy that leads on 
to other things, including - and here again I 
would mention you as a rapporteur who has 
compiled extensive inventories - independent 
information systems. An independent obser-
vation satellite would improve our security and 
help to stabilise our defence measures. When we 
discuss Mr. Bassinet's report, we should raise 
this point in particular, in order to indicate what 
co-operation in armaments means. 
For us social democrats this political stand-
point means that our security policy must be 
aimed at reducing the tendency for each military 
alliance to regard the other as the enemy and a 
threat, and at achieving defensive military doc-
trines in both alliances. That is crucial. The two 
military doctrines are what matter. For the 
Warsaw Pact this means- to spell it out clearly-
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abandoning the strategy of the expansionist 
offensive. 
For Western European secl.llrity policy it means 
developing, in agreement with the United States 
and Canada, a system of structural non-
aggression, with a nuclear-free corridor in 
Central Europe. Structural non-aggression means 
more than mere parity. What it requires is that 
both blocs visibly forgo offensive options. 
Common security and the capacity for genuine 
disarmament must dictate Ol!lr policy. 
This joint programme must be guided pri-
marily by two principles: (a) the principle of 
credibility and (b) the principle of acceptance by 
the public and the armed forces. 
On the one hand, Mr. Stokes, you consciously 
avoid the word "balance". On the other hand 
you again undertake a comparison of force~ 
without actually using the . term " force com-
parison". Just now you again referred to 
NATO's thirty-day supply of ammunition, and 
pointed out that the other side has a ninety-day 
stockpile. I should like to ask you at this 
juncture: what do these thirty days, these ninety 
days actually tell us? They are, after all, quan-
tities used as reference points, which cannot be 
compared as they stand beca\lse we have no idea 
what either side will be using on the first day. A 
thirty-day supply of ammunition does not mean, 
of course, that the same amount of ammunition 
will be used by both sides on the same day. It 
may well be that ten thousanp missiles or bombs 
are launched or dropped 0111 the first day and 
only five thousand or two thousand on the last 
day, and so on and so forth. Comparisons of this 
kind tell the expert in these matters nothing on 
their own. They are usually quoted simply to 
convince others who do not know much about it. 
The North Atlantic Assem)bly's Military Com-
mittee, for example, works bn the basis of 144 
land-based short-range missiles in the West and 
775 in the Warsaw Pact. We have different 
figures in another sphere too, as you have 
pointed out, Mr. Stokes: in Europe some two 
hundred short-range missiles with a range of less 
than 500 km are deployed in1 the West and about 
1 240 on the Warsaw Pact side. Whatever the 
actual number of short-range missiles may be, 
these systems represent a special threat to our 
country. That is not disputed. So German soil is 
bound to become a battlefield, because the vast 
majority of short-range missiles are deployed on 
German soil or aimed at it. So we Germans, in 
~oth East and West, are exnosed to a very high 
nsk. 
At this point the question of acceptability nat-
urally arises. Is this risk acceptable to the 
Germans? As I see it, acceptance by the German 
public is dwindling. To put it in plain terms, the 
deployment of tactical nuclear weapons can no 
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longer be made credible from the German point 
of view. 
The Federal Republic of Germany must not 
become Western Europe's nuclear fire wall. 
Anyone who takes the saying " the shorter the 
range, the deader the Germans" seriously must 
want to eliminate this potential threat. This was 
pointed out by Theo Sommer in Die Zeit, a 
German weekly with. a very large circulation. 
This is also a reference - and I say this here in 
Western European Union- to the French Pluton 
missiles, which are aimed at German territory 
and so threaten the population of France's own 
defence partner. It should also be made clear 
here that this weighs heavily on us. 
As we see it, therefore, a third zero option is 
needed in the sphere of Short-range missiles, 
especially as this would result in a greater 
reduction of the Warsaw Pact•s potential. We 
must not miss this opportunity: we must take 
advantage of the movement towards dis-
armament initiated between the superpowers 
and extend the negotiatiom to include shorter-
range nuclear weapons. On no account must the 
success achieved in the INF negOtiations be nul-
lified by an increase in short-range nuclear 
weapons. 
We believe our next task must be a reduction 
in tactical nuclear weapons. These short-range 
missiles are, of course, inseparably linked with 
conventional forces today. Nevertheless the 
West should make every effort to put together an 
agreement coneerning these two sectors. We 
must realise that negotiations on conventional 
disarmament are bound to take longer than 
negotiations on nuclear disannament because of 
the greater difficulty of comparing arsenals. We 
also know that in the case of negotiations on con-
ventional disarmatnent time is not on our 
side. 
It is therefore important for negotiations on 
nuclear battlefield weapons and conventional 
systems, particularly tanks and artillery, to begin 
as soon as possible. The Soviet Union can then 
prove whether it is really prepared for a compre-
hensive disarmament and peace policy in this 
area. We shall then see whether a policy of 
common security is possible under Mr. 
Gorbachev. 
Ladies and gentlemen, you will appreciate 
from what I have said that I can hardly be 
expected to approve Mr. Stokes's report. It is 
therefore logical that I should recommend you 
not to give your approval to this report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Lambie. 
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Mr. LAMBIE (United Kingdom). - Unlike 
some of my colleagues from the United 
Kingdom who have already spoken, I cannot 
commend this report, and I hope that the 
Assembly will vote against it. 
I come from a part of the United Kingdom 
where conservatives are very thin on the ground. 
I cannot understand the philosophy behind this 
report, which, as has already been stated, is the 
philosophy of the cold war. I hope that we shall 
not go back to the philosophy of the cold war. 
British conservatives have never got over the 
idea of losing the British empire. I hope that we 
are not seeing an attempt in this Assembly to 
build another British empire in Western Europe 
when General Secretary Gorbachev and Pres-
ident Reagan are negotiating to reduce weapons 
in Europe. The philosophy of this report is to 
replace those weapons with European weapons. 
On Monday, I was privileged to hear the Secre-
tary-General speaking with great pride about the 
WEU fleet in the Gulf. At one time, I thought 
that he seemed to be the European admiral. We 
have enough admirals and generals travelling 
around the world and telling us about the 
build-up of munitions and weapons without 
international civil servants doing the same. I 
believe, as I have heard during previous debates 
in the last couple of days, that we have to listen 
not just to generals and politicians but to the 
man in the street. Where I come from, the man 
in the street believes that the Americans and the 
Russians are taking the first step towards peace. I 
hope that this Assembly will not take the first 
step back from peace by supporting this report 
today. 
As a new member of this Assembly, I have 
been astonished to hear people assuming that we 
are Europe. WEU is not Europe. WEU is a small 
number of countries in Western Europe. I have 
just as much in common with people in East 
Germany as I have with those in West Germany. 
Europe stretches over the whole of the European 
continent and notjust over a small group of capi-
talist countries in Western Europe. 
I hope that this report will be consigned to the 
waste paper basket, where it belongs, and that the 
Assembly will speak out in support of what the 
Americans and the Russians are doing, and that 
we shall not try to fill the vacuum in Europe by 
building up war weapons in Western Europe to 
replace those being taken away by the Americans 
and the Russians. I hope therefore that we shall 
reject the whole concept of this report which is 
the concept of cold war, something that I thought 
we had left many years ago. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Dudley Smith. 
Sir Dudley SMITH (United Kingdom). - In 
considering the threat assessment that this report 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Sir Dudley Smith (continued) 
graphically underlines in many respects, I 
believe, contrary to what was said by Mr. 
Lambie, that we face a classic dilemma in the 
East and the West. The free world believes that, 
as there are to be nuclear armaments reductions, 
that is the beginning of the end of the story, that 
from now on we shall be able to spend far less on 
defence and more on many other pressing social 
priorities - health, housing, infrastructure and so 
on - in which the free nations of the world are 
interested. But in a situation of maintaining 
nuclear weapons of the kind that strong conven-
tional forces need, that will be increasingly dif-
ficult on two scores: first, to raise the amount of 
money required to meet the targets which have 
been set by NATO for its member countries and, 
secondly, to convince the electorates of those 
countries that the money for the insurance policy 
which we have had since the end of the second 
world war, and which we have never had to 
redeem, needs to go on being paid. No one likes 
to pay insurance, but, by golly, people who do 
not do so are very foolish. 
The other side of the classic dilemma concerns 
the Soviets themselves. The Soviet Union, as an 
underdeveloped, backward country in so many 
social respects, is already well stretched because 
of its massive spending on armaments over the 
past thirty to forty years. The people who rule in 
a dictatorship decide what should be spent and 
where. In consequence, there is no question of 
consulting anybody else about the massive 
amounts that are required for armaments; it just 
happens - to the detriment of many other 
aspects of normal life. 
I believe that Mr. Gorbachev, who is the most 
significant leader of the Soviet Union since 
Stalin, although of an entirely different character, 
has recognised this. Although still basically very 
much a Soviet communist, he sees the reality 
and the need to try to restrict defence spending, 
if only because he will not otherwise be able to 
bring his country up to the sophistication of the 
free western powers. 
Allied to that are other problems that we in the 
West have to recognise. There are the natural 
fears, which are enhanced by the Soviet lead-
ership, of what happened in the second world 
war. Millions of Russians were killed and 
overrun during that time. That has added to the 
situation in which Russia finds itself as a result. 
When people are frightened, they take every pos-
sible precaution to avoid recurrence. 
The other feature - a dual one - that has been 
mentioned in several debates during this session 
is that Mr. Gorbachev, however sincere and able, 
must be vulnerable because, as in all totalitarian 
states, he could be usurped in a coup by other 
elements within that country. We hope that will 
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not happen, but it is a factor that we must con-
stantly bear in mind. There is an additional con-
sideration that I wish to put tcp the Assembly. In 
our calculations of the cost o~defence, from the 
point of view of both East an West, and in any 
analysis of the threat assess ent, we must not 
forget that until now the communist creed has 
always been expansionist. The idea behind 
Soviet communism has always been to enlarge 
its influence and capacity. I do not believe that 
leopards necessarily change their spots. I do not 
believe that that can be discounted. It must 
always be borne in mind for the future. 
We have had many criticisms in recent ses-
sions about having too many speakers from min-
isterial sources, but we should do well to ponder 
the excellent speeches of our Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers, Mr. van den Broek, Mr. 
van Eekelen, who spoke ytjsterday, and Mr. 
David Melior, Minister of State, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, from the United 
Kingdom. In their various contributions they 
underlined the difficulties and the situation that 
we now face. 
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I think that the report is a useful contribution. 
I hope that Mr. Lambie is wrong. I hope that it 
will not be cast on one side. A lot of work has 
been put into it, and it represents a significant 
contribution to the thinking and progress of 
WEU. 
I believe that we need to be more, not less, vig-
ilant as the nuclear capabilities of both the West 
and the East are reduced. Like everybody else, I 
welcome those reductions, but, by their very 
nature, they contain the danger of a 
destabilisation of NATO. It would be ironic if 
the third world war - if ever there were a third 
world war - were conventional. If a third world 
war were to break out on conventional lines, we 
should undoubtedly lose it. We have mentioned 
before, and it is a fact, that in today's circum-
stances, if a third world war were to break out on 
conventional lines, it would rapidly escalate into 
a nuclear war. The temptation is too great for the 
losing side not to resort to a nuclear capability. 
When nuclear weapons are finally eliminated, we 
must have the right balance of conventional 
forces, that will deter any possibility of hostilities 
breaking out again in the future. If we do that, we 
shall have made considerable strides towards the 
kind of Europe, both East and West, that we all 
wish to see. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Hitschler. 
Mr. HITSCHLER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, ladies 
and gentlemen, the recommendation submitted 
by the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments on threat assessment is based on a 
report which contains, on the one hand, a 
political appraisal of the Soviet Union's actual 
foreign policy and its possible intentions and, on 
the other, an accurate comparison of NATO's 
and the Warsaw Pact's military potential. 
The part of the report that deals with the com-
parison of nuclear and conventional weapons 
can be described as an excellent analysis, com-
posed extremely realistically, with an obvious 
determination to produce an objective appraisal 
that is commendable for its detail and frankness. 
We owe the Rapporteur a special debt of thanks 
for the effort he has put into this report, which 
was needed in this particular form. 
The force comparison addresses all the 
problems that hamper such an undertaking -
problems connected with sources, the uncer-
tainty of estimates, the difficulties presented by 
the use of different methods of intelligence gath-
ering, difficulties in the assessment of the quali-
tative differences in the levels of training of 
troops and of the qualitative disparities between 
weapons. 
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Unfortunately, the remarkable observations 
made here are not noticeably reflected in the rec-
ommendations submitted to us. Paragraphs (iv) 
and (v) of the preamble to the draft recommen-
dation do not reflect the information contained 
in the report on the qualitative differences in 
such armaments as tanks and anti-tank weapons. 
Nor do they record the latest developments 
inherent in the disarmament policy successes 
announced in the INF negotiations. 
The first paragraph rightly states that any 
threat assessment requires not only a com-
parison of military capabilities but also a 
political assessment of behaviour and intentions. 
While the force comparison in the report has its 
highly dynamic aspects, in that it takes account 
of the time factor and qualitative differences, no 
such impression is created by the part of the 
report containing the political assessment. An 
analysis of the threat posed by a potential 
adversary must cover far more factors than find 
expression in the part concerning the political 
assessment of objectives. It is not enough simply 
to consider a few such indicators as population 
structure, economic strength and defence 
spending and to infer the quantitative defence 
product from these. A threat analysis must be 
more comprehensive. It must proceed from the 
potential adversary's overall situation, cover his 
situation at home and take account of its 
political implications and the difficulty of 
meeting them and deal with his external respon-
sibilities on every frontier. 
The adversary's military strategy and the par-
ticular problems that would be encountered in its 
pursuit should also be considered. Account must 
be taken of any logistical problems raised by the 
economy and the degree to which industry and 
the support troops are organised. The problems 
arising from political, economic and military 
co-operation with allies within the Warsaw Pact 
deserve greater attention than this report pays 
them, and the current process of change in the 
principles of political leadership should also be 
recorded. This section of the report does not do 
justice to these issues, is not comprehensive 
enough and is not reflected in the recommen-
dation. 
A threat analysis should not be based on the 
principle of hope. It must consider the facts, as 
they stand, but it must not ignore the dynamic 
processes, more recent developments in the 
Soviet Union and the successes achieved in the 
disarmament negotiations. 
The recommendation we are asked to adopt 
here transmits political signals. A closer con-
nection should therefore become clear between 
actual Soviet policy and the trust or distrust that 
this policy causes in the western world. The 
USSR's failure to respect human rights in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere - I would not refer to 
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the Baltic states in the same breath - naturally 
influences the threat assessment. Progress in the 
application of human rights favours the climate 
in which further steps towards disarmament can 
be taken. This must find clearer expression in the 
recommendation. 
The recommendation should also be supple-
mented by the information revealed in the 
excellent force comparison: firstly, the infor-
mation that NATO's defence potential is at 
present so constituted that the mix of conven-
tional and nuclear forces is sufficient to give 
credible support to the strategy of the flexible 
response, and that further defence efforts will be 
needed if this strategic flexible response capa-
bility is no longer guaranteed; secondly, the 
information that a comparison of NATO's and 
the Warsaw Pact's capabilities cannot mean a 
simple comparison of quantities but must be 
related to the underlying strategic objective and 
the ability to achieve it. Only then is there any 
point in all the counting, measuring and esti-
mating, and only then does the military aspect of 
security policy find its political place; thirdly, the 
information that NATO's defence capability is 
currently sufficient to enable further progress to 
be made towards disarmament, and that will-
ingness to do this will be favourably influenced 
by any indication on the part of the Soviet 
Union that it is willing to guarantee fundamental 
human rights in its sphere of influence to a 
greater extent than has been discernible in the 
past. Steps towards disarmament must, of 
course, result in a better balance of forces, espe-
cially in the conventional sphere and in chemical 
weapons. 
The assessment I have tried to outline cannot 
be adequately reflected in amendments. I 
therefore regret to say that I cannot approve the 
report and the recommendation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I inform 
the Assembly that Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. 
Reddemann is withdrawn. 
I call Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - I shall be 
brie£ I should very much have liked to support 
this report. Unfortunately, one cannot place 
regard for one's colleague against the logic of 
one's assessment of the report. Although it may 
have been appropriate for socialist committee 
members to abstain when the decision was taken 
in committee, it is too harsh a report to deserve 
to be supported today, in the light of the INF 
agreement and of the impending dialogue with 
Moscow. 
There are probably several words in the report 
that make it unacceptable. In view of its timing, 
it is unfortunate in its references to the Baltic 
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states. Given the need to assure the Soviet Union 
that we are not aggressive in our approach, it is 
an unnecessary resurrection at this stage. Dia-
logue may help us to point to a different course 
in that part of Europe, but at this stage it is inap-
propriate. 
It is not wise for us to use the word " unre-
mitting " about military growth. For example, in 
1960, the Soviet Union had 210 nuclear war-
heads and the West had 1 850. In 1981, the West 
had 10 276 and the Soviet Union had 7 731. 
According to the latest figures in the report, the 
West has 11 454 and the Soviet Union 9 987. 
There has not only been unremitting growth in 
the Soviet Union, but also almost equally unre-
mitting growth among the western states. At this 
stage, that sort of adjective would not be entirely 
appropriate. 
Given the timing and context of the report, we 
should not have accepted the list six words of 
recommendation 2 (c) "by matcping words with 
further deeds". That strikes a rather aggressive 
note. 
The other reason for my opposition to the 
report is that there is still insufficient recognition 
in the West that the overwhelming superiority in 
men and equipment required to sustain suc-
cessful aggression must be enormously greater 
than that required to maintain a proper defence 
on prepared grounds. The Soviet Union does not 
have such an overwhelming superiority to guar-
antee it success, particularly if initial aggression 
had to be sustained by reinforcement and supply. 
On the present disposition of forces, the Soviets 
could not be confident that their aggression 
would succeed. Given that, and our commitment 
to security, and despite glasnost, perestroika and 
whatever words one wants to use, it is not good 
enough to strike harsh notes and1 aggressive posi-
tions when we are about to have successful dia-
logue. 
For that reason, I hope that the report will be 
defeated or blocked today. We should take that 
position in the interests of Europe. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
last speaker on the list, Dame Peggy Fenner. 
Dame Peggy FENNER (United Kingdom). - I 
am honoured to be called to speak about the 
report produced by John Stokes, even though we 
are at the tail end of the debate. This is the first 
time that I have attended a full session of WEU 
and I am privileged to have been nominated to 
join the Assembly at this time in its history, 
when its role has become so important and 
when, despite what was said by Mr. Hardy, we 
all have common objectives. I congratulate John 
Stokes on his immensely detailtd and valuable 
report. It is an assessment of tht threat, but the 
first recommendation accepts that the threat is 
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not simply the capability, but involves the Soviet 
Union's external policy and behaviour. 
We have heard from two foreign ministers this 
week and both commented on the West's sur-
prise when it discovered how much it had under-
estimated the Soviet threat. There are various 
ways of determining numbers but the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council of Ministers referred this 
week to the first admission by Mr. Gorbachev of 
the existence of research on a Soviet SDI system. 
That was not mentioned during the months of 
preliminary negotiations on an INF agreement. 
The West said that the Soviets were researching 
such a system, but there was not a sound from 
the Soviet Union. 
Mr. Mellor reported this week on the dif-
ference between the West's assessment of the 
number of Soviet missiles and the actual number 
disclosed in the INF negotiations. The confi-
dence to which Mr. Mellor referred cannot be 
established or sustained without honesty and 
good will. on both sides. British ministers have 
referred to the litmus tests of that honesty - the 
general behaviour of the Soviet Union 
throughout the world, its performance on arms 
control, its action in Afghanistan and its action 
on human rights. 
We accept that the Soviets' general behaviour 
shows good intentions and moves in the right 
direction are being made on arms control, 
though there have been only promises and good 
intentions about a limited withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. However, on human rights, which 
form part of the political threat, there has not 
been as much progress as we would wish. 
I became aware recently of the absurdity of the 
continued denial of free access across the borders 
of the Soviet Union. I was in Moscow to support 
a British agricultural exhibition and my visa was 
withdrawn because as a humble parliamentarian 
I wished to go into Moscow to talk with local 
people about human rights. 
Mr. Lambie mentioned his fear of a cold war 
of words. I know that we must be careful. He 
said that he has much in common with men and 
women in Eastern Europe. Have not we all? 
However, it would be much better if they had 
more in common with us, such as free access 
across the borders of Europe. Then we should be 
talking about good will, confidence and good 
intentions. 
Britain's Foreign Secretary has said that we 
should meet glasnost and the astonishing dia-
logue taking place between Russia and the West 
with realism, vigilance and an open mind. My 
colleague Michael Lord referred to the longing in 
the West for a successful conclusion to the arms 
reduction negotiations. I assure Peter Hardy, 
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who cast doubts on WEU's open mind, that 
mothers and grandmothers throughout the world 
long for men to live in peace. They want to live 
in a peaceful world where families can be raised 
and fed. 
Minds in WEU must be open to longed-for 
changes and I believe that they are open. 
Nothing in the report changes my view. The 
realism is pragmatic and eternal vigilance is 
essential to the defence of our democracy. 
I congratulate John Stokes on the immense 
research that made his considerable report pos-
sible. I support its conclusions. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg on a point of order. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom).-
Under Rule 31(1) (d), I beg to move that the 
report be referred back to the committee. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 31, paragraph 2, of the 
Rules of Procedure, the debate may be sus-
pended if the Assembly agrees. 
I call Mr. Stoffelen. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - I back Sir 
Geoffrey's proposal. It will not surprise anyone 
to hear that if the report were pressed my group 
would call for a roll-call vote. Looking round the 
chamber, I realise that such a vote would not be 
a true reflection of the political balance in the 
Assembly. 
In addition, it would be a good idea if the com-
mittee tried to reach the same sort of agreement 
on Mr. Stokes's report as has been reached on 
Mr. Scheer's report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - You 
support Sir Geoffrey's request for reference back 
to the committee. You were therefore the 
speaker in favour. 
Does anyone wish to speak against? ... 
What is the committee's opinion? ... 
I call Mr. Kittelmann. 
Mr. KITTELMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, ladies 
and gentlemen, both the Rapporteur and I, the 
Chairman of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments, support this proposal, and 
I should like to make a few comments on this. 
First of all, we should bear in mind that this 
report was approved in committee unanimously 
- with only four abstentions - and as no amend-
ments have been tabled, the Assembly could well 
have assumed that the report would be adopted 
today. We must consider this, because I feel that 
the Rapporteur has a right to see the hard and 
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difficult work he has done acknowledged here. I 
regard this reference to consideration in the 
political groups as well as by individual members 
as a positive indication for the future. 
I also asked to speak because I want to 
emphasise that reference back to committee also 
has its positive side. Developments in the next 
few months will undoubtedly make it useful for 
us to discuss the report once again in committee 
- with specific reference to these forthcoming 
developments. I would just ask those who have 
voiced criticisms to attend, because I feel it is 
fairer for the criticisms to be discussed in com-
mittee. 
Mr. President, I also asked for the floor 
because I should like to depart from the agenda 
and say a word of thanks. This is the last report 
that Stuart Whyte has helped to prepare in his 
capacity as secretary. He is retiring - far too 
early, to judge by his youthful looks. Perhaps 
referral of the report for further discussion is not 
the nicest way to say goodbye, but Stuart 
Whyte's spirit will live on in further debate on 
this report, and I believe we all have good reason 
to thank him sincerely for the excellent 
assistance he has given us in recent years. 
Please do not take it amiss if I also thank our 
Rapporteur once again. Despite serious personal 
difficulties he has devoted a great deal of time 
and attention to this report, and he is with us 
today. I thank him too most sincerely for his 
work. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Kittelmann. I personally wish to associate 
myself with the words of thanks you have just 
expressed to Mr. Stuart Whyte. The Assembly's 
applause bears clear witness to its appreciation of 
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all the work he has done for Western European 
Union. You have my sincerest thanks. 
I now ask for the Assembly's view on the 
request for reference back to committee. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The request for reference back to committee is 
agreed to. 
5. Date, time and orders of the day 
of the next sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next p).lblic sitting this 
afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of 
the day: 
1. Public information activities on security 
and defence matters in WEU member 
countries (Presentation of and debate on 
the report of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations and vote on 
the draft resolution, Document 1112). 
2. European armaments co-operation - reply 
to the thirty-second annual report of the 
Council (Presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aeros.,ace Questions 
and vote on the draft recommendation, 
Document 1119 and amendments). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The orders of the day of the next sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 1.15 p.m.) 
TWELFfH SITTING 
Thursday, 3rd December 1987 
SUMMARY 
1. Attendance register. 
2. Adoption of the minutes. 
3. Public information activities on security and defence 
matters in WEU member countries (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doe. 
1112). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Burger (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Rathbone, Mr. Filetti, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Katsaros 
(Observer from Greece), Mr. Burger (Rapporteur). 
4. European armaments co-operation - reply to the thirty-
second annual report of the Council (Presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Tech-
nological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft 
recommendation, Doe. 1119 and amendments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Bassinet (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Klejdzinski, Mr. Bassinet (Rapporteur). 
5. Change in the membership of a committee. 
6. Close of the session. 
The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The sitting 
is open. 
1. Attendance register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The names 
of the substitutes attending this sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be pub-
lished with the list of representatives appended 
to the minutes of proceedings 1• 
2. Adoption of the minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). In 
accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the minutes of pro.ceedings of the pre-
vious sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The minutes are agreed to. 
3. Public information activities on security and 
defence matters in WEU member countries 
(Presentation of IUid tkbate on the report of the Committee for 
Parliamentary IUid Public Relations and 11ote on 
the draft resolution, Doe. 1112) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order of the day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations on public infor-
mation activities on security and defence matters 
I. See page 43. 
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in WEU member countries and vote on the draft 
resolution, Document 1112. 
I call Mr. Burger, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, drawing the 
attention of parliament and the general public to 
the activities of WEU and to the state of western 
security and defence is one of the chief tasks of 
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations. 
As part of a special exercise started in the 
French Senate in April 1985 our committee 
organises information meetings in all the parlia-
ments ofWEU members to call their attention to 
the Assembly's work. We have been able to draw 
a number of conclusions from our most recent 
information meeting which was held this year in 
Luxembourg with members of the Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies, or more precisely 
members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and 
the Luxembourg representatives to NATO. 
Our first finding was that the specific aims of 
WEU and its reactivation are still generally 
speaking largely unknown to the public. Our 
second was that greater efforts must be made to 
educate the younger generation about security 
and defence problems. 
Since the answers supplied by member govern-
ments to questions from parliamentarians as to 
how they keep the public informed were fre-
quently rather vague, our committee decided to 
go into the problem in more detail. I was finally 
instructed to prepare a report on public infor-
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mation activities on security and defence matters 
in WEU member countries. 
To provide a basis for a comparative study, a 
questionnaire, a specimen of which is appended 
to the draft report, was sent to the foreign and 
defence ministries of the seven WEU member 
countries. You will find the results of the survey 
in Chapter IV. With regard to the preparation of 
this questionnaire and the classification of 
replies, my warm thanks go to Mr. Burchard, the 
secretary of our committee, who did a large 
amount of work with great enthusiasm. 
Just a few days ago, after this chapter had been 
written, I received late replies from two min-
isters, which confirm the report's conclusion that 
most governments are making noteworthy 
efforts to attract the attention of the younger gen-
eration and of the population as a whole. 
However, with a few exceptions the measures 
taken nationally are still far from giving suffi-
cient importance to WEU's role and activities. 
Furthermore there appears to be no 
co-ordination between member countries or 
between them and the organs of WEU. 
The other two main chapters of the report deal 
with the activities of parliaments and of the 
WEU Council. 
The Presidential Committee instructed our 
committee to study the section of the Council's 
annual report concerning information to the 
press and public. This study forms the subject of 
Chapter Ill. 
Turning to relations with the press, we can 
welcome the initiative taken by the Netherlands 
chairmanship-in-office of the Council, which for 
the first time distributed guidelines to the press 
on the meetings of a group of senior officials 
from the governments of WEU member coun-
tries on the situation in the Gulf held in The 
Hague on 20th August and 15th September 1987. 
Let us hope that this will become standard 
practice in spite of the fact that no information 
was released to the public on the outcome of 
these consultations. 
Finally, the information provided in the 
second part of the thirty-second annual report is 
not such as to arouse any hope that an active and 
constant supply of information to the public will 
become one of the chief concerns of the minis-
terial organs of our organisation. It is specially 
regrettable that in spite of increased public 
interest in all WEU's activities, the specific 
public relations post created in the Secretariat-
General in London has still not been filled. The 
present arrangement assigning these duties to a 
member of the political section can only be tem-
porary. The Council must have an efficient unit 
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exclusively concerned with implementing an 
active information policy and the co-ordination 
of action by member governments at national 
level. 
The current regulations governing our com-
mittee's powers and terms of reference do not 
allow us to present draft recommendations to the 
Council. The regulations on this point should 
perhaps be revised. 
Of course, every representative may table a 
draft recommendation provided it is signed by 
ten representatives at least, that is by ten 
members of our committee, but we preferred to 
submit an amendment which was tabled when 
Mr. van der Sanden's report on the political 
activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-
second annual report of the Council - was con-
sidered. This amendment was adopted by the 
Assembly, and I would like t<i> take this oppor-
tunity of repeating my thanks to Mr. van der 
San den. 
As far as our parliamentary activities are con-
cerned, the summary in Chapter 11 gives the 
impression that interventions based on recom-
mendations adopted by ou~ Assembly have 
fallen off somewhat due either 'to recesses of par-
liament or to the elections which have taken 
place in Italy and the United Kingdom. 
We should particularly welcome the initiative 
shown by the members of the Second Chamber 
of the Netherlands States-General as a result of 
which the Netherlands Government submitted 
to parliament a detailed memoire on the Nether-
lands chairmanship-in-office of the WEU 
Council touching on all our organisation's 
present problems which have been under dis-
cussion morning and evening during our days 
here. 
There must be pressure for more Assembly 
members to intervene in thetr national parlia-
ments on the basis of the adopted texts. This 
should be done within political groups and in the 
context of public debates and will enable us to 
attract government and public attention more 
effectively to the work we are doing in Paris in 
plenary session and in comm~ttee. 
The draft resolution attributes special impor-
tance to this parliamentary adtivity. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Burger. 
The debate is open and I c~ll Mr. Rathbone. 
' 
Mr. RA THBONE (United Kingdom). - It is 
normal in the United Kingdom Parliament, 
when making a maiden speech, to make some 
felicitous remarks about one's predecessors. 
There are so many of my predecessors here that I 
cannot enumerate them by name, but I should 
like to embrace them all by saying that they have 
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done well by WEU in their work here and in 
their representation of the United Kingdom. 
They have set a high standard in so many ways 
that I aim to emulate. 
It is also normal in the United Kingdom Par-
liament to make a short mention of one's own 
constituency. Although it seems far removed 
from this Assembly, my constituency is pertinent 
in two specifics. 
My constituency is called Lewes and it is built 
around the town of Lewes. After the battle of 
Lewes, the British Parliament was first formed. It 
is therefore appropriate to draw a parallel 
between the formation of the British Parliament 
and that of one of its children, WEU. It is a great 
pleasure to me, and I hope that it will be a great 
pleasure to my constituents, that their member 
of parliament is taking part in this Assembly. 
Within my constituency is the town of 
Newhaven, which historically has been the 
English end of the shortest route between the 
parliament of the United Kingdom and the 
WEU Assembly here. It will shortly be super-
seded in terms of speed, if not in terms of dis-
tance, by the end of the financial requirements 
and the start of work on the Channel tunnel this 
very week. I believe that there has been no 
reference to the Channel tunnel during the 
Assembly's debate so far, yet I also believe that it 
is something that we must bear in mind in our 
debates and discussions, because it bears on the 
tourist benefits and the commercial benefits 
between the United Kingdom - that island of 
Europe - and the rest of Europe. It also bears 
upon the strategic defence aspects of our consid-
erations. I hope that one of the committees of 
this Assembly will make a point of including 
thought and discussion about the Channel tunnel 
wherever and whenever its existence seems 
important to their considerations. 
WEU and the wider world are now beginning 
the difficult reassessment of defence needs for 
the future, after the historic Washington super-
power summit discussions next week. The fact 
that neither superpower is a member of WEU in 
no way diminishes the role that WEU can play to 
an ever greater degree in the future, and we must 
give our determination to contribute and support 
our ministers' efforts. 
Europe will remain strategically important as 
it has been historically. It is here where East 
meets West and where the superpowers still have 
their most dramatic interface. That is accepted 
by the United States and by the Soviets. Indeed, 
I believe that it underlies the INF agreement -
an agreement that leads to absolute reductions in 
nuclear weaponry and which I for one, and, I 
believe, all delegates here, hope will be extended 
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to embrace reductions in chemical and in 
so-called conventional weapons. 
With the acceptance of asymmetry and 
extensive and intrusive verification procedures, 
the future augurs well but we must be on our 
guard to ensure that that defensive capacity is 
not eroded, and we must be particularly wary 
here in Western European Union. 
Yesterday, my colleague, the British Minister 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
David Melior, reminded us that 80% to 90% of 
fighting forces in Europe were European and that 
70% of the navies around Europe were European. 
While a continued United States presence is 
imperative for us, as for them, European actions 
and thinking are and always will be crucial. 
You may think, Mr. President, that I have 
wavered from the point of the debate, but it is of 
no importance to the outside world whether we 
project ourselves correctly if what we are doing is 
not important to the outside world. I hope that 
by re-accenting some of the debates we have had 
so far this week I have drawn attention to the 
importance that I attach and that we all attach to 
WED's contributions. They are of growing 
importance. As you, Mr. President, pointed out, 
I believe that this is the only body explicitly 
responsible for debating security matters, histori-
cally the most important national responsibility 
of sovereign governments, and now the most 
important international responsibility of interna-
tional groupings of nations, such as WEU. 
Therefore, WEU must be the instrument for 
building greater European unity within the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
I suppose that begs the question: how is WEU 
doing and how is its influence being felt? While 
we share a commitment to the exchange of views 
- what one might term the search for truth in 
these matters and debate about what is the truth, 
which has been apparent in this session of the 
Assembly ofWEU- that may of itself deceive us 
into believing that we are doing our job well. Our 
job must be measured by the influence of what 
we do, and I believe that that is the true yardstick 
of our effectiveness. 
As a naive and new member of this distin-
guished body, I hope that fellow delegates will 
excuse my raising the possibility that we are 
doing less than well. That is the real message of 
Mr. Burger's excellent report. The report con-
tains much fundamentally important data on 
what is being done by national governments and 
on identifying gaps in what national govern-
ments are doing about publicising WEU, its role 
and activities. Too often in our national govern-
ments' explanations of security policy the role of 
WEU may be overlooked or subsumed, as the 
report frequently makes clear, most particularly 
in paragraph 108. We must keep a careful watch 
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on this, and the report suggests various avenues 
of action. The recommendations in the report 
deserve careful study. 
I should like to make two comments on the 
conclusions of the report. First, the report sees 
value in greater co-ordination among member 
countries to improve understanding of WEU. I 
should be wary of such advocacy not because it is 
not a good thing, but because co-ordination and 
an aim for concerted action can too often lead to 
delays and inaction. I would rather encourage 
each individual national initiative and count on 
strength in diversity. 
Secondly, I give my wholehearted support to 
the establishment of a professional and effective 
public affairs unit in the office of the Secretary-
General. Indeed, if shortage of funds is the inhib-
iting factor I believe that the Council and the 
Secretary-General should seek reductions in 
other activity plans and in spending, so that what 
remains to be done will have wider influence and 
proper and fuller effect. It is no good deceiving 
ourselves into thinking that what we do has full 
effect unless it is known in the wider world. The 
establishment of however good a unit will not 
have sufficient success or proper effect if it is not 
operated under a detailed and active information 
policy - proactive, not just reactive - and under 
an established strategy for what the WEU 
Council, the Secretary-General and the Assembly 
should and must do to complement and 
encourage ever better national efforts. Policy and 
strategy are as important as mechanisms. They 
may even be more so. Therefore, I al!l. ~ little 
sorry - this is my only fundamental cntiCism of 
the report - that there is no mention of the need 
for a strategy or a policy in the draft resolution. 
However, I certainly hope that the Secretary-
General and the Council will note these com-
ments. 
WEU must make its voice heard within 
Europe and across wider horizons. In today's 
world such publicity is the lifeblood of any dem-
ocratic assembly. Without proper projection of 
what we discuss and advocate, ministers and 
governments are less likely to achieve what they 
and we want them to achieve to ensure con-
tinued reductions in tension and in weaponry of 
all kinds that contribute to such tension in 
Europe and worldwide. If the report is acted 
upon, we shall certainly take a step towards that. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. 
Filetti. 
Mr. FILETTI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. Pres-
ident, ladies and gentlemen, I am a newcomer to 
Western European Union and have the honour 
to be one of the members of the Italian Dele-
gation. As is the us1:1a1 way with new.boys I have, 
on this first occasiOn, been followmg the pro-
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ceedings of the ordinary session of this Assembly 
assiduously and closely in order to learn exactly 
how our institution works and what its real func-
tions are. I am happy to express my full satis-
faction and sincere praise for the detailed and 
excellent reports that both ministers and 
members have given us on the various subjects 
on the agenda during these four days of intense 
activity and for the valuable statements 
delivered during the debates on those reports. 
However, speaking on Mr. Burger's interesting 
analysis of public information activities on 
security and defence matters in WEU member 
countries and wishing to keep within the bound-
aries ofthe subject we are considering, I am sorry 
to have to introduce a note of disappointment 
and at the same time concern on what seems to 
me to be no light matter. 
The fact that I have noted is, to my great sur-
prise, the practically complete silence, with~ut 
any justification, of the p~ess, the. news a&encies 
and the radio and televlSlon services - with the 
exception of this morning when we had the brief 
appearance of a television operator and his crew 
- about all that has been said in this chamber 
since Monday with consider11ble intensity and 
deep-felt emotion. 
To my mind, it is essential and imperative that 
the most important activities and events of 
WEU in which those concerning security and defen~e problems must surely be included, 
should be recorded and apprc)priately broadcast 
by member countries' commulnications media so 
that the public is directly and quickly informed 
and not left in shameful ignorance or informed 
too late, or else - which is worse - is allowed to 
form wrong interpretations and judgments. 
It is true that our seven countries have the 
responsibility of introducing initiatives and mea-
sures in their respective padiaments in imple-
mentation of WEU resolutions and recommen-
dations but of itself and in fact, the absence of 
adequate a~d live news of the work of our union 
in the press and on radio and television in the 
individual countries has the effect - I am sorry 
to note - of disparaging or at best reducing the 
importance of the problems tlllat are studied an~ 
discussed, and in effect detracts from the credi-
bility, validity and effectiveness of the resolu-
tions and recommendations that are adopted, 
thus discrediting and destabilising the 
organisation of which, as representatives of the 
respective parliaments, we are members. 
These negative effects - not merely feared but 
only too real- need to be firml~ avoi~ed, espe-
cially when they relate to such high~y Important 
subjects and events. These certamly mc~ude 
topics relating to security and defence, given 
that, among the provisions s~elled o~t i~ the 
modified Brussels Treaty With their highly 
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important implications and effects, Article V lays 
down a binding obligation on the member states 
to afford all the military and other aid and 
assistance in their power to any ally who should 
be the object of an armed attack and Article VIII, 
paragraph 3, gives the contracting parties an 
instrument for protecting, in concert, their 
political, military and economic interests in any 
part of the world where a situation arises that 
may constitute a threat to peace. 
What is more, information about WEU's work 
on security and defence and other major subjects 
is undoubtedly of vital importance to the basic 
interests of European citizens and therefore news 
of what we are doing must not be kept from them 
or communicated to them too late. 
I put forward these brief comments in dis-
charge of the duty that I intend to perform as a 
European parliamentarian and citizen who has 
always believed - and will continue firmly to 
believe - in a better and brighter future for 
united Europe. 
It is in that spirit that I put these thoughts 
before this eminent Assembly and particularly 
you, Mr. President, in the hope and - dare I say 
- the certainty that speedy and useful steps, mea-
sures and remedies will be introduced to correct 
the serious failing that I and, I think, all the 
members of the Assembly rightly and respon-
sibly have no alternative but to deplore. 
In the confident expectation that the necessary 
initiatives and decisions will be taken I warmly 
thank all the members and you, Mr. President, 
for your kind attention. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir 
Geoffrey Finsberg. 
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (United Kingdom). -
I commence by congratulating our two col-
leagues who have just made their first speeches 
in the Assembly. It is nice that people are inter-
ested in our work and that in their first speeches 
they offer a modest contribution in terms of phi-
losophy, which is correct in a first speech. The 
Assembly does not like a speech from a new 
member that tells us how wrong we are and tries 
to change the rules and generally cause a distur-
bance. The two speeches that we have heard this 
afternoon have been helpful and restrained. 
We have a publication in the United Kingdom 
called Punch. It is a humorous magazine and I 
found a short proposal in Mr. Burger's excellent 
document that might qualify for entry in Punch. 
It was the proposal by the European Parliament 
that its members should form the Assembly of 
Western European Union. The European Par-
liament likes to involve itself in a vast number of 
issues that many of us feel have no bearing on 
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Europe. However, they must know - if they do 
not, they should - that they are not in the 
business of defence. I hope, therefore, that this 
proposal will not be taken any further, unless 
Punch wishes to take it up. 
I want to make a couple of comments on the 
failure of the Council of WEU and its ministerial 
organs to do much about publicity. As an 
Assembly, we operate as best we can in our own 
parliaments, but we do not have the facilities to 
call press conferences and to brief journalists 
behind doors and tell them things that they 
should know before they find out things that they 
should not know. However, the Council and the 
Secretariat-General have that opportunity. I do 
not think that they have taken it, but it may well 
be our fault that we have not sat down and talked 
it through with them, asking how together we can 
get more and better publicity for WEU. I cer-
tainly propose to go and talk in London to the 
Secretary-General and to see how it may be pos-
sible - at least in the United Kingdom, where the 
headquarters of the Secretary-General are at 
present - to make an impact on United 
Kingdom public opinion. 
It will not be easy because WEU does not have 
much sex appeal. If one was able to find a senior 
member of staff running around with seven of 
the secretaries in a nude bathing orgy, you may 
be certain that that would be a headline in the 
national press ofWEU activities. It would not do 
much good for WEU, but at least we would be 
told that these were employees ofWEU. How do 
we find a better way of getting WEU into the 
press? That is what we all need to do in our own 
countries by talking with those responsible for 
the other organs of WEU. 
It is surprising to be told in paragraph 32 of the 
document about the unit for relations with the 
press and information, which was set up in 1986 
in the political division. However, as Mr. 
Burger's report says, we do not know what hap-
pened to the specially created unit outside the 
political division. Perhaps rather more dis-
turbing was the interesting report mentioned in 
paragraph 33 which was prepared by the Federal 
German Government on the activities of WEU. 
That document made it clear that the post of 
counsellor for press and public relations had not 
yet been filled, that the work was being carried 
out by the Secretary-General himself and that an 
official from another section had been made 
responsible for relations with the press. Later 
that year, three days before Christmas, the Bun-
destag had said that" the Secretary-General had 
given an assurance " - an assurance is an 
important thing - " that he would ensure that 
this post was filled as soon as possible and in the 
prescribed form ". 
Those of us who have held ministerial office 
know that there is a form of ministerial termi-
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nology that is rather like a maze - " I will do 
something soon", "I will do something at an 
early date", "sometime this year", "before the 
end of the summer " - but, when you give an 
assurance, that is something quite firm. The post 
was still vacant in October - nearly ten months 
later. Why is the post vacant? I hope that after 
the debate you, Mr. President, will receive a 
letter from the Secretary-General telling you why 
the post is still vacant or when it was filled. If 
you do not get that letter, perhaps you will write 
and ask that question. I hope that we shall have 
an answer before the Presidential Committee 
meeting in two weeks' time. I know that the 
Secretary-General's office has a telephone rather 
than a carrier pigeon and it is important that we 
get an answer. 
We are told in paragraph 35 that the Secretary-
General's office answers many requests from the 
public for information about the activities of 
WEU and that the number of requests has 
increased considerably. Mr. Burger's committee 
rightly says that that is an interesting piece of 
information, which raises a number of questions. 
Who is asking for the information? How are they 
informed? I know some of the staff in London 
and they are capable, very helpful people. I 
should like to see what information they are 
sending out. 
The entrance foyer at the Council of Europe 
contains a display of literature about the Council 
in at least five languages. There is short, basic 
information for members and for the hordes of 
members of the public who listen to the 
debates. 
I wonder what effort is made to interest the 
public in coming here. Are parties of school-
children from higher forms invited to come in 
for an hour to listen to our debates? I suggest that 
they should come not on the first or the last 
afternoon, but on the second full day when they 
would find a fairly full chamber. If we do not 
interest the young, we shall not interest older 
generations. 
We owe a debt of gratitude to Mr. Burger and 
his committee. Not only should we accept the 
report, but we should bring it up to date every six 
months so that we can continue to find out what 
is happening. The report mentions that various 
publications are circulated by the British Min-
istry of Defence, but that " in none of these pub-
lications is there any information on WEU ". It 
also mentioned that the British Foreign Sec-
retary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, made a good speech 
at the Royal Institute of International Relations 
in Brussels, but that in the distributed copies all 
parts of the speech calling for a stronger role for 
WEU were omitted. 
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I have spoken to Sir Geoffrey and to our Sec-
retary of State for Defence, Mr. George Younger. 
I said that I did not believe th~t they wanted that 
sort of thing to happen and • it is certainly not 
what we expect. I have reason to believe that 
both will ensure that in appropriate speeches in 
the future reference will be made to WEU. That 
is why I ask that we should have an updated 
report every six months until we are satisfied 
that we are getting the responses to which we are 
entitled. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I shall cer-
tainly forward the official report of our debates 
to the Secretary-General and will ask him for an 
early, favourable response to your request. 
I call Mr. Katsaros, Observer from Greece. 
Mr. KA TSAR OS (Observer from Greece). - I 
offer my sincere congratulations to the 
Rapporteur on his excellent work and also con-
gratulate the other speakers on the high quality 
of their contributions. I should like to examine 
the report in the context of the enlargement of 
WEU. As I have mentioned in previous speeches 
in the Assembly, the accomplishment of political 
and economic co-operation cannot, after the 
modified Brussels Treaty and the single 
European act, be separated from defence 
co-operation. 
The division of political, economic and 
defence problems is only an artifice for gov-
ernment and departmental p~uposes. Those dif-
ferent aspects of the same subject should be faced 
together if we want to remain in the spirit of the 
single European act. 
The Hague platform of October 1987 
declares: 
"We recall our commitment to build a 
European union in accorda~nce with the single 
European act, which we all signed as members 
of the European Community. We are con-
vinced that the construction of an integrated 
Europe will remain incomplete as long as it 
does not include security and defence. 
An important means to this end is the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty. This treaty, with its far-
reaching obligations to collective defence, 
marked one of the early steps on the road to 
European unification. " 
I should add that the European Parliament at its 
session in October adopted a resolution on the 
political and security aspects of European 
strategy. Taking all these facts into consider-
ation, it should be easily understood that WEU 
and the EEC should be considered as two institu-
tions aiming for the same final purpose. 
As regards public information activities, we 
think it appropriate to draw your attention to the 
link between EEC and WEU countries with a 
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view to finding ways of ensuring the cohesion of 
all members of the Community and improving 
public relations activities to keep the public in 
WEU and EEC countries informed about the 
purposes and activities of WEU. 
I thought it useful to bring these matters to 
your attention and to point out that co-operation 
in all areas among all the countries involved and 
successful public relations will improve the 
European idea and reactivate WEU. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. BURGER (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
We are privileged to see a number of new parlia-
mentarians in our midst and I congratulate them 
for having taken part in the debate. 
The first British speaker talked about his con-
stituency where, I understand, there is no lack of 
publicity for our organisation. He referred to the 
Channel tunnel which is a topic that is sure to be 
of concern to us in the future. He mentioned 
defence, WEU's important role and the delays in 
our activities reflected especially in the creation 
of a public relations post in the Secretariat-
General. 
Briefly, policies have to be sold; on their own 
they are not enough. The speaker also mentioned 
strategy, and a careful reading of the report will 
reveal that three main subjects are addressed. 
First, there are parliamentary activities, that is 
discussions between parliamentarians and inter-
ventions in national parliaments based on WEU 
texts. Secondly, there is the Council with which 
we have a contentious relationship on a number 
of issues of which one of the most important is 
public relations. 
The final point is that national governments 
should do more for our Assembly. When reading 
the press and other publications one sees a great 
deal about defence and security but very little 
about WEU. 
The second speaker said he was worried 
because the press, the radio, the television and 
the media generally tended to disregard us! 
Today, by chance, Le Figaro has quite a large 
article about our Assembly, but that is a rare 
event. Drawing a parallel with the European Par-
liament, the journalist points out that defence is 
not within its terms of reference, and it is a 
matter of satisfaction that that point should be 
made. The speaker expressed concern about the 
destabilisation of our organisation if we are not 
more successful in using public relations to 
secure greater recognition by the public and by 
many members of parliament. I have been a 
member of the Luxembourg Parliament for 
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twenty years and of this Assembly for only three, 
but I have noticed that most of my colleagues 
were ignorant on the subject of Western 
European Union. 
The third speaker, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, did 
not confine his remarks to the report but also 
congratulated our new colleagues. He made a 
number of suggestions and in particular drew our 
attention to the need for reports on information 
activities which would appear twice a year, or at 
least every six months. He spoke about his 
country and also the defence problem. In his 
view, many speeches are made on the subject, 
but too little is said about Western European 
Union. He also suggested that we should imitate 
the Council of Europe where each parliamen-
tarian is entitled to invite his compatriots to 
attend sittings as a means of spreading 
knowledge of the work of the Parliamentary 
Assembly. 
I wish to renew my thanks for the work done 
by our secretary in collecting and processing the 
replies we received. I should mention that a large 
number of questionnaires were received from 
young people who wished to know about the 
origin and role of WEU. 
Our colleague again raised the vital problem of 
the establishment of a public relations service. 
He also referred to the problem of Germany and 
asked whether Father Christmas was likely to see 
to it that the necessary post is filled. Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg finally mentioned Mr. Ahrens's sug-
gestion that two members of WEU including a 
substitute should be specially instructed to deal 
with this problem. 
Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges has suggested that a 
member sitting in WEU should no longer sit in 
his or her national parliament. 
Finally, as is pointed out in today's Le Figaro, 
defence is a subject within the remit of the 
Assembly ofWestern European Union and is not 
the concern of the European Parliament. 
The observer from Greece spoke of the 
Common Market, defence and the European 
Parliament. He considered that the single 
European act should be implemented in full. If I 
understood him correctly, he thought that, as 
Greece belongs to the Community, it should also 
be part of WEU. 
My thanks again to all the speakers. We did 
not have many representatives here but we did 
have quality. 
I will end with a small anecdote. In my 
country, quite close to my home, I read the fol-
lowing graffiti on a cemetery wall: " Get out of 
NATO and WEU!" I must admit to great sur-
prise not at the message conveyed but at the fact 
that its author knew of the existence not only of 
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the wall I never fail to give it a glance. 
I hope that our Council of Ministers will find 
the resources mentioned by Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg. There are certainly expenditures which 
could be saved on certain posts in the interests of 
giving us a genuine public relations service. I 
consider that to be very important. Politicians, 
political parties and members of government do 
substantial work in this place but they are 
somewhat overlooked during elections because 
of their inability to sell their product. 
I hope that the Council of Ministers will ulti-
mately give us the assistance we need to avoid 
our having one day to engage the unemployed to 
put up graffiti on walls to make our organisation 
better known. As Sir Geoffrey said, we must 
make it a point of honour not to let the reminder 
come from the Council. It is up to us to remind 
the Council of this matter every six months until 
from sheer fatigue it finally does what we 
request. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Burger. 
We shall now proceed to vote on the draft res-
olution on public information activities on 
security and defence matters in WEU member 
countries contained in Document 1112. 
Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless 
ten representatives or substitutes present in the 
chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there ten representatives requesting a vote 
by roll-call? ... 
There are not. 
We shall therefore vote by sitting 
standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting 
standing) 
The draft resolution is adopted 1• 
4. European armaments co-operation -
reply to the thirty-second annual report 
of the Council 
and 
and 
(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on 
the draft recommendation, Doe. 1119 and amendments) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
order ofthe day is the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Scientific, 
1. See page 44. 
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Technological and Aerospace Questions on 
European armaments co-operation - reply to the 
thirty-second annual report of the Council and 
vote on the draft recommeqdation, Document 
1119 and amendments. 
I call Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions. 
Mr. BASSINET (France) (Translation). -Mr. 
President, ladies and gentlemen, the report 
which I am presenting on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions is concerned with European 
armaments co-operation. 
The reply to the Council is rather a ritual 
exercise forming part of the effort to conduct a 
dialogue between the Council and our Assembly. 
It might therefore be asked why there should be 
another report on European armaments 
co-operation when this is in fact a familiar, 
accepted and rarely disputed issue. 
In our committee's view, there were a number 
of reasons. In the first place, although such 
co-operation is rarely disputecl:l in so many words 
and is often the subject of approval and encour-
agement, what has been achieved in real prac-
tical terms is still very disappointing. Again, the 
WEU Council speaks constantly of the 
important role that our organisation can play in 
the process of armaments co-operation and in 
lending the process political drive, but in 
practice, when we look at the concrete results, we 
see that the actual substance is very slight. 
Finally, our committee considers that the 
Assembly should give expression to its con-
tinuing keen interest in this issue. We will 
therefore urge the Council to persevere in its 
endeavours to achieve the ultimate goal. 
The report makes no direct allusion to the 
problems posed by armaments co-operation as 
the European defence industry study group has 
already produced a very detailed, expert analysis. 
This report, which was prepared at the request of 
the IEPG, seemed very useful, and, as it was 
written in December 1986, we decided not to go 
over the points made but ins11ead to make ample 
reference to the report. 
We also thought it pointless to rehearse once 
more the reasons why Europe should rationalise 
its defence efforts by closer co-operation in arms 
procurement and design. We considered simply 
that reference could usefully be made to a recent 
study by the American Academy of Sciences 
which put the wastage due to duplication of the 
same work in our various European countries at 
an annual $35 billion. This figure, considered in 
conjunction with our current difficult economic 
situation, seems to us sufficiently eloquent in 
itself not to require development. 
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Our committee has paid not critical but close 
attention to the succession of statements which 
have emerged from each meeting of the Council 
of Ministers since the Rome meeting of 1984. 
This is reflected in the written report so I shall 
not analyse these statements now. However, if 
we compare and bring together the statements 
made in Rome in 1984, Bonn in 1985, Venice in 
1987 and others which I could mention, we see 
that fine words have been formulated on each 
occasion but that year after year real, practical 
progress has been insignificant, not to say zero. 
Our committee is unanimous in regretting this 
aJ?.d I believe that our Assembly takes the same 
VleW. 
The written report also records the comments 
of various political leaders: Mr. Jacques Chirac, 
Prime Minister of France, speaking on this 
platform, Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for 
Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom, 
Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy, and 
Mr. Fischbach, the Luxembourg Defence Min-
ister. Here again the statements express the same 
view, but the fact remains that, as with the 
Council, there is talk of the political thrust to be 
imparted and ofWEU as the forum in which this 
could be done, but nothing concrete actually 
happens! 
Our countries all belong to the IEPG but if the 
political drive, the reactivation and the activities 
of both are observed over a long period we have 
the impression of the liquid levels in a U-jar; 
when the IEPG has been a little more active 
intentions declared in WEU have been a little 
less so, and vice versa. We hope this time is now 
at an end. 
At the June 1987 session, Mr. Fischbach said 
that it was now up to WEU to give political 
thrust to armaments co-operation within the 
IEPG, and this thought is corroborated by the 
position of the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group. I do not wish to use this 
platform to pass too final a judgment on the 
position of the IEPG. This is not the right place, 
nor is it our purpose or function, although this 
question must be in all our minds. 
My colleagues on the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions have 
asked me to convey, without dilution, the words 
I used in committee, together with our dissatis-
faction when we observe that these declarations 
and fine phrases are not followed by concrete 
progress. 
Our committee has put forward two sugges-
tions to improve concerted action by the 
Council, the WEU Assembly and the IEPG. The 
first is that the IEPG chairman should once a 
year address our Assembly or one of the com-
petent committees, that is the Committee on Sci-
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entific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 
or the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, to present a report on the progress 
of armaments co-operation in the IEPG. 
The fact that the chairman may be a minister 
of a country which is not a member of WEU 
does not seem to us an adequate reason for 
rejecting this suggestion. On the contrary it 
seems to be an additional reason for its 
acceptance. If this proposal were unanimously 
accepted, it could be taken up and given urgent 
support by the Council of Ministers. The IEPG 
might then prove highly receptive to an invi-
tation which could only improve relations on 
both sides. 
The second proposal is much more complex 
and ambitious, but one day - and the sooner the 
better - the WEU member countries will truly 
have to take the initiative in implementing a 
plan of action for the establishment of a 
European market for defence equipment of the 
kind indicated in the EDIS report to which I 
referred at the start. 
WEU is in fact the organisation best placed to 
give political impetus to this suggestion. The 
WEU countries all belong to the IEPG, which 
has more members and seems more likely to be 
able to act efficiently, though it is also true that 
mere will to act is not enough by itself. Resources 
are also required. 
Our report also refers to the very prolonged 
gestation period of the agencies and to the defi-
nition of their role. Between the declarations of 
Rome and The Hague nearly four years were 
needed to define the future role of the Standing 
Armaments Committee before it was discovered 
that this committee no longer met and that some 
of its tasks had now been assigned to Agency Ill. 
If we have been correctly informed, as the infor-
mation was conveyed to us only by word of 
mouth when writing the report, it seems that 
substantial progress has now been made in this 
area. 
The concept of a single agency was put forward 
at the meeting in The Hague. We dare express 
the hope that it will not take four years to set this 
up and that its functions, objectives and ultimate 
goals will be properly defined. We also hope that 
the research and working tools which the 
Council possesses in these agencies or in this 
single agency will really be operating in the near 
future. 
Those are the comments I wished to make on 
behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions, none of whose 
members opposed this report, there being just 
one abstention. 
I may have adopted a somewhat more critical 
tone than is customary on this platform but I had 
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to state loud and clear the feelings of all the com-
mittee members, which I am sure will be shared 
by this Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, 
Mr. Bassinet. 
The debate is open and I call Mr. Klejdzinski, 
the only member who wishes to speak. 
Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, ladies 
and gentlemen, Mr. Bassinet has presented us 
with a draft recommendation on European 
armaments co-operation which is simultaneously 
intended as a reply to the Council's thirty-second 
annual report. I consider that Mr. Bassinet's 
report deserves our thanks. It is no simple matter 
to present a comprehensive report on this 
subject. The discontent felt on this subject is 
expressed by the author in his wording of para-
graph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommen-
dation: the Assembly... dissatisfied that the 
Council, notwithstanding the primordial role of 
the WEU countries in the IEPG since 1984 - I 
repeat, since 1984 - has failed to date to provide 
proof of a decisive political impetus towards 
co-operation in the armaments field. I can only 
endorse the author's remarks. This statement is 
made by the author on the basis that (a) the geo-
graphical, (b) the military situation in Europe, 
and (c) the capacities of the European armaments 
industries should really be an ideal subject for 
joint planning, development and production. 
The economic advantages which would flow 
from such co-operation are an additional 
bonus. 
The difficulties in the path of co-operation are 
indirectly demonstrated by the fact that the final 
communique following the ministerial meeting 
of the Independent European Programme Group 
in Seville expressed a minimum consensus con-
cerning no more than an action programme for 
the phased creation of a European market for 
defence systems. 
Mr. Bassinet has sensibly refrained from enu-
merating the problems of co-operation and refers 
us to a study of December 1986 on the European 
defence industry, which is no doubt intended to 
help. 
At the same time one is impressed by the 
figure of $35 billion a year mentioned in para-
graph 7 of the report and repeated today, which 
represents additional European expenditure 
arising from the duplication of research, devel-
opment and manufacture. I assume that the real 
sum is actually higher, if we consider the total 
price of a weapons system, including the expense 
of the necessary ancillary equipment and the 
associated autonomous logistical systems. 
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I would like to quote examples which illustrate 
our current dilemma. They represent the real sit-
uation in Europe, regardless of expressions of 
good intentions and the numerous decisions 
taken on the subject at various levels. All 
members of WEU are conscious that anti-tank 
weapons are of central importance to defence 
strategy in Central Europe. A helicopter capable 
of opposing tanks at any hour of the day or night 
and under all weather conditions is an urgent 
necessity, and the need for a helicopter to this 
specification is undisputed. · 
But what is the position in reality? So far only 
France and the Federal Republic of Germany 
have managed to commit themselves to joint 
development planning. Only in the weapons 
sector, and I refer here to the Trigat anti-tank 
missile, are joint deliberations also being con-
ducted with the United Kingdom. Although this 
involves just one anti-tank missile, additional 
development costs are generated by the need for 
adaptation to suit the different weapons plat-
forms, including the integrated firing systems. 
There is not even any broad European 
co-operation in night 'fision technology, 
although the experts know that Europe has 
ground to make up in this exclusively high-tech 
area. 
Another sad chapter is the collaboration on the 
European fighter aircraft for the nineties. The 
non-participation of our Ftrench friends, with 
their highly capable aircraft industry, is sympto-
matic of the dilemma of armaments 
co-operation. The European aircraft industry has 
proved its ability to build high-performance air-
craft with the Tornado, but what lessons have 
been learnt from the exercise? It is my personal 
hope that there will be a growing comprehension, 
which will ultimately cause more European 
countries to take part in the European fighter air-
craft programme. 
Our shortcomings in radar technology, partic-
ularly as regards look up, look down, shoot down 
capacity, are already familiar. 
We Europeans are pursuing two costly lines of 
development towards the · desirable modern 
radar systems. These are (a) the Ferranti-led con-
sortium aiming at an entirely new development 
and (b) the consortium of AEG and Hughes 
United States, which is developing a special 
version of the Hughes AP~65 radar system. I 
could mention other examples which would 
further illustrate the fragmented state of our 
co-operation on armaments.' 
Quite apart from the development and pro-
duction costs incurred, and in terms merely of 
the follow-on costs arising from logistical 
arrangements and different cross-servicing facil-
ities, the pursuit of two opposing lines of fighter 
aircraft development is in itself a cost factor 
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which cannot even be accurately quantified, but 
certainly warrants the description of an 
expensive luxury. 
Mr. Stokes's report, which we considered this 
morning, makes it clear that, of twenty selected 
technologies, we enjoy equality with the Soviet 
Union only in six. Mr. Stokes rightly points out 
that the selected technologies could substantially 
alter military potential in the next ten to twenty 
years. Where are the joint efforts by WEU coun-
tries (a) to attain the standards of the United 
States and (b) to extend and safeguard our 
western lead in conjunction with the United 
States? 
Eureka is a small step in the right direction, 
but Eureka alone is insufficient. 
My remarks apply equally to European 
co-operation in the military use of computers in 
defence technology. Mr. Fourre has presented a 
report on this. If only we were able to undertake 
jointly the work on planning, production, com-
patibility and financing of all the information 
systems for the various armed forces, we would 
end up by saving millions - or I would say bil-
lions - but here again everybody is ploughing his 
own furrow. 
Apart from the real situation referred to, the 
burden of all my remarks is to emphasise how 
important it is that the members of the Council 
should agree on the common operational 
requirements in relation to all major weapons 
systems, as well as on joint planning and devel-
opment projects which can and should leave 
room for specific interpretations consistent with 
national requirements. 
I will conclude by repeating my thanks to Mr. 
Bassinet for his report, which, I recognise, deals 
with a difficult area. Notwithstanding a few 
critical remarks on my part, his report warrants 
our approval. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate 
is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Bassinet. 
Mr. BASSINET (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I should like to thank Mr. Klejdzinski 
for his kind words about the report and for sub-
stantiating by his comments the points which I 
myself tried to bring out. He emphasised the 
clear advantages arising not merely from joint 
manufacture but also from joint weapons devel-
opment. What he said perfectly illustrates these 
advantages. 
Mr. Klejdzinski referred to one point in my 
written report which I did not mention in my 
presentation: the results of the Seville meeting 
which we considered to be insufficient and which 
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are so described in the document. He made par-
ticular mention of the brilliant achievement of 
the European aircraft industry, the Tornado, and 
the possible worries as to its future. He also 
referred to Mr. Fourre's report on a similar 
subject - co-operation in data-processing tech-
nology. 
I share his conclusion; the Council must press 
for armaments co-operation, not simply talk 
about it. 
Although I did not do so in the written report, 
I cannot overstress the significance of the suc-
cessful Nunn amendment adopted when the 
national defence authorisation act was under dis-
cussion in the United States Congress. In a way 
this success is a challenge to each of the member 
countries of our Assembly because, whatever the 
generous intentions behind this effort at collabo-
ration with the alliance countries, we see the 
filling of a vacuum which we ourselves have left, 
and we are well aware that vacuums have a brief 
existence! 
That is what I wished to say, Mr. President. I 
repeat my thanks to the speaker for his com-
ments, and I hope that the Assembly has found 
some interest in our report. 
To save time, Mr. President, may I at once 
speak to the two amendments? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I have 
indeed been notified of two amendments tabled 
by Mr. Bassinet and Mr. Fourre. 
Amendment 1 reads: 
1. After paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
" Welcoming the organisation in 1988 of a first 
European defence study session to advance 
knowledge of the European dimensions of 
security matters; " 
Amendment 2 reads: 
2. At the end of the draft recommendation 
proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
" Instruct the Secretariat-General to ensure 
periodical meetings of European defence study 
sessions and to co-ordinate national initiatives 
in this connection with a view to setting up a 
European defence research institute as soon as 
possible." 
I call Mr. Bassinet. 
Mr. BASSINET (France) (Translation). -
These amendments are designed to make good 
an oversight of mine for which I apologise. I 
have already mentioned to the Assembly the 
advantages of setting up a European defence 
research institute. I did not refer to this in the 
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report, and it was consequently not included in 
the draft recommendation. 
We can take satisfaction in the organisation of 
the first European defence study session which 
will, we hope, add to the European dimension of 
security questions. I also hope that it will further 
concentrate all our minds on the need for 
increased armaments co-operation. It is these 
considerations which prompted these two 
amendments. I therefore request that the 
Assembly include them in the draft recommen-
dation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does 
anyone wish to speak against Amendment 1 ? ... 
I now put Amendment 1 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 1 is agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak against 
Amendment 2? ... 
I now put Amendment 2 to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 2 is agreed to. 
We shall now proceed to vote on the draft rec-
ommendation in Document 1119, as amended. 
Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the 
Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless 
five representatives or substitutes present in the 
chamber request a vote by roll-call. 
Are there five members requesting a vote by 
roll-call? ... 
There are not. 
We shall therefore vote by sitting and 
standing. 
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(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft recommendation is adopted 1• 
5. Change in the membership of a committee 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I have to 
inform the Assembly that I have been notified by 
the French Delegation of the candidature of Mrs. 
Trautmann as an alternate member of the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
In accordance with Rule 38, paragraph 6, of 
the Rules of Procedure, this change must be 
ratified by the Assembly. 
Is there any opposition? ... 
This change is agreed to. 
6. Close of the session 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
gentlemen, we have now reached the end of the 
session. 
Before announcing the close of the session I 
wish to thank Assembly members for their atten-
dance and the quality of their speeches, the 
Council members who have attended, the Secre-
tariat-General, the ministers who have addressed 
us, the press representatives who have followed 
and reported on our work and all the permanent 
and temporary staff including especially our 
friends the interpreters who, as usual, have per-
formed with great skill a task bristling with diffi-
culties. 
We shall meet again in 1988 and I now declare 
closed the thirty-third ordinary session of the 
Assembly of Western European Union. 
The sitting is closed. 
(The sitting was closed at 4.20 p.m.) 
l. See page 45. 
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